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This thesis examines how the Labour Party used the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 
how the Soviet Union affected the development of the political thought and actions of 
the Labour Party. The emergence and continued presence of the USSR after 1917 
offered a "working model" of socialism to socialists in the Labour Party. Yet while 
this appeared to have similar aims to some of the strands of socialist thought within 
the party, many Labourites felt uneasy at the fact that this aggressive form of 
socialism had such support within the party. Throughout the 1930s there was a clash 
between Labour's different socialist traditions. This was made more acute by the 
actions of the Soviet Union and the Comintern, and this struggle helped to define the 
Labour Party. 
The thesis begins by placing the USSR in the context of other socialist influences 
within the British labour movement. It then reflects upon how Labour dealt with the 
USSR when it was in Government, and it explores how Labourites who visited the 
country during the period gathered information about the Soviet Union. 
The thesis then concentrates on the role of the Soviet Union as a definer of the Labour 
Party in its foreign policy, its internal party politics and its economic thought. At the 
time, other external forces, namely an unstable capitalist system and the rise of 
fascism in Europe, were forging a highly turbulent decade. The USSR appeared to 
offer a way of coping with the desperate problems of the 1930s, as it was used to offer 
hope against economic depression and the far-right in Britain and Europe. 
The thesis finds that the Soviet Union played a more significant role - both negatively 
and positively - in the development of the Labour Party than is generally thought. 
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There are certain areas of the Labour Party's history that have been studied in great 
depth. There are numerous biographies of party leaders and important figures in the 
labour movement. And the latest area that historians have focused on is, naturally, the 
party's recent centenary. Labour has once again come under the microscope of history 
as answers are sought to questions about its successes and failures when it was in and 
out of power and about what type of party Labour is. Yet one area that still has not 
received the attention it deserves is Labour's relationship with the Soviet Union in the 
1930s, despite the fact that this is an era that offers answers to all of the above 
questions. 
In this decade, Labour was in power (albeit for a very short period), it had some minor 
successes, some major failures, it had interaction with a number of countries, 
especially the USSR, and faced some challenges to its understanding of what 
socialism was. The 1930s were a time when Labour needed to define and redefine its 
character and beliefs, in order to become a party that could again win elections. And 
this means that understanding this decade and how Labour responded to the 
challenges posed by the "working model" of socialism that was the USSR, is 
absolutely crucial to understanding how Labour became the party it was not only in 
the 1940s, but also in the post-Attlee years as well. 
When looking for the key moments in Labour's history, there are the obvious choices 
of when it was formed, when it led its first government, when it led its most 
successful administration (though that may be open to debate) and when it began to 
move away from its traditional ideals and principles (again debatable). But if the 
purpose is to establish defining moments, when the party stood at a crossroads and 
had to make difficult choices about the type of party it was and was to be, then this is 
harder as there are fewer moments to choose from. However, the 1930s were 
definitely one of these moments, when the party's relationship with the USSR defined 
the party's understanding of its own political thought. 
There is a common maxim that states that Marx has not been especially important to 
the Labour Party. One historian who has ventured onto the ground that covers the 
Labour Party and the USSR states that it is 'wishful thinking to claim ... that Marx, not 
Keynes, became the dominant intellectual power in the mainstream of the Labour 
movement in the 1930s. " While Andrew Williams' debunking of the idea that Marx 
was a powerful inlellectual presence is largely correct, this statement, and the overall 
clich6, is in much need of a rethink. While it is not argued in this thesis that Labour 
followed the path of Soviet socialism, one of the underlying themes is that the USSR 
played a major role in defining the Labour Party. To be clear, while Marx was not a 
major influence on Labour minds, the Soviet Union, which claimed the Marxist 
mantle, was. 
In the main areas of Labour's interests - foreign, internal party politics and economic 
- the USSR played a defining role as Labour looked to the Soviet model of socialism 
in order to construct its own ideas. However, the Soviet Union failed in its role as 
"teacher", as, on the whole Labour shaped what type of party it was by re jecling 
Soviet-style socialism. Labour's most positive response to Eastern ideas was in the 
field of economics. Even then, Labour's theorists who embraced the concepts behind 
the Five Year Plan could not foresee the wholesale introduction of Soviet planning in 
Britain. But the presence of these ideas meant that Labour embraced the ideas of 
planning and state intervention as a basis for the economic structure for Britain. 
The party's historic mission in this period was to challenge capitalism - either to 
succeed and work for the whole population by allowing piecemeal social reforrn 
1 A. Williams, 'The Labour Party's Attitude to the Soviet Union, 1927-35: An Overview with Specific 
Reference to Unemployment and Peace', Journal of Contemporary History, 22, (1987), pp. 80-81 
(which was advocated by the "gradualists" in the party), or to crumble in the face of 
the might of a united, socialist working-class. This challenge was met in the 1940s by 
a government willing to fuse the two ideologies together by pursuing a regulated 
capitalism that incorporated some national i sation. This could not have been achieved 
had Labour not already established what type of intervention it would pursue when it 
was next in power. 
It was in this way that the USSR helped to forrn Labour's boundaries concerning the 
type of party it was to be, and therefore this is a period that needs to be studied in 
more depth. Labourites used Soviet socialism in different ways in the turbulent 1930s 
when the party had to come to terms with a crushing electoral defeat, the Great 
Depression and the rise of fascism. Faced with these monumental problems, Labour 
used the USSR in a number of different ways. Some in the party saw the Soviet Union 
as a partner in the fight against the fascist threat, some saw it as a meddlesome 
revolutionary entity that threatened Labour's traditional support base and ideals, while 
others saw it as a beacon of hope, promising to deliver socialism to the world. 
Each of these interpretations of what the USSR was helped Labour to define its own 
political thought. There was a sense of urgency in this as capitalism appeared to be on 
the verge of collapse and other political models were ready to replace it. Labour 
needed to be clear in its own mind as to what it was and what it was not. The presence 
of Soviet socialism added to the many other socialist traditions that grew up with, and 
out of, the Labour Party. However, it is difficult to argue that Labour was a socialist 
party. That is not to say that socialist ideas and actions have not played a part in the 
way the party thought and acted. There can be little doubt that Labour has been 
influenced by the various strands of socialism in the party's history. These have acted 
as a driving force for members, leaders and opinion formers alike. 
3 
But, whenever Labour has formed a government, it has failed to fundamentally alter 
the basis of capitalism. Attlee's Government perhaps came closest to this, but the 
fundamentals of capitalism remained largely intact. It is therefore easier to place 
Labour within the specifically social democratic / progressive bracket, even though 
many members laid claim to the socialist traditions of Britain. Labour was then, a 
progressive party with socialists in it, who were united by a common belief in 
socialism, even though what that socialism was was not always agreed on, or acted 
upon. 
It was this shared belief in socialism though, that made many in the Labour Party turn 
to the USSR in the 1930s. The Soviet Union appeared to have answers to all of the 
questions raised in this decade, and seemed to offer a way out of the desperation that 
accompanied the 1930s, thus demonstrating that ideas and context were intertwined in 
this decade. Had the 1930s not been so traumatic, the USSR may well have been only 
a passing interest to even the most passionate Kremlin supporters. Labour's political 
predicament was also an important factor. The fact that Labour was out of power gave 
the party time to explore new and different ideas and models of socialism and social 
democracy, such as the USSR, the New Deal in America and Sweden. 
There must have been a tacit acceptance amongst the more realistic Labourites that 
the party would not win an election for some time, given the fact that in 1931 only 46 
Labour MPs returned to Parliament. Therefore, Labourites knew that they had time on 
their side in which to restructure the party. This truly was a defining decade for the 
Labour Party. Given the importance of this decade, and also the positive and negative 
influences that the Soviet Union had on Labour, it is surprising that there are so few 
studies concerned with either Labour and the USSR, Labour and the 1930s, or both. 
It is therefore time to reflect on the impact the Soviet Union had on the Labour Party 
in this decade as a whole, to add to histories that have been written on these subjects. 
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It is only possible to suggest why this subject has not been studied in more depth in 
these years. The collapse of the Soviet Union has seen the CPSU archives open in 
Russia, leading many historians, naturally, to choose to explore the internal history of 
the country, looking at Lenin's leadership, Stalin's Russia and Gorbachev's 
perestroika. In the international sphere, it is the Soviet Union's actions during the 
Cold War that provokes most interest. Labour historians, it has already been noted, 
tended to prepare for the party's centenary in 2000. 
This reflects the fact that the main studies that have been made into this subject were 
all written before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stephen Richards Graubard was 
the first to explore the Labour Party's reaction to the Russian Revolution. His work, 
British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917-1924 2 is a helpful starting point as it 
concentrates on the seven years between the revolution and the first Labour 
Government. The main areas of interest for Graubard, apart from the revolutionary 
period, were the intervention in the Civil War, the Internationals and also the visits 
made by Labour delegations. An underlying theme of the book is Labour's acceptance 
that the Russians should be allowed to forge their own destiny without outside 
interference, while it also looks at the importance that Labour placed upon trade with 
the Russians. 
The next key text came from Bill Jones. The Russia complex 3 offers a comprehensive 
overview of the development of the Labour-USSR relationship from the end of Tsarist 
rule in 1917 to the post-Berlin blockade period, although the book's conclusion does 
venture a little further into the Cold War era. The first two chapters of Jones' book 
cover the period that concerns this thesis, and it asks a number of questions based 
around one of his major themes - 'the part played by Labour perceptions of Soviet 
2 S. R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917-1924, London, 1956 
-1 B. Jones, The Russia complex. The British Labour Party and theSoviet Union, Manchester, 1977 
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Russia in the development and post-war decline of the idea of a distinctive 'socialist 
foreign PoliCy,,. 4 
One of the questions he asks, which is also addressed in this thesis, is '[w]hy did so 
many British socialists, often brilliant men and women, ignore all the evidence to the 
contrary and insist upon seeing Stalin's Russia as a Utopia to be visited, marvelled at 
and defended against its detractors? 5 Jones suggests that it was a mixture of their age 
and the fact that the Webbs believed that the USSR had embarked upon a Fabian 
journey that constructed socialism from the top down. To these answers, for others as 
well as for the Webbs, must be added context, as Labourites' thoughts on the USSR 
cannot be seen without taking into account the problems of the 1930s. 
In The Russia complex, Jones claims that British socialists, sixty years after the 
revolution, 'possibly sees a ... bleak, highly centralised bureaucratic machine; certainly 
he sees a State with the unpleasant, not to say unsocialist habit of suppressing 
dissident views. 16 He continues to say that this was not always the case, and rightly 
notes that '-during the 'thirties a typical member of the Labour Party might have 
described Soviet Russia in glowing terms, as a hugely successful experiment in 
planned economics and advanced approaches to social, political and legal 
questions... ' 7 His point that 'most socialists still view the USSR through the harshly 
uncomplimentary lens of the Cold War period, ' 8 highlights the fact that events that 
occur when the reader reads history will, in some way, influence what conclusions are 
reached. 
Jones' other main point in the book is that, for thirty years or so, Labour 'had a "love 
affair" with the Soviet Union ... 
[which was] an integral part of the history of the 
lbid, p. vii 
lbid 





party' , and although this statement 
is completely ruled out by Andrew Williams, 
author of the latest works on Labour's attitude to the USSR, Jones makes a valuable 
contribution to the limited scholarship on this subject. 
The final studies in Labour-Soviet relations come from Andrew Williams. His article 
concerning Labour's unemployment and peace policies and the USSR between 1927- 
1935 laid the basis for his wider examination of the party's attitude to the Soviet 
Union between 1924-193410. This is a very specific exploration of history that 
concentrates on the two aforementioned topics, whilst broadening the study to 
incorporate the first Labour Government and the period when the Conservative 
Government ended diplomatic relations with the USSR. It also adds to the limited 
historiography on the visits made by Labourites to the USSR. ' 1 
Williams examines many issues in the book, not least the question of the USSR being 
an 'exemplar' for the Labour Party. This is a very important feature of any study of 
these two 'socialist' entities. The USSR was seen, at times, as a teacher, and the 
Labour Party has always found the time to review other models of socialism and 
social democracy, from the USSR in the 1930s to the American Democrats in the 
1990s. The point is to understand how far these other models of political thought 
influenced and defined the party's own theories. 
Labour's Altitude also focuses quite heavily on how the USSR fon-ned an integral part 
of Labour's policies after the fall of the MacDonald Government. It is especially 
interested in the start of the economic debates concerning the Five Year Plan the 
Soviet Union as an element of Labour's foreign policy as it sought to include it in the 
9 [bid 
10 A. Williams, Labour and Russia: The attitude (? f the Labour Party to the US, 5R, 1924-1934, 
Manchester, 1989 
'' The main texts on this subject, which are mentioned later, are D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers, New 
York, USA, 1973, S. Margulies, The Pilgrimages to Russia; The Soviet Union and the Treatment of 
Foreigners, 1924-1937, Madison, USA, 1968 and S. White, 'British Labour in Soviet Russia', English 
Historical Review, 109, (1994) 
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League of Nations, which the USSR joined in 1934. Williams also identifies that there 
was a 'new' and 'old' left, and a new centre-right in the party after 193 1, and he 
highlights how these differed in their approach to the Kremlin. This is a very 
informative book which uses many primary sources that help to construct a detailed 
account of the relationship between the Labour Party's leadership and the Soviet 
Union in an important period of Labour's history. 
There are some omissions from the existing literature dealing specifically with the 
Labour Party and the Soviet Union. For example, Jones' Russia complex offers little 
on Labour's two governments and it does not place enough emphasis on the important 
issue of the Five Year Plan and the economic thought of the Labour Party. In 
Williams' detailed study, more emphasis perhaps could have been given to the 
ideological aspects to this area, as both parties were tied to socialism. Labour's 
Attitude focuses to some extent on the ILP, but the interest in this group ends too 
early, and neglects to look at the relationship between the ILP and CPGB which 
caused the leadership so many problems. 
There are of course other works that cover Britain and the USSR, but the focus is not 
specifically Labour-Soviet relations. Some look at Western intervention in the 
Russian Civil War and this period in general, 12 while others offer a broader 
overview. 13 Andrew Thorpe has recently bridged the gap between the histories of 
Labour and the USSR and the British left and the USSR, with his article 'Stalinism 
and British Politics' 14 , and his recent book, The British Communist Party and 
Moscow, 1920-1943.15 
" See R. Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War November 1918-December 1920, Princeton, USA, 
1968 and J. Silverlight, The Victor's Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, London, 
1 920 
See G. Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce: Anglo-Sovief Relations /924-1977, Cambridge, 1977 and 
his edited bookSoviet Foreign Policy 1917-199: A Retrospective, London, 1994, and S. White, Britain 
and the Bolshevik Revolution, London, 1979 
14 A. Thorpe, 'Stalinism and British Politics', History, 83, (1998) 
15 A. Thorpe, The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-43, Manchester, 2000 
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'Stalinism and British Politics' compares the different approaches taken by Labour 
and the Communist Party of Great Britain to Stalinism, which Thorpe traces back to 
Labour's move away from federalism in 1918. The 
fissure between parliamentary and revolutionary Socialism, already 
apparent in Britain before the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917, was strongly reinforced by events in Russia and especially 
the formation of the Communist International, of which the CPGB 
was a more or less loyal section. 16 
The fact that Labour continued to house communist revolutionaries, rather than see 
them follow their own paths as they did in Europe (where Communists in countries 
such as France and Germany broke from the Social Democratic parties) was a very 
important factor in the way the Labour Party was able to define its own ideas in the 
1930s, as there were constant calls from inside the party for the CPGB to be allowed 
to affiliate to Labour, or for a softer line to be taken where the USSR was concerned. 
The British Communist Party and Moscow uses sources from the newly opened 
archives in Moscow, and challenges some of the established ideas that the CPGB was 
the Kremlin's unthinking slave. It does not argue that the CPGB was independent, 
claiming that 'there is ... material here to hearten those who wish to see the 
hidden 
hand of Moscow in most of the CPGB's activities', 17 but instead it portrays an image 
of conflict and disharmony not normally associated with Western visions of 
"monolithic" communist politics. The overall thesis therefore adds to what is termed 
'revisionist' history of the USSR, as it breaks free from the Totalitarian argument that 
assumes complete control from Moscow in all spheres of life. The time period of the 
book also adds to the comparatively few works on the British labour movement and 
the 1930s. 
16 Thorpe, 'Stalinism and British Politics', p. 609 " Thorpe, British Communist Party, Moscow, p. 277 
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The main works here are Ben Pimlott's Labour and the Lqft in the 1930s and John F. 
Naylor's Labour's International Policy. 18 Pimlott's study concentrates on the strengths 
and weaknesses of the left in the Labour Party in this decade, and also the challenges it 
made to the Labour leadership through bodies such as the Socialist League and the 
coalitions of the United and Popular Fronts. Naylor's book traces the roots of Labour's 
foreign policy, but naturally focuses largely on how the party responded to the threat 
of fascism. Neither book, however, lends much space to the USSR, which is surprising 
given the important role the Soviet Union played in the main areas of Labour interest. 
A new book on Labour in the 1930s that also suffers from this omission is John 
Swift's Labour in Crisis. '9 There are passing references to the Soviet Union, 
especially concerning planning, but this work examines Clement Attlee's role in 
Labour's recovery after 1931. After tracing Attlee's journey from his middle-class 
background to leader of the labour movement, it challenges the idea that Attlee was an 
unambitious leader, arguing that he 'provided more effective leadership than is usually 
accepted' '20 as Labour in Crisis explores this period of the party's 
history from quite a 
personal perspective. 
This thesis is a study of a specific time with the specific aim to demonstrate how the 
USSR's presence influenced Labour's political thought, and it is therefore worth 
noting some of the literature that also covers some of the wider themes explored here, 
such as Labour's ideas, political thought and purpose. Recent research into Labour's 
one hundred years, such as the collection of essays in Labour's First Century, 21 edited 
by Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane and Nick Tiratsoo, have tried to emphasise the 
" B. Pimlott, Labour and the Lqft in the /930s, Cambridge, 1977 and J. F. Naylor, Labour's 
International Policy, The Labour Party in thel930s, London 1969. Among other works that cover this 
period, see K. Morgan, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British Communist 
Polilics 1935-1941, Manchester, 1989 and J. Jupp, The Radical Left in Britain, 1931-1941, London, 
1982 
19 J. Swift, Labour in Crisis. Clement Attlee and the Labour Party in Opposition, 1931-40, Houndmills, 
2001 
20 [bid, p. 4 2'D. Tanner, P. Thane, & N. Tiratsoo, Labour's First Century Cambridge, 2000 
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successes and positive achievements Labour have made, whilst highlighting perceived 
weaknesses as well, and this approach judges 'Labour against its own aims and values, 
and against what might reasonably have been expected. 22 
In other words, rather than criticising the party for not being socialist enough, or for 
not treading a Marxist path, it offers a more realistic evaluation of Labour in and out 
of power. Such a position has perhaps emerged because of Labour's own re-evaluation 
of what its beliefs are since the mid-1980s, and it looks to move away from the 
fighting of 'old internal Labour battles, between supposedly 'conservative' trade 
unions and 'radical' socialist intellectuals, between evolutionary and active models of 
change... ' 23 This is not to say that ideology does not play a part in these histories, and 
Harris rightly notes that there is an 'artificiality of the fixed ideological lineages' 24 in 
Labour's political thought. This thesis also recognises this, and as such tries to move 
away from 'Left' and 'Right' labels where possible, as there was a certain amount of 
agreement between the two wings on issues in the 1930s. Of course, this was not 
always the case, but the terms 'ideological' and 'pragmatic' have been chosen instead, 
as most groups at times in this decade acted in both practical and ideological ways. 
Other histories of the party written with the centenary in mind include Andrew 
Thorpe's A History qfthe British Labour Party 25 and another edited collection of 
essays covering the one hundred years by Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan in The 
Labour Party: A Centenary. 26 This offers a wide range of debates from contributors 
including Michael Foot, Denis Healey and Clare Short, and explores the rise of the 
Labour Party and New Labour. 
Where purpose and ideas are concerned, Thorpe's History notes that the 
" lbid, p. 2 23 J. Harris, 'Labour's Political and Social Thought', in ibid, p. 10 24 [bid 
25 A. Thorpe, A History qf the British Labour Party, Houndmills, 1997 26 B. Brivati & R. Heffernan, The Labour Party: A Centenary, Basingstoke, 2000 
basic reason for the formation of the Labour Party was defensive. It 
was not the mark of a working class rising up to take power, but a 
body established to protect the rights of workers, and of trade 
unions in particular, at a time when they were coming under 
renewed threat. 27 
He also argues that Labour was not a socialist party, even though it contained 
socialists. He is correct in his assertion that this did not mean that socialism was 
unimportant, and rightly identifies Labour's socialism as vague, which meant that it 
could act as 'a unifying myth when all else failed. 28 
However, other historians have asked the question What's Wrong With Labour. " 29 as 
they look to the link between the party and the unions, and the 'ideology' of 
Labourism that emerged from that link. Keith Laybourn's Century qf Labour 30 
certainly looks at the former, while Allender's book explores the latter. All of these 
works add much information to help answer the long-asked question 'what does 
Labour stand forT and this is also an underlying question in this thesis, but attention 
here is turned to outside of the party to help explain its defining process, rather than to 
its many internal traditions. 31 
A note must be made on the choice of sources that have been used. It must be 
appreciated that at the time when Graubard, Jones and Williams were writing, Russian 
sources would have been hard to come by, though newspapers such as Pravda and 
Izvestiya would have been available. This has left a gap in the history of relations 
between Labour and the USSR that still needs to be filled. This thesis cannot claim to 
rely heavily on recently released documents from the CPSU archives. Archival 
research can still be difficult in Russia. But it does include some new documentary 
27 Thorpe, History, p. 233 
28 lbid, p. 234 
29 P. Allender, What's Wrong With Labour?, London, 2001 
3" K. Laybourn, A Century (#'Labour. A History of the Labour Party 1900-2000, Stroud, 2000 
" Works offering in-depth analyses of some of these traditions include T. Cliff & D. Gluckstein, The 
Labour Party- A Marxist History, London, 1988; G. Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought. A 
History, Houndmills, 1997 and J. Hinton, Labour andSocialism, Massachusetts, USA, 1983 
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evidence from the Comintern archives in Moscow, which confirms that the Labour 
hierarchy was often right to be highly suspicious of the attitude of the Comintern 
during the early 1930s. Indeed, part of the Third International's purpose in this period 
was 
to show the role of the Labour Party as the chief social supporter of 
the bourgeoisie and how it weakens and divides the working class 
by showing illusions regarding Democracy and enchaining it to 
"constitutional methods. " Thus the Labour Party acts as an 
accomplice of Fascism and the democratic institutions are utilised 
in order to prepare the way for it. ' 32 
Labour had to find its own answers in an ever more hostile environment while it was 
attacked from the left, and, in so doing, often defined itself by establishing what it was 
not - in this case an extension of Moscow. 
The personal papers of some leading Labourites have been used in this study. Ramsay 
MacDonald's papers when he was Prime Minister, and Arthur Henderson's when he 
was Foreign Secretary were both very useful when looking at Labour's official 
dealings with the USSR. The papers of Ernest Bevin, and some private responses 
from Walter Citrine also add much to establishing the opinions of some of the key 
figures in the movement. 
The newspapers and journals that made up the 'Labour Press' have also been used as 
much as possible, as these give an excellent idea of how the party as a whole felt. 
Articles by opinion formers such as G. D. H. Cole, Michael Farbman, Kingsley 
Martin and Arthur Henderson among others allows a broad picture to be drawn, 
showing that Labour had many different ideas about the USSR and also the problems 
of the 1930s. These ideas are also reflected in the numerous party pamphlets and 
discussions at Conferences throughout the period. 
" Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History [RGA] 495/100/881, document no. 7835/6 
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This study places Labour's relationship with the Soviet Union into the wider context 
of the party's quest for an identity, as it sought to define its political thought. What 
follows aims to show that the Labour Party used the USSR in both positive and 
negative ways, as it rejected and accepted elements of Soviet socialism, whilst trying 
to establish what type of party it was and wanted to be. If there was one thing that 
united the whole party in the 1930s, it was the fact that it could not ignore what was 
happening in the USSR, and that the Soviet model of socialism defined Labour's 
political thought in one way or another. 
The study begins with an overview of the different strands of socialism and the 
different socialist factions that existed within the Labour Party before and during the 
1930s. Because of the eclectic nature of Labour's socialism, the type of socialism 
Labour advocated generally depended on who was leading the party at the time. There 
has always been such a range of different socialisms on offer to Labour members - 
ethical, scientific, gradualist, Marxist - that a leader could claim to represent the true 
principles and values of the Labour Party if he came from one of the groups that 
promoted these ideas, and Chapter One looks at each of the most influential groups. 
The next two chapters explore how Labourites came to terms with what was 
happening in Russia. Chapter Two covers the years 1917-193 1, incorporating the rise 
of the Internationals and the two Labour governments while Chapter Three pays close 
attention to the many visits made by official and unofficial delegations to the country 
after 1917. 
The next three chapters focus on the developments in the main areas of interest for the 
party as it sought to clarify its position and ideas after 193 1. Chapter Four is 
concerned with the USSR's role in Labour's foreign policy as fascism threatened 
Europe, taking into account the Spanish Civil War and the party's decision to accept 
rearmament. Chapter Five examines Labour's internal politics as it came under 
increasing pressure from left-wing Labourites and the CPGB, paying particular 
14 
attention to the battles fought with the Communist Party, as it encroached upon 
traditional Labour territory. Chapter Six looks at the planning debates within the party 
and assesses how influential the Soviet model was in Labour's decision to tread a 
more interventionist path. It also looks at the two other models Labour studied - the 
New Deal in America and social democracy in Sweden, and this allows a slightly 
wider perspective to be gained, which is important when examining how the main 
traditions that shaped Labour's political thought dealt with the Soviet challenge. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Labour Party - Forming an Identity 
It is indeed true that Socialism is the basis of the Labour Party's 
faith. 1 
During the 1920s, the Labour Party formed two governments. Of paramount 
importance to the programmes of both administrations were close relations with the 
Soviet Union. The approach taken concerning the USSR represented far more than 
simply hoping for good diplomatic and economic relations with a foreign country. In 
some ways, dealing with the Soviet Union forced Labour to define more specifically 
what type of party it was. It added an important dimension to Labour's much wider 
search for an identity, especially once the party was forced to question its beliefs after 
one of its most influential figures, James Ramsay MacDonald, formed a National 
Government with Conservative and Liberal MPs in 193 1. 
The USSR posed more of a challenge to the Labour Party than any other country 
partly because of the shared belief in socialism but also because of the nature of the 
Labour Party itself. Unlike the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), there 
was no single, overriding definition of socialism that guided the Labour Party in the 
way Marxism did for the CPSU. The many ideas and beliefs that contributed to 
Labour's understanding of socialism allowed the party to create a more fluid and 
eclectic form of socialism, and this chapter places the Soviet Union's influence within 
the context of the other forces that shaped Labour's socialism from its early days 
through to the 1930s when the USSR was at its most influential. 
The first section looks at how the boundaries of Labour's socialism were determined 
by the chosen parliamentary route to power, assessing whether the party was driven 
more by ideology or pragmatism. It is suggested that the reality was that both were 
1 Labour Party, Unitj, - True or Sham', London, 1939, p. 7 
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important. The need for political office was not the only thing that drove the party. 
Ideas played an important role in giving Labour a programme of action, and also in 
the party's wider quest for an identity of its own that needed to show that Labour was 
neither a far left organisation like the Communists, nor simply another reformist 
capitalist party like the Liberals. 
The second and third sections are more specific, as they offer overviews of the 
various socialist groups that either grew out of, or attached themselves to, the Labour 
Party. The second section looks at the growth of some of the more prevalent traditions 
in the Labour Party, paying particular attention to the groups and individuals 
representing these ideas. The Independent Labour Party, the Fabian Society, the 
Social Democratic Federation and the Socialist League are all included here. 
The third section looks at the general impact the presence of the Soviet Union had on 
left-wing ideas in the post-war period. It then offers an overview of the developments 
in the Socialist League, as this was the most important left-wing group in the Labour 
Party in the 1930s. It specifically chose to remain inside the party, whilst trying to 
maintain an independent line concerning the USSR and the Popular Front. This 
caused the official party problems as it meant that a section of the party openly 
courted the Communist Party of Great Britain, thereby flouting party rules on links 
with communists which was seen as bad for its electoral credibility. The overall aim 
of the chapter is to explore the different ideas that shaped Labour's political thought, 
to ascertain what type of party Labour was and to place the Soviet experiment within 
the context of Labour's search for an identity. 
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1.1 Socialist purity or electoral pragmatism? 
Socialism has always meant different things to different people, and this was 
especially true of the Labour Party in the 1930s, when the need for clarity in the face 
of confusion was perhaps more necessary than ever. In this decade, capitalism was 
perceived to be collapsing through economic incompetence and rightist extremism, 
and Labour again found itself countering attacks from its rival on the left, the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). It is true to say that what one Labour 
activist saw as socialism meant authoritarianism to another member of the party or a 
betrayal of Labour's roots to someone else. The communist T. A. Jackson remarked in 
1900 that there was 'an almost total failure to agree as to what "Socialism" meant in 
terms of concrete, specific, political practice. 2 In his examination of Soviet socialism, 
Mark Sandle states that 
Socialism has always been a diverse, complex, eclectic doctrine. 
Socialists have been classified as "utopian", "scientific", 
"reformist", "revolutionary". The socialist movement has divided 
into Social Democrats, Eurocommunists, Leninists, Maoists, 
Trotskyists, Marxists, Fabians, Democratic Socialists, eco- 
Socialists and so on. 3 
The term "Socialist" has provoked so much debate amongst scholars that a universal 
agreement 'has been almost impossible to achieve. ' 4 Yet while the Labour Party never 
came any closer than anyone else to solving this political equation, it evolved into an 
organisation capable of offering different perceptions of socialism that held the party 
together in periods of great uncertainty and upheaval. It offered a belief that one day 
the Labour Party would deliver its socialist promises, whatever they were. 
Though the form of socialism was generally unclear, the method of achieving change 
was, in the main, accepted by the whole party, and it was this method that established 
2 Cited in J. Callaghan, Socialism in Britain, Oxford, 1990, p. 27 3 M. Sandie, A Short History ofSoviel Socialism, London, 1999 pp. 9- 10 4 lbid, p. 10 
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the boundaries of Labour's political thought. Ideologically, these boundaries were 
fluid and blended different theories of progressive thought into the loosely defined 
socialism of the Labour Party. But tactically they were set by the rigid acceptance that 
Labour was first and foremost a parliamentary party that fought elections in order to 
gain power through the parliamentary process. 
Of course, this does not mean that Labour was simply an 'electoral machine', whose 
primary role was 'to win power at all costs within the existing constitutional 
5 structure' . The truth 
is more complex than that. Labour's identity was shaped by a 
struggle between the pursuit of power and the need to use that power when it obtained 
it. The factors that determined how it used it were the many socialist and progressive 
traditions that formed the party's political thought. Jose Harris asks whether Labour's 
quest was 'driven by ethical, religious and humanitarian imperatives' instead of, or as 
well as, the aforementioned need to win power 'at all costs'. 6 
This question is deep rooted in Labour's psyche. In his book about being a Labour 
Party activist during the Thatcher and Major years, John O'Farrell states that the 
'battle between socialist purity and electoral expediency is constantly being fought 
within the soul of every Labour Party activi St, 7 and this has been a fact of Labour's 
politics since it formed its first government in 1924. The fact is, Labour was driven by 
both issues. It could not have been otherwise for a party with the 'emotional' history 
that Labour had. At times one was more important than the other and that one was 
generally the need for power. Labour is, after all, a political party and not a pressure 
group. The problem for socialists - either the politically active or the historian - stems 
from the fact that in order to gain that political power the party's ideas were often 
played down or changed. But there was more to Labour than solely wanting power - 
5 J. Harris, 'Labour's Political and Social Thought' in Tanner, Thane and Tiratsoo Labour's First 
Century, p. 9 
6 lbid 
' J. O'Farrell, Things can only get better. Eighteen Miserable Years in the Life (? /' a Labour 
Supporlerl 979- / 997, London, 1998, p. 208 
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it had a purpose once it was in power, although that purpose was never clearly 
outlined in the same way as parties whose ideology was unambiguous in its contours 
and content, such as the Russian Bolsheviks. 
There were, of course, many differences between Labour and the Bolsheviks, one of 
which was the path to power. Labour struggled over the question of who to appeal to 
- workers alone, or the wider community? As a 'labour' party, the working class was 
obviously important, but leaders such as Henderson and MacDonald saw a role for the 
middle class as well, making it a much more inclusive, 'one-nation', party than the 
Bolsheviks. It also accepted that the parliamentary route was the best way to achieve 
political power, rather than advocating an abrupt change to the system. And this 
organisational structure helped to shape its political thought, as, for the most part, it 
favoured gradual refonns over revolutionary ideas. Overall, the aim was to change the 
existing system, but it was never specified whether that meant achieving a socialist 
goal or reforming capitalism in a more general way, perhaps even offering to manage 
capitalism better than other parties. 8 This was the ground on which different ideas 
were debated, discussed and fought for. 
At certain times in the party's history, ideology was at least as important as its need 
for political Office in defining the party's policies. This was the Labour Party's 
dialectic. It was prevalent in the immediate post-war years and in the aftermath of 
MacDonald's decision to form the National Government, when a consequence in both 
eras was that the party briefly moved to the left. Context was very important to the 
debates on ideas. When crises loomed, socialist ideas were the answer. When stability 
returned, socialist pragmatism (or gradualism) was restored to prominence. 
' It has been argued that this meant that Labour was more of a social democratic than specifically 
socialist party. For more on this debate see M. Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour 
Party. Politics andpolicy-making, 1970-83, London, 1996, and D. Howell, BritishSocial Democracv: 
A Study in Development and Decay, London, 1976 
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Take, for example, the adoption of Labour and the Nation at the 1928 Conference. 
This pushed the party along its well-set gradualist lines, and it was possible for 
gradualism to be asserted by party leaders, as this was a stable period compared with 
what began a year later. After the Wall Street Crash in 1929, many more radical left- 
wing ideas were advocated than those outlined in this document. The tone of Labour 
and the Nation reaffirmed the party's reformist approach. It outlined a cautious 
advance, compensating those affected by Labour's policies and rejecting violence. 9 
While there was some debate about how far left the programme should go, a non- 
specific socialism that embraced gradualist, inclusive policies was accepted by the 
party. Its approach to foreign policy highlighted this, stating that '[tjhrough the 
League's machinery the Labour Government will co-operate with all other 
Governments to promote the world's common interests. ' 10 It is shown elsewhere that 
these interests did not necessarily mean the pursuit of socialism. Instead a stable 
world order was deemed necessary in order to fulfil one of the traditions that formed a 
part of Labour's socialist thought - the ability to improve people's lives within the 
existing capitalist system. 
Such a position caused tension within the party as it offered little hope to members 
who wanted a more definite declaration of socialist intent. It was here that the Soviet 
Union helped to resolve and exacerbate some of these tensions. The role of the USSR 
depended upon how it was defined at any particular moment. The Labour Party 
defined the USSR as more than simply a 'united communist entity', breaking it down 
so that at different times it meant different things, depending on what the party needed 
it for at the time. Labour's own identity therefore shifted according to its concerns at 
the time, whether they were foreign policy, internal party politics or economic theory. 
Labour Party, Labour and the Nation, London, 1928, p. 6 
lbid, p. 46 
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The notion of breaking the Soviet Union down into separate and easily usable parts is 
a prominent theme of this thesis. 
The presence of the Soviet Union added another dimension to the 'radical' strand of 
Labour's political thought, which in itself complemented the many other traditions 
that made up the party's socialism. Within these traditions were justifications for the 
actions of all of the leaders, as they came from these traditions. Keir Hardie and 
Ramsay MacDonald were members of the ILP; George Lansbury passed through the 
Social Democratic Federation and Clement Attlee spent some time in the Fabian 
Society. The other key figures in the movement's leadership, such as Arthur 
Henderson, Ernest Bevin and Walter Citrine all came from the trade union movement 
and in some way represented the labourist traditions of the labour movement. '' 
Labour's identity could shift depending on whose voice was stronger at any given 
time. And this meant that whoever led the party could claim to be representing the 
'true' ideas of Labour. 
Labourism can, in some ways, be seen as something of a short-term action plan 
formulated by the trade unions that sought immediate improvements to members of 
the labour movement. This was the embodiment of Lenin's 'trade union 
consciousness' and from this came the understanding that cross-party alliances in 
parliament, especially with radical Liberals, was the best way forward. This was the 
aim of the movement, and not only when unionists such as Bevin and Citrine led it. It 
is shown below that cross party alliances were an important element of Ramsay 
MacDonald's leadership as well. It was this labourist approach which gave Labour a 
pragmatic side, allowing pragmatism to became something of an ideology in itself, 
thereby sharpening the conflict between ideological purity and practical necessity, and 
this conflict was heightened by the many socialist ideologists present in the party. 
II For more on Labourism, see G. Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History, London, 
1997, pp8-14 and P. Allender, What's Wrong with Labour. ", London, 2001, Chapter One 
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While the struggle between the pursuit of power and ideas became a vicious circle for 
Labour, it does explain why it used the Soviet Union as it did. Many of the ideas and 
traditions within Labour's past were seemingly being tried in the USSR, such as 
workers' control, scientific socialism through planning the economy and socialism 
being 'installed from above'. All of these represented an attack on capitalism, and thus 
found their way into even the most moderate Labourites' heart. But because of the 
need for electoral credibility and success, the various leaders could not be seen to be 
getting too close to the system established by a revolutionary party. 
It was these two factors that dictated how the Labour Party responded to the Soviet 
Union as it searched for ideas to solve the problems that capitalism created. These 
factors also helped to define Labour's identity as it responded to the ideological 
challenges on the left, from the CPGB and the ILP, both of which used more 
revolutionary and therefore hostile language than Labour. Electoral responsibility and 
ideology became unequal partners in Labour's pursuit of power. 
It has already been shown that this ideology was a vague interpretation of socialism, 
and that practical Labourites instead of the party's ideologists have been in a better 
position to control the destiny of the party. Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane and Nick 
Tiratsoo state that Labour's 'operating principles have been defined and refined by a 
series of original and practical politician/thinkers, rather than abstract theoreticians. ' 12 
More often than not the practical Labourites won the support of the wider membership 
of the party, except on certain issues, which are discussed elsewhere. But it is true that, 
while electoral credibility and ideology dictated the way in which Labour responded to 
the USSR, the need to resolve the present problems and take care of day-to-day 
concerns, whether they were fascist, electoral or economic, dictated how it used it. 
Both the Labour leadership and the rank and file turned to the Soviet Union for 
practical more than ideological reasons. While the ideological links between the 
12 Tanner, Thane and Tiratsoo, Labour's First Century, p. 4 
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Labour Party and the Kremlin were enough to keep some party members in touch with 
the USSR, many activists favoured allying with the communists to fight fascism, and 
this was the basis for the united front campaigns in the 1930s. When in power, the 
leadership established diplomatic and trade links, and later described the news that the 
Soviet Union had joined the League of Nations as 'a historic event., 13 This was 
important for the gradualists, as it meant that the USSR's Foreign Ministry had joined 
an organisation that sought solutions through traditional and orthodox means, as 
opposed to the alternative, more revolutionary, Comintern. Of course in Britain, 
Labour's leaders stopped well short of working with Communists. This was because 
the party feared detrimental electoral consequences such as being portrayed as a 
"Bolshevik" Labour Party and also for the simple reason that Labour wasn't a 
"Bolshevik" Labour Party. 
The ideas emerging from Russia influenced and inspired some Labour theorists and 
members, while they infuriated many leaders and other members. In a sense, Russia 
installed a mirror for the Labour Party to gaze into, offering a reflection of working 
socialism. This mirror sent back refracted images that looked like the socialism that 
Labour knew, but on closer inspection was quite different. Yet, despite the obvious 
differences in the two forms of politics, the USSR in the 1920s and, more importantly 
in the 1930s when capitalism appeared to be failing and fascism threatened the 
established order, continued to hold the party's interest. 
The answer to the question why did the Soviet Union hold such an interest can be 
found in the traditions of the party's political thought, which were centred on 
socialism and its various interpretations. This made party members interested in many 
other models and examples of socialism. According to Stefan Berger, Germany partly 
fulfilled this role in the post-World War One era, although this was more in terrns of 
how to organise the party as opposed to influencing Labour's political thought. The 
13 New Fabian Research Bureau, Why the USSR Joined the League, London, 1935, p. 3 
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Labour Party, 'especially after 1918, increasingly came to look towards the SPD 
[Social Democratic Party of Germany] as an organisational model. ' 14 
Soviet Russia played its part in the 1920s as well, and in the 1930s Labour had a 
number of different models to choose from, though not all of them were what could 
be termed "progressive". On the left was the Stalinist model in the USSR and the 
Social Democrats in Roosevelt's USA and in Sweden, and on the right was the 
corporatist-fascism of Italy and Nazism in Germany. All of these inspired Labour 
thinkers to muse over aspects of these systems. Yet no other model, with perhaps the 
exception of the New Deal in America, provoked as many articles in Labour Party 
newspapers or books written by Labourites, as the Soviet Union in the 1930s. 
The Soviet model offered something for everyone in the Labour Party. Trade 
unionists were interested in workers' and trade union rights and workers' control; 
economists questioned the virtues and possibilities of a planned economy; feminists 
assessed whether Bolshevism would improve women's lives. Soviet socialism also 
promised freedom to Labour's libertarians, equality to egalitarian socialists and even 
socialism 'from above', which was of interest to the more elitist element in the party. 
By breaking the USSR down into easily understandable segments, Labourites only 
needed to know where to look to find what they wanted. And some of the questions 
asked by each section of the party addressed the wider issues of what type of party 
Labour should be. 
The glue that united these constituents of the labour movement was a general belief in 
socialism, and without this common ideology, the USSR would have offered little 
more than a passing interest. The Soviet model could not have attracted the interest 
that it did in the Labour Party had there been no common ground. There were 
14 S. Berger, " 'Organising Talent and Disciplined Steadiness': the German SPD as a model for the 
British Labour Party in the 1920s", Contemporary European History, 5, (1996), p. 172 
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characteristics that both the British and Russian labour movements shared with each 
other, and also with the wider European socialist movement. Yet at the same time all 
countries had certain traits that distinguished their ideas from those of their comrades 
in other countries. It is difficult to deny that in the initial stages of the development of 
a working class or labour consciousness, national circumstances were influential in 
dictating how workers' movements would respond. Clement Attlee wrote that '[t]he 
British Labour Party is an expression of the Socialist movement adapted to British 
conditions. It is also a political movement of the British people in line of succession to 
many others'. ' 5 
This dispels the myth disseminated by Labour's opponents in the 1920s and 1930s 
that socialism in Britain was imported from abroad, that it was somehow not British. 
The Conservative Party took any opportunity they could to portray Labour as some 
kind of 'Soviet stooge'. One example of this was during the 1924 General Election 
campaign when Winston Churchill used scare tactics to woo the voters. He claimed 
that the 'Socialist Movement was from beginning to end a foreign minded movement. 
It had been lifted bodily from Germany and Russia. ' 16 Ramsay MacDonald however, 
claimed that the Independent Labour Party, which was Britain's first mass party of the 
working class, and which followed a socialist path of sorts, was 
a product of British history and conditions. It is neither Russian, 
nor Gen-nan, nor American. It found the radical movement as one 
ancestor, the trade union movement as another, the intellectual 
proletarian movement - Chartism and the earlier Socialist thinkers 
like Owen, Hall, Thompson - as another; the Continental Socialists 
- especially Marx - as still another. 
17 
15 C. R. Attlee, The Labour Paqy in Perspective, London, 1937, p. 20 
16 The Times, 22 October 1924 
17 R. MacDonald, 'Parliament and Revolution' in Barker, B. (ed. ) Rainsqy MacDonald's Political 
Writings, London, 1972, pp. 239-40 
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According to MacDonald, the ideas and practices that governed the Marxists in 
Russia and Germany or the Syndicalists in France could also be found in the British 
labour movement, which strongly suggests that socialism is an international concept. 
In stating that British labour found inspiration from various ancestors, MacDonald 
shows that there was not one single tradition that defined Labour's political thought. 
There were numerous movements and beliefs that influenced members' opinions, and 
this led to the emergence of a loose collection of socialist ideals rather than a distinct 
socialist philosophy. It was this lack of specific ideology, and the tactics chosen to 
pursue these aims, that ensured that Labour developed into a different type of party to 
the Bolsheviks, even though both grew out of the social democratic tradition. 
Leninist tactics were alien to most British socialists. Labour openly contested 
parliamentary elections, preferring to use the ballot box to implement reforms rather 
than sweeping away the old regime via international insurrections. Labour was not a 
vanguard party that would lead the workers to socialist salvation. Electoral success 
was too important to the party, and one of its main aims was 'to organise and maintain 
in Parliament and the country, a definite and independent political party-'18 The 
parliamentary methods adopted by Labour set the party's boundaries. Even though the 
party had no rigid ideological blueprint about what it would do or how it would do it 
once it won power, it knew that such power had to be gained by participating in the 
existing framework. Therefore the ideas that were discussed had to be achievable 
through parliament. 
However, the fact that there was no clear blueprint allowed socialism to mean many 
different things to Labour Party members, but every comrade was still united in a 
party that was able to house them all. It was this loose interpretation of socialism that 
"' Labour Party, The "Popular Front" Campaign: Declaration by the National Execulive Committee, 
London, 1939, p. 1 
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held the Labour Party together when other European socialist parties split into 
socialist or social democratic parties and the communists. The Labour Party 
maintained a cohesiveness that bound most socialists together, irrespective of their 
different backgrounds. 
Jean Goldie, a Labour Party activist from 1946 onwards, remembered that her branch 
'used to sing Jerusalem at the start of the meeting and The Red Flag at the end of the 
meeting'19 and this encapsulates the very essence of the socialism of the Labour Party. 
At the beginning of a party meeting, members could sing a hymn whose words 
inspired belief in the idea that a new society was possible. At the end of the meeting 
the same members could sing a socialist anthem that removed religion from the 
equation, but shared its sentiments. The Labour Party was a hybrid of different 
political ideas that spanned the social democratic spectrum, from left to right, from 
revolutionary to refon-nist, from atheist to Christian. Labour MP Hugh Jenkins 'drew 
attention to the importance of Labour's tradition of a socialism drawn from many 
sources including John Wesley, Robert Owen and Karl Marx' saying that this was 
why the Labour Party has a collection of beliefs rather than a single dogma. "" 
The discussions that took place as socialists tried to identify Labour's socialism 
included arguments about the nature of internationalism, for parliamentary and 
revolutionary socialism, collectivism and planning versus the free market and 
egalitarianism and elitism. These debates played a major role in developing the non- 
specific socialism that defined the Labour Party's political thought, and the way in 
which the Soviet Union's presence influenced these debates is discussed later. 
However, the chapter now focuses on some of the other sources of these ideas in the 
political bodies that played a leading role in shaping Labour's ideas in the early part 
of the century. 
19 Cited in D. Weinbren, Generating Socialism Recollections of Lýfe in the Labour Party, Stroud, 
1997, p. 2 
20 lbid, p. II 
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1.2 The Independent Labour Party 
In 1893 the Independent Labour Party (ILP) was founded, and the emergence of the 
ILP was a decisive factor in the development of a parliamentary tabour group, which 
became more necessary with the enfranchisement of manual workers in 1867 and 
1884. The radicalism of the New Unions in the 1880s meant that workers desired 
more than that offered by progressive Liberals. 21 The ILP was composed largely of 
trade unionists, and together with the other socialist parties such as the Fabian Society 
and the SDF, it offered a real alternative to the negotiation and conciliation that had 
guided workers' representatives until now. This could not happen without the ILP 
though. Neither the Fabians nor the SDF had the huge support of the working class 
that the ILP attracted in certain areas of the country. 
One of the founding members of the ILP was Keir Hardie. Hardie has been described 
as a Jr]adical and a Gladstonian Home Ruler'. 22 Indeed, he was rejected by the 
Liberals as a candidate, and when he entered parliament as a member of the ILP, he 
declared that 'I have all my life given an independent support to the Liberal Party ... I 
am in agreement with the present programme of the Liberal Party'. 21 However, he 
was also a great believer in trade union activity, and hoped that a parliamentary labour 
group could further the cause of the ordinary worker. 
Hardie's unionism pushed him towards socialism, which, according to Geoffrey Foote, 
had a4... labourist basis, in that he appealed to the almost instinctive assumptions of a 
trade union movement which found itself in a fundamental conflict with capitalist 
employers. ' 24 However, Hardie opposed the Marxist concept of class war, yet, like the 
21 For information on the radicalism of the 'New Unions', see T. Cliff & D. Gluckstein, The Labour 
Party -a Marxist History, London, 1988, pp. 8-12 and James Hinton, Labour and Socialism, 
Massachusetts, 1983, Chapter Three 
22 L. Macneill Weir, The Tragedy (#'Ramsay MacDonald, London, 1938, p. 26 23 Cliff & Gluckstein, The Labour Party, p. 8 (their italics) 24 Foote, Labour Party, Political Thought, p. 43 
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Marxists, he believed that emancipation of the working class should come from the 
workers themselves. This lack of common ground did not stop Hardie from combining 
with Marxists, socialists and the Scottish Land and Labour League to form the Scottish 
Labour Party. This later became a constituent part of the ILP and thus made the 
organisational break with the Liberal Party. It also shows the inclusiveness that was at 
the heart of the British labour movement from the beginning. 
Ramsay MacDonald was another ILP member who, like Hardie, was willing to form 
cross-party alliances with progressive politicians to further the labour cause. 
MacDonald also shared Hardie's belief that '... Liberalism was the true gospel ý25 and 
he spent most of the 1880s under the wing of the Liberals. He disliked Marxism and 
the concept of class war, favouring a more gradual replacement of capitalism with 
socialism while capitalism was strong. In 1905, he wrote that Marx's view on the class 
struggle was *both inaccurate as to the facts it assumes and misguided as a guide for 
action' 26 continuing to say that '... any idea which assumes that the interests of the 
27 proletariat feel an economic oneness is purely formal and artificial' . 
Socialism for MacDonald meant more than pursuing the interests of just one class, and 
this inevitably meant that future co-operation between all progressive forces would be 
possible. This tradition of cross-class alliances was clearly established early in the 
party's history, and with Ramsay MacDonald retaining a leading position within the 
movement for many years, he was in a good position to allow this to continue. This 
not only saw cross-party alliances being developed, such as Labour giving its support 
to Britain's role in World War One (ironically without MacDonald), but also 
progressive Liberals, such as those in the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), joining 
the ranks of the Labour Party after the war. 
25 Macneill Weir, Tragedv, p. 27 26 
R. MacDonald, 'Socia-lism and Society' in A. Wright, Brilish Socialism Socialist thoughifirom 1he 1880s Io 1960s, Harlow, 1983, p. 70 27 lbid 
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The ILP attracted political figures from all sides. Keir Hardie shaped the party IS 
socialism through a mixture of Liberal thought and trade union activity, while Ramsay 
MacDonald displayed a practical side where cross-party unity was necessary. 
MacDonald believed in the existing political institutions as a means of change, while 
Hardie saw hope in the unions. But the left-Liberalism of these two influential figures 
left a long tradition, most noticeably a belief in parliament and the need to be practical 
when necessary. 
1.3 The Fabians, the SDF and the Socialist League 
The ILP was obviously not the only socialist party that shaped the ideas of the 
emerging Labour Party, although it was perhaps the most important at rank and file 
level. Its role in founding the Labour Party has an 'iconic status', as leaders such as 
Hardie 'gave the smaller organisation enormous prestige within the wider 
movement. ' 28 But the Fabian Society perhaps had a bigger influence than the ILP in 
terrns of the ideas the Labour Party developed after it was born in 1906.29 The Fabians 
comprised middle class intellectuals such as the aforementioned Annie Besant, but the 
most famous adherents to Fabianism were Sydney and Beatrice Webb and the Irish 
playwright George Bernard Shaw. 
Fabianism is most famous for the idea of the 'inevitability of gradualness, which 
dictated the Labour Party's approach to changing society for nearly thirty years. This 
concept urged a gradual transition to socialism with the replacement of capitalist 
managers by socialists, reflecting Sidney Webb's Civil Service background. Fabian 
socialism focused on state control of utilities and industries, earning the label "Gas and 
28 C 
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Water Socialism. " However, the question of who actually controlled the state, rather 
than just managed its amenities, never entered the equation. In fact, it was better that 
the workers did not actually have a say in the running of the country, as this would 
only lead to chaos. With the emphasis on management rather than participation. 
Sidney and Beatrice were able to praise the USSR under Stalin for following Fabian 
socialist ideals. 
This question over what role the working class should have in the construction of a 
new society proved to be one of the main differences between the ILP and the Fabians. 
The ILP's views have been discussed. The Fabians adopted a contrary position, which 
is not surprising given Beatrice's belief that 'we [her and Sidney] personally belong to 
the ruling class'. 30 She had nothing but contempt for the working class, writing jw1hat 
can we hope from these myriads of deficient minds and deformed bodies that swarm 
our great cities - what can we hope but brutality, meanness and crime' and some years 
later spoke of 'the colossal stupidity of the trade union rank and file' and 'those 
underbred and undertrained workmen. 31 The socialism of the Fabians had a distinctly 
elitist nature, and the fact that they espoused 'permeation' of the older and established 
parties caused great mistrust amongst working class leaders of the labour movement. 
The Fabian Society contributed much to the doctrine of British Socialism over a long 
period, and without doubt played a crucial role in shaping Labour's political thought 
throughout the inter- and post-war years. 
The final groups that influenced Labour in this period, though to a lesser extent than 
the ILP and the Fabians, were the Social Democratic Federation and the Socialist 
League. Both though left a legacy in the party that would remain in one way or 
another for many decades. The SDF established an organised Marxist wing of the 
British labour movement. Founded in 1884 by Henry Myers Hyndman, it has been 
10 Cited in Cliff &Gluckstein, The Labour Party, p. 18 
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described by Eric Hobsbawrn as 'the first modem socialist organisation of national 
importance in Britain', 32 but he regarded the man himself as '... a jingoist, an anti- 
Semite and an imperialist'. 33 
Hyndman was instinctively a Conservative who favoured a strong British Empire, and 
he had no time for Liberalism. He converted to Marxism after reading Das Kapital in 
1881, although both Marx and Engels shunned him. His patriotism shaped his 
Marxism, and he 'saw socialist transformation as the best way of preserving Britain's 
world pre-eminence at a time when it was being challenged by the United States and 
Germany in particular. ' 34 His 'Marxist terminology concealed a crude national 
chauvinism and a belief that socialism could be achieved by the existing state. ' 35 
Hyndman's Marxism, as was shown earlier, appealed to many radicals, and future 
Labour and union leaders such as Tom Mann, George Lansbury and Ramsay 
MacDonald were drawn to the SDF. However, the sectarian nature of the SDF was 
resented by some members, driving away such people as Mann, Eleanor Marx and 
William Morris. Engels commented that the SDF was 'purely a sect. It has ossified 
Marxism into a dogma and, by rejecting every labour movement which is not orthodox 
Marxism ... it renders itself incapable of ever becoming anything else but a sect. 36 
The SDF was important in that it established the Marxist element in the British labour 
movement, and went on to join other small socialist groups in the British Socialist 
Party in 1911, which claimed a membership of 15,000 at its peak. Despite the 
sectarianism of its founder 'many SDF members did co-operate with members of other 
socialist groups in campaigns in the 1880s and 1890s' 37 which once again highlights 
32 Cited in P. Adelman, The Rise of the Labour Party 1880-1945, London, 1972, p. 5 33 Cited in D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of'Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth 
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the tolerance that existed in British labour politics. It was also successful in 'providing 
a breeding ground for a succession of gifted working-class activists ... and acting as the 
main progenitor of the British Communist Party. ' 38 
The Socialist League was founded in 1884 when a group of SDF members left to form 
their own body. The artist and poet William Morris is probably the best known 
member of the League, although he was joined by Marx's daughter Eleanor, while 
Engels advised the parliamentary socialists of the movement. The Socialist League did 
not outlive the 1880s and its membership never passed more than a few hundred. 
However, it contributed an ethical element to Labour's socialism that lasted for over 
one hundred years. 
The socialism that was embraced by the League was somewhat eclectic. Max Beer 
noted that it 
lacked unity of views and aspiration; some of its members had 
turned their backs upon the Federation, because they mistrusted 
Hyndman; others were convinced that ... the object [was to] graduall ý9 educat[e] the working men to independent political 
action... 
Beer claims that Morris was among the anti-parliamentarians who 'hoped to see 
society transformed into something quite different from what it was. They were 
looking for a revolution, for a radical change of the social institutions. ' 40 Morris alone 
represented some of the different views of socialism that the League stood for. Beer 
saw him as a revolutionary, while Thorpe notes that Morris wrote 'a series of utopian 
works describing what a socialist society could be like [which] showed a spiritual side 
of socialism which was not really to be found with the SDF or the Fabians. ' 41 Working 
alongside Eleanor Marx and Engels, Morris also embraced Marxism. He helped to 
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write 'a series of essays under the heading Socialism: its growth and outcome, [which] 
paraphrase[d] ... the Communist Manýfesto, 
but [were] based on English economic and 
political history. ' 42 
Yet it was to be the ethical socialism espoused by Morris that had the biggest 
influence in the Labour Party. This element to his socialism stemmed from his artistic 
background, as he attacked capitalism for being concerned only with the growth of 
industry to enable capitalists to pursue profit. Morris claimed that capitalism lacked 
passion. G. D. H. Cole suggested that 'Morris passed from art to socialism, because he 
saw that under capitalism there could be no art or happiness for the great 
majority ... 
He saw clearly that, so long as men are in thrall to the industrial system, 
there could be no good art and no good life for the mass of the people. 143 Cole points 
out the utopian nature of Morris' socialism, noting that '[p]erhaps he did not see so 
clearly the way out - that was less his business. 
A4 In other words, he had identified the 
problem but not a solution. 
The claim that capitalism was somehow not a just system, that it could not benefit 
ordinary people because it was soulless, became a fundamental element to Labour's 
socialism in the twentieth century. Socialists may not have been able to agree on 
where they were going or how they were going to get there, but there was a strong 
agreement that socialism was a more decent system and that capitalism was just 
wrong. This feeling was shown in a survey of the books that most influenced the new 
intake of Labour MPs in the 1906 and 1910 general elections. In 1906 the MPs did not 
choose Fabian Essays or Das Kapital members (only two II-Pers cited Marx and 
Engels in the survey). 'The book chosen by easily the largest number of these high- 
minded working men was Ruskin's Unto this Last. 545 This was a critique of the 
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classical political economy and 'the philosophy of individualism, which seeks to set 
free the economic man to pursue his own private interests through the profitable use of 
his capital. -, 
46 
Labour MPs were, by now, more interested in establishing a more community-spirited 
system. Ruskin's claim that as an economic system, capitalism 'considers men as 
activated by no other moral influences than those which affects rats or swine 947 
suggests that the ethics and morality of a political system were just as important as the 
economics of that system. The importance laid upon ethics was seen in the politics of 
William Morris, but also stemmed from the religious background of many trade 
unionists and socialists. The union movement was bom out of the Methodist Church, 
and by 1910,25 MPs stated that religious texts were their guiding influence (10 said 
the Bible), and the importance of religion to Labour later influenced the debate on 
religious persecution in the USSR. 
The many different strands of socialism in the 'broad church' that was the Labour 
Party influenced the political opinions of Labourites, but perhaps two played a more 
significant role in the formation of Labour's socialism than the others. The first was a 
belief that gradual progressive change was 'inevitable' once a Labour Government 
was elected, and the second was that Labour had to be a party with a mass 
membership, representing trade unions, socialists and other progressive political 
elements. This was in stark contrast to the Bolsheviks in Russia who favoured a small, 
tightly knit 'vanguard' party. Although this 'elitist' approach gave the Webbs reason 
to believe that the CPSU under Stalin was following Fabian leadership, there was no 
move to allow Labour to be led in such a way. One reason for this was the strength of 
the trade unions and their leaders who would not accept a passive role when being 
represented in parliament. 
46 J. Lewis, The Life and Teaching ofKarl Marx, London, 1965, p. 184 47 Cited, ibid 
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Indeed, at times this led to a division between the middle class intellectuals and the 
working class leaders of the movement. Bevin never totally trusted the intellectuals, 
although he did get on well with G. D. H. Cole and Clement Attlee. Bevin saw the 
idealists as unrealistic at times, as is shown in a letter he wrote to Cole in 1935, after 
Cole had written to Bevin expressing his sadness at the rift that had developed 
between the 'intellectuals' and the rank and file in the party. Bevin replied 
[y1ou see, the difference between the intellectuals and the Trade 
Unions is this: you have no responsibility, you can fly off at a 
tangent as the wind takes you. We, however, must be consistent, 
and we have a great amount of responsibility. We cannot wake up 
in the morning and get a brain wave, when father says 'turn' and 
half a million people turn automatically. That does not work and so 
we have to stand all the criticisms, ridicule and talk about 'right 
wingism' and 'leftism' and all the rest of it, and just go on with our 
Work. 48 
The coalition of interests was the foundation for Labour's growth as a political party. 
Of course, the party was not ruled simply by these ideas alone, and as circumstances 
changed - such as the enfranchisement of more people and the sharpening of the 
domestic and international class struggle - certain sections of the party became more 
interested in other ideas. But these different interpretations of socialism could not have 
found a home in the Labour Party had there been no tradition of them in the party's 
history. 
1.4 The presence of the USSR in the post-war Labour Party 
Despite the upheaval during and after World War One, the fundamental elements of 
Labour's political thought were not shaken. It still believed in the idea that the 
working class should be organised and that they should have parliamentary 
representation. This representation did not necessarily have to be by a labour party 
48 Ernest Bevin papers, MSS 126/TG/61195 TEMP 45 Modem Record Centre, University of Warwick 
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alone, as the Fabians and some ILPers favoured an alliance with progressive 
politicians who were sympathetic to Labour's issues, and this approach developed into 
one that welcomed activists from different classes. 
However, prior to the 1929 General Election some groups like the ILP began to exert 
more independence as some socialists searched for a more left-wing socialism. 
According to Gideon Cohen, the ILP 'began to define a clear strategy and policy of its 
own, formulated independently of the official Labour Party. A9 Labour's hierarchy 
fought back though, pushing the ILP towards disaffiliation in 1932. The details of this 
are discussed elsewhere, but it led to the formation of the Socialist League as ILP 
members who did not want to leave Labour fused with Cole's New Fabian Research 
Bureau and the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP) formed a year 
earlier. While the Socialist League decided to stay within the official party, it caused 
the leadership problems as it grew ever closer to the CPGB, eventually calling for it to 
be allowed to affiliate to the Labour Party in an attempt to fight fascism. 
Andrew Williams correctly states that the movement of socialists into different 
organisations meant that by the early 1930s there was a three way split in the Labour 
Party - the old left, the new left and the new right. George Lansbury represented the 
old left - mainly the pacifists in the movement. Cripps and Laski formed the new left 
- the bloc concerned with fighting fascism through organised working class struggle, 
and Bevin, Citrine, Dalton, and Morrison made up the new centre-right, and the 
50 leadership. 
The term 'moderate leadership' is used to describe the men in Transport House who 
came to lead the labour movement. Between 1933 and 1935, they consolidated their 
position, and, after much internal wrangling, fonned a quite cohesive, though not 
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completely homogenous, hierarchy. Ernest Bevin and Walter Citrine offered strong 
representation for the trade union movement, and with Dalton, Morrison and later 
Attlee, steered Labour along a course of gradualist and pragmatic change. This had 
important overtones for the party's international policy between 1931 and 1939, 
especially after 1935 when pacifism was rejected as a possible way of defeating 
fascism and it became a clear fight for influencing policy between the new left and the 
new right. 
It was these two camps that defined Labour's political thought in these years, as they 
embodied the struggle outlined above, between ideas and pragmatism. The leadership 
favoured the more pragmatic line, placing electoral credibility above almost 
everything else, including the rise of fascism in Britain. The official party response to 
the suggestion that it should work with communists to make democracy safe was as 
fierce as the arguments from the left in favour of this proposition. 
Yet this did not stop some of the moderate socialists openly advocating their support 
for certain Soviet policies and approaches to problem solving, as ideas were 
continuously put forward that often had a connection in some way with the USSR. 
While the SSIP was intended by Cole to 'propagandize practical socialist policies' and 
the NFRB carried out more detailed research into new policy areas" both groups 
turned to the USSR for ideas. The SSIP primarily concerned itself with new ideas for 
Labour's economic policies, while the NFRB offered a more comprehensive analysis 
of the Soviet system with its Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia. Labourites who 
theorised in these groups, such as Cole, Bevin, Attlee, Dalton and D. N. Pritt, to name 
a few, contributed to the leftist progressivism that governed the thought of the party in 
the 1930s. It was only the more extreme socialist ideas, from parties like the Socialist 
League and the ILP, that were discouraged, and as these two groups were increasingly 
sidelined, Labour's political thought became more defined. 
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Perhaps the main difference between the NFRB and SSIP on the one hand, and the 
Socialist League on the other, were their attitudes towards the USSR. The former 
groups were more concerned with exploring the nature of the political and economic 
system that governed the Soviet Union, with the intention of seeing whether any 
elements of the Soviet system could be adapted for 'use' in Britain. The Socialist 
League however, became somewhat obsessed with bringing the USSR's satellite, the 
CPGB, into a Popular Front of socialist parties in order to fight fascism. This issue 
was not debated by these groups alone, as the party leadership also addressed the same 
question - should the USSR be a teacher and a model, whilst being kept at a safe 
distance, or should it be an active partner in solving the world's problems? This, 
however, could lead to an encroachment upon Labour's ground from the CPGB. The 
way that Labour defined the USSR as more than simply a 'united communist entity', 
breaking it down into areas from which it could take and copy or reject and ignore 
ideas and practices, helped define Labour's own identity in a number of different 
ways. 
In foreign affairs, Labour's leaders saw the USSR's role as no different from the other 
Gprogressive' states. It needed to be brought into the League of Nations to help defend 
the stability and peace of Europe. Dalton and the other leaders did not place particular 
emphasis upon building a socialist bloc of states in order to achieve the party's 
objectives, but rather upon a collective comprising the anti-fascist states. However, 
Labour's long-term reason for this was to see right-wing aggression defeated so that 
the party's reforms could be made. This differentiated Labour from those who 
favoured returning to the status quo, and therefore the party's overall foreign policy 
can at least be seen to be 'progressive'. 
In the other two main areas of policy that concern this thesis, Labour used the Soviet 
Union in a different way that had its basis in the shared ideology of socialism. 
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Concerning the party's internal party democracy, Labour reaffirmed itself as a 
parliamentary party that could not accept any revolutionary alliance, even though this 
was advocated by a section of its own organisation. Labour was definitely rejecting 
Soviet practice. However, in its economic thought, it was more than willing to 
embrace Soviet ideas on planning. This not only had a clear influence on the party's 
own notions of planning, but it also meant that Labour's identity was shaped by anti- 
capitalist ideas as the party sought a clear socialist alternative to the free market. It is 
perhaps in their economic thought that Labour's dealings with the Soviet Union can 
most clearly be termed socialist. 
1.5 The Socialist League 
The Socialist League was bom out of the ILP's disaffiliation from the Labour Party. 
A. J. P. Taylor stated that '[t]he more intellectual members of the ILP refused to cut 
themselves off in this way and formed a new organisation, the Socialist League, 
designed to continue the work of the ILP in association with the Labour Party. ' 52 
Andrew Thorpe notes that the aim of this body was to 'replicate the 'old' ILP within 
the Labour Party, and be a force for radicalism but not disloyalty. ' 53 People like G. D. 
H. Cole, Stafford Cripps and Harold Laski were all members of the Socialist League, 
which filled the space on the left that the ILP had vacated. 
Some members of the League saw the 1929-1931 Labour Government as a 
disappointing failure claiming that 'inevitability of gradualness' and elitism of the 
Fabians had been discredited. Members like Cole and Laski both still agreed that 
socialist change could come through Britain's institutions. Cole though, did not see a 
rationalisation of private capital and state banking as enough to achieve socialist goals 
'because monopoly interests would retain the power to sabotage them; only 
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substantial state ownership of industry could remedy this defect. ' 54 Cole saw'a, mix of 
parliamentary and industrial democracy as a way of ensuring that capitalists did not 
Gsteal' power that they did not earn through elections. This was a common fear on the 
left after 193 1. 
Stafford Cripps saw the 1931 crisis as 'the clearest demonstration of the power of 
capitalism to overthrow a popularly elected Government by extra-parliamentary 
means. 55 Such consternation shaped the political attitudes of Labour socialists who 
were wary of a coup by the right because of the events of 1931 and the rise of fascism 
in Europe. Pimlott notes that '[t]he League, like the ILP and the CP, took for granted 
that capitalism was in decline and could only be saved by entering a new, fascist 
phase. 956 Even Clement Attlee accused the National Government of pursuing policies 
that had more than a trace of fascism about them. In 1935, he criticised MacDonald 
for pursuing a philosophy that was 'essentially Fascist. ' 57 
Kevin Jeffreys notes that the 'newly formed Socialist League attracted much rank- 
and-file support with its advocacy of direct attacks on the capitalist system, fuelled by 
mass unemployment peaking at nearly three million. '58 Support for the ILP must be 
seen within the context of the events of its time. At its height, it attracted 3,000 
members and had 100 branches. This is clearly not an overwhelming number for an 
organisation that had the possibility of attracting a much wider audience within a 
labour movement that included an increasing trade union membership. But it was still 
quite substantial for a party that used openly revolutionary language and favoured 
closer ties with Communists - two aspects that set it well apart from the main Labour 
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Party. However, the League also represented the elitist and intellectual strand in 
Labour's political thought. 
As the international situation worsened, the Socialist League became more extreme. 
In 1933 Cole left to return to a Labour Party unencumbered by Marxist rhetoric. He 
felt that the political line the League was taking 'was certain to bring it into direct and 
unfruitful collision with the official Labour Party. 59 Cole was, first and foremost, a 
loyal party member who sought to influence Labour's political thought and actions 
from within the party. But the extremism of the Socialist League meant that even 
long-term Communist Party members felt safe in joining it. 
J. T. Murphy explained his decision in an article in the New Clarion. 'I am a 
revolutionary Marxist who is convinced that the working class of this country is 
facing an oncoming revolutionary crisis, in which the Labour Party, of which the 
Socialist League is a part, will be called upon to play a deciding role. ' 60 Murphy 
believed that 'it is clear as daylight that the masses regard the Labour Party as the 
only serious opposition to the reactionary National Government. ' 61 He seemed to 
agree with Cole that the Labour Party could be won over to a socialist programme. 
The workers, he said, 'are demanding a Socialist solution to the crisis and becoming 
increasingly ready to put it to the test. This is reflected ... in the internal life of the 
Labour Party itself and the whole Labour Movement. '62 
The Socialist League emphasised the strand of Marxist thought that was an important 
force in the party in the 1930s. In the climate of this decade, this strand of Labour's 
socialism was perhaps the only genuine contender from the left inside the Labour 
Party to the moderate leadership's crown. Yet the presence of an openly Marxist 




fraternity that colluded with the CPGB actually helped the wider Labour Party to 
define itself as a more progressive, less distinctly socialist party. The official party 
leadership distanced Labour from the overtly left-wing socialism of the Marxists in 
the movement by clamping down on Communist organisations, and it ultimately 
expelled problematic left-wingers who did not toe the party line. Cripps found himself 
isolated on the left and was forced out 'for disloyalty to the Labour Party 63 in 1939. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Since the day that the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, Labour's identity was partly 
driven by the need to prove that it wasn't a British version of Lenin's party. It did this 
by reaffirming its belief in electoral rather than revolutionary democracy, and also by 
attacking communist activity inside the party. This process saw the party use the 
USSR in both negative and positive ways. It discarded elements of Soviet socialism 
that it did not want. But it also accepted Soviet ideas as it developed its economic 
thought in the thirties. Its foreign policy fell somewhere between the two. 
Labour's identity was also shaped by all of the different traditions that were present in 
the party's history, which meant that Labour's socialism could remain all things to all 
people. The party's socialism was eclectic where ideas were borrowed or inherited 
from a number of traditions and interpretations of socialist thought. These traditions 
included radical Liberalism, labourist trade unionism and different forms of Christian 
Socialism, and they lived side by side with a Marxist element from the inception of 
the party. And at some time in Labour's one hundred years, each one has found a 
voice in the higher echelons of the party depending on who led the party. This 
explains why Clement Attlee's government in 1945 could include members who had 
disagreed with the party line in the 1930s. The debates that took place in this decade 
formed the basis of the most left-of-centre government of the twentieth century. The 
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political thought of the 1930s Labour Party was one of thesis and antithesis. The post- 
war Labour Government was the synthesis. 
But the party's history dictated that it would remain interested in Soviet 
developments, as Russia had something to excite all strands of Labour's socialism. In 
the 1920s, workers' control was praised by left-wing trade unionists while the party 
leadership could support a less "extreme" Bolshevik Party that followed a more 
gradual market-based economic approach under the guise of Lenin's New Economic 
Policy (NEP). In the 1930s, the bureaucracy-obsessed Webbs could revel in Stalin's 
'socialism from above' while moderate economists accepted the notion of a planned 
economy along Soviet lines. Rank and file members who would ordinarily obey their 
party and have no truck with Communists began to call for a united front with the 
CPGB to fight fascism. The non-specific aims of Labour's socialism always allowed 
for interest in other models of progressive or socialist governments. However, the 
nature of Soviet Marxism - which became the dominant interpretation of this faith in 
the thirties - meant that it could not sit easily with a leadership that forged the party 
into a reformist and left-progressive party which believed that change had to come 
through parliament. 
On the whole, the Labour Party's position on the Soviet question remained largely, 
though not completely, unchanged in the 1930s. In terms of foreign and economic 
policies, the images reflected in the Soviet mirror offered hopes to some members and 
alternate interpretations of socialism to others. To the moderates in the party 
leadership, the USSR was a crucial element in the process of stabilising the 
international situation, but certainly not to be used in determining Labour's socialism. 
One way or another the USSR helped define the political thought of the Labour Party 
in the 1920s and even more so in the 1930s. This was a positive influence in areas 
where the Labour Party could choose whether or not it wanted to associate with the 
USSR. Bill Jones notes that Labour could form a coherent foreign policy concerning 
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Russia, as it was sufficiently distant for Labour to be comfortable in offering 
support. 
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In the internal politics of the party though, Labour was much more hostile when it 
came to the Soviet Union and, more specifically, the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. Jones correctly asserts that Labour's relations with the CPGB should not be 
used as a barometer of its feelings towards Russia, as when the party rejected the 
CPGB's first application for membership, Labour leaders were 'passionately 
supporting Russia against Western intervention. '65 
It was not only the presence of a 'working model' of socialism in a far away country 
that would influence the political thought of the Labour Party, but the very real 
presence of proponents of that model not just inside the labour movement (CPGB 
members) but inside the Labour Party. These included respected figures who traded 
that respect for blind faith in the Soviet system, like the Webbs, and other influential 
personalities who tempered their admiration, favouring a more selective approach in 
their admiration for the USSR. One thing is definite though, and that is that it did not 
matter which strand of Labour's socialism an individual aligned themselves to, or 
whether they identified with the liberal tradition or the radical wing of the party's 
history, they had something to say about the Soviet Union. 




Labour, the revolutions and the Kremlin 
(-a new star of hope has risen over Europe. " 
'Russia has brought us down once. We can't afford to let it happen twice. 2 
These two quotes from the Labour newspaper Daily Herald in 1917 and from Arthur 
Henderson when he was Foreign Secretary in Labour's second Government, represent 
how the different groups discussed earlier saw the Soviet Union. Those on the left of 
the Labour Party, with varying degrees of faith, believed that the Soviet system 
offered hope to the socialist movement. Right-wing Labourites however, had a more 
problematic relationship with the country, as their understanding of socialism was far 
removed from too many elements of the USSR's regime. The experiences of 
government also influenced the attitudes of the moderates, as those on the right tended 
to be the members of the party who were chosen for Cabinet posts. 
This chapter offers an overview of the history of Labour Party-Soviet Union relations 
between 1917 and 193 1. It looks at the party's reaction to the Russian Revolutions in 
1917 and the period after these events prior to the first Labour Government, and 
highlights the different responses of various socialists and what this meant in terms of 
Labour's philosophy. It then assesses Labour's policy towards the Soviet Union when 
it was in government, looking at how the party's policies were affected by its dealings 
with the Kremlin. 
I Daily Herald, 24 March 1917 
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2.1 Rejoice at the fall of Tsarism 
The end of Tsarist rule provoked great excitement in the Labour Party. George 
Lansbury claimed that if the promise that came with the revolution was fulfilled 'the 
political conditions of affairs in Russia will be very much more liberal and progressive 
0 than in any other belligerent country... Philip Snowden agreed. Were the revolution 
to be successful in implementing the manifesto of the Provisional Government, which 
desired civil liberties and a democratic constitution, Snowden wrote that a 
,... revolution will be needed in this country to put us on a level of equality with 
Russia. We shall see then how sincere are the professions of sympathy of our own 
governing classes with the Russian Revolution. A H. N. Brailsford exclaimed that 
'[w]e have won Russia. 5 
This section explores an important period in the evolution of Labour's political 
thought, as events in Russia appeared to show that the international scene was shifting 
away from repressive autocracy and empires, and towards a more progressive 
liberalism, as the quotes from Lansbury and Snowden above suggest. And there was a 
move away from the rule of capital towards more importance being placed upon the 
question of labour, as socialists, workers and peasants played an active part in ending 
Tsarist rule and socialists would join the Provisional Government. The question of 
what to do about the war also needed to be addressed, as Russian soldiers displayed 
their war-weariness by deserting the front lines. And it also needed to assess what to 
do once the Bolsheviks came to power. 
From the very beginning the two wings of the party supported different sides in 
Russia. The right favoured the leading role of the Mensheviks -a party that many 
Labourites could liken to themselves. The left was excited by the activity of the 
3 Daily Herald, 24 March 1917 
4 Labour Leader, 29 March 1917 
5 Daily Herald, 24 March 1917 
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workers and soldiers. Both wings though, looked on with interest as socialists were 
participating in an influential way in the new Russian Governments. Such a gigantic 
leap forward for the Russian socialist movement must have offered hope to British 
Labourites. Socialist parties and trade unions in Russia had not long been legal, and 
still suffered at the hands of the Tsar's secret police force. Yet now there were 
socialist representatives in the Russian Government. And if this could happen in a 
country where democracy was only just emerging then in Britain Labour could surely 
hope for a similar turn of events relatively soon. It had been present in parliament 
since 1906, and Britain, it was claimed, was a respected democracy with the Mother 
of Parliaments -a very different situation to that of 'backward' Russia. 
The question of continuing the war was the cause of a split between the Petrograd 
Soviet and the Provisional Government in Russia, and the same was true in the 
Labour Party. 'Most Labour men had been uneasy' wrote G. D. H. Cole 'at the war 
alliance with the reactionary Czarist [sic] Government; and the Revolution was hailed 
as a grand liberation for the consciences of Allied Socialists as well as the Russian 
people. 6 The inclusion of socialists in the Russian Government now inspired hope for 
a quick end to the war. The ILP, which had opposed World War One on pacifist 
grounds, supported the Petrograd Soviet's call for a negotiated peace with no 
annexations or indemnities, as this had long been the position of the ILP. 
The British Government assessed the situation somewhat differently, fearing that 
socialists in power could destabilise the war effort or the country. George Buchanan, 
Britain's representative in Russia sent a telegram on 16 March 1917 stating that there 
was no chance of the old regime being reinstalled, and that 'the dangers to be feared 
lie in the direction of socialists and anarchy. ' 7 His letter two days later suggested that, 
6 G. D. H. Cole, A History ofthe Labour Partyfrom 1914, London, 1948, p. 32 
7 PRO FO 3712998 
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while the succession of the Tsar's son would have been more agreeable, the 
government should 'pursue a policy to strengthen the hands of the moderate party. ' 
8 
Labour politicians focused their attention on keeping Russia in the war, urging 
Russians to continue their war effort. Arthur Henderson's A World Safe for 
Democracy (1917) was characteristic of this opinion, and it outlined his long-term 
vision. He argued that the Russian contribution was necessary for more than just 
victory, claiming that some Allies judged the Russian Revolution by 'its immediate 
effect upon Russian military strength, and not from the point of view of its lasting and 
profound influence on the development of world democracy'. 9 Some people, he 
claimed, were not concerned with such details of politics, of whether Russia was a 
democracy or an autocracy, as long as she stayed in the war. He argued that 'a 
democracy at war, if convinced of the righteousness of the cause for which it was 
fighting, would be a more reliable and longer-staying partner'. ' 0 
Henderson sent a telegram to the Russian workers urging them not to pull out of the 
war. 'We earnestly trust' he wrote, 'you will impress upon your followers that any 
remission of effort means disaster to the comrades in the trenches. "' However, Bruce 
Glasier, an anti-war ILP comrade of Snowden and MacDonald, offered a more 
internationalist message to the Russian people. 'We trust our Russian comrades will 
not believe that this message, with its stinted sympathy and pro-war obsessions, 
represents the extent of the sympathy and interests of the British Socialist and Labour 
Movement in the great revolutionary uprise of the Russian democracy'. 12 While this 
was not the opinion of the majority in the labour ranks, it demonstrates that there was 
a lbid 
9 A. Henderson, 'A World Safe for Democracy' in Bealey, F. (ed. ) The Social and Political Thought of 
the British Labour Party, London, 1970, p. 87 10 lbid 
11 Labour Leader, 22 March 1917 
12 Ibid. 
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still a feeling of the old socialist internationalism, dropped by the social democrats at 
the start of the war, being kept alive within the labour movement by the ILP. 
The war and the Russian Revolution had pushed British workers leftwards, and this 
manifested itself in a remarkable meeting of over one thousand left-wingers in Leeds 
in June 1917. The Daily Herald sponsored the event, claiming that the meeting '... Will 
hail the Russian Revolution ... the first representative gathering of the British Labour 
Movement to express unqualified approval of what the socialists of Russia have 
accomplished. ' 13 
Among the'1,200 socialists who attended this conference were delegates from various 
left-wing bodies in Britain. It was significant that Ramsay MacDonald and Philip 
Snowden represented the ILP, as these were, until the outbreak of the war, two of the 
Labour Party's biggest names. They were also devotees to the parliamentary cause, so 
for them to be at a meeting celebrating the revolutionary overthrow of the old order in 
Russia is highly symbolic. The Labour Party itself however, was not present. Labour's 
ruling National Executive Committee (NEC), the authority that oversaw party 
management between conferences, passed a resolution on 18 July stating that it had 
,... nothing to do with the Leeds Convention... ' and that '... no local organisation 
affiliated to the Labour Party ought to convene conferences which are not in harmony 
with the general policy of the party. ' 14 However, local labour parties, trades councils 
and women's organisations joined the ILP, the Union of Democratic Control (whose 
members included radical anti-war Liberals) and the far-left British Socialist Party in 
Leeds. 
The fact that the Labour Party was not present has led some historians to dismiss the 
importance of Leeds. Paul Adelman and Stephen Richards Graubard both argue this 
13 Daily Herald, 2 June 1917 
14 Cited in J. T. Murphy, Labour's Big Three, A Biographical Study of Clement Attlee, Herbert 
Morrison and Ernest Bevin, London, 1948, p. 53 
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point. Adelman claims that Ramsay MacDonald was embarrassed to be there, while 
the congress itself '-proved a resounding failure. "5 Graubard asserts that this was an 
unrepresentative meeting of the left because the official Labour Party was not present. 
He claims that this was 'one of the great anomalies in British Labour experience. ' 16 
Yet to claim that it was unrepresentative simply because the Labour Party was not 
there is to imply that the British labour movement had a very narrow base, and this is 
incorrect. Henry Pelling declared that '[t]he conference was a great success, for it was 
attended by delegates not only of Socialist party branches but also of trade-union 
branches and trade-councils. ' 17 He observed that the resolution urging the 
establishment of soviets in Britain '... was a revolutionary gesture and no more, but it 
signified the weakening of the existing ties of authority within the labour 
movement. ' 18 
Adelman and Graubard dismiss too quickly the profound effect Leeds had on the 
labour movement as a whole. The composition was different to other Labour 
conferences, with a much wider audience from which to draw ideas. Snowden wrote 
... it was not a caucus-ridden gathering, manipulated by officials and "leaders" but it was a spontaneous expression of the spirit and 
enthusiasm of the Labour and Democratic Movement. It was 
representative of all sections of the Labour and Socialist movement 
and of all shades of Democratic opinion. 19 
While members of the Labour Party such as Henderson were not there, MacDonald 
was present, and he had been the leader of the party until he resigned less than three 
years earlier. It is not true that he was embarrassed to be there. His speech praised the 
fact that the revolution had returned the initiative to the working class. 
15 Adelman, The Rise ofthe Labour Party p. 49 16 Graubard, British Labour, p. 19 
17 H. Pelling, A History ofBritish Trade Unionism, Harmondsworth, 1987, p. 146 18 Ibid 
19 Labour Leader, 7 June 1917 
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... We congratulate the 
Russians on the Revolution without any 
reservations whatever ... When the war 
broke out, organised labour 
in this country lost the initiative ... Now the Russian Revolution has 
once again given you the chance to take the initiative yourselves. 
Let us lay down our terms, make our own proclamations, establish 
our own diplomacy, see to it that we have our own international 
meeting. 20 
These are not the words of an embarrassed man, although they should be put into the 
context of the meeting. His speech was made to the euphoric mass of excited socialists 
in the hall, where other speakers made 'flamboyant speeches to the cheers or 
, 21 revolutionary shop stewards and other left-wing Socialists... Indeed, the mood in 
the hall dictated the actions of everyone. 'Reacting to the mood of their audience, mild 
trade unionists talked like Bolsheviks and for a few hours, within the crowded hall, a 
socialist revolution in Britain seemed a viable proposition. 22 After Leeds, the mood of 
the party changed. Jones said that Leeds 'marked the catalytic effect which events in 
Russia were having upon Labour's thinking, particularly on foreign PoliCy., 23 Such 
revolutionary excitement did not last long, but this certainly provoked a leftwards shift 
in the movement and workers became more militant in the summer of 1917. 
The war years saw trade union membership rise from four to six million, and days lost 
from strikes rose from almost zero at the beginning of the war to six million by the 
time it was over. The attitude of thousands of workers had been radicalised by the 
revolution. In May 1917 the Labour Leader wrote of the 'Magnificent Labour 
Demonstrations in Britain' and called Glasgow the 'British Petrograd'. It said that the 
Greatest Labour and International demonstrations ever known in 
Glasgow, if not in the United Kingdom, took place without let or 
hindrance, and free from even the hint of opposition. Glasgow and 
Petrograd, the Clyde and the Neva, were linked together on Sunday 
in the bonds of International Brotherhood. 24 
20 What Happened at Leeds - Report published by the Council of Workers and Soldiers' Delegates, 
London, 1917, p. 6 21 Jones, The Russia complex, p. vii 
22 lbid, p. 3 
23 lbid, p. 1 
24 Labour Leader, 10 May 1917 
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Despite the wave of militancy, the Labour Party retained its roots in reformist politics 
and parliamentary tactics, and Lenin's seizure of power did little to change this. The 
response to the second revolution was less enthusiastic from Labourites than it had 
been for the first insurrection. The majority view was that Lenin would not keep 
power. The Manchester Guardian wrote little about the Bolsheviks coming to power. 
While it carried stories about the 'Maximalist Manifesto: All things Promised to 
Soldiers and Workmen 25 it did not really pass judgement. The paper saw no long-term 
future for Lenin's regime, and the Petrograd correspondent said that Lenin was in a 
similar situation to Kornilov, in that he 'seems on the point of being overthrown 
chiefly by the spontaneous uprising of the democracy itself 926 Philip Snowden agreed, 
noting that '[flor a time the Extremists have captured the Government. 27 He 
obviously did not expect the Bolsheviks to be in Government for too long. 
The general feeling was one of sadness 'that the frail flower of Western-style 
, 28 democracy should have been crushed so soon... The Webbs found the aggressive 
nature of Bolshevism alien to their approach, and J. R. Clynes expressed the trade 
union view, describing the Bolsheviks' methods as 'vicious, unjust, tyrannical and 
dictatorial' . 
29 H. N Brailsford noted with sorrow that the moderates could not succeed. 
He wrote that the 'Rise of the Maximalists' led to the victory of the 'uncompromising 
party of social revolution' because 'the moderates were unable to win peace' while the 
Russian people became more desperate for 'bread and boots and fuel. 00 
Labour's reaction to the Bolsheviks' seizure of power failed to live up to Lenin's 
hopes that the socialist revolution would spread to industrialised countries such as 
Britain. While this did not happen, Labour did adopt a more left-wing position. A new 
25 Manchester Guardian, 10 November 1917 
26 Ibid, 12 November 1917 
27 Labour Leader, 15 November 1917 
28 Jones, The Russia complex, p-4 29 Cited in ibid 
30 Daily Herald, 17 November 1917 
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constitution was drafted in 1918 by moderate party reformers such as Henderson and 
Sidney Webb. To this constitution was added Clause Four, Part IV, the clause that 
caused the most hope or the most distress for Labour Party members, depending on 
which wing of the movement they stood. 31 
Clause IV can be interpreted in different ways. The clause undoubtedly represented 
the Labour Party's shift to becoming a socialist party, capable of attracting all types of 
socialist. Yet Marxists argue that this marked 'the conversion of the Labour Party 
into ... a mass reformist party distinct from the two openly capitalist parties ... [the 
clause was] a conscious means of staving off the revolution. 932 There is no doubt that 
leaders like Henderson and MacDonald hoped to develop the foundations of a true 
6people's party', which relegated the importance of class in favour of the nation. The 
problem with trying to marginalise the party's proletarian base was that 98% of the 
Labour Party's membership came from affiliated trade unions. 
Cliff and Gluckstein's Marxist critique is not the only way of interpreting Clause IV. 
Geoffrey Foote argues that this was the ideas of British socialism emerging over the 
three decades in the forms of Labour Marxism, Fabianism and Ethical Socialism 'into 
an integral whole. They were supplement to, not a replacement of, the labourism. of the 
trade union movement. 33 While both arguments are persuasive, the timing of the 
redrafting of the party's programme lends support to the Marxist claim. Yet the 
adoption of Labour and the New Social Order at the eighteenth Labour Party 
conference suggests that Foote's assertion is correct for the whole party, representing 
the continuation of the general move to the left that began after March 1917. Drafted 
by Sidney Webb, Labour and the New Social Order outlined ideals such as guaranteed 
31 Clause IV of the Labour Party's constitution: 'To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full 
fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis 
of the common ownership of the means of production'. 32 Cliff and Gluckstein, The Labour Party, p. 72 (their italics) 33 Foote, Political Thought, p. 71 (his italics) 
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employment, nationalisation, social welfare and education for all. Progressive thought 
in the Labour Party had become decidedly socialist. 
One aspect of this socialism was a belief in the national sovereignty of a country. This 
was evident in MacDonald's writings about non-class based socialism and socialism 
for the whole community. In the 1920s and 1930s, Labour had to defend Britain (and 
itself) from Communist propaganda, which was seen as Soviet interference. Yet in 
1918 the majority in the labour movement, after some initial misgivings, lent its full 
support to the notion that Russia should be allowed to follow its own path, and even 
the most moderate socialist defended the citadel of revolutionary socialism. 
In March 1918, the Bolshevik leaders of Soviet Russia negotiated a separate peace to 
end Russian involvement in World War One. British attitudes to this development 
ranged from indignation from Tories, angry at Russia's betrayal, to disappointment in 
the trade unions that Russia had not stayed to continue the fight. Yet the Labour Party 
sympathised with the Russians for their predicament. Leaders sent encouragement 
instead of condemnation. Henderson sent a message to the Russian people in the Daily 
News. 
In the hour of Russia's agony, the organised workers of Britain 
would wish me to send a message of sympathy to their Socialist 
comrades. In the moment of total crisis in the fortunes of the 
Revolution, British Labour proclaims to the Socialist and Working 
Class parties of Russia its undiminished faith in their eventual 
triumph ... the sacrifices which Russia has made for peace and freedom will not have been made in vain. 34 
Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden made similar proclamations and this was the 
start of Labour's campaign to permit Russia to solve her own problems and choose her 
own government and destiny. The labour movement was not immediately united in 
34 Cited in Graubard, British Labour, p. 55 
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this sentiment, but it soon rallied to the cause of stopping the intervention and 
promoting the recognition ok Soviet Russia in the post-war era. 
Members of the newly formed Advisory Committee on International Questions 
(ACIQ), which was established to study international affairs and to make 
recommendations to Labour's NEC and the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), offered 
this advice on the question of intervention: 
... we express no opinion for or against the Soviet system, we 
consider that the Labour and Socialist Parties of the Alliance ought 
to exercise a special vigilance in preventing the use of Allied forces 
to favour the Russian counter-revolutionary parties. 35 
The New Statesman and Nation agreed, stating that it was time to end the 'self 
imposed silence which we have observed with regard to the British Government's 
attitude toward Russia', shrinking 'from the responsibility of taking a strong line in the 
question. 36 
However certain we may be that the Bolsheviks' experiment in 
"catastrophic socialism" will fail, it is not our business to stop 
it 
... we 
have neither the duty nor even the right to suppress it 
merely because we dislike it and to kill British soldiers in the 
operation. 37 
This point about not attacking the Russians simply because the British Government 
did not like the new regime was also made by Ernest Bevin, leader of the Transport 
and General Workers' Union (TGWU) and by no means a Communist. The Tsars, he 
said 
have murdered thousands and we have not interfered - but if a 
peoples' revolution takes place we appear to be called upon, 
according to the policy of the last three years, to stamp out a 
35 MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1403 
36 New Statesman and Nation, 21 December 1918 
37 lbid 
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"terrible menace". This is a principle that Labour can no longer 
stand idly by and see develop. 38 
Attacks from the Conservatives forced Labour to defend Soviet Russia. Jones declared 
that 'the hard pressed Bolsheviks seemed to symbolise the beleaguered spirit of 
socialism in Europe, and social democrats firmly identified the Bolsheviks as being on 
their side 39. Labour opinion rallied to the cause of Soviet Russia in the face of attacks 
from Conservative critics. 'Sympathy gave birth to an enthusiasm which acted as an 
antidote to doubt'. 40 
Philip Snowden and Ramsay MacDonald were among those who called for immediate 
recognition of the Bolshevik Government. Their cause was not furthered by the Allied 
intervention in the Russian Civil War. Snowden criticised both the Liberal leaders who 
stayed silent on the issue of intervention and the official Labour Party for offering 'no 
word of protest against an act which is as unjustifiable as the German invasion of 
Belgium. A1 He continued to say that its purpose was to overthrow the social 
revolution in Russia 'in the interests of the capitalist and imperialist classes. 42 The 
intervention was often seen as an attack on Russia on behalf of the powers of finance 
capital. It was dictated by no other motive 'than to protect the financial interests of 
foreign investors and to overthrow a form of government in Russia which threatens the 
interests of property and privilege'. 43 Labour Conference stated that the 'interests of 
financial capital' should not extinguish the spark of socialism. 44 
Such strong support in favour of the right of Russians to choose their own government 
reached its peak in May 1920, when the London dockers, encouraged by their leader 
Ernest Bevin, refused to load the Jolly George ship. The cargo included munitions 
38 Cited in Murphy, Labour's Big Three, p. 77 
39 Jones, The Russia complex, p. 5 40 Ibid, p. 6 
41 Labour Leader, 8 August 1918 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid, 26 December 1918 
44 Labour Party Conference Report 1918, p. 156 (From here referred to as LPCR) 
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bound for Poland to be used against the Red Army. The strike lasted until 12 May 
when the dockers won their fight and the ship sailed without the munitions. This was 
the finest hour of the "Hands Off Russia7' campaign -a committee supporting Russia's 
right to national self-determination without interference from outside. Prominent trade 
unionists in the movement issued a manifesto that demanded that 'the Parliamentary 
Committee of the Trades Union Congress, and the Executive Committee of the Labour 
Party, should convene a National Conference ... in order to declare a National 'down- 
tools' policy of 24 hours to enforce peace with Russia'. 45 
J. H. Clynes summed up the trade unionist attitude after the Jolly George victory. 
During the past few weeks we have gone through what is, perhaps, 
the most momentous period of the Trade Union and Labour 
Movement in our long history ... which found for the first time, a united and determined working class effort to challenge the 
existing order of Parliamentary Government. 46 
He continued: 
Our action regarding Russia does not carry with it an acclamation 
of the Soviet method of government, and many of those who 
advocate a Russian peace do not subscribe to Soviet methods. We 
can, by unity and by the exercise of our political powers, determine 
our own form of Government, and if the Russian people prefer the 
Soviet system it is their business. 47 
The dockers' decision sent a clear message to Lloyd George's Government. They 
would not tolerate British involvement in the blockade and intervention of Russia, nor 
would they support the continuation of military action in Europe. A combination of 
negotiations with the Bolsheviks, once Lloyd George realised that they were winning 
the Civil War and would remain in government, and industrial agitation from the 
British labour movement, helped to end British armed intervention in Russia. 
45 Cited in W. P. & Z. Coates, A History OfAnglo-Soviet Relations, London, 1943, p. 151 46 Cited in Murphy, Labour's Big Three, p. 77 47 Cited in ibid, p. 79 
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2.2 The Internationals 
While Labour was arguing for the Russian people to be allowed to work out its own 
problems, a new organisation was bom which forced Labour to re-evaluate its policy 
towards Russia. The creation of the Third, or Communist, International (Comintern), 
meant that Labour had to develop a twin-track approach to Soviet Russia, that 
incorporated Russia's right to national sovereignty and the inclusion of Russia on a 
pragmatic basis into the party's foreign policy, whilst denying political air to the 
offshoot of the Comintern, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). The 
establishment of the Comintern helped define Labour's attitude to the Soviet Union in 
this period, and also Labour's own socialism. It forced it to reassert its parliamentary 
rather than revolutionary approach to winning power, to ensure that it did not get close 
enough to either the CPGB or the USSR to allow its enemies to portray it as a 
"Bolshevik" Labour Party. 
The formation of the Third International brought members of the British Labour Party 
into direct contact with Russia and Russian affairs. Such contact was evident when the 
CPGB applied to affiliate to the Labour Party in 1920. However, there was never any 
serious possibility that the CPGB's application could be accepted. It was part of the 
Comintern, whose revolutionary socialism was alien to the parliamentary gradualism 
of the Second International - the body to which the Labour Party was affiliated. Both 
Internationals rejected each other's approach, which therefore guaranteed that Labour 
could not allow the Communists into its organisation. 48 
The reconvening of the Second International by the social democrats of Europe and 
the creation of the Third International by the Marxists left a vacuum which was filled 
by those who were left of Labour but not as extreme as the Bolsheviks. The Vienna 
48 For more specific details on the Internationals, see Graubard, British Labour, Chapter 9; R. Palme 
Dutt, The Internationale, London 1964; E. H. Carr, The Twilight ofthe Comintern 1930-1935, London, 
1982 and A. Thorpe, The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-43, Manchester, 2000 
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Working Union of Socialist Parties, or the "Two-and-a-Half' international as it 
became known, was the home for the parties that joined neither the old or new bodies. 
This International remained neutral over the question of reformist and revolutionary 
methods, of the Soviet and parliamentary approach. Still though, Ramsay MacDonald 
hoped that the internationalists in the movement could unite 'those who were divided 
without good cause. A9 
The'Labour Party saw the Comintern as 'absolutely doctrinaire 50 and exclusive to 
those who ignored the historical, political and economic conditions of individual 
countries. The all-encompassing doctrine of the Comintern that rejected the 
importance of national histories and circumstances would never sit comfortably with 
Labour's one-nation socialism. MacDonald wrote that 'there are various roads leading 
to the same trysting place; that the Russian comrades may come one way and the 
British come another way. 51 'A tactic which claims universal conformity as a 
characteristic' he said, 'is self-condemned. 952 In 1922 MacDonald again criticised the 
Comintern. 
From the very beginning I have taken the view that the Third was 
divided so deeply from the main Socialist movement, in 
temperament and methods that it had to be regarded not only as 
hostile, and no sloshy sentiment of brotherly unity made me blind 
to what I considered to be the facts that ought to dominate our 53 attitude. 
The CPGB in the 1920s concentrated on denouncing the reformism of the leaders of 
the British Labour Party, but simultaneously attempted to fulfil Lenin's plan of 
infiltration into the labour movement. In 1924, Trotsky even briefly considered the 
left-wing of the Labour Party to be a more viable option in spreading the revolution 
westwards. Ronald Segal notes that members of the TUC delegation in Moscow in 
49 J. R. MacDonald, Wanderings and Excursions, London, 1925, p. 239 50 Labour Leader, 8 April 1920 
51 MacDonald, Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings, p. 239 52 lbid 
53 MacDonald, Wanderings and Excursions, p. 23 8 
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1924 'revealed a readiness for closer ties with the Soviet regime' and therefore a 
6revolutionary alliance with militant labour in Britain glimmered before the Soviet 
leadership: promising a nearer and more credible prospect than the tiny Communist 
Party there could provide, of storming capitalism in its historic citadel. ' 54 
It is unlikely that the possibility of the Labour Party being won over to revolutionary 
socialism was ever seriously entertained by any of the leaders. But given what he was 
led to believe by the delegates, it is not surprising that Trotsky contemplated the idea, 
especially as the CPGB failed to make any serious gains in working class support at 
Labour's expense. Of course, for the rest of the decade the CPG13 attacked the Labour 
Party more ferociously than it attacked the Tories, having abandoned any hopes of a 
CPGB-Labour Party pact as unrealistic. Bill Jones correctly notes that such Leninist 
propaganda in the 1920s only pushed the 'traditionally loyal British trade unionists to 
even greater loyalty' as leaders realised that an effective way to counter Bolshevik 
propaganda was to claim that the CPGB was 'a Trojan horse for sinister Russian 
influence. 55 
This approach was characterised by the Comintern's 'Class against class' policy, 
which saw the CPGB denounce social democracy as 'social fascism'. Although the 
Comintern did not argue that the Labour Party was a social democratic party yet, it 
claimed that Labour was degenerating into one and therefore lying to British workers 
about the party's true aims. This period in Labour-Communist relations formed the 
starting point for most of the debates about unity against fascism in the 1930s. 56 By 
then the Comintern and the CPGB had turned its attention to the ILP after its 
disaffiliation from the Labour Party and in 1935 the Comintern Central Committee 
54 R. Segal, Tragedy ofLeon Trotsky. Traitor, Hero or Prophet? Harmondsworth, 1983, p. 291 55 B. Jones, The Russia complex, p. 8 56 For more on this area of Comintern politics, see J. Callaghan, The Far Left in British Politics, 
Oxford, 1987, pp36-38 and Thorpe, Communist Party, Moscow, chapters Six and Seven 
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held a meeting concerning the United Front and the Labour Party. The decision taken 
on the Labour Party was that 
[w]e are faced still with the gravest responsibility of any section of 
the C. I. We are faced with the responsibility that this bunch who 
control the reformist movement in this country are now the chief 
obstacles to any tremendous advance. 57 
Labour's attitude to the new Internationals highlights its overall approach to reform as 
it demonstrated that, even though the party had moved leftwards in the post-war era, it 
had retained its faith in changing society through the existing order. W. P. Maddox 
suggests that the decision by the Labour Party to 'stand by the moderate and 
innocuous Second [International], rather than consenting to be drawn under the red 
banner of Moscow' showed that it 
retained its faith in the ultimate perfectibility of the existing 
structure and machinery of international society. Instead of plotting 
to use the political and economic crisis as opportunities for 
revolution, the British sought to ameliorate them internationally; 
instead of condemning the League of Nations as essentially an 
implement of capitalism, they realized its value and sought to 
improve it. 58 
Labour's socialism continued to be based upon the premise that change could come 
through reform rather than through a violent overthrow of the system. But by the early 
1920s, the socialism of the post-war Labour Party had developed into a more defined, 
though not clearly distinctive, socialism, and this development owed a lot to the events 
in and after October 1917. Labour adopted a socialist constitution in which a direct 
response to aggressive Bolshevism can be seen in Clause IV. The party re-embraced 
internationalism, although the pre-war talk of 'General Strike Second International' 
57 RGA 495/100/1001 
58 W. P. Maddox, Foreign Relations in British Labour Politics, Massachusetts, 1934, p. 153 
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internationalism disappeared. Labour's new interpretation focused more on inter- 
governmental relations and the protection of national sovereignty than a reliance on 
expressing solidarity with workers in other countries. This latter focus still concerned 
the party, but the means of change had altered as Labour gave its full support to the 
development of the League of Nations. While this reflected Labour's gradualist 
approach to change, it also emphasised the difference between the reformists and the 
revolutionaries in international affairs. 
The final reaction from the labour movement was the TGWU's flexing of its industrial 
muscle, inspired by the need to protect the revolution from Western intervention and 
culminating in the Jolly George affair. The influence of both revolutions was evident, 
and they shook Labour's socialist thinkers into questioning the fundamentals of their 
doctrine, and led them to embrace a slightly more defined socialism. Of course, this is 
not to suggest that the party thinkers had converted in any way to the aggressive 
socialism of Lenin. A. J. P. Taylor comments that in the 1920s, 'the unions had been 
the instruments of class war, and the Labour party had been more moderate, 
particularly under the leadership of MacDonald. '59 But it is significant that the 
"working socialism" of Soviet Russia began to shape Labour's socialism, and in 
Labour's more introspective moments, the Soviet Union became a gauge by which it 
could measure its own socialism. And at times Soviet socialism fed into Labour's 
formation of foreign and economic policies when it was both in and out of 
government. 
2.3 The first Labour Government and the USSR 
Labour forined its first government in 1924 and second government in 1929. The first 
one lasted less than a year and the second less than its full tenn. Yet within these 
administrations, Labour was able to not only make a pro-Soviet foreign policy a 
59 A. J. P. Taylor, English History1914-1945, Harinondsworth, 1976, p. 429 
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fundamental part of its wider goals, but also successfully bring the USSR back into 
world politics. This was largely due to the single-mindedness of MacDonald in the 
first government and the skill of Henderson in the second. The main thing to notice 
about the nature of this pro-Soviet policy was that it was largely based on a practical 
need rather than a shared ideology. This section shows how, in Labour's first period in 
Office, the Soviet Union was used as a means of resolving problems. 
Of course, socialism linked Labour and the Communist Party, and despite the evidence 
before them, Labourites must have hoped that by bringing Russia into world politics 
through traditional means such as trade agreements and the exchanging of 
ambassadors, some of the more militant aspects of Bolshevism would disappear. As 
shall be shown, they were heartened when the more extreme Communists were 
replaced by moderate ones and in the long term this approach appeared to be 
vindicated as the USSR joined the League of Nations in 1934. But it was not a shared 
belief in socialist ideology that initially brought the two parties together. This had 
more to do with MacDonald's pragmatic approach to solving Britain's post-war 
problems than extending Labourist or Marxist politics around the world - Soviet 
Russia was an untapped market with huge potential. Unlike many in the Labour Party 
who saw 'the new Russia through mists of idealistic and romantic illusion', 60 
MacDonald's motivating factor for a progressive attitude towards the Communist 
State was practical rather than ideological, showing that the USSR could be a resource 
by which Labour could maintain power. 
MacDonald took the post of Foreign Secretary as well as Prime Minister, ensuring that 
he had full control over international issues. He offered recognition to Soviet Russia 
without consulting his Cabinet, believing that any delay through consultation with his 
colleagues or indeed other powers may have meant a three month wait due to the 
dispersal of the Congress of Soviets on 2 February 1924. By giving recognition, he felt 
60 P. A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter- War Years, London, 1954, p. 62 
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that it had been possible to secure the acceptance not merely of Georgy Chicherin and 
officials at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) in Moscow, 
but also of the representatives of Soviets of all the Russias, who sent a 'very cordial 
telegram of acceptance. 61 The fact that Mussolini's Italy was also on the verge of 
being the first country to officially recognise Russia also played a major part in this 
decision. The ILP's New Leader enthusiastically greeted the dejure recognition of I 
February with enthusiasm. It claimed that it should have been done years ago and 
rejected the claim in The Times that it was only a sort of recognition, arguing that 
,... recognition was precisely the instrument necessary for the efficient adjustment of 
details'. 62 
The official Soviet view appears somewhat contradictory. Pravda wrote that England 
was jo]n the path to full recognition of the USSR' as '[t]he Working Masses of 
England demand immediate recognition. 63 Yet Maksirn Litvinov, the deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, told Izvestiya that the British Government had 
recognised the USSR in the only way possible - namely unconditionally and 
unreservedly. He praised MacDonald, saying that he not only understood the 
diplomatic problems of the Soviet Government, but that he had come to an appropriate 
conclusion. 64 He went on to say that '[h]aving conceded under the pressure of workers 
I and radical circles, MacDonald finally refused all of the preliminary negotiations and 
gave unconditional recognition. 65 This was not strictly true. Whether radicals and left- 
wingers in the Labour Party wanted full recognition for Russia did not matter. 
MacDonald had wanted Russia to be officially recognised for years. 
On the whole, Litvinov offered a positive interpretation of MacDonald's actions. 
However, while his response represented Narkomindel, Labour still had to be aware of 
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the Comintem's position. Karl Radek, the ambitious international revolutionary, 
highlighted the contradiction in Soviet foreign policy. In a long interview in Pravda, 
Radek criticised the conditions placed upon the Soviet regime, which contradicted 
what Litvinov told Izvestiya. Radek said that England stood at the head of the counter- 
revolutionary campaign against Soviet Russia. English imperialists 'offered the Soviet 
Government recognition in return for a rejection of all the economic gains of the 
October Revolution. ' 66 Accepting these conditions, he claimed, would see Russia 
paying its debts and compensation to foreign capitalists and therefore allow such 
capitalists to 'exploit the great wealth of the country, as yet uncultivated. 967 He 
claimed that the Labour Party wanted to save capitalism, just as the German social 
democrats tried to in 1918. 'Recognition for the Soviet regime is for them a means of 
struggle against unemployment and against dangers threatening England and 
France. -)68 For Radek the political significance of recognition by most of the European 
powers 'signifies that all attempts to extract from us material concessions, in the end, 
were a failure. The recognition convinces us that we not only exist, but that we will 
exist. ' 69 
The different positions taken by the different Communist bodies shows how difficult it 
was for Labour to negotiate with Soviet politicians. The official view demonstrates 
that the Soviets, while obviously more radical than the Labour Administration, knew 
that they had to deal with Britain in something of a "traditional" manner. The reaction 
of Radek and the Comintern shows that Labour also had to take into account a more 
extremist point of view from the same side. The safest approach for MacDonald was 
to negotiate with the Soviet Government without the interference of ideology - to 
secure a deal that would be acceptable to the British electorate as a whole. 





In April the Anglo-Soviet Conference took place, opening with MacDonald expressing 
his satisfaction at the fact that the Soviet delegates were present. He told them 'I have, 
as you know, advocated the recognition of your Government during the past few 
years, and it is therefore a source of personal gratification to me to receive you here to- 
day %70 He understood what the Soviets wanted from his government - political 
countenance and financial assistance - and that 'We want neighbourliness and 
recognition of international obligations. ' 71 Khristian Rakovsky, in charge of the 
delegation, gratefully thanked the Prime Minister for his party's support. 'The highest 
governing body of the nations constituting our Union has emphatically declared in its 
resolution that close co-operation with Great Britain is one of the foremost aims of the 
Soviet Government'. 72 
Despite MacDonald's hope for success, the government would not be pushed into 
I 
anything that could frighten the British electorate. The Tsarist debts and the question 
of British properties were the main points of the Commercial Treaty, but MacDonald 
had to be careful not to be seen to give the Soviets too much, which could be used for 
political gain by the Conservatives. The pre-war debts were a big stumbling block. 
The defaulting of repayment of original Tsarist loans comprised articles 7,8 and 9 of 
the draft treaty - the most important articles in the paper. 
However, it was accepted that a failure to succeed would be resented 'very bitterly by 
the Party, not only in the House of Commons but in the country. A chance of getting 
work for the unemployed would have again been missed'. 73 While the Government 
fell before the agreement could be ratified in parliament, this opinion shows that there 
was a largely pro-Soviet view amongst Labour members at the time, not necessarily 
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because of ideology, but because a trade agreement would help bring employment 
back to the country. 
Nevertheless, this pro-Soviet view should not be mistaken for a pro-Communist view, 
and this was highlighted by Labour's attitude to attempts by the CPGB to affiliate to 
the party. Given that Lenin had once referred to the ILP as 'an opportunistic party that 
has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie', 74 and that the Comintern had earlier 
dismissed the ILP's hopes of peaceful methods being employed by the new Third 
International with such fierce criticism of MacDonald and Snowden that they could 
neither forgive nor forget, it was unlikely that the leadership of the party would 
support the application. 
But the views of Labour members, which were not always in line with their leadership, 
suggest support for the official position. Arguments ranged from the Communists 
being 'anti-labour and disruptive' to their newspaper devoting 'very much space to an 
attack on individual members of the Labour Movement 75 to the fact that affiliation 
would give the Tories and Liberals the weapon of '[q]uotations from speeches of 
leading Communists! 976 Other arguments against allowing the CPGB into the Labour 
Party were that Communists were slaves of Moscow, that they believed in force and 
violence, and that communism was not in the British democratic tradition. Frank 
Hodges, a Miners' delegate at the 1923 Labour Conference stated that 'Russia has 
nothing to teach the political democracy of the Western world. British institutions 
have grown up in accordance, very largely, with Britain's own peculiar history ... 9 
77 
Communists were also far from united on this issue. Some favoured affiliation, as 
influencing the working class would be easier inside the Labour Party. 'You cannot be 
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a vanguard unless you are going to march with the working-class' 78 said the 
Communist J. F. Hodgson. Yet William Paul claimed that every argument Hodgson 
put forward in favour of affiliating to Labour 'can be applied to joining the Salvation 
Army ... we have got to 
build up our own organisation, and we have to set out our own 
code of tactics. ' 79 However, the debates inside the CPGB proved to be academic, as 
the Labour Party continued to reject any approach from the Communist Party. In 192 1, 
4,115,000 voted against affiliation with 224,000 in favour. In 1922 the rejecters 
numbered more than three million, in 1923 just less than three million and in 1924 
there were again over three million. The most support the pro-affiliationists could 
muster was 366,000 . 
80 The Communists spent the rest of the decade trying to build 
alternative 'united fronts' which included the Miners' Minority Movement and the 
National Left Wing Movement, both of which had limited successes. 
The official party line towards communism and Communists was definitely 
established by the early 1920s. It was one of critical acceptance of what was 
happening in Russia, while rejecting out of hand what the Communists wanted in 
Britain. This remained the party's position throughout the 1930s as well, despite the 
intense efforts of some left-wingers in the party who favoured co-operation with the 
CPGB to combat fascism, or from moderates who wanted to import Soviet economic 
ideas such as planning to counter the Depression. 
This is not to say that the ideas and perceptions held by some in the party were 
completely closed, as ideas changed as different infon-nation became available. On the 
whole though, as the Labour leadership learned more about Soviet Communism, it 
tended to reinforce those ideas established in the early 1920s and therefore shape 
Labour's socialism in a negative way, to push Labour into a position stating "We are 
not Them". 
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Some of this information about the USSR came from visits by Labour members before 
and during the first Labour Government. These gave the party a valuable insight into 
the conditions that ordinary Russians had to cope with. Now Labour politicians were 
dealing directly with the Communist Government in a governmental capacity, on an 
equal footing. MacDonald therefore had an idea of the nature and the status of the 
Soviet Government. Just prior to the trade negotiations, on 28 January 1924, R. M. 
Hodgson, British Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, sent a letter to the previous Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon, stating that the Communist Party of Russia was 'sick 
physically and morally. Lenin 'is gone, never to return as a serious factor in politics; 
Trotski is an invalid. '81 He said that '[s]horn of its two leaders the party cuts a sorry 
figure. ' 82 He did not give much significance to any of the other possible leaders either. 
Zinoviev, a poor creature at the best, finds his influence rapidly 
waning since the Communist debacle in Germany; Kamenev is a 
depressing personality incapable of giving inspiration to the mass; 
Stalin, "the man of steel", a narrow-minded obstinate Georgian, 
entangled in the intricacies of Party doctrine; Bukharin, a fanatic, 
popular 83 with 
the working man, but without the makings of a 
leader. '
MacDonald would surely have been hopeful that the extremist enthusiasm that brought 
the party to power was in decline. Enthusiasm for negotiating with the Soviet 
Government later came from the fact that the 'moderates' had been victorious over the 
'extremists'. Stalin and Bukharin - the exponents of Socialism in One Country had 
ousted Trotsky and Karl Radek (a gutterjournalist 84) who pursued world revolution on 
the Soviet model. 
However, the fact that negotiations did not bring about a successful conclusion 
consequently enabled Labour's enemies to claim that the party had been too soft on 





the Soviets, and meant that MacDonald would be more cautious next time. Andrew 
Williams says that 1924 'was only a preliminary skirmish in what became and 
remained a very complex love-hate relationship between the British Labour movement 
and the Soviet Union. , 85 He concludes that Arthur Ponsonby best outlined the party 
organs' and the leadership's attitudes in the House of Commons. 
The middle way is a difficult one. I believe the policy which the Labour 
Party has always advocated, the policy of conciliation, ought to guide us 
for the sake of British trade and for the sake of the revival of Russia 
itself. I have a great belief in the future of Russia, and it is with this 
consideration in view, and for the sake of healing the wounds of Europe, 
that we are desirous of bringing Russia into the comity of nations. 86 
Labour's first period in Government failed to last long enough for the party to 
implement any of its programme to full effect, but it was able to partially improve 
Anglo-Soviet relations. But one aspect of this relationship - the Zinoviev letter - 
demonstrated two things about Labour's approach to politics. The first was the 
publication of a letter in the Daily Mail supposedly from Grigory Zinoviev, the head 
of the Comintern calling for British workers to prepare for revolution and communist 
military units in the British army. This would have been dismissed with less fuss had 
closer ties with the Kremlin not been a major part of Labour's programme. The second 
aspect to this problem though, demonstrates Labour's all-embracing philosophy. The 
cross-party alliance that MacDonald and his comrades were trying to build relied on 
gaining the trust of the middle classes and the Conservative press. It is surprising 
though, that he was so willing to accept what was published in newspapers that had 
never been anything less than critical of his administration, especially when he had not 
even seen the original document. 
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The Labour leader denounced the 'Red letter' more zealously than the Conservatives, 
as he wanted to ensure that he was seen to be tough on Communism and to give his 
opponents no ammunition with which to paint the party a darker shade of red than it 
actually was. But by failing to denounce the letter as a forgery, MacDonald's actions 
gave it credibility. This was despite the fact that there was a lack of evidence to 
support the Daily Mail's accusations that the letter came from the Comintern. He 
chose to believe the Daily Mail rather than the Soviet Charge d'Affaires Khristian 
Rakovsky (although some may say that this is the equivalent of being caught between 
a rock and a hard place). Rakovsky said that he had not seen the letter, and declared it 
a forgery, saying that the most surprising thing was 'that the Foreign Office should 
have chosen to publish this document before ascertaining our views upon it. ' 87 Two 
days after the General Election that swept the Conservatives back to power the 
committee appointed to examine the letter wrote a communiqud explaining that it 
found it 
impossible on the evidence before them to come to a conclusion on 
the subject. The original letter has not been provided to or seen by 
the Government Department, and action was taken solely on what 
purported to be a copy. Unfortunately, in the short time available, 
the committee found it impossible to obtain evidence throwing 
further light on the matter. 88 
Even now, with access to previously closed archives, the Foreign Office is still 
uncertain who wrote the Zinoviev letter . 
89 The letter failed, however, to affect the 
outcome of the 1924 election, as Labour's vote actually increased by 1,100,000 votes 
(although the number of Labour MPs decreased by 40). The electorate also failed to 
allow this to become a long-term problem for Labour, as the party was returned to 
power in 1929. Yet this episode shows how far the party's opponents would go to try 
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to portray the Labour Party as nothing more than a Moscow lackey. Andrew Thorpe 
notes that 'Labour was attacked for being a Communist party in disguise, and 
Labourites had to try to deal with the accusation that they were conscious agents of the 
extreme left. '90 
Although Labour's first attempt at ruling the country could not be described as an 
overwhelming success, its attempts at reconciling Britain and the USSR were more 
profitable, especially in terms of the long-term aims of the Labour Party. It laid the 
foundations for the policies it would pursue the next time it was in power. The party's 
overall ideals of ensuring economic recovery in Britain and peace in Europe - two of 
its main objectives in the 1930s - depended on an accommodating Soviet Union, due 
to the potential of the untapped market, the size of the country and the general belief 
that socialism equalled peace. Everything the Labour leadership did concerning the 
USSR while it was in power kept these objectives firmly in mind. 
2.4 Labour out of Office 
In the years between the two Labour Governments, Anglo-Soviet relations worsened 
as the Tories sought to bum the bridges built by the 1924 Government. The raid on 
Arcos Ltd, ajoint stock company and premises of the Trade Delegation of the USSR91, 
led to the cancellation of the 1921 trade agreement and the suspension of diplomatic 
relations between the British and Soviet Governments. Yet Labour still advocated 
close links with the USSR. Labour and the Nation showed that the USSR would 
remain highly prominent in Labour's thoughts even though it was not in power. It 
stated that both Britain and Russia had 'everything to gain by trading with each 
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other'92 and it criticised the Conservatives for the way they handled Anglo-Soviet 
affairs. 
The Conservative Government, in its eagerness to snatch a fleeting 
political advantage by exploiting the bogy of revolution, tore up the 
Trade Agreement made with the Russians in 1924, with the result 
that orders for machinery and manufactures, which would have 
found employment for thousands of British workers, have been lost 
to this country. Gestures of this kind may be magnificent, but they 
are neither common sense nor good business. 93 
The first line of this quote shows that Labour recognised the threat from its enemies. 
Yet even though the party leadership knew that the Conservatives would always try to 
gain such an advantage, it was still willing to renew Anglo-Soviet relations. 
A Labour Government, whilst opposed to the interference of the 
Russian Government with the domestic policies of other nations, 
would at once take steps to establish diplomatic and commercial 
relations with it, would settle by treaty or otherwise any 
outstanding differences, and would make every effort to encourage 
a revival of trade with Soviet Russia. 94 
The party remained careful however, to ensure that the electorate could not mistake 
Labour's socialism for an extension of the Kremlin's. The party's 1929 General 
Election manifesto warned voters that 'misrepresentation of Socialism and the aims 
and Policy of the Labour Party [are] already pouring from our opponents. 995 
Countering this claim, it states that '[t]he Labour Party is neither Bolshevik nor 
Communist. It is opposed to force, violence and confiscation as means of establishing 
the New Social Order. It believes in ordered progress and in democratic methods. 996 
In terms of tactics, the party had not moved too far away from its social democratic 
beliefs, and in terms of ideas, it still spoke of peace as against force and violence, of 
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compensation instead of confiscation. Its election statement also shows that it was 
careful not to offer ammunition to the Tories with which they could paint Labour a 
Soviet shade of red. 
As Labour formed its second government at the end of the 1920s, three factors gave 
the party confidence in its Soviet policy. The first was the success of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in the USSR. NEP was a less restrictive economic system 
than many commentators thought possible in a "Communist' 'state. By establishing a 
more market-based economy, the USSR became a country in which foreign 
businessmen saw new markets. NEP also gave the perception that the Soviet Union 
was moving away from its extremist politics. By 1929 advocates of socialism in one 
country were in power and internationalist revolutionaries were being pushed out of 
the CPSU. These three aspects of Soviet politics produced a stable environment that 
could promote a positive image with which to pursue foreign capital. This proved to 
be something of a success and in 1929 a delegation of British industrialists - not 
generally known as natural allies of the labour movement in this period - visited 
Moscow in March 1929. 
The Daily Herald gave extensive coverage to the delegation believing that 'important 
negotiations were to be entered into'. 97 Ernest Remnant of the Trade Delegation said 
that they were 'naturally hopeful of success. '98 The Russians welcomed the arrival of 
representatives of British industry to Moscow, 99 but the acting Chairman of the Soviet 
State Bank, and member of the People's Commissariat for Finance, Georgy Pyatakov, 
commented that the future of trade between Russia and Britain was impossible 
without the restoration of normal diplomatic relations. Pyatakov said that relations 
should improve because of the delegation's visit, and that an agreement between the 
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two countries could be reached leading to Russian trade with Britain being worth 
E150 million, possibly rising to E200 million. The Russians stressed the fact that no 
representatives of British banks were present, and an editorial in Pravda stated 
concern at the withdrawal from the delegation of significant figures such as Sir Robert 
Home, a Director of Lloyds Banking Company. Pravda also hoped that the delegation 
would conclude that the resumption of diplomatic relations was essential. 100 
Ramsay MacDonald said '[e]veryone knows that British engineering and other 
manufacturing concerns are not merely desirous of obtaining Russian orders, but are 
positively anxious to get them. It is all a question of conditions. " 01 He said that it was 
Labour's contention 'that the fullest and most complete diplomatic intercourse should 
be resumed at once' 102 as this was the only way to have any complaints satisfactorily 
met. Labour could portray their policy of a rapprochement with the Soviet 
Government as one of practical business rather than dark-red socialism, and the 
journey made by British capitalists to the country that advocated the exact opposite of 
what they believed in helped to vindicate Labour's policy. 
2.5 Labour's second government and the USSR 
When Labour returned to power in 1929 it immediately set about reconciling the two 
countries, and its policy towards the Soviet Union was clear - to maintain its original 
position that the USSR should be included in world affairs because it would be good 
for British business, and it would be good for European stability. The Labour Party 
was dealing with the Soviet Union as a matter of necessity - to pursue employment 
and peace - not because their socialisms were the same. 
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This section focuses on how developments in the USSR confronted some of the 
traditions that defined Labour's socialism when the party was in power for the second 
time. It shows how pragmatists reconciled their need to broker agreements with the 
Kremlin with their own socialist beliefs. It looks at practical and ideological 
arguments in official Government business such as blocking Trotsky's entry into the 
country and at Henderson's negotiations with the Soviet Government. Attention is 
then turned to allegations that slave labour was used in the USSR, which confronted 
the labourist strand in the party's thought, and to the challenges to freedom of speech 
in the CPSU and to the 'alleged' persecution of the Orthodox Church which 
threatened Labour's egalitarian and religious heritage. 
Labour was clear in its own mind that as 'Anglo-Soviet trade increased in the 1920s, 
so did the pressure for pragmatism in relations with the USSR. Anti-Bolshevism was 
one thing; the purse quite another. ' 103 Labour's left-wing also called for a quick 
renewal of relations with the USSR. The New Leader claimed that because diplomatic 
relations had never legally been broken, normal relations could be resumed by 
administrative action. 'We hope that the earliest possible step will be taken in this 
direction - first, because it is a simple act of justice and common sense; second 
because the development of Russian trade is urgently needed; and third because 
normal relations with Russia are so essential to peace. ' 104 
It has already been shown that by the time Labour returned to power, things had 
changed in the USSR. Its economic base had altered, though by 1929 it was beginning 
to industrialise and collectivise. And the non-threatening 'moderates' - those pre- 
occupied with building socialism in the Soviet Union - were firmly in control in the 
Kremlin. The CPSU was more stable than the 'physically sick' body that Labour dealt 
with in 1924. 
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Labour too had changed. Arthur Henderson was brought into the Cabinet as Foreign 
Secretary - the only fundamental change to MacDonald's 1924 Administration. 
Henderson's knowledge of Russian affairs, and his desire for peace through the 
League of Nations, shaped Labour's foreign policy until the Government fell in 193 1. 
He maintained that 'Russia, with its vast population, cannot be permanently ignored; 
only by diplomatic and other intercourse with her will it be possible to bring her once 
more into the family of nations. ' 105 
Henderson's Foreign Office team included Hugh Dalton, acting as Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary, and Philip Noel Baker as the Parliamentary Private Secretary. Lord 
Robert Cecil was brought in as advisor on questions about the League of Nations. 
Labour's foreign policy towards the USSR and the League reflected its 'inclusive' 
socialism -a doctrine based on nation over class. The importance that Labour placed 
upon reconciliation with the Soviet Union became clear as the party rejected Leon 
Trotsky's application for political asylum in Britain in 1929, as accepting him could 
have been seen by the Soviet Union as something of a hostile act. Labour was also 
wary of offering residence to a figurehead of the internationalist movement, especially 
one who had been one of the most hostile critics of British labour movement and its 
leaders only five years before. It is therefore understandable that a Labour 
Government would not feel comfortable about having the original agitator for 
international revolution in its own backyard. 
After much debate, Labour's Home Secretary, John Clynes, refused Trotsky's request 
because 'the right to asylum did not mean the right of an exile to demand asylum, but 
only of the right of the state to refuse it. ' 106 Henderson and Dalton both felt that by 
dismissing Trotsky's application, the Labour Government had questioned Britain's 
historic image as being a haven for the internationally oppressed. Kenneth Miller 
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noted that Henderson thought that 'the Cabinet should consider Trotsky's application 
for residence in England since there was, after all, "a right to asylum. "' 
107 
The left-Liberal conscience of some moderate Labourites was being tested. Henderson 
disagreed with the Home Office, and Labour left-wingers criticised the decision. 
Fenner Brockway and John Strachey disagreed that such a decision would lead to 
problems in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. George Bernard Shaw, like Brockway and 
Strachey, saw the history of asylum under attack. All three distanced themselves from 
Trotsky's ideas, but still felt that he should be allowed to find refuge in Britain. 
Ultimately though, Trotsky stood little chance of being granted political asylum. It was 
not possible to negotiate seriously with Stalin's Foreign Ministry while simultaneously 
giving refuge to his greatest political rival. Successfully negotiating with the USSR, it 
was believed, would bring its own rewards for the good of Britain as a whole - 
rewards far greater than maintaining the image of Britain as a 'haven of freedom'. The 
case of Leon Trotsky highlights the influence that the USSR had on Labour's domestic 
and foreign policies, even without exerting specific pressure. 
Henderson concentrated on securing recognition of the USSR and attempted to find a 
solution to the two questions that dominated the rest of Labour's Administration - 
those of unemployment and peace. As it turned out, the way the party conducted 
overseas business was the most successful element of the second Labour Government. 
There was some success in developing closer links with the USA (the New Deal was 
an inspiration for some of Labour's economic theorists searching for a policy on 
planning), and Collective Security through the League of Nations remained one of the 
main interests in foreign affairs. 
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Arthur Henderson was a successful Foreign Secretary for Labour, despite not having 
the total trust of his Prime Minister. He was an intelligent public servant who knew 
Russia better than most in the Cabinet. But despite this, Henderson knew 'that his 
Prime Minister lacked full confidence in him and that he could not expect 
unquestioning support if he ran into difficulties. ' 108 Yet he 'confounded his 
critics ... [and was] ... generally acknowledged as one of the successes of the second 
Labour Govemment. "09 Pivotal to this success was a new trade agreement with the 
Soviet Union and a move towards co-operation and a reduction in armaments in 
Europe through the League of Nations. 
The negotiations with the Soviet representatives were continued despite Henderson's 
hands being tied by MacDonald's promise that no exchange of ambassadors would 
take place between the two countries without the consent of Parliament. At the 
Exchequer, Snowden ensured that this Labour Government could not be accused of 
scaring the City, and therefore ruled out credit loans to the USSR. Henderson's 
contribution to the efforts to realign Anglo-Soviet relations could have been halted 
there and then. However, he continued to oversee the talks that would improve 
diplomatic and economic business but let it be known that he was not happy with the 
constraints on his ability to deal with the Russians, at the 1929 Party Conference. 'At 
the general election we made it unmistakably plain that if we formed a government 
one of the first things we would do would be to bring about a resumption of 
diplomatic relations with Russia. " 10 
The renewed negotiations had three aims. The first one was essentially short term, as 
it sought to conclude a trade deal that would help Britain out of the Depression. The 
second aim was to gain assurances that communist propaganda would be suspended. 
This was to prove difficult as the Soviet Government refused to accept responsibility 
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for the actions of the Third International, and this meant that no guarantee to end 
propaganda could be made. The third aim was more long term, as it was part of 
Henderson's continued hope of strengthening the League of Nations by creating 
conditions that would see the USSR become a member which would help the cause of 
peace in Europe. 
Before negotiations even began however, Henderson found that his hands had been 
tied by his leader, who, without consulting the Foreign Office, promised that the 
Government would not permit the exchange of ambassadors without the approval of 
Parliament. Henderson disagreed, but knew that he could not go back on this 
statement without running the risk of being attacked in the press. Dalton felt that 
MacDonald was wrong to give this supplementary answer to the House, but realised 
that, for the same reasons that Henderson gave, the Foreign Secretary could not go 
back on it. 
The King also frustrated Henderson's efforts. On 27 September 1929, he received a 
letter explaining that the King was not happy that when Henderson met with Valeryan 
Dovgalevsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, they referred to one another as 
'Ambassador'. The King was not in favour of this, as friendly courtesies given to 
'real' ambassadors hould not be given to Ministers from the USSR who 'if they did 
not actually plan, certainly approved of the brutal murder of the King's first cousins, 
the late Emperor and Empress of Russia. "" It was understood by the King, after 
discussing the issue with Ramsay MacDonald, that Government policy was to 'insist 
on a satisfactory settlement of the points at issue between our two countries, such as 
propaganda and debts, before resuming relations. ' 112 
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The Foreign Office replied on Henderson's behalf. It reminded the King that the 
majority returned to the House of Commons represented the importance in ending 
Soviet isolation. Labour and Liberal MPs were 
committed by declarations made at the time of the elections to the 
resumption of relations with the Soviet Government and it soon 
became apparent that if this was to be achieved an essential 
condition would be the exchange of Ambassadors, as the Soviet 
Government representing as it does at the moment, a country with 
which we have for decades past maintained relations through the 
medium of representatives of the highest diplomatic rank, would be 
satisfied with nothing less. 113 
The Cabinet supported Henderson's approach. His colleagues agreed that the intricate 
nature of re-establishing relations meant that 'if a settlement of the question of debts 
is to be reached there is more likelihood of such a settlement once normal diplomatic 
relations are re-established rather than if relations remain suspended as at present. ' 114 
Negotiations moved slowly. No trade agreement was signed and the issue of 
propaganda remained a stumbling bloc. In fact, the only concrete development that 
had come out of the negotiations was the announcement by Henderson that he would 
accept a Soviet ambassador in London. 
The negotiations continued, and on 3 June, the Foreign Office received a note from 
the Department of Overseas Trade on the 'Financial and economic deterioration in the 
Soviet Union'. It reports a conversation between the British vice-consul in Lodz and a 
member of Eitigon and Company, a Lodz firm who traded with the USSR. The note 
points out that 'Mr Eitigon considers the financial situation is becoming precarious 
and that the position is worsening steadily. " 15 The hand-written response underneath 
states that '[tlhis is extremely interesting, as coming from a firm infinitely better fitted 
than any British firm to estimate the situation accurately, and which after second 
years' trading with the Soviet Government now resolves to grant no further 
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credits. ' 116 Underneath this reply was a note agreeing that this was indeed interesting, 
and that at a time when reliable information was needed to help decide whether 
credits should be offered to the USSR, it shows fairly conclusively that 'such trading 
is not possible on any scale appreciably larger than at present. ' 117 
There was also a warning against believing Pyatakov's figures given to the 1929 trade 
delegation. Pyatakov's daring 'will not bear close analysis., " 8 The Anglo-Russian 
Committee stated that it was 'quite inconceivable that the whole of [the] increased 
foreign trade will be awarded to Great Britain, since some of the main requirements of 
Soviet industry are raw materials which neither Great Britain nor the Dominions 
could possibly fumish. " 19 It also ruled out any hope that British banks, at a time when 
British industry was suffering from 'the prevailing tightness of money' 120 would be in 
a position to give such huge credits to a country which has steadfastly refused to 
honour its old debts. ' 12 1 However, those in the Foreign Office who supported closer 
ties with the USSR, such as Dalton, must have been encouraged by the fact that the 
Soviet Union had for some years been employing 'American experts to help 
reconstruct the Soviet economy' and that 'the reports of these experts are said to have 
whetted the appetite of American finance and industry. ' 122 
Concerning the propaganda issue, Litvinov gave Ernest Remnant 'a vague assurance 
that the Third International was an organisation entirely separate from the Russian 
Government. ' 123 On the strength of this assurance, the Anglo-Russia Committee was 
convinced that 'an effective guarantee for the cessation of hostile propaganda can be 
obtained. ' 124 However, earlier in the year Remnant, Simon Harcourt-Smith and 
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Lawrence Collier discussed this point with Dovgalevsky who did not deny 'the 
connection between the Soviet government and the Kornintern. ' 125 
Nevertheless, by October, Remnant and Walton (who was responsible for the trade 
delegation) resigned from the Committee. It was claimed that both knew that the 
Russians had fooled them when they were in Moscow and were anxious that they 
should not fool anyone else in the same way. 126 This is strange given that prior to this, 
Walton had written to Henderson claiming that Stalin was not a dictator in the 
Mussolini sense. He was a dictator of Russia but not the CPSU, and he wanted more a 
moderate policy at home and a more conciliatory policy abroad. 127 
Dovgalevsky returned to England and both he and Henderson continued to try to find 
solutions. In the final discussion Henderson 'informed the Soviet representative that 
the Government inferred that any guarantees regarding propaganda would extend to 
the Third International. ' 128 Leventhal states that '[b]y papering over their difficulties 
the Foreign Office could appear to snatch a modest victory without the Soviet 
authorities agreeing to specific references in the formal protocol that admitted their 
responsibility for the actions of the Comintern. ' 129 In a House of Commons debate on 
5 November 1929, Henderson defended what he had done and, supported by the 
Liberals, won the vote by a substantial majority (324 to 199). Ambassadors could now 
be exchanged. The Soviet Union sent Grigory Sokolnikov as its envoy, and the King 
was obliged to receive him. 
Henderson chose an experienced diplomat rather than a Labour politician to be 
Ambassador. Sir Esmond Ovey was Henderson's choice. While Leventhal states that 
Ovey 'at least spoke Russian, but was otherwise in the traditional ambassadorial mold 
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(SiCy, 130 Williams comments that he played an important role in shaping Labour's 
attitudes to the Soviet Union for the rest of its Administration. According to Williams, 
Ovey 'had a great impact on [Beatrice Webb's] drift during 1930-31 towards the 
Soviet Union', and that he 
was in an almost unique position for feeding information to the 
Labour Government. There is no evidence that Henderson doubted 
the truth of his despatches. Dalton went to the Soviet Union as soon 
as he could for confirmation ... Even Beatrice Webb was 
convinced! 131 
The choice of Ovey as Ambassador should not only be seen in the context of Labour's 
pragmatic approach to international affairs, but also as a choice that reflects the 
relatively conservative nature of the Foreign Office. David Carlton observes that the 
background and training of Foreign Office officials 'stressed prudence, continuity and 
especially the defence of the national interest in foreign policy. ' 132 
While the majority of Labourites supported Henderson's work, Labour's opponents 
criticised the decision, claiming that the Government had given too many concessions 
to the Soviets. H. N. Brailsford attacked these opponents in the New Leader in 
February 1930. He said that Tory tactics of baiting the Russian bear by challenging the 
Labour Government over its business with the USSR - here about Soviet propaganda 
- was not just 'the usual effort of an Opposition to embarrass the Government of the 
day -) , 
133 and that the Tories had 'something much more important in mind. ' 134 
They are bent on a final breach with Russia. Now there is just one 
way of attaining that end - to manoeuvre a Labour Government into doing it. Any rupture for which a Tory Ministry alone were 
responsible would be temporary. But if any subtlety could tempt 
Labour into a quarrel that ended in the expulsion of the Russian 
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Ambassador from London, a generation might pass before another 
took his place. 135 
He continued to outline the long-term plan of this attack. 
Russians would use their arts to foster discontent; Mr Churchill 
would renew his surreptitious conversations with the white 
Generals; the oil magnates would again allow their imaginations to 
stray toward the pipe-line that crosses Georgia, while the "Daily 
Mail" would discover that religion is in danger. An occasion for an 
intervention would soon present itself, and even if a Labour 
Government had pronounced the Russians impossible, the 
resistance to warlike adventure might be weak. 136 
Brailsford questioned why, even though Henderson had already exchanged 
ambassadors, the right-wing did not realise 'that an expansion of trade in Russia is one 
of the hopeful issues from our tribulations of unemployment. ' 137 
On 16 April 1930 Henderson's hard work paid off, and he successfully concluded a 
trade agreement with the Soviet Union. There can be little doubt that much hope 
rested upon the trade issue. The Five Year Plan that the Soviet Union had embarked 
upon was a source of inspiration for many in the Labour Party. The wider 
implications this had on Labour's economic thought are discussed elsewhere, but 
prominent party economists such as Hugh Dalton argued in favour of a planned 
economy in Britain. It is enough to note here that in the first year of resumed trade, 
Russia took between E6 -7 million worth of goods, mainly engineering, chemical and 
electrical goods, while Britain took E34 million of Russian goods. It must be assumed 
that as this was a long-term policy of Labour's, these numbers would have risen over 
the course of this Parliament had Labour stayed in power. 
Henderson was kept well infonned by Ovey about the rhetoric of Soviet foreign 
policy and what the reality was. He reported to Henderson that 
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It 
I remain convinced... that the whole policy of the Soviets will 
consist in going as far as possible in vituperation of all foreign 
countries and Governments, without actually causing a breach of 
relations. In this the Communist Party who are directors of the 
policy are at least logical and consistent. 
W 
He questioned whether the tolerance of the European powers will 'prove equal to the 
docility of the Russian people. ' 139 
Ovey and William Strang, who was based in Leningrad, continued to report to 
Henderson on the possibilities that the Five Year Plan offered. These reports were 
mostly positive, and it can therefore be assumed that these were sources of hope for 
the Foreign Secretary. There can be no doubt that Henderson wanted his negotiations 
with the USSR to succeed for many reasons. But even as late as December 1930, 
Henderson commented that he was unhappy at the progress made, and that he was 
mindful of the fact that the USSR was still a stick with which the Tories could beat 
Labour. He complained to Ovey that 
I am bitterly disappointed at the results of one year's experience of 
renewed relations with the Soviet government whose actions seem 
designed deliberately to play into the hands of the opponents of 
continued Anglo-Russian relations. 140 
The critical, yet supportive, reports from Ovey coincided with stories emerging from 
the USSR that touched on two issues important to the Labour Party. The first was the 
accusation that forced labour was being used in the USSR, the second was the 
allegation that the Soviet Government was persecuting members of the CPSU and the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Both issues were of particular interest to the Labour Party 
as they challenged many of the fundamental ideas and beliefs of various groups in the 
party. Trade unionists feared for workers' rights in the USSR, socialists were 
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concerned for the safety of democracy in the CPSU and Christians feared for the 
freedom of religion in the Marxist State. 
Michael Farbrnan wrote about the first issue in the New Statesman and Nation, 
claiming that Labour's opponents were using this argument to exploit it as a new anti- 
Bolshevik scare, as British political life needs some kind of anti-Bolshevik scare to 
continue and 'only its particular form needs to be changed. ' 14 1 The stories about 
forced labour continued for some time. Correspondence between Farbman and a 
Swedish critic filled the letters pages of the NS&N for many weeks. Yet the response 
from an American j ournalist in the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times 142 was 
more likely to persuade Henderson that there was no forced labour in the USSR. 
While it is obvious that forced labour was used extensively in Stalin's Russia, this is 
not the point. What was important here is that that the perception of workers' rights in 
the USSR was good. The fact that there appeared to be so many American supporters 
of trade with the USSR, if not support for the actual raison detre of the Soviet Union, 
meant that Henderson was on quite solid ground in continuing to pursue economic 
agreements with the Russians. 
The second issue was more complex. In the 1920s, party members who sympathised 
with the USSR were willing to regard the attacks on the Soviet State in the 1920s as 
nothing more than attacks on international socialism by the Tories, and supported the 
Bolsheviks' right to defend the revolution against 'counter-revolutionaries', 'class 
enemies' and 'White Russians'. Now Stalin turned his attention to his CPSU 
comrades and the Orthodox Church. While the first group could be regarded as simply 
a change in personnel in the ruling party, the second group was particularly pertinent 
for Labour Party members because of the historic links the British labour movement 
had with the Methodist Church. 'Many Labour Party members felt the need to define 
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their faith in quasi-religious terms. The ghost of 'christian socialism' still haunted the 
party and at times it remained a part of its distinctive style. ' 143 Religion also played a 
part during the Spanish Civil War as Catholic Labour members made their voices 
heard. 
The Government knew about the persecution and the rise in the use of terror tactics in 
the USSR. In December 1929 Henderson received a transmission of a dispatch sent 
from Moscow to the Norwegian Foreign Minister that offered a detailed account of 
what he called the 'New Period of Terror. "44 There were general details about how 
unrest and revolt had returned to the Russian provinces and towns due to the lack of 
food, and the hardships that Russians faced because of this and the fact that winter 
was approaching. The transmission then commented on '[flumours regarding 
dissensions within the party [which] remain persistent ... Cleansing of the party 
constantly takes place, and there are many who do not feel safe. ' 145 
I 
The message to Henderson was clear, although there is little to suggest that he would 
have been particularly surprised, as he had always been uncomfortable with the use of 
violence to overthrow the old order in 1917 and remained wary about Communist 
tactics used to build socialism in the USSR. His doubts were reinforced in July 1930 
when he received correspondence from Britain's Ambassador in Moscow, Sir 
Esmond Ovey, concerning the chistka (purge) of party workers in the CPSU. 
Commenting on a report from Grigory Ordzhonikidze, the Commissar for the 
Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Ovey wrote that the purges had led to 5 1,000 state 
employees being removed from their posts. While he claimed that the 'system has 
certain obvious merits' (he doesn't say what these merits were), he claimed that 'it 
may easily prove in practice to be a dangerous one and is likely to lead to serious 
injustices 
... The 
idealism of the members of the "chistkas" may easily become 
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subordinate to personal motives, and the temptation to turn a man out of his job in 
order to secure it for one of themselves, must be a severe one. ' 146 Ovey clearly 
understood the nature of the Stalinist purges before they had even come close to their 
more famous consequences. 
The final issue was the harassment of the Russian Orthodox Church, and there was a 
stubborn refusal to accept these stories. This continued the practice of either 
defending or refusing to accept the harsh realities of building a new society that began 
after the revolution and, as shall be shown later, persisted in the 1930s. The new 
Soviet Ambassador in London told Sidney Webb and Philip Noel-Baker that 'he had 
left Russia in the middle of December unaware that there was any such thing as 
Religious Persecution ... he arrived in England to find the question becoming to be one 
of burning political importance'. 147 
Pro-USSR Labourites dismissed the stories as nothing more than a campaign by the 
Conservative Party and Christian right-wingers. 148 The Daily Herald reported that 
there was "No Persecution of Christians" in an article entitled 'Firm Reply from the 
Russian Church'. 149 The story carried 'facts' from the Russian Holy Synod which 
declared that '[t]here is no religious persecution by the Soviet Union and there never 
was' and it declared that the stories in the Conservative-supporting Morning Post 
were 'absolutely untrue. The Daily Herald correspondent wrote that 
[t]he Soviet Press prints a signed interview with the leading 
orthodox churchmen, denying religious persecution by the Soviet 
Union, and sharply taking the Pope and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to task over recent anti-Bolshevik declarations. ' so 
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Ramsay MacDonald wrote in the Daily Herald that the Government did not have the 
facts. 
News supplied from Riga should not be believed until 
corroborated; a good part of the statements which have done duty 
from time to time have been proved to be false. The History of 
religion in Russia, however, is unfortunately full of the records of 
persecution. 151 
The party adopted a 'wait and see' policy towards these stories, as it was concerned 
with the completion of the trade agreement, as this was an integral part of Labour's 
economic policy. The leadership wanted to learn the full facts before it tackled the 
difficult question of challenging a nation's right to conduct its own affairs, despite the 
fact that these questions challenged many of Labour's long-held beliefs. It clearly 
caused problems though, as Williams notes that there was 
a dialectic between those in the Labour Party who believed the 
allegations might be true and those who only concerned themselves 
with the domestic impact of the campaign. Snowden and 
MacDonald broadly speaking found themselves in the second 
category. Henderson was in the first category and he probably went 
through agonies of conscience until he persuaded himself of the 
lack of truth in the allegations. A lot of people fell into both 152 categories. 
Henderson's approach was probably most indicative of many party members' 
approach to Soviet affairs as a whole - to believe what they chose and try to ignore 
everything else. A small number of people of course chose to believe in everything 
the Soviet propaganda machine fed them and ignore anyone opposing them. In the 
face of rising unemployment and fascist aggression in the 1930s, this situation 
remained, in the main, the same. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The 1931 banking crisis that led to the end of the second Labour Government had a 
number of consequences, some of which directly influenced leftist members of the 
Labour Party to openly encourage a closer relationship with the USSR in the 1930s. 
Not only did it raise questions about the direction of the party's economic ideals, 
which were discussed earlier, it caused irreversible splits. Ramsay MacDonald, Philip 
Snowden and J. H. Thomas left the Cabinet in order to join with Conservative and 
Liberal MPs in a National Government. 
But more importantly for those that remained active in the labour movement it 
encouraged the belief that capitalism was close to collapse and that the class struggle 
was sharpening. Members of the labour movement became even more suspicious of 
the capitalist ruling class. A. J. P. Taylor said that Labour again 'claimed to have been 
intrigued out of office by a ruthless and unscrupulous capitalist class. ' 153 This led the 
ILP to believe that it would be better to fight for socialism outside of the Labour 
Party, and other socialists like Cripps to demand that on returning to power, Labour 
must pass an act to ensure this could not happen again (widely seen as a call for a 
some form of 'dictatorship', which made Cripps seem even more enamoured with the 
USSR). 
Politically, the party was in disaffay and a division between left and right seemed 
clearer as ideology became more important than it had been in the gradualist years of 
MacDonald. After Labour left Office and expelled MacDonald and his followers, the 
party moved leftwards as it sought to define itself once again. The USSR was never 
far away in this quest, and the ideas and policies that have been discussed here were 
prevalent in these debates. Information gathered from the visits to Lenin's and 
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Stalin's Russia throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as is discussed later, aided this search 
for identity. 
The view that Labour Party members had of the Soviet Union as the party left office 
had been fundamentally shaped by not only its dealings with the USSR, but also its 
own understanding of what it was trying to do. After the first revolution in Russia, 
Labour's socialists hailed it as an event that would free the oppressed people of 
Russia and change the world. It also changed the Labour Party as it moved leftwards 
after the war. This was helped by the meeting in Leeds in June 1917 where many 
reformist socialists, for a brief moment in time, flirted with the romanticism of 
revolution. 
A direct consequence of the second revolution in Russia was Labour's new 
constitution and the adoption of Clause IV- the clause for the workers, designed to 
either offer socialist hope to party members and trade unionists, or to ensure that 
Bolshevik tactics were not adopted in Britain. The subsequent Civil War in Russia 
allowed Labour to rediscover its internationalism that was lost during World War 
One, as it defended Soviet Russia from attacks by capitalists and anti-socialist forces. 
It also allowed Labour to develop its own ideas about the rights of nations to tread 
their own paths, which was one reason why the party was so in favour of a League of 
Nations. 
Ironically, as Labour sought to extend the notion of national sovereignty to the 
Russians, Russia took the opposite position as the Comintern was born. The attitude 
of the Labour Party towards the Soviet Union was invariably influenced by the 
relationship it had with the Comintern and the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
Labour had to develop a twin-track policy concerning the USSR. It had to negotiate 
with the Soviet Government in the traditional manner, with ambassadors eeking trade 
agreements whilst simultaneously ensuring that the existence of a Communist Party in 
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Britain did not arm opponents of the Labour Party with ammunition with which to 
portray Labour as further left than it was or even as a "Moscow lackey" - the 
accusation that some Labourites levelled at the CPGB. This helped define Labour's 
actions when it was in a position to influence events. During the second government, 
Labour's identity was shaped in part by its programme at that time, but also by events 
in the USSR which challenged some of the party's traditions through aggressive 
policies towards workers, socialists in the CPSU and Orthodox Christians. 
When the party was in Opposition in the 1930s concerns about the "Moscow lackey" 
label were even more important with the rise, of extremist politics in Europe and the 
desire for unity to counter this in Britain. This Communist encroachment onto 
traditional Labour ground influenced the way Labour's political thought developed, as 
it had to ensure that the Communists did not outflank it on the left if it moved towards 
the central political ground. However, at the same time it had to move away from the 
revolutionary slogans of the CPGB so as not to give its opponents ammunition with 
which to portray the Labour Party as a "Bolshevik" Labour Party. 
What role did the information Labour gathered from its dealings with the Soviets 
when it was in power play? It certainly formed a fundamental part of the party's 
understanding of what the Soviet Union was about and how it worked. It gained 
information from ambassadors and Foreign Office staff that reinforced fears and 
taught lessons. Henderson was alarmed, but not surprised, by news of the oppressive 
nature of the Stalinist system as he learnt about the purges of CPSU members. But 
news of the successes of the Five Year Plan offered Labour an alternative to the free 
trade orthodoxy of Snowden, which was so important to the economic thought of 
Labourites in the 1930s. 
As Labour vacated the Government benches, it can be said that its opinions regarding 
the Soviet Union ranged from hope for the pragmatists and the idealists, to distrust 
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from the politicians who believed in the parliamentary system, as they knew how 
Communists worked and the tactics they would employ to gain support from 
traditional Labour ground. The idealists and the pragmatists both had their views 
confirmed when they visited the USSR. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Searching for Truth: Labour's visits to Communist Russia 
One of the most difficult tasks ... is to strike a proper 
balance 
between the various accounts of present-day conditions in the 
Soviet Union, which range from the ultra-pessimistic to the ultra- 
optimistic. The unsympathetically-disposed observer perceives 
nothing but privation and inefficiency wherever he goes, while the 
"Red" sympathisers sees in the broad plains of Russia the limitless 
asphodel meadows of an earthly paradise. Neither of the above 
estimates can be accurate, and the objectively-minded are faced 
with the problem of having to reconcile contradictory accounts. ' 
Numerous visitors made the long trip to communist Russia in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Some were independent travellers, but many went representing the British Labour 
Party. Official delegations from the labour movement were sent to explore the new 
society being built by the Bolsheviks. The reports sent back by all visitors served as a 
balance to the hostile newspapers such as the Daily Mail and Morning Post, which 
were using words like 'Gang of Thieves and assassins' and 'The Red Devils of 
Moscow' to describe the leaders in the Kremlin. By contrast it was difficult to find 
such language, unless it was being repeated from the Mail, in any of the pro-Labour 
media. Scare stories constantly appeared in the Conservative press, and in many cases 
the stories that returned with the British socialists were used to destroy the myths 
created by Communism's enemies. These included the claim that the Bolsheviks had 
nationalised women and children and that leading communists were living in Tsarist 
palaces eating expensive food while the workers were starving or that people were 
dying. 
Members of the Labour Party and Trade Union Congress delegation, visiting Russia in 
May 1920, refuted these allegations. They noted in their reports that most of the 
accounts that they had seen about Russia in the capitalist press before they made their 
trip 'proved to be perversions of the facts. The whole impression gained was of a 
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different character from that presented by these accounts. ' They said '[w]e did not find 
that either women or children had been nationalised ... We did not see people fall dead 
of starvation in the streets' and they saw '... no evidence of extraordinary luxury on the 
part of the leading Commissars. 2 
The New Leader and the New Statesman also ran articles suggesting that stories in the 
capitalist media were not true. In June 1920, the Labour Leader reported a claim in the 
Times that the Bolsheviks were stage - managing a Communist paradise to show the 
British delegates. 'The British Labour delegates are now reported to have reached 
Samara. If the Soviet Government can stage-manage a Communistic paradise from 
Petrograd to Samara, surely it deserves all success! 0 Reviewing Arthur Ransome's Sbc 
Weeks in Russia, the New Statesman claimed that the book made clear that 'the official 
picture of Russia and of the Bolshevik Government which is periodically drawn in 
blood and thunder for the benefit of the British elector is a monstrous perversion. A 
This did not mean that all Labour's visitors sent back glowing reports praising the 
Communists for saving the world and this highlights the fact that no definitive 
viewpoint about the nature of the Soviet Union emerged. The reports, books and 
articles written by returnees were often greeted with enthusiasm by party members 
who were eager to learn about the type of socialism that was being constructed in the 
land of Tsarism. One delegate, Ethel Snowden, wife of Philip, wrote about her journey 
in Through Bolshevik Russia, and this was popular enough amongst Labourites to 
justify a second printing after publication. 
The reports depended on the individual's interpretation of socialism and meant that 
different assessments could be made of the same thing. Paul Winterton, a student who 
visited the Soviet Union in 1928, said that '[tlwo men may go to Russia at the same 
2 Trade Union Congress, British Labour Delegation to Russia 1920 - Report, London, 1920, p. 6 3 Labour Leader, 3 June 1920 
4 New Statesman and Nation, 12 July 1919 
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time and see exactly the same things, and yet produce widely divergent reports. '5 In 
many cases, people saw what they wanted to see, and their own political background 
dictated this. Of course, they also saw what the authorities and those who produced the 
itineraries wanted them to see as well. 
There were obviously many "truths" that emerged from the reports from returnees. 
However, this means that opinions are also open to criticism from observers who have 
the benefit of hindsight. But visitors to the USSR should not be judged too harshly for 
writing what may seem to the modem historian as blatant lies or blind conviction as 
their reports were products of their time. Historians who are scornful of anyone who 
returned with a positive view of Lenin's Russia and the USSR fail to fully understand 
the mood at home, and the great influence such visits had on thinking when they 
returned. It was one thing for a country to issue propaganda stating how good life was 
there, another for people to return and substantiate such claims. This does not mean 
that historians writing during the Cold War period, such as David Caute and Sylvia 
Margulies, should be ignored. But their works should be read within the context of 
their time -just as the works of the visitors should be. 6 
This does not, of course, excuse some of the more outrageous claims made by some 
travellers. The Webbs accepted that Stalin was not a dictator. Unlike the other 
dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler, 
Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow- 
citizens, and not even over the members of the Party to which he 
belongs ... Stalin is in no sense the highest official 
in the USSR, or 
even in the Communist Party. 7 
3 P. Winterton, A Student in Russia, Manchester, 193 1, preface 
6 See D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers New York, 1973 and S. Margulies, The Pilgrimage To Russia: 
The Soviet Union and the Treatment offoreigners, Madison, USA, 1968 
7S&B. Webb, Communism: A New Civilisation, London, 1937, p. 431 
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This was as ridiculous then as it is now. Indeed, A. J. P. Taylor described their book 
Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation as 'the most preposterous book ever written 
about Soviet Russia. 's However, some of the things that returnees wrote about 
reflected what was actually happening in Russia in this period of the country's history. 
George Lansbury painted a picture of a paradise being built, and while at times nalve, 
he was, to a large extent, writing honestly, when this is compared with what went 
before under the Tsars. But the more moderate observers, such as the 1920 Labour 
delegation, who countered their enthusiasm with criticism, should be accepted as 
credible witnesses whose accounts of Soviet life and politics give the historian 
valuable insights. 
The socialist press in Britain also played an important role in helping Labour to 
understand what was happening in Soviet Russia. Through the stories and articles that 
appeared, the Labour rank and file and leadership were given a greater insight into 
Russian life than their opponents. This was necessary as leaders such as Ramsay 
MacDonald attached much importance to cordial relations with the Kremlin. The 
Communist experiment occupied more column space than any other foreign country 
except perhaps the United States of America. It was not until the rise of Nazism in 
Germany that the Soviet Union's hold over the columns of the newspapers was 
challenged by a European power. Stories about Russia appeared more and more 
frequently in the pages of the Labour press. Newspapers and journals all had a part to 
play in shaping the movement's understanding of Soviet Russia and there was clearly 
a great deal of interest. 
Those who travelled to Russia did so with only a limited knowledge about where they 
were going. Since the revolution, the Bolsheviks had restricted the numbers and 
movements of foreign journalists. Those sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause could 
stay, although they were limited in what they could send home for publication. M. 
a A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Hartnondsworth, 1975, p. 43 In 
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Philips Price was one such observer. As special correspondent in Russia for the 
Manchester Guardian from 1914 to 1919, he reported from within Russia after the 
revolution, giving details of how life was changing under the new regime. 
Price wrote on a wide range of topics whilst reporting on the attempt to build 
socialism in Russia, and he did not confine himself to recounting the effects of the 
revolution on Moscow or Petrograd. In December 1917, he began a series 'Through 
the Russian Provinces', that took him to the Volga region, including Samara, Kazan 
and Nizhni Novgorod. Articles included 'The Peasants and their Land Programmes' 
'The Russian Tartars and the Revolution' and 'The Voice of the People on the 
Revolution'. Price's articles served to counter some of the stories in the Conservative 
press mentioned earlier. Price had his own agenda as well though. He was of the 
opinion that Russia should be treated fairly, and he soon decided that he would 'sink 
or swim with the Soviets. '9 
This chapter is concerned with some of the key visits that were made to communist 
Russia by Labourites during the 1920s and 1930s and focuses on what the visitors 
found whilst there. The first visitors from the Labour Party made their trips in 1920. 
George Lansbury went in an unofficial capacity in that he did not officially represent 
the Labour Party. An official delegation made up of Labour Party and Independent 
Labour Party members and trade unionists toured the country after Lansbury had left. 
Ramsay MacDonald chose Menshevik Georgia instead of Bolshevik Russia, and 
returned thoroughly impressed with what he found. His time here was of great 
importance as it did more to shape his understanding of Soviet socialism than 
anything else until he formed the first Labour Government four years later. 
9 Rose, T. (ed. ) Morgan Philips Price: Dispatches ftom the Revolution, Russia 1916-1918, London, 
1997, p. 9 For more on the ideas of Philips Price, see The Soviet, The Terror and Intervention, New 
York, 1920, and My Reminiscences ofthe Russian Revolution, London, 1921 
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3.11920: Lansbury, MacDonald and the first official delegation 
George Lansbury visited Soviet Russia twice in the 1920s, the first time in the early 
part of 1920 and the second in 1926. The details of his first journey were reported in 
his book "at I Saw in Russia, published in June 1920. His devotion to the revolution 
shone through in this book, which is surprising given that he was a Christian pacifist. 
However, it can be explained by his comment that his 'sympathies are always with the 
left-wingers and those who stand for principle. " 0 
Lansbury found Bolshevik Russia a harsh place to be, but at the same time, a place 
filled with hope and expectation. He noted that children suffered from hardships, 
hunger and disease, but claimed that even the most fierce critic of the Soviet regime 
is obliged to confess that within the narrow limits of their means, 
and these are miserably small owing to our infamous 
blockade ... the Bolsheviks, led by Lunacharsky the Minister for Education, have done everything possible to preserve the life of the 
children, both mentally and physically. " 
He continued to say that, despite the long queues for food, he saw no signs of 
depression 'or lack of mental or physical vigour'. 12 
Lansbury met a number of people whilst in Russia, including the anarchists Prince 
Pyotr Kropotkin and his wife and the secretary of the head of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Patriarch Tikhon. But perhaps his most important meeting wa's with Lenin. 
Lansbury's assessment of Lenin was generous to say the least. He praised his 'far 
reaching ability, downright straightforwardness and the whole hearted enthusiasm and 
devotion to the cause of humanity... ' 13 - Lansbury described Lenin as impersonal and 
the best hated and loved man in the world but believed that he was 'absolutely 
10 Cited in J. Schener, George Lansbury, Manchester, 1990, p. I 11 G. Lansbury, What I Saw in Russia, London, 1920, p. 92 12 lbid p. 93 
13 Ibid, p. 22 
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indifferent both to love and hatred -I do not mean that he has no feeling, because I 
am confident that he loves little children. ' 14 
However, in his pursuit of socialism, 'Lenin could not be thwarted or turned one side 
or the other by personal consideration of any kind'. 15 He also refused to believe that 
the stories of violence that were reported in the British press could be attributed to 
Lenin. 'While talking with him it was impossible to imagine that such a man would 
love or care for violence or butchery, torture or any of the other horrors which are laid 
to his charge. He is too big in his outlook and much too wide in his sympathies to 
want to kill anyone. ' 16 
Lansbury accepted that violence was used, but also that Lenin could not have known 
about it, and that every one received 'some form of trial' 17 during the Red Terror, 
despite the lack of evidence to support this assertion (this was told to him by head of 
the Cheka, Feliks Dzerzhinsky). Perhaps the only reason that Lansbury accepted the 
use of violence, in spite of his pacifism, was that he desperately wanted to see 
socialism being constructed. He should not be singled out for this, as he was not the 
only socialist willing to overlook elements of the Soviet system that did not fit the 
Labour Party's socialism in the hope that they would see a state constructed along 
socialist lines. In the 1930s some Labourites who favoured an alliance with the USSR 
and CPGB members in order to fight fascism adopted this approach. 
The second visit from the Labour Party was an official delegation, whose members 
'reflected a wide range of opinion about Soviet socialism' and were given 'unrivalled 
access to the Bolshevik leaders, to institutions, and to documentation of all kinds. ' 18 
14 lbid, p. 26 
15 lbid 
16 lbid 
17 lbid, p. 1 15 
" S. White, 'British Labour in Soviet Russia, 1920', English Historical Review Vol. 109, (1994) p 62 1. 
Both this article and Graubard's British Labour and the Russian Revolution offer some excellent details 
and analysis of this delegation 
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The main reason why this party could offer such a broad analysis of the Russian 
situation is the numerous interests that were represented within this group. The 
Labour Party sent three delegates, Ethel Snowden, Tom Shaw and Robert Williams. 
The TUC members in Russia were Alfred Purcell, Margaret Bondfield, and Herbert 
Skinner. Charles Roden Buxton and L. Haden Guest were joint secretaries and Ben 
Turner was chairman. The Independent Labour Party sent two delegates in an 
unofficial capacity, Clifford Allen and Richard Wallhead. 
The group travelled for six weeks in Russia between May and June 1920 officially 
representing the British labour movement. As the first delegation of its kind, it greatly 
influenced the way the party felt about Soviet Russia. The very fact that Labourites 
had been to Russia gave them a credibility to speak about it that others did not have. 
The Labour Leader argued that because Tom Shaw had been to Russia and to Poland, 
he 'spoke with peculiar authority. 19 The paper accepted that because he was there, he 
should be more informed than other commentators. Because Tom Shaw said that 
Poland was the aggressor in the Russo-Poland conflict, Poland was the aggressor in 
the conflict. 
The party reached Petrograd on II May, and was greeted by welcomes in Pravda and 
Izvestiya in both Russian and English, showing that this was obviously important to 
the Soviets as well (Izvestiya did the same for Italian delegates in June). The article in 
Pravda, entitled 'Nash privyetlOur Greetings', spoke of the split in the proletarian 
movement that had grown since 1914, about the Allied blockade and how the Russian 
workers had been cut off from the rest of the world. Russia's enemies 
have made every attempt to raise enmity between the Russian 
workers and the proletarians of other countries. They attempted to 
stifle the revolutionary Russian workers with the hands of the 
brother-workers of England, France, Italy and other countries. 20 
19 Labour Leader, 17 June 1920 
20 Pravda, 18 May 1920 
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It claimed to understand that the delegates did 'not share our views on all questions', 
but placed emphasis on this visit as 'one of the stages' in the process of unifying the 
workers of the world. 21 
The Izvestiya article 'Dobro pozhalovat! 'lBe Welcome' embodied a widespread 
sentiment amongst the Bolsheviks at this time, namely that the working class of 
Britain was ready to add its full support to the world revolution. This spectacular 
misreading of the international situation should be put down to revolutionary 
excitement, but there really was little evidence to back up such hopes. In amongst the 
general welcomes given to the delegates, the article attempts to inspire the Russian 
workers and Red Army soldiers by telling them that '[t]oday Moscow will accept 
within its walls dear guests - the representatives of many millions of British workers 
who are fighting against the British capitalists, landlords and generals. 22 The view of 
Izvestiya reflects that of Lenin. Snowden said that 
[h]e showed a surprising lack of knowledge of the British Labour 
Movement. He gave to conscious and intelligent Communism a far 
greater place in British politics than can truly be accorded to it, 
seeing there is as yet no organised Communist party 13 but only a handful of extremists of the older Socialist movements. 
Ethel Snowden's socialism largely reflected that of her husband. She had a strict 
Christian background and appears to have favoured some of the harsher elements of 
Bolshevik rule that emphasised control. Like all the visitors who went to Russia, she 
explored aspects of Soviet socialism that were important to her. That is why her book 
Through Bolshevik Russia includes chapters entitled 'Education and Religion', 'The 
Dictatorship of the Communists' and 'The Suppression of Liberty'. This was a 
21 Ibid 
22 IZVeStl), a, 18 May 1920 23 E. Snowden, Bolshevik Russia, London, 1920 p. 117 
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common feature of the works that came out of people's visits as Labour's history 
dictated the interests of the members over Russian affairs, so trade unionists studied 
workers' and trade union rights, feminists studied women's issues in the Soviet 
Union, economists studied socialist planning. These reflected life in Soviet Russia in a 
way that could be easily understood by readers back home, and details about Soviet 
practice informed Labour's policy towards the Kremlin more than second hand 
reports from newspapers. 
The sober socialism of Snowden led her to celebrate the temperance of the Bolshevik 
regime. She appeared untroubled at the thought of the death penalty being 
implemented if people are caught drinking, '... the attitude of the Government to the 
question of drinking is evidenced in the fact that if a railway worker is discovered 
drunk, having possessed himself illegally of vodka, he is promptly shot. 24 She 
believed that the absence of drinking shops and public drinking and therefore the lack 
of men and women 'the worse for liquor' was a 'commendable feature of social life in 
Russia, and accounts for many good things, probably for the Revolution itself, almost 
certainly for the unvaried success of the Red armies. 25 
Whilst in Russia, some interesting observations were made about some of the more 
famous features of the Soviet system, such as the question of how much freedom 
groups enjoyed in a country with a secret police force, the Cheka. This provoked 
different responses from the visitors. Ben Turner wrote that 
All the stories of organised camouflage to deceive us are nonsense. 
No greater preparations were made for us than would naturally be 
made to welcome a friendly delegation coming to a country which 
had been closed for so long to the outside world. The assertion that 
the streets were specially cleaned and hardships hidden in order 
that we might not learn what the actual conditions are may be 
dismissed as so much moonshine. The Soviet representatives were 
quite open and frank and wanted us to see the worst as well as the 
24 Ibid, p. 27 25 ]bid, p. 26 
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best ... We had absolute freedom to go where we desired, to see 
whom we desired. 26 
George Young, the special correspondent from the Daily Herald who was travelling 
with the party agreed with Turner, refuting allegations that delegates were not allowed 
to see everything they wanted. 'There has been absolutely no attempt to conceal 
anything from the visitors. The short-comings have been as easy to see as the fine 
things. Everywhere we have talked freely with the workers and the people in the 
streets. ' 27 
These accounts contradict what Snowden found, despite them being part of the same 
delegation. While pleased to learn that the Bolsheviks would let them see everything, 
at which she said '[t]his sounded splendid. We heaved a sigh of relief. We had been in 
mortal terror of being a conducted party' 28 the truth was somewhat different. 
As events transpired, we were everywhere accompanied by 
representatives of the Authorities, who were sent, it was said, partly 
to act as interpreters and partly to protect us from counter- 
revolutionaries and Polish spies who might be lurking about with 
bombs ! 29 
Snowden claimed that they were often escorted by up to twenty people, who got 
'fearfully in the way, and often crowded out members of the Delegation eager to get 
close to charts and maps and anxious to ask questions. 30 Whether the "escorts" who 
showed the groups around were there out of kindness and to act as guides in a vast and 
bewildering place, or out of secretive necessity, was also open to interpretation. 
Paul Winterton said that the Russians 
... are by nature an hospitable race and prefer that their guests 
should not flounder about ... This friendliness was real, not 
26 Labour Leader, 17 June 1920 
27 Daily Herald, 22 May 1920 
28 Snowden, Bolshevik Russia, p. 48 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid pp. 4849 
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assumed ... spontaneous, and not a calculated prelude to deception ... far from wishing to conceal things, these Russians 
were usually naively frank. 31 
However, this should be seen in the context of a judgement on an earlier era of 
Russian society. A member of Petrashevsky's circle, (Petrashevsky was a nineteenth 
century Russian revolutionary) wrote that 
[i]n Russia everything is a secret or a falsehood, and therefore one 
cannot have reliable information about anything ... The policy of the 
government is to keep many things secret or to lie about 
them ... Slaves willingly or unwillingly try to anticipate the wishes 
of their oppressors. Hence the tendency to secretiveness and to lie 
has become with us a habit. 32 
Adam Ulam noted that this '... unfortunately is relevant not only to Nicholas I's times. 33 
At times, Snowden felt that she was a pawn in the Bolshevik's propaganda game, 
although she reflected that this was no worse than the anti-Bolshevik propaganda of 
the Daily Mail. She said that 
It was frequently suggested ... that "the representatives of the revolutionary working-class movement in Great Britain had come 
to bring greetings and assistance to the revolutionary Government 
of Russia. " From this belief, or the affectation of it, sprang the 
clever notion of using us in every possible way to advance their 
propaganda. Immense public demonstrations ... at which we were expected to make speeches were already arranged for us when we 
arrived there ... On several occasions members of the Delegation 
addressed the troops in language eminently satisfying to the 
Bolshevik Commissars, and those like myself, who declined to do 
this on the ground that we had not come for such a purpose, 
became objects of suspicion and of quiet dislike. 34 
Other aspects of the trip included going to bed very late, at the 'terribly un-English 
hour 35 of two or three o'clock in the morning. 
31 Winterton, A Student in Russia, p. 23 
32 Cited in A. B. Ulam, The Bolsheviks, Massachusetts, 1998, p. 37 
33 Ibid 
34 Snovýden, Bolshevik Russia, pp 50-51 
33 Ibid, p. 52 
108 
People in Russia appear to be able to live without sleep. At any rate 
they never go to bed before the small hours of the morning ... soon 
we became quite used to the sight of little children playing about at 
eleven and twelve at night, and to the spectacle of a ploughman 
ploughing his land at an hour when it was difficult to say whether 
twilight or the dawn lighted his labours. 36 
She also recounted some of the more bizarre rituals of the new Soviet State. At their 
public reception in Petrograd, the Internationale was played to announce the arrival of 
the delegates. It was then played again when others entered late, when speeches were 
made and to welcome the President of the Soviet. She said that they learnt the tune to 
the song unforgettably that night 'for it was sung whole or in part, exactly seventeen 
times. 37 
Robert Williams and Clifford Allen also gave accounts of life in "normal Russia7. 
Whilst in Petrograd, they shared an ordinary lunch with workers in a public restaurant 
where 'the meals are provided free for the workers as part of their wages. ' They 
continued to say that '[t]he food was enough to sustain and supply bodily energy, but 
unsatisfactory to our unaccustomed palates, and we were made to feel the evidence of 
the infamous blockade'. 38 
These animated accounts were more informative in the ways of Russian life than the 
official report. Stories about bedtime, singing and the ordinary life of Russian workers 
gave the British socialist just as much of an insight into the lives of Russians as 
information about the way the new soviet system worked. Of course, the delegates' 
report also informed its readers about the nature of Bolshevism and how the Allied 
blockade was affecting life in the new Russia, but the nature in which it was written 
confirms its official status. Whereas the accounts of Snowden, Allen and Williams 
considered Russian bedtime and food, the delegates' report offered few categorical 
36 Jbid 
37 Ibid, p. 55 
38 Daily Herald, 20 May 1920 
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opinions, saving itself more for a factual analysis of the situation. Graubard is 
absolutely right in his assessment of the report: 
This report must by any standard be accounted a document of the 
greatest significance. Conceived in an objective spirit, and based on 
a judicious sifting of evidence, it served as a necessary corrective to 
some of the more biased judgements produced by men of the 
Lansbury school. The delegation visited Russia neither to praise 
nor to condemn but only to examine. Good and bad were 
discovered everywhere, never in perfect balance, and usually 
explainable by rational argument. 39 
The purpose of the report was to be as scientific as possible, to research, and to report. 
The delegates produced a report notable for its clarity. When they did offer opinions, 
these tended to differ from the passionate pro-Bolshevism of Lansbury. While he 
wrote an affectionate description of Lenin, the official representatives of British 
Labour were far less impressionable when it came to describing the founder of the 
Bolshevik state. The philosopher Bertrand Russell, travelling with the party, found 
Lenin 'opinionated, narrowly orthodox and dictatorial' although he commented that he 
was also 'undeniably courageous and dedicated. t40 Snowden met Lenin and accepted 
that one meeting would not entitle her 'to be dogmatic about ... the character of Lenin. 
It is not possible to know anyone in so short a space of time. 41 But she said that 
I have read much of what Lenin had written, and disagreed very 
profoundly with most of it; but I knew that he had kept together his 
Government in circumstances of tremendous difficulty and 
discouragement for more than two and a half years. One year after 
another, he and his tireless colleague, Trotsky, had overcome his 
country's enemies. 42 
This point obviously interested British socialists. Here was a government that had 
come to power promising to build socialism and that had also kept power despite 
39 Graubard, British Labour p. 217 
40 Cited in ibid, p. 221 
41 Snowden, Bolshevik Russia, p. 115 
42 Ibid 
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overwhelming pressure from the capitalist powers. Labour could find themselves in 
the same boat one day. Indeed Stafford Cripps argued that Labour's second 
government had been brought to an abrupt end in 1931 by unscrupulous and dark 
capitalist forces. 
Snowden found Lenin's fanaticism impressive, claiming that this was his driving 
force. But 'his firm belief in the necessity of violence for the establishment throughout 
the world of his ideals makes one doubt miserably. A3 She said that Lenin was a 'keen- 
brained, dogmatic professor in politics'44 , and it is clear that she quite liked him, if not 
his politics. Nevertheless, this highlights the main stumbling block for most of the 
delegates - the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Whether this was in the form of 
violence against enemies or suppression of freedom of speech, whichever way they 
looked at it, the Bolsheviks implemented tactics abhorrent to the main British 
traditions of gradual reform (which prevailed for the most part of Labour's history, 
except for the short-lived but radical New Unionist period). 
Bertrand Russell criticised Russia's friends abroad for thinking that "proletariat" 
meant "proletariaf' but "dictatorship" did not mean "dictatorship". 'This' he said, 'was 
the opposite of the truth. '45 He saw no sign of democracy being built in Russia, 
arguing that the soviets were just a way for the Communist Party to relay its orders. 
The delegates found that freedom in the Western sense was completely unknown -a 
point they utterly deplored and one that they believed was too high a price to pay for 
the benefits the revolution promised. However, Ben Turner put the Bolshevik's case. 
He said that they do not hide the fact that they use repressive measures. 
They say that, so long as a great part of the world is plotting against 
them, they must have exceptional powers to arrest counter- 
revolutionaries, monarchists, and officers in the old White Guard 
who act as agents and spies for the enemies of Russia. They say 
43 lbid p. 1 17 
" lbid p. 119 
45 Cited in Graubard, British Labour, p. 220 
"We are surrounded by war and we are going to protect the 
Revolution by all means possible. 46 
Snowden recounted numerous stories about the suppression of liberty, such as being 
told by the chairman of the Cheka that nobody 'had been shot without a fair trial' and 
that 'no great tyranny was exercised. 947 Her translator's eyes were 'swimming with 
tears9 as she told her '[i]t is hard for me to hear these replies and be able to say 
nothing. ' Snowden left the room 'cold with horror and dislike, for I knew without the 
implication of the interpreter's words that much of what had been said to us was 
absolutely untrue. 48 However, she still tried to put forward a balanced account, 
making it clear that the opponents of Bolshevik rule, the Whites, were more brutal. 
It is no consolation to me to learn, as I did, that the White Terror 
was even worse. I am absolutely satisfied on the evidence I have 
seen, that where the Red Terror has slain its thousands the White 
Terror has destroyed its tens of thousandS. 49 
However, despite her attempts to be balanced, pro-Soviet supporters criticised her for 
only looking for the negative aspects. Sylvia Pankhurst visited Soviet Russia soon 
after Snowden left, and she claimed that 
Mrs Philip Snowden proved one of the most obstinately determined 
not to be influenced by the prevailing atmosphere. She bolstered up 
her original prejudices by visits to counter-revolutionaries and anti- 
Communists, who supplied her with a jumble of feeble and 
mutually conflicting stories ... 
so 
Communist supporters always claimed that critics - even those who accepted that 
some elements of the new system were positive - were always looking for ways to 
highlight the negative. 
46 Labour Leader, June 17 1920 
47 Snowden, Bolshevik Russia, p. 159 
48 Ibid p. 159 49 Ibid p. 161 
50S. Pankhurst, Soviet Russia as I saw it, London, 192 1, p. 163 
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The conclusion of the delegates' report highlighted the different attitudes within the 
group, and therefore the different attitudes that were prevalent within the party itself. 
Some delegates had their views confirmed, that this was a model of socialism that 
Britain could follow, and that it was socialism that was being constructed in Russia. 
Others had their hopes shattered by their experiences of Leninist socialism. There 
appears to be, however, no attempt to conclude whether Lenin's interpretation of Marx 
was indeed actual Marxism in practice. The final group had their doubts confirmed - 
that this primitive form of socialism was fine for the Russians, but could certainly not 
work in Britain. Snowden wrote that some of the delegates left Russia 'filled with 
uncritical enthusiasm for the Bolsheviki; others were bitterly disappointed in their 
expectations; others again were confirmed in former opinions. 51 
One delegate told her that 
I went without the slightest bias in the world against what I 
regarded as a very big thing, the establishment of a great Socialist 
Republic, and I have come out with a deep feeling of 
disappointment. There is practically no Socialism in Russia worthy 
of the name. And the people are utterly wretched. 52 
Most delegates agreed on one point, however, and this was that it was the Allied 
intervention, and not Lenin, that was responsible for the problems that Soviet Russia 
faced. They asserted that the militarism that existed in the country was a consequence 
of the Civil War, and that this should be concluded as quickly as possible. They saw 
the war as a 'crime in its inception and a blunder in its continuance. ' 53 
The report concluded that: 
The Russian Revolution has not had a fair chance. We cannot say 
whether, in normal conditions, this particular experiment would 
have been a success or failure. The conditions have been such that 
51 Snowden, Bolshevik Russia, p. 179 
52 Ibid p. 180 
53 Ibid p. 179 
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would have rendered the task of social transformation 
extraordinarily difficult, whoever had attempted it and whatever 
had been the means adopted. We cannot forget that the 
responsibility for these conditions resulting from foreign 
interference rests not upon the revolutionaries of Russia, but upon 
the capitalist Governments. 54 
Ethel Snowden's conclusion shares these sentiments. Summing up how she viewed the 
results of the tour, she wrote that 
I am not hostile to the Russian Revolution which the tyrannous 
regime of the Czars (sic) made necessary and inevitable; but I am 
utterly opposed to the coup detat of the Bolsheviki, as I should be 
to the seizing of power by any small minority of the people; for out 
of this action has sprung a large part of the misery the unhappy 
people of Russia endure. " 
The last part of this statement is a direct contradiction to how the other delegates felt. 
Unlike her comrades who blamed the capitalists, Snowden blamed the Bolshevik 
seizure of power for the position Russia found herself in. But it was not reasonable to 
judge Bolshevism only on what it had achieved by the time of her visit. For those 
living under the Bolshevik system, she concluded that 'Bolshevism is a failure. ' 56 
However, this was inevitable because of the great difficulties that were facing Russia. 
Alien invasion, internal disorder, counter-revolutionary activities, 
scarcities of necessities of all sorts, the blockade of Russia - all 
these things made it quite impossible for the Russian Revolutionary 
Government with the best brains and the finest intentions in the 
world to carry out more than a fraction of its programme in a very 
imperfect manner. The wonder is not that they have failed to 
establish Socialism, but that they have successfully accomplished 
so much that is good. 57 
It must be assumed that the good Snowden saw was the fact that the Tsarist Autocracy 
was gone, and in its place was a government willing to use harsh measures to outlaw 
54 Labour Delegation Report, p. 27 
55 Snowden, Bolshevik Russia, p. 11 
56 Ibid p. 180 
57 Ibid p. 181 
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some of the more decadent ills of society (such as alcoholism), and also willing to 
pursue socialist goals, even if 
Soviet Russia could teach Western Europe nothing and that 
Socialism would prevail in Great Britain long before it would in 
Russia. Dr. Guest expressed the same view, and said the delegation 
had been well received in Russia, but that their views had won little 
sympathy. 58 
It is clear from this that certain sections of the Labour Party would not be won over to 
the ideas that argued that extreme measures were needed to defeat capitalism. For 
Ethel Snowden, the politics of Soviet Russia offered nothing to Britain. 
Ramsay MacDonald agreed and this was demonstrated by the fact that he chose to 
visit Menshevik Georgia rather than Bolshevik Russia, and it was this visit that shaped 
his own views of Bolshevism. The events that took place in the Menshevik Republic 
of Georgia meant that MacDonald broke completely with any sympathy he had for 
Lenin's regime. Georgia was a country that had undergone revolution and successfully 
established a socialist democracy, but not under the influence of the Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat. 
The socialist style of Georgia, and not Bolshevik Russia, was how MacDonald saw a 
future socialist Britain. It is likely that this was the break that ensured that Labour's 
leaders would not see Soviet Russia as a total exemplar. While there were times later 
in the 1920s and 1930s when Labour intellectuals, rank and file members and even 
leading figures supported the USSR and Soviet policy, such as planning, it was 
Ramsay MacDonald's Georgian experience, together with Labour's history, that 
ensured it would not become a willing Soviet satellite. 
The Georgian Socialists are too good ILPers to play monkey tricks 
with dictatorships or any such varieties. They are democrats. They 
58 The Daily Herald, 24 June, 1920 
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have had their revolution - social as well as political - without 
shooting an opponent, except when they were invaded, without 
suppressing aj ournal ... [the Georgian socialist] 
has had his Soviet 
time, but he very soon ended it. He created it when the first Russian 
Revolution took place, but he at once elected a Constituent 
Assembly, formed a temporary coalition, held a regular general 
election on adult suffrage, with full protection for all 
minorities ... The Russian conception of government 
is, for me, 
fundamentally bad, the Georgian fundamentally good ... Georgia [must] ... at once [be] recognised as an independent state and 
admitted into the League of Nations. 59 
Once the Bolsheviks had triumphed in Georgia, MacDonald's flirtation with 
revolutionary socialism, which began in Leeds in 1917 but never grew into anything 
more than support for other nations' right to tread this path, ended. Yet despite bitter 
disappointment that Menshevism. could not prevail in this region, the pragmatic 
MacDonald still sought to bring Leninist Russia into contact with Britain. Ideological 
links had been broken, but MacDonald saw a potential way out of Britain's troubles in 
dealing with Russia. 
These three visits each represent the most prevalent schools of thought that dominated 
Labourites' understanding of Soviet Russia at this time, and thus laid the foundations 
for Labour's overall attitude to the USSR in the inter-war years. Lansbury, the most 
uncritical visitor, represented the smallest group within the Labour Party throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s - those who gave their support to the revolution and to Soviet 
Socialism, without wishing to break with the party and join the newly formed 
Communist Party of Great Britain (termed 'fellow travellers'). Lansbury largely 
supported what the Bolsheviks were trying to do, and "at I Saw in Russia presented 
a favourable account of life in Leninist Russia. Aside from the obvious facts about the 
deaths during the Red Terror and the problem of child poverty, the image portrayed in 
the book is one of hope that socialism could and would be constructed. 
59 Labour Leader, 21 October 1920 
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The Labour Party and Trade Union Delegation represented the majority of the party 
who were critical yet understanding of what the Russians were trying to do. There 
was widespread support for closer links with Russia, although not to the extent that 
invoked support for communism in Britain. The overall findings suggested that 
Russia's problems were caused by the circumstances left to the Bolsheviks by the 
ancien rigime, but some delegates also saw no solution in Bolshevik ideology. The 
suppression of liberty and clear use of dictatorial powers by the ruling party did not 
please the delegates. However, the fact that there was a party in power that favoured 
socialist ideals was better than either a capitalist government or Tsarist autocracy, 
especially given the pressure from hostile forces during the Civil War. The final 
approach was followed by some of the leaders of the movement who favoured the 
more gradualist form of socialism discussed elsewhere, and they could find solace in 
MacDonald's overall argument that Bolshevism was not the right approach to win the 
people over to socialism. 
The visits helped to influence party policy in two ways. Firstly, it meant that shaping 
policy concerning Soviet Russia was more informed than it would have been without 
first-hand experience. This fact was given more significance as the party's future 
Prime Minister had made the journey to see an alternative to Bolshevism, which he 
saw as more relevant to how he interpreted socialism. MacDonald's own views, and 
those of the delegates who visited Bolshevik Russia, helped to shape Labour Party 
opinion for years to come. 
Secondly, the most important decision agreed upon was that Russians should be 
allowed to experiment with whatever form of government they saw fit. Capitalist 
powers should not be allowed to interfere in the internal politics of Russia, and this 
opinion had been gaining support in the party for some time, as is evident from the 
view put forward by the ACIQ and the New Statesman and Nation detailed elsewhere. 
This understanding of sovereignty can be reconciled with moderate Labour leaders' 
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understanding of international affairs. Internationalism had taken on a new meaning 
for some in the party. The original meaning of international solidarity with the 
workers of the world was no longer as important as security and safety (and possibly 
socialism), which were to be promoted through agreements with the world's 
governments. The original idea was still there, but the emphasis and means had 
changed. 
Once Labour had decided that the Bolsheviks were not going to be removed from 
power, and this was by no means a certainty at this time, it followed that a specific 
policy was needed, and this was that immediate negotiations over trade should be 
opened, and normal diplomatic relations should be resumed at once. Labour began to 
realise the necessity of befriending Soviet Russia, and this policy was fulfilled in 1924 
when the short-lived Labour Government became the first Government to officially 
recognise the Soviet Union. 
3.2 A visit to post-Leninist Russia 
Soon after the Labour Government fell in October 1924, the British Trades Union 
Delegation went to the Soviet Union and visited various regions including Moscow, 
Kharkov, the Caucasus and Baku. This was the first organised labour group from 
Britain to visit Russia since the death of Lenin. This is important, as it gave the 
members of the party the opportunity to compare post-Leninist Russia with the reports 
of the earlier visitors who were researching the newly revolutionised Russia. The 
members in this delegation were Albert Purcell, the TUC Chairman, Ben Tillett, the 
political secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, John Bromley MP, a 
member of the TUC General Council, Alan Findlay, Herbert Smith, President of the 
Yorkshire Miners' Association, John Turner, Fred Bramley, Secretary of the TUC 
General Council, Harold G. Grenfell, A. R. McDonell and George Young. 
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While the purpose of the visit was research, it would seem that the delegates' agenda 
was to prove that socialism was being built in the Soviet Union, and that, whilst there 
were some difficulties and problems, on the whole the experiment was working. 
Evidence for this is in a November issue of Izvestiya in 1924. Next to sketches of the 
delegates, the paper allowed delegates to write comments before they even went 
anywhere in Russia. Albert Purcell wrote 'Soviet Russia - the first bright jewel in the 
world's Working Class Crown'; John Bromley: 'Long Live the workers of Soviet 
Russia'; Ben Tillett - 'Soviet Russia is the hope of the world's workers' and Allan 
Findlay wrote 'Let the Workers live. ' 60 Of course there could also have been an 
element of trying to flatter their hosts in order to curry favour as well. 
There are a number of reasons as to why the members travelling in this party were 
more willing to accept what they saw and what they were told whilst in the USSR. 
The first reason is that people like Ben Turner had been at the front of the radical 
struggle in the trade unions in the late nineteenth century in Britain, which saw him 
lead the London Dock Strike in 1889, as the "new unions" turned more and more to 
direct action. In 1908 Tillett wrote Is the Parliamentary Party a Failure, a pamphlet 
describing non-socialist Labour MPs as hypocrites who repaid 'with gross betrayal 
the class that willingly supports them'. 61 Certain members of this party were not sober 
socialists like those in 1920, and were more than willing to embrace socialism brought 
to power through direct action rather than wait for socialism through parliament. 
The second reason that helps to explain the militant attitudes of the members is the 
political climate at the time in Britain. After the revolutions of 1917 and the forming 
of the CPGB, Russia and communism caught the attention of more than just a few 
people. This is not to say that there was any mass movement towards communism, but 
it reflected a growing, albeit slow, trend within the British working class, towards 
60 Izvestiya, 12 November, 1924 
61 Cited in Foote, Labour Party, Political Thought, p. 47 
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supporting communism. Obviously there was no gigantic breakthrough for the 
Communist Party, but the membership of this revolutionary body was increasing in 
these years. It rose from over 4000 at the end of 1924 to over 11,000 at the end of 
1926 (incorporating the General Strike of this year). 
This highlights the fact that workers had become more radical since the end of World 
War One and the Russian Revolution, and the consequence of this was that Labourites 
were often willing to side with the Russians in international disputes. The refusal of 
London dockers not to load the Jolly George ship with munitions for Polish soldiers 
fighting against the Red Army in 1920 is one such example, and this helped bring 
British intervention in the Russian Civil War to an end. The lack of any significant 
breakthrough to place Britain on the road to socialism in the post-war years, 
especially while Labour was in power, also led people to look elsewhere for ideas. 
Indeed, within the party itself, there was a small but growing support for letting the 
Communist Party affiliate to Labour. Hugh Armstrong Clegg claims that while 'the 
Communist Party attracted attention out of all proportion to its membership', 
[t]he Independent Labour Party, claiming ten times as many 
members, also felt the attraction of the Russian revolution and the 
'workers' state' now established in Russia and spent much of their 
energy in the immediate postwar years ... pursuing the possibility of 62 affiliation to the Communist International... 
The actual content of the report highlights how the 1924 delegation looked at similar 
aspects of Soviet life to that of the 1920 delegation. The report they produced often 
compared conditions in Russia with those seen by Snowden's group, and looked at 
what had changed in those four years. There were some major differences compared 
with 1920. The Civil War was over, and the delegation was visiting a different 
country. The 1920 group had gone to Soviet Russia, whereas the 1924 visitors were in 
62 Clegg, H. A. A History of British Trade Unions since 1889, Volume H 1911-1933, Oxford, 1987, 
p. 360 
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the Soviet Union, formed in 1923. Lenin was gone, and the economy had changed 
significantly. 
In 1920, the delegates witnessed War Communism -a type of economic system 
specific to the Leninist period that saw large-scale nationalisation try to bring industry 
under the control of the Bolshevik Government. The 1924 group however, looked at 
the New Economic Policy, (NEP), which allowed some measure of private trade 
amongst citizens. In comparing the situation, Tillett and his comrades noted that 
Snowden's group called War Communism 'an experiment that must get more and 
more extreme until it exploded. -)63 
The 1924 party found that the economic situation had improved. They saw NEP as the 
first and most fundamental compromise of the Soviet regime, commenting that this 
Gwas not only viable, but [it] has real vitality and stimulates the economic recovery 
that peace has now made possible. ' 64 As is shown elsewhere, some Labourites had 
already begun to call for greater state intervention in the economy, arguing that the 
war years showed how planning in the economy was more beneficial than unreliable 
markets. The controlled reintroduction of markets to Russia meant that it looked more 
like an economy run by leftist social democrats rather than communist 
revolutionaries. Lenin himself admitted that there was an element of 'state capitalism' 
to it. And this helped to define Labour's own theories on planning the economy, 
which found widespread support in the Labour Party in the 1930s and this laid the 
foundations for the mixed economy introduced by the post-war Attlee Government. 
When the TUC delegates looked at the political system, they noted that despite the 
lack of oppositional press, there was a 'very considerable latitude of criticism 
allowed' which 'took the form of open discussion on social and economic 
63 The Official Report of the British Trade Union Delegation to Russia in November and December 
1924, London, 1925, p. 59 64 Ibid 
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questions. 65 They did, however, note that '[n]o attack on the Communist Party is 
66 
permitted'. They admitted that this open discussion was only permitted within the 
confines of the party, and that free speech of the type known in England was non- 
existent. 
They also found that political participation was largely confined to those who 
supported the ruling party. Participation was 'still severely restricted, and the system 
has as yet been kept under close control by its originators with the tacit consent of the 
immense majority of their fellow electors. ' 67 This clearly differed from the Labour 
Party which had altered its constitution after the end of World War One to allow 
individual membership as it looked for mass membership as opposed to the vanguard 
elitism of the Bolsheviks. 
Despite finding that only membership of the Communist Party allowed some kind of 
freedom of speech, the members so wanted to see the meek inherit the earth in a 
socialist utopia, that they still found a way to argue that this system of politics 
worked. Such a system was not undemocratic 'in the widest sense of the word', as in 
many respects 'the individual [has] a more real and reasonable opportunity of 
participation in public affairs than does parliamentary and party government. 68 This 
was fine, of course, if the individual concerned was a Communist Party member, but 
the delegates do not mention how things were for non-Party members. 
The visitors found that 'Communism in one aspect can best be understood in its origin 
as a new Religious Order of devotion and discipline'69 , and claimed that Lenin's 
international representatives could be seen as missionaries. Indeed, the cult that 
surrounded Lenin prompted the observation that Karl Marx and Lenin had replaced 
63 lbid, p. 121 
66 lbid 
67 lbid, p. 17 
69 lbid 
69 lbid, p. 12 
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God and the Tsar. Social and religious conditions, and law and order were also 
surveyed. This was continuing the idea that it was best to report home with facts about 
life in the USSR that could be easily understood by the British worker. 
According to Tillett's comrades, 'public order is now on a footing well above that in 
most continental countries, [and] justice is equitably enforced in the new courts. ' 70 it 
was found that the social system as applied in Russia would not 'be acceptable, in its 
entirety' in Britain, because Russian people are more susceptible to mass 
organisation, 'and are socially less individualistic than the British. 01 They also found 
that 'the moral tone is likely to be greatly improved by the new status acquired by 
women. 972 
The conclusion that the delegation reached was that the USSR was 'a strong and 
stable state' whose 'Government is based firmly on a system of State Socialism that 
, 73 has the active support of a large majority of the peasants... It found that the 
machinery of government, while 'fundamentally different from that of other states' 
worked well, and that it represented better government than anything Russia had 
known before. The travellers conceded that some rights had been eroded, such as the 
right to opposition. Although they claimed that this was 'essential to political liberty 
elsewhere' they argued that this caused no resistance 'partly because these rights have 
been replaced by others of greater value under the Soviet system, and partly because 
recent movements have been steadily towards their restoration. ' 74 Finally, the 
delegates agreed that the Soviet Union was well worth more foreign study. 
The main point that is evident from this report is that it largely supported what was 
happening in Russia, and further reports throughout the 1920s helped to keep this 
70 lbid, p. 98 
71 lbid, p. 108 
72 lbid 
73 lbid, p. 171 
74 lbid 
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support alive inside the Labour Party. H. C. Stevens wrote in the New Leader that he 
had 'excellent opportunities for observation' and argued that Russian workers 'are 
still, in the main, wholehearted supporters of the present regime. ' 75 His reasoning 
behind this assertion was the fact that the Russian people had not overthrown the 
government yet, 'something the Russian people are able to do 976 meant that they were 
happy enough with the Communist programme. 'It is not a satisfactory answer to say 
that the tyranny is too efficient and complete. As a matter of fact very few of the 
workers have any consciousness of the existence of tyranny. 77 While admitting that 
the Communist regime was a dictatorship, he said that '[t]he worker has gained 
substantially as a worker. The eight-hour day; the medical care; the maternity 
provisions; the months cheap holiday every year ... the first opportunities in education 
for his children; in housing accommodation... ' 78 
On his return to the Soviet Union in August 1926 George Lansbury wrote an article 
for Izvestiya, in which he supported the views of Stevens. Lansbury found that 
Russian citizens 'whether in the fields, factories ... mines, on the railways ... are living 
in far better conditions. 79 Life, he said, 'was spouting like an inexhaustible 
fountain. 80 It is not difficult to see why the Russian experiment remained interesting 
to the British working class. Such reporting targeted issues important to ordinary 
people in Britain. According to these accounts, socialism really could bring about 
improvements to everyday life outside of the workplace as well as inside the factory. 
Overall these views can be seen as a product of their time and the TUC report 
reflected a growing interest in left-wing alternatives to the traditional, gradualist way 
the Labour Party sought social and economic change. The promise of socialism in the 




79 Izvesliya, 29 August 1926 
go lbid 
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Soviet Union - the process of which had already been started - was perhaps more 
appealing than waiting for Labour to regain power. This was particularly important 
given the failure of the 1924 government to introduce any recognisably socialist 
policies. 
While information from the 1920 delegates helped Labour's leadership to form a 
specific policy towards the USSR when it dealt with the Kremlin in 1924, this visit 
helped to define some more of Labour's theoretical boundaries. The Labour 
leadership was concerned with continued attempts by the CPGB to affiliate to the 
party, and the evidence from the delegates about the nature and tactics of the CPSU 
confirmed that their position was the correct one to take. Labour was not an elitist 
party with a small membership. Indeed, for the most part, the party had the general 
support of its members and it did not therefore want to ally itself politically with a 
party that had strong connections with a body such as the CPSU. 
Freedom of expression was still a factor of Labour Party politics (at least until the 
more ideologically charged thirties when Stafford Cripps was expelled for failure to 
toe the party line). The party was, first and foremost, a mass membership party with a 
constitution that demanded loyalty to the cause, but also freedom within that set up. 
This issue also came to the fore in the 1930s when, as is shown elsewhere, a 
significant section of the membership defied their leaders' demands to have no 
contact with communists in a united front against fascism. 
However, Labour was also willing to learn from the Soviet Union, and this helped to 
define its thinking on the economy. While there was certainly no fundamental break 
with the orthodoxy of the free market, so loved by Philip Snowden, there was an 
acceptance that some new thinking was called for. The intricacies of Labour's 
economic thought are dealt with later, but the mixed economy witnessed by the TUC 
delegation offered hope to those socialists who had criticised the random nature and 
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pro-consumerist, anti-producer position of capitalism. NEP offered a new vision of a 
planned economy that could still accommodate capitalism. It is here that the 
corporatist-socialist thinking that defined Labour's economic thought in the 1930s 
began to emerge, and this distinguished the Labour Party from all the other political 
parties, from the Conservatives on the right to the CPGB on the left. 
On the whole, by the end of the 1920s the Labour Party's interest in the USSR had not 
waned and this was largely due to the travellers' tales. The rank and file, and to a 
greater extent the intellectuals of the Labour Party, were still enamoured with 
communism in the Soviet Union. Neal Wood noted that 
For many intellectuals Soviet Russia was the one hope of the 
future. Books and articles favourably reporting every aspect of 
Soviet life were eagerly devoured by a hungry audience. 
Pilgrimages to this new land of promise were made by British 81 people from every walk of life. 
As the next decade began Kingsley Martin, editor of the New Statesman, wrote that 
even Lord Lothian gave 'a remarkable speech at the London School of Economics 
... advising us to learn from Russia instead of abus[e] her. ' 82 The policies that Labour 
adopted in the twenties show how the party adapted to the situation. And the mood of 
the party to some extent shows how it did learn from the USSR. In its economic 
thought this had a positive influence as the party looked at NEP, while in terms of 
party democracy Labour was certainly unlikely to follow the methods and tactics of 
the CPSU. 
By the early 1930s, the backdrop to the visits had altered. The economic depression 
and a questioning of Labour's faith in parliamentary methods meant that a renewed 
interest in Soviet affairs to some extent threatened Labour's traditional gradualism. Of 
course, the moderate leaders still espoused non-revolutionary methods to reach the 
81N. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, London, 1959, p. 42 92 New Statesman and Nation, 4 July 1931 
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New Jerusalem but others were not so sure, as this had brought only limited results in 
the short-lived Labour Government of 1924 and the MacDonald goverment. 
As Andrew Williams notes, by late 1931 after Ramsay MacDonald's split from 
Labour 'the atmosphere of defeat made many, if not most members of the Labour 
Party look elsewhere than Westminster for inspiration... ' 83 The party was certainly 
open to ideas from other models of progressive politics, such as the USA and Sweden, 
but the most favoured option was still the USSR as this offered a total break with 
capitalism, which appeared to many as if it was about to collapse, and thus ensured a 
steady flow of visitors in the 1930s. 
3.3 Stalin's Russia through Labour eyes 
The nature of the new Stalinist dictatorship was of paramount interest to Labourites in 
the early thirties. In January 1931 the New Statesman noted how the CPSU was 
becoming more of a personalised dictatorship with Stalin assuming the leading role 
and its words have been proved correct by history. 
Since the death of Lenin ... the dictatorship of Stalin has been 
established, not by any triumphant victory over a foreign enemy or 
even over Russians of other political persuasions, but by gradual 
yet relentless elimination of any comrade in his own party who 
might endanger the Stalin leadership. 84 
The article continued to say that 
[a]cting in the sacred name of Lenin, Stalin has ostracised or exiled 
most of the men on whom Lenin relied for the successful carrying 
out of the October revolution. Trotsky, Zinovieff, (sic) Kameneff, 
(sic) Rakovsky were the first to be subjected to this Pride's purge. 
Tomsky, once the tribal god of the Russian Trade Unions, has 
suffered the same fate. Even Rykoff, (sic) that most harmless of 
Bolshevik mandarins, has had to endure the degradation of public 
93 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 183 
"New Statesman and Nation, January 3 1931 
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recantation and enforced leave of absence, and, finally, of enforced 
resignation. Bukharin, the privileged interpreter of Lenin and the 
drafter of the Communist programme, is now denounced openly in 
the official Bolshevik press as Mr Facing-Both-Ways and as the 
leader of the opportunists. 85 
Of course, the Labour leadership already knew much of this, which is why they were 
willing to negotiate trade deals with the Soviet Government, but keen to put as much 
distance as possible between the British labour movement and the Russian concept of 
socialism. For ordinary Labour members though, these developments in Moscow 
were news. But such opinions were not categorical and there were those who refuted 
the allegations that Stalin was a dictator. C. M. Lloyd wrote about his visit to the 
USSR in the New Statesman and Nation in 193 1, and took up a contradictory position 
to the previous article. 
Lloyd described Stalin not as a dictator, but instead as 'the most powerful individual 
in the State, but he is neither theoretically nor actually an absolute monarch. ' 86 He 
continues to claim that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is 
a system of control that vies with and surpasses that of Italian 
Fascism in its ingenuity and its effectiveness. It is a regime which 
is repugnant to British traditions of liberty. But one must put aside 
prejudice in order to understand it. It is not all brutal violence and 
malevolent cunning. 87 
While agreeing with critics of the regime that this constitutes a dictatorship over the 
proletariat, he points out that the Communists 'conceive this dictatorship as a 
trusteeship, and, moreover, they are not an entirely alien body, a class with separate 
interests. ' 88 
85 lbid 




Even the Daily Herald lent itself to this view. An article in March 1930 described 
how Stalin had personally ordered a change in policy that would loosen the CPSU's 
tight grip on the peasantry and allow the 'voluntary entrance and exit of members of 
collective farms'89, implying that Stalin did not know that the peasants were being 
victimised. The Herald was reporting Stalin's 'Dizzy with Success' article in Pravda, 
and the story that followed said that '[s]ince he took to announcing special advantages 
for members of collective farms, and a moderation of the methods of collectivisation, 
his prestige among the peasants has risen sky high. ' 90 
According to the Herald, 'Stalin is at present receiving daily mailbags containing 
letters and questions from the most distant villages of the Soviet Union. The peasant 
looks up to him as a protector against arbitrary local officialdom. '91 While such views 
may have been expected in the pages of the Daily Herald whilst George Lansbury 
was involved, the paper had been under trade union control since 1922, and tended to 
reflect the more moderate views of the union and party leadership. Yet such a pro- 
Soviet view here can be attributed to the fact that Henderson was negotiating a new 
trade deal with the Russians at this time. 
The ILP's paper, the New Leader, aired an increasingly pro-Soviet view, thanks partly 
to Anna Louise Strong, a journalist who had lived in Russia since the early 1920s. 
The New Leader described her as an 'ardent friend of the Soviet Government, '92 and 
in 1924 she wrote The First Time in History, which described the successes that the 
Russian Government had had so far. Leon Trotsky wrote the introduction, and 
described Strong's approach - one that was 'not from the aesthetic, or contemplative 
point of view, but from the point of action' - as 'the only correct one'. 93 A fantastic 
89 The Daily Herald, March 26 1930 
90 The Daily Herald, April 8 1930 
91 lbid 
92 New Leader, June 20 1930 
93 A. L. Strong, The First Time in History, London, 1924, p. 7 
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twist of historical irony later saw Strong become one of the most tenacious pro- 
Stalinists to write in the Labour press. 94 
Her work often appeared in the New Leader, and strove to put forward the most 
positive of pictures of Stalin's Russia. Her articles included 'Stalin unites Russia' and 
'Wonder Years of Russian Socialism 95 and extolled the virtues of life in the workers' 
paradise. After claiming, in the first article, how wonderful Stalin was, Strong said 
'Russia will use this power to promote world revolution! There may be a united soviet 
state of Europe under Russian domination by 1950, or sooner. ' 96 When describing the 
'wonder years of Russian socialism' Strong neglects to mention the human cost that 
came with industrialisation and collectivisation. It must be assumed that this could not 
have been hidden to someone who spent so much time in the USSR, and therefore that 
she accepted it as an inevitable consequence of building socialism. 
Such reports helped to create a utopian vision of the USSR that contradicted the 
stories in the New Statesman of personal dictatorship and the elimination of rivals for 
Stalin's power. Ironically, the views of the Labourites who established the New 
Statesman, the ardent Fabians Sydney and Beatrice Webb, failed to support the 
opinions espoused in that journal, after they visited the USSR in 1932. They were not 
the only Fabians to go to the USSR in this period, as the New Fabian Research 
Bureau also made the trip. So too did the Webb's Fabian friend George Bernard 
Shaw. 
94 There was another, sad, twist in store for Anna Louise Strong. Her loyal support for the Stalinist 
system did not save her from becoming a victim of its arbitrary repression, as in 1949 she was taken to 
the Lubyanka and interrogated by the OGPU. She was then abandoned on the Polish border and denounced on Soviet radio as a spy. For more details, see D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers, pp. 74-75 95 New Leader, July 25,1930 
96 New Leader, March 21,1930 
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3.4 Fabian gradualists in revolutionary Russia 
The conversion of Bernard Shaw to Soviet Communism began a trend that saw 
Fabian socialists extol the virtues of the Stalinist system. The process began in 1931 
with Shaw's visit to the USSR and was completed when the Webbs followed a year 
later. It is fair to say that the Stalinist leadership represented a core element of Fabian 
socialism, the concept that an elite should head the movement that would construct 
socialism. This was one of the main reasons why Fabians felt able to support the 
methods of Stalin. Gareth Griffith said that Shaw is mentioned in relation to political 
thought only as a supporter of 'various forms of dictatorship - proletarian or 
otherwise. 97 He argued that this is 
either in connection with the elitist tendencies in Fabianism, which 
culminated in his support for the Stalinist conception of state- 
worship in the 1930s, or else his name is to be found in the long list 
of literary proto-fascists, fellow travellers with Hitler and 
Mussolini, those fake emblems of the collectivist politics of 98 virtue. 
Shaw spent ten days in the USSR with Lady Astor - the more questioning and critical 
of the two - and this was widely publicised in the USSR. Shaw offered no criticism of 
the world he had found, yet his claims that Russia was living in an atmosphere of hope 
and security not seen in any capitalist country were greeted with derision. Griffith cites 
one damning example. 'The lengthening obscenity of ignorant or indifferent tourists, 
disporting themselves cheerily on the aching body of Russia, seemed summed up in 
this cavorting old man, in his blanket endorsement of what he would not 
understand. '99 
97 G. Griffith, Socialism and Superior Brains. The Political Thought of Bernard Shaw, London, 1993, 
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Dmitri Shostakovich, the famous Russian musician, made his feelings clear about 
Shaw, whom he sarcastically referred to as a 'famous humanist'. Responding to 
Shaw's famous claim that there was no hunger in the USSR (even throwing out his 
food as he crossed the border into Russia to make his point), Shostakovich said 
[i]t was Shaw who announced on his return from the Soviet Union, 
"Hunger in Russia? Nonsense. I've never been fed as well 
anywhere as in Moscow. " Millions were going hungry then and 
several million peasants died of starvation. And yet people are 
delighted b 
0ý 
Shaw, by his wit and courage. I have my own opinion 
on that ... 
10 
He also scoffed at Shaw's comment '[y]ou won't frighten me with the word 'dictator" 
saying '[n]aturally, why should Shaw be frightened? There weren't any in England, 
where he lived. I think the last dictator had been Cromwell. '101 This demonstrates one 
of two possibilities. It either shows a complete shift in the opinions of Russians since 
the 1920s when the visitors were welcomed with open arms and long passages in the 
Soviet press. Or it represents the true feelings of Soviet citizens who saw the truth of 
what was happening in their country but could not understand why foreigners failed to. 
Shostakovich's comment that people were delighted by Shaw makes it difficult not to 
accept that his words about the Soviet Union would not have been greeted with the 
same enthusiasm. Andrew Williams points out that, as Shaw was a founder of the 
Fabian Society with the Webbs, 'he still had a role as 'opinion leader' in the Labour 
Party. ' 102 But he also claims that, while one commentator noted that Shaw had a 
'bigger audience than anybody else on Earth', '[i]t is very difficult to ascertain to what 
extent Shaw was taken seriously within the Labour Party, and to what extent he was 
seen as the court jester. ' 103 
100 S. Volkov, (ed) Testimony. The Memoirs ofDmitri Shostakovich, London, 1979, p. 200 101 lbid 
102 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 145 103 ]bid, p. 146. The 'bigger audience' comment was made by a Co-operative member who visited 
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Shaw's conversion to Stalinism should not be seen as a surprise. It represents not only 
the elitism of the Fabian theory of constructing socialism, but combined Shaw's hope 
for the future (there was nothing different here than with many other socialist visitors 
from Britain) with the way he was treated while in the USSR. Witnessing Shaw's 70th 
birthday in celebrations in Moscow, the Soviet writer Lev Razgon noted that he was 
greeted as if it were Stalin's own birthday. Shaw himself told an actress friend of his 
that 'never in my life have I enjoyed a journey so much. You would have been 
disgusted at my reception as a Grand Old Man of Socialism, my smilings and wavings 
and posings and speech makings; but it made things very smooth for us all. "04 
Shaw later endorsed Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, even to the point of 
getting the three dictators mixed up, and this fact demonstrates that it was perhaps the 
elitism of Fabianism, rather than the end result, that excited George Bernard Shaw. He 
represented the very essence of fellow-travelling as described by Trotsky: 'A whole 
generation of the 'left' intelligentsia has ... turned 
its eyes eastwards and has tied ... its 
fate not so much to the revolutionary working class as to a victorious revolution, 
which is not the same. " 05 
Like George Bernard Shaw's visit, the journey made by Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
has been the subject of much discussion. Yet, again like Shaw's visit, it is impossible 
to write about the visits made by Labourites to the Soviet Union without mentioning 
the conversion of the original Fabians to Stalinism, and the background to their visit is 
worth noting. Until Shaw's journey to Russia, both Sidney and Beatrice had been 
critical, though not hateful, of the USSR. They saved their loathing for the CPGB and 
Comintern, and this was entirely in line with the wider view held in the Labour Party, 
which remained wary of the Communist movement in Britain. There were, however, 
104 Cited, Griffith, Socialism and Superior Brains p. 244 103 Cited, Caute, The Fellow Travellers, p. 2 
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three definite turning points that saw the Webbs begin their love affair with Russian 
Communism. 
The first was Shaw's conversion. Lisanne Radice argues that Shaw's support of the 
Soviet Union 'was bound to add to Beatrice's fascination and eagerness to visit 
Russia. ' 106 She cites an entry in Beatrice's diary in August as an example. 'Russian 
revolution with pure Fabianism. - Lenin and Stalin had recognised the 'Inevitability of 
gradualness' p107 The second was the friendship that the Webbs had developed with 
the Soviet Ambassadors in London. Gregori Sokolnikov created a good impression on 
the Webbs, and was the first to urge them to go to Russia and see things for 
themselves. 
And according to Williams, Sokolnikov's replacement Ivan Maisky had more of an 
influence on them. 108 The final turning point was the general atmosphere in the 
Labour Party in this period. Not only was there much confusion and anger after 
MacDonald's formation of a National Government, but also the view that capitalism 
was closer to collapse than ever before had permeated the party more than ever. 
Evidence for this is discussed elsewhere when the 1932 Labour Party Conference in 
Leicester, often cited as the most left-wing in this period, is assessed. All of this 
supports a comment made by William Gillies, the head of Labour's International 
Department, to the Secretary of the Labour and Socialist International, Friedrich 
Adler. He said that 'I am afraid that he [Sidney] is already infected. I have already 
said, after a conversation with him yesterday, that he knows, before he goes, what he 
will write on his return. ' 109 
106 L. Radice, Beatrice andSidney Webb, Basingstoke, 1984, p. 295 107 Cited, ibid, p. 294 (original emphasis) 
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The Webbs' views were discussed by Beatrice in an interview, 'What I think of 
Soviet Russia', in the New Clarion in October 1932. In the interview, she relates how 
material comforts were somewhat less than she was used to. 'It is no pleasure' said 
Beatrice 'for those used to material comforts to travel in Russia to-day. But as 
material wealth is the world's standard of judgement, this is bad for Russia's 
immediate influence on the rest of the world. '110 However, her opinion that 
'Communism's strength rests on a moral foundation' as 'Soviet Russia represents a 
new civilisation and a new culture with a new outlook on life"', was entirely in line 
with the argument put forward in the aforementioned Soviet Communism: A New 
Civilisation a few years later, which compared the CPSU to 'the religious orders 
established in past ages in connection with Buddhism, Christianity and other world 
religions. ' 112 The Webbs were very impressed with the way the Communist Party was 
trying to re-shape society from above, regarding its functions as church-like. 
In spite of Labour's history of placing freedom as an important issue in the struggle 
for socialism, Beatrice was undaunted by the repression she witnessed in the USSR, 
disregarding criticism of this practice as little more than the West failing to 
understand a new way of life. 
Owing to the initial backwardness, some features of Soviet Russia 
will be, and remain, impulsive to more developed races. For 
instance, its crude metaphysic and its fanatical repression of heresy; 
not to mention the sudden disappearances of unwanted persons, 
seem to the Western world to belong to the barbarous Middle 
Ages. 113 
She explained that Communists with whom she spoke defended the repressive 
measures as a 4necessary "war measure" to ensure national unity in the presence of a 
powerful enemy at home and abroad. " 14 She said that in their 'casual contact with 
110 New Clarion, 8 October, 1932 
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representatives of the Communist Party, the repression of free thought and free 
expression, in all that concerns the structure of human society, was obvious'. ' 15 
Ironically, the Webbs' understanding of the Soviet system was not as prescient as 
their old journal, the New Statesman, as Beatrice thought it was more likely that the 
'occasional physical terrorism; the trapdoor disappearance of unwanted personalities; 
[and] the ostracism and persecution of innocent but inconvenient workers' 116 would 
disappear. It must be assumed that she was trying to defend the repression as a 
necessary interim step to the construction of socialism. After all, was this not an 
essential, indeed integral, part of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which demanded a 
period of repression and violence against the old classes? At least the Webbs were 
open about this aspect of the regime, unlike loyal CP members who had to paint a 
perfect picture of Stalin's Russia. 
Finally, on the two big questions that dominated this period when the USSR was 
discussed, Beatrice spoke positively about the Soviet economy, but not so 
categorically about importing Soviet methods into Britain. Asked whether the 
Russians had made a contribution to economic and social progress, she said: 
[e]mphatically yes. I believe that Soviet Russia - if she can civilise her somewhat barbaric peasants - has solved the economic problem by organising production exclusively from the standpoint of 
consumption, by the whole people, of the goods and the services 
produced by all the workers by hand and brain. That is why the 
Soviet Union has no unemployment. 117 
Representing perhaps the best example that the Webbs, as with others on the USSR- 
supporting British left, were good fellow travellers in the Trotskyist sense of the term, 
is the interviewer's closing remark. Ernest Davies noted that, at the end of the 
interview on Russia, 'the conversation turned to home affairs, upon which subject I 
113 Ibid 116 
Ibid 117 Ibid 
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found the Webbs' opinions running along less revolutionary lines" 18 which, perhaps, 
implies that they shared the majority Labour Party view that Communism was fine in 
Russia but not so welcome in Britain. 
It is worth reflecting on this point. By referring to the 'backwardness' of Russia, and 
by rejecting such methods for Britain, she is clearly highlighting the importance of 
"national character" -a trait that Marxists play down in importance when compared 
with class-consciousness. In the Webbs' opinion, the Russians retained elements of 
backwardness and this was incompatible with the Fabian understanding of socialism. 
Not because this philosophy was particularly internationalist (it was not), but rather 
because of British conditions, and the history of how the British labour movement 
developed (slowly and over time due to the nature of the "spontaneous" industrial 
revolution, as opposed to the "forced" industrialisation of Russia). The British 
working class had been allowed time to unite and lose their 'backwardness' and this 
idea that Russians were not quite as advanced as British workers helped shape 
Labour's thinking on the subject, especially when the question turned to what the 
party could learn from the USSR. It is clear that Labour was willing to look at 
economic developments that included a 'collectivist' element, but there was obviously 
nothing that the Soviets could teach Labourites about democracy. 
The reasons given to explain the Webbs' acceptance of Stalinism also go some way to 
account for more moderate Labourites suggesting that the Soviet Union may hold 
some answers. The general climate in the party after 1931 saw many people reject not 
only MacDonald the man, but also his belief that socialism could come out of the 
success of capitalism. In this respect, it is hardly surprising that another type of 
socialism was briefly held up as a model. 
118 lbid 
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This model was given credence by the reports of George Bernard Shaw and the 
Webbs, but not really in terms of actually influencing specific party policy. It is far 
more likely that the fact that these old Fabians, whose politics did so much to shape 
the outlook of the Labour Party, helped to further interest in the Soviet Union because 
of who they were rather than what they said. This, coupled with the time period in 
which they were writing, explains why Beatrice's acceptance of violence and 
repression, which went against the core beliefs of the British Labour Party, did little to 
turn party members away from the USSR. As with the first visits in 1920 and the 
TUC delegation, these reports need to be understood as products of the circumstances 
that were evident at the time. Of course, they also represent a great shift away from 
the traditional gradualist approach that the Fabians favoured for so many years, but at 
the same time they were able to see Fabian elitism at work in the Stalinist 
dictatorship. 
3.5 The NFRB - organised Fabians in the USSR 
While the prestige of Bernard Shaw and the Webbs was probably enough to ensure 
that their opinions were accepted with more than just a passing interest, the visit to the 
Soviet Union made by the New Fabian Research Bureau was important for the 
information it gave to the party thinkers - both those who went and those who stayed 
at home. The NFRB undertook research 'for the development of a constructive 
Socialist programme'. 119 Such research had to include a study of the 'working model' 
of Soviet socialism. 
In the introduction to Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia, G. D. H. Cole and Clement 
Attlee, state that the authors 'went out for a definite purpose, knowing within fairly 
narrow limits what questions [they were] setting out to answer'. 120 They 'were 
119 G. D. H. Cole, History of1he Labour Party, p. 282 
120 New Fabian Research Bureau, Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia, London, 1933, p. 7 
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particularly on the look out for such features of the Soviet system as seemed likely to 
be of special interest and importance to Socialists in Great Britain'. 12 1 They make the 
point of noting that 'these essays [especially] throw ... fresh light on the working of the 
financial system of the Soviet Union'. 122 Authors were to be responsible for their own 
ideas as the aim of the study tour was 'not to formulate any collective attitude or 
policy towards the great Russian experiment. ' 123 
It is not the object of this book to present any agreed collective 
statement of conclusions, but rather a series of independent pictures 
drawn by experts in different fields of social and kindred studies, 
the authors having no more than this in common - that they went 
out under the auspices of a Socialist organisation, the New Fabian 
Research Bureau... 124 
The fact that '[e]ach author is of course solely responsible for the material embodied 
in his essay and for the conclusions which he has drawn from it' 125 meant that the 
conclusions could fluctuate between moderate and extreme support for what was 
found. This allowed Williams to note that '... the excessive claims of the few were 
buried among the modesties of the most important contributors. ' 126 
Those representing the NFRB in the USSR included Hugh Dalton, D. N. Pritt K C, 
Margaret Cole and F. W. Pethick-Lawrence and each member of the delegation 
looked at specific areas of the Soviet system, writing a chapter for Twelve Studies in 
Soviet Russia. Dalton, Pethick-Lawrence, T. G. N. Haldane and G. R. Mitchison 
looked at various aspects of the Soviet economy. Their opinions, and those of H. L. 
Beales who studied 'The Political System', are discussed in detail elsewhere. Pritt 
assessed 'The Russian Legal System' and Cole looked at 'Women and Children'. 
121 Ibid, p. 8 122 lbid 
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Some delegates such as Dalton also commented on aspects other than their chosen 
subject. He waxed lyrical about working men's clubs in Soviet Russia, noting that 
'[t]he Russians, even then, were leaving the capitalist West behind in their provision 
of new parks, athletic stadiums, clubs, libraries, theatres and workers' holiday 
centres. ' 127 To Dalton, most Russians looked better fed than unemployed miners back 
home. 'People here, I was told, were "paying a tremendous price for rapid 
industrialisation. " But in Durham they were paying a tremendous price for nothing at 
all - except unemployment. ' 128 In other words, Dalton believed that it was better to 
pay a high price and get something as opposed to paying a high price and get nothing. 
As is shown elsewhere, relating their findings back to British conditions was a 
constant theme of Twelve Studies. 
Dalton went so far as to say that '[w]e knew that in Soviet Russia there was no 
political freedom. But there never had been under the Russian Tsars. And, perhaps, 
some of us thought, we had overvalued this in the West, relatively, to other 
freedoms. ' 129 He returned from the Soviet Union 'convinced that here was a most 
formidable people, whether as friend or foe in war, or as near neighbour in peace. ' 130 
D. N. Pritt was already known to be a fellow traveller, although according to 
Williams, he was '... more measured in his blindness' 131 than H. L. Beales, another 
fellow traveller in the party. Pritt shared at least one thing with Dalton, despite the 
distance between their respective socialism's, in that both found the Russian spirit was 
alive. While Dalton was claiming that 'the future belongs to these people' 132 Pritt 
wrote that he did not expect to find people in Russia living in comfort. 
127 H. Dalton, The Fateful Years Memoirs 1931-1945, London, 1957, p. 28 128 lbid, p29 
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I expected to find them with few material possessions, able to buy 
in their shops little more than bare necessities, but working hard to 
build up their country. I found pretty well what I had expected, but 
I found also - to an even greater extent than I had expected -a 
wealth of spirit and hope, and a great deal of progress already 
achieved. All sorts of minor things were being done inefficiently, 
but every major thing was done well. 133 
He returned to Britain believing that Russia had socialism, but Britain could have it 
better. This was 'something that we ought to build for ourselves, in our own way; we 
could do it better and more easily, with our material wealth, our industrial basis and 
our great numbers of skilled workers. ' 134 Although this was accepted in some quarters 
- that should Britain choose this path, then her industrial history and strength would 
allow her to enter the race for socialism a little later - Pritt's argument was largely 
defunct after the Show Trials began to eliminate Stalin's old Bolshevik comrades. In 
the mid- 193 Os Labourites grew more and more aware that Stal inism. and j ustice were 
not compatible. Yet Pritt continued to defend it to the last, thus exposing himself as a 
die-hard Stalinist. Williams said that he particularly suffered from the epithet of 
'fellow traveller'. Despite the truth becoming known about the purges, 'Pritt kept 
steadfastly to his beliefs about the system until long after it was obvious that he was 
wrong. ' 135 
Margaret Cole's visit took her to Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine, and throughout 
her essay on women and children she makes a number of comparisons with England. 
Her first observation was that 'the Russian woman, as a general rule, works, and has 
always worked, alongside the man, and on an equality with him. ' She continued to 
say that 'the USSR looks upon women as citizens and workers as well as mothers' 136 
and noted that 'the large pool of practically unemployed or under-employed women 
which exists in England, particularly in the middle and upper classes, does not exist in 
133 D. N. Pritt, From Left to Right, London, 1965, p. 37 
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Russia. ' 137 Cole was clearly trying to assess the egalitarian side of Soviet 
Communism, to see how favourable the Russian system was when compared with 
English capitalism and the English class system. She 'found women ... 
holding high, if 
not the highest, offices in all manner of institutions; and people did not seem 
particularly interested, as English people would be, in whether there were more 
women in this or that concern, and if so, how many. ' 138 
Cole looked at a more specific aspect of the zhenskiy vopros (the woman question) - 
abortion. While acknowledging that, unlike in Britain, abortion was legal in the Soviet 
Union, she noted that if there was no medical reason why a woman should not want 
the child 'she is strongly urged' to continue with the pregnancy. 'The Soviet Union 
wants an increasing population'. 139 But the last word 'rests with the woman; if she 
won't have her child, she won't, and that is the end. But it would take a strong- 
minded woman to stand up to the battery of propaganda and persuasion that is brought 
to bear. ' 140 A comparison between the Soviet Union and western countries is drawn. 
With 'abortion being legal and recognised, all need for secrecy and its evil 
consequences has disappeared. ' 141 Cole does not offer an opinion on whether she was 
in favour of legal abortions, but the implication is that it at least removed some of the 
dangers for women who did favour them. 
Cole also added some general notes on Soviet healthcare, particularly hospitals. 
They vary very much. The hospital in Moscow, for example, could 
give points to most English hospitals in equipment, design and 
management. It has many of the newest devices, and all in working 
order; it has a very high standard of surgical cleanliness; and in 
some of its arrangements, such as the "wards, " none of which 
contain more than two patients, it compares very favourably with 
137 Ibid, p. 181 138 Ibid, p. 182 139 Ibid, p. 183 140 Ibid 141 fbid 
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London nursing homes which charge twelve guineas a week to 
their inmates. 14Z 
She does, however, note that 'this hospital can only be used by Government officials 
and those in the high ranks of the Communist Party' 143 although no Russian to whom 
she spoke felt 
the slightest resentment about this. They accepted that the life of a 
high Government official was of such importance that, if he fell ill, 
the best resources of the State must be devoted to restoring him to 
health. This may be the "Thermidor, " to use Trotsky's phrase; but 
if so many of the Jacobins support it. Our Moscow guide, himself a 
passionate and occasionally boring Communist sympathiser, 
regarded the Kremlin Hospital, to which he could not possibly have 
been admitted, as a triumphant advertisement of the Soviet 
regime. 144 
Cole pointed out that the Metchnikov Hospital in Leningrad was more typical. 
Here medical purists might be shocked by the absence of uniform 
and by the way in which persons - including patients - wander in 
and out of wards, including even the operating theatres. Probably 
the standard of sterilisation is lower than that of the best English 
hospitals. On the other hand, there are points on which English 
hospitals might do well to take a lesson from the Metchnikov'. "5 
These points include the use of a private room for one or two days after an operation 
'which is surely most desirable' also a garden with fruit, vegetables and flowers - 
'upon which neurotic patients are put to work for short periods, and which supplies 
flowers to the wards and the private roorns. ' 146 She continued to say, however, that 
she did not have a chance to visit any district hospitals, but the information she 
received from some people led her to understand that 'in cleanliness and privacy some 
of them might come as a shock to persons brought up on Western standards. ' She 
concludes though, 'any sort of hospital may well be better than none. ' 147 
142 lbid, p. 187 






Cole's other main topic was how children fared in the USSR. She said that while 
Russia 'is at present a poor country' it 'is not, where it can help it, saving on the 
children'. 148 She says that it tries to ensure that once the 'vital needs of the adult 
workers have been supplied, the next call upon resources shall be to provide for the 
citizens of the fature. ' 149 
The contrast, to any historian, between this attitude and the attitude 
of England during the first half of the nineteenth century, when the 
situation with regard to capital supply was somewhat similar, is 
most suggestive. So, on a smaller scale, is the fact that, at the 
moment when we are, as a nation, proceeding to cut down 
secondary education, the USSR is embarking upon an effort 
designed to extend the beyond-kinderqrten period of school life to 
ten years, i. e. from seven to seventeen. so 
The comparison being made is clear. The Soviet Union was not rich, yet it still tried to 
ensure that its children - the future generation (presumably the ones not killed by the 
famine that hit certain areas of the USSR incredibly hard) - had sufficient provisions. 
However in Britain, the Great Depression hit the country so hard that children and 
adults alike suffered severe hardships to the extent that many adults, let alone children, 
had any hope or prospects. 
After Cole described the educational system, she commented on the 'almost infinite 
network of extra-school organisations for children' 15 1 and made the inevitable 
comparison between the Scout and Guide movements. But she said that the functions 
and importance of the 'junior Red organisations - the October Children for the little 
ones, the Pioneers for the middle years, and the Young Communist League for the 
older ones up to twenty-four ... are very much wider. ' 
152 She said that they 'are part of 
the organisation of government; they are the chief means of training the young 
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generation to be good Communists'. 153 While she does not venture into a description 
about the purpose of the Scout movement, she does note that, while scouts had to 
perfonn "one good action a day", a 
boy or girl who want[ed] to become a Pioneer ha[d] to go through 
probation like an applicant for the Communist Party, and ... a 
member has to perform ... specificjobs ... which may 
be organising a 
holiday camp, lecturing to clubs in a kindergarten, or a whole host 
of other things. 154 
She also makes it clear that not all of young communists' energies were 'confined to 
civic duty. There are athletics; there are clubs of all sorts, some confined to the Red 
155 
organisations, some open'. 
Finally, Cole turned her attention to family life, and compared the home life in both 
countries. She said that 
[t]hree obvious facts must be mentioned: first, that the facilities for 
changing of partners are very much greater and simpler in Russia 
than in this country; second, that the enormous provision of State 
services, from cr&he to factory kitchen, means that "domestic 
work, " in the sense of cooking and cleaning and looking after the 
children, plays a substantially smaller part in the life of a Russian 
home than in that of an English one; and third, that family life and 
personal relations are regarded generally as in the last resort 
subordinate to the welfare of the State, and that a State struggling, 
as Russia is, against enormous natural and artificial odds, may tend 
to override personal and family claims... 156 
She did note that Russians that she met 
declared very emphatically that family life, in any real sense, was 
not being destroyed, though they agreed that immediately after the 
Revolution there had been a tendenpy to throw it out of the window 
along with other bourgeois lumber. 157 
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She realised that, while ties may be looser in the Soviet Union than in some other 
countries, 'as far as I could see this does not mean that family affection has in any 
way ceased to exist'. 
158 
Cole's conclusions question 'what lessons, if any, has [Russian life] for a Socialist 
society in a more advanced country? "59 This immediately draws attention to the 
'backwardness' of Russia's pre-Revolutionary conditions, with the implication again 
being that while Britain could learn something, it could no doubt do things better. 
Cole's view was that in design and intention the Soviet project 
is wholly praiseworthy and that its results are already remarkable. 
It is not, as yet, anything like complete; some of it is very 
makeshift; and the chance of its becoming a really model system of 
its own kind depends upon the Soviet Union being able to draw on, 
and to train, enormous numbers of men and women ... and to do it steadily, not in a burst of enthusiasm. 160 
This last point reminds the reader that the delegation that visited the Soviet Union and 
who wrote Twelve Studies were reformists, they were gradualists, they were Fabians. 
The USSR now needed stability, not a return to the revolutionary excitement that had 
given birth to the regime. 
Overall, Margaret Cole saw equality in the system, as it had 'succeeded in utilising 
the energy and ability of its women for social purposes' they were now 'on equal 
terms with men. ' 16 1 This final point was the one which 'an English Socialist State 
would have most to learn from the Russians. ' Although of course, the cr6ches and 
schools in Britain were 'better than anything I saw in Russia. ' 162 
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On the whole, Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia not only fitted in with the general 
interest in the Soviet Union in this period, it helped to define the party's attitude 
towards, and thoughts about, the USSR in the early 1930s. The generally positive 
reviews of Soviet socialism were due to two important factors. The first was the time 
in which the delegates were visiting the Soviet Union. Depression at home and right- 
wing reaction abroad meant that Labour needed to re-in ect a radicalism into its 
policies that had gone missing under MacDonald and Snowden. Of course, the 
movement was not going to be converted en masse to communism - Soviet or 
otherwise. But the shift to the left that occurred after the MacDonald split that led to 
the formation of the National Government helped to create a climate where interest in 
more radical alternative routes to socialism could be considered. 
The second factor was what the delegates actually saw on the visit. The fact that they 
went when the first Five Year Plan was being completed, and with some success, 
meant that Labourites were offered a vision of actually existing socialism that had 
apparently not been affected by the economic hardships apparent in the West. It is 
also unlikely that the NFRB travellers witnessed any of the effects of the devastating 
famine that began in 1932 and ended with such disastrous consequences, as the 
delegates were not in the country long enough to see the full results. Even if they had 
been, the tour guides would have been able to keep it from them as the 
Soviet authorities tried to prevent the full picture from being known 
at the time ... However, the basic information could not be entirely 
suppressed and rumours quickly circulated abroad. Journalists and 
writers such as Malcolm Muggeridge and Ewald Ammende wrote 
about a vast famine, although they were often not taken seriously, 
not least because their reports were vigorously denied by the Soviet 
authorities who went to considerable lengths to fool visitors into 
thinking all was well. 163 
163 C. Read, , The Making and Breaking ofihe Soviet System, Houndmills, 200 1, p. 96 
147 
Margaret Cole also admitted that there was little suspicion that the Soviet authorities 
were there for any other reason than to help the visitors. She said that they 'knew the 
men of the GRU., the secret police, as kindly souls who came to our rescue and found 
us seats on crowded trains. ' 164 
The mood of the party and the findings of the visitors therefore helped shape Labour's 
thought not only on the USSR but also its own political thought in this era. By the end 
of 1932 the Labour Party witnessed one of its most left-wing conferences in its history 
when delegates at Leicester committed the party to an introduction of socialist 
legislation - specifically nationalisation, on its return to power. Further details are 
given later, but it was no coincidence that this happened in this year as Labour's 
thought process was most definitely driven by 'socialism', and a more radical one than 
had existed in the wider movement for some time at that. 
While such radical socialist thought that was seen at Leicester did not last for long, the 
effects of the NFRB's visit to the Soviet Union did, and this was due in part to such 
'heavy hitters' as Dalton continuing their association with the ideas that they saw in 
the USSR. Of course, he did not fail to recognise that there were 'grim aspects' and 
that the Soviet people were 'short of food ... And many of them are still incredibly 
inefficient, and impractical. And the lavatories --- ! Far worse than anything in Spain or 
in pre-Fascist Italy. It became an obsession after a firne... ' 165 However, he continued 
to say that 'I go North tomorrow to my unemployed constituents. In Russia at any rate 
everyone is working! ' 166 
And, as is seen elsewhere, it was here that Dalton arguably became a 'convert not to 
Communism but to the concept of the Plan. ' 167 Pimlott notes that he was convinced 
'64 Cited, B. Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, London, 1985, p. 2 10 




'that the only solution to the economic troubles [in Britain] lay in emulating part at 
least of the Russian example'. ' 68 'It is my firm conviction' wrote Dalton, that 'unless 
we in this country also adopt the principle of economic planning on Socialist lines, we 
shall find no solution of our economic troubles. ' 169 Of course, he had to make the 
obvious point that 'if the Russians can do it and make much remarkable progress in so 
short a time how much more effectively could we in England do itp170 He remained in 
favour of some form of planning throughout the 1930s and this shaped Labour's 
economic policies in the Attlee years. 
3.6 Labour's leaders in the USSR 
Following the tradition that the individual who led the labour movement visited at 
least one area that had seen revolutionary change in the East, Clement Attlee made the 
trip in August 1936. In the year before Attlee's visit, Walter Citrine returned to the 
country after ten years away. These visits were significant because they were made at 
a more stable time than when the NFRB made its visit. The economic problems of the 
early thirties had passed, although many people were still feeling the effects of the 
poverty of that time. But Labour had moved on from the radical left-wing policies that 
were so popular in 1932, and the new leadership reflected this. 
While on the left, Attlee was no Jimmy Maxton, but he did act as a counterbalance to 
the right-wing socialism of Walter Citrine, the rightist General Secretary of the TUC 
and Ernest Bevin of the T&G. The visits made by Attlee and Citrine came at a time of 
heightened tension internationally, but the general views of these two leaders of the 
labour movement concerning the USSR dictated how they reported their discoveries 
about Stalin's Russia. 
169 lbid 
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Attlee went to the Soviet Union after receiving an invitation from his friend Ivan 
Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador. Unlike Walter Citrine, whose month-long visit to the 
USSR in 1935 was his first time back in the USSR since 1925, Attlee did not record 
his findings in an official publication. Citrine, on his return, published his account in I 
Searchfor Truth in Russia. 
Walter Citrine and his wife travelled from Leningrad to Moscow, and also visited 
Gorky, Kharkov and Baku, among other places. His report, while not wholly positive, 
does contain some interesting insights. Citrine was clearly aware that he did not 
portray the USSR in a totally agreeable light. His wife was given a bouquet of flowers 
on their departure from the country, he commented to Alekseyev, the President of the 
Leningrad Trades Council, '[a]fter all the criticism I have levelled at the USSR, I 
expected you to arrive with a bomb, not a bouquet. ' 171 But his book did not warrant 
the vitriolic response from Pat Sloan, the CPGB member, who wrote I Search for 
Truth in Citrine. Sloan complained that I Search for Truth in Russia 'is a detailed 
account of Citrine's search for the worst. If he sees a "hovel" on a hillside, he stops 
the car and goes to investigate it. But not once is there a record of his stopping the car 
because he saw a particularly attractive building. ' 172 Sloan concluded that 'Citrine's 
"Search for Truth" cannot in any way be considered worthy of its title. The true title 
should be this: "I Searchfor Arguments to Condemn the USSR and Communism. "' 173 
Citrine was certainly no supporter of the USSR as a model of socialism for Britain, 
and strongly disliked the CPGB. However, he was not the anti-Soviet that the British 
communists made him out to be. He attempted to put forward a balanced report of 
what he found, noting that most visitors to the USSR 'swing from one extreme to 
another. ' 174 Before he left Britain he noted that 
171 W. Citrine, I Searchfor Truth in Russia, London, 1936 p. 304 " P. Sloan, I Searchfor Truth in Citrine: A Reply to Sir Walter, London, 1936, p. 12 173 lbid, p. 59 
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my admiration had been excited by the titanic efforts which had 
been made by the Soviet Government to raise the low economic 
and cultural standards of their people. I had been profoundly 
disturbed by the curtailment of personal liberty and the complete 
suppression of independent political criticism. My pride in the 
achievements of the Soviet had been tempered by the recollection 
that these had been obtained in many cases at a great cost in human 
suffering. 175 
Once in the USSR, Citrine looked at many aspects of the Soviet system, and offered a 
broad assessment in I Search for Truth. Travelling to Peterhof, twenty miles from 
Leningrad, he passed through the Kirov district of Leningrad and noted that 
[s]ome of the houses in this district were wretched looking in the 
extreme. Many were old and decrepit wooden buildings which had 
not been painted for years ... The shops we passed were 
dingy 
looking and the stocks of food, as I could judge from a fleeting 
glance at the windows and through the doorways, seemed neither 
extensive nor varied. 176 
He did remark however, that '[olne good thing the authorities have done is to supply 
even these outlying villages with cheap electric light and it must be a boon to the 
peasants. ' 
177 
On the whole, Citrine was concerned with political affairs, of how workers fared in 
the USSR and their relationship with the 'ruling class' that was the CPSU. While in 
Leningrad, he visited a shoe factory, textile works and the Kirov engineering works 
(formerly the famous Putilov factory). He discovered from his trips here that trade 
unions 'were only the puppets of the Communist Party. All the principal officials 
were Communists and as Stalin had said, "This was no accidenf'. I asked how could 
the Trade Unionists exercise any independent criticism of the system? " 78 Citrine 
claimed that if a worker tried to do so in the factory, he would first be given a friendly 
175 Ibid, p. vii 176 Ibid, p. 44 
177 Ibid, p. 45 
179 Ibid, p. 255 
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warning, the next time find himself up against the Communist nuclei in the factory 
and finally the Factory Director and that he 'would have a fairly rough time. ' 179 
When the question of political freedom arose, Citrine was told that Party members 
criticise and settle difficrences at the Party Conferences. He replied that '[y]ou settle 
your differences by exiling your opponents, or you remove them from their posts and 
put them into inferior ones. ' 180 He then pointed out that, while he was aware of 
criticism of fallen leaders like Trotsky and Zinoviev, he knew of no criticism of any 
incumbent leaders. He asked if anyone could give him a single instance when Stalin 
had been criticised in the Party, to which came the reply '[n]o doubt there have been 
instances, but I cannot recall them. ' 181 
As Citrine studied the nature of Stalin's Russia, he concluded that the dictatorship in 
the Soviet Union was not as bad as those that governed Germany or Italy. Stalin, he 
said, was 'much less of a personal dictator than either Hitler or Mussolini. ' 182 Like the 
delegates in 1920 and 1924, he recognised that the Communist Party was the most 
important political body in the land, and as Stalin led the CPSU, it followed that 
Stalin was the most important man in the country. Citrine said that Stalin's picture 
was to be found everywhere, that '[s]carcely a speech is made without eulogistic 
183 references to "our beloved leader, Comrade Stalin7'. The Party was full of loyal 
communists - loyal to the cause, to the Party and to Stalin. 
He criticised this loyalty however, as he believed that it led to an environment where 
Party comrades were encouraged to fight against comrade as they sought to 
implement the party line better than anyone else. He noted that everyone had to 
179 Ibid 
180 Ibid, p. 256 
181 Ibid, p. 257 
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question ' "[w]hat is the true Leninist line? What would Stalin say? "... To argue with 
a Russian Communist is to argue with a gramophone record of Stalin. ' 184 
To conclude, it can be said that Citrine enjoyed his time in the USSR. He wrote at the 
start of his book that 'I wish the reader could obtain half as much pleasure and 
instruction from reading the diary as my wife and I did from our visit. "85 He 
recognised that there were problems with Russian Communism, such as the lack of 
personal freedom, freedom of movement and the liberty to criticise the country's 
leaders. These however should be weighed against the improvements. He was excited 
by the fact that a socialist economy had been established, that private ownership had 
been abolished, production was for use and not for profit and that, in his opinion, 
unemployment in Russia had 'ceased for all time'. 186 Nevertheless, he was worried by 
the lack of trade union rights for workers. He said that he would like to see 'the Trade 
Unions stand up against the Government occasionally on behalf of the workers. At 
present the Unions seem to think too much about their duties to the Communist Party, 
and too little of their duties to the workers themselves. ' 187 
His visit to Stalin's Russia did not change his concept of socialism. This was unlikely 
given that he was on the right of the movement. Citrine decided that socialism, as he 
understood it, had not been constructed in the USSR. He saw that the Communist 
Party had become a new ruling class, and told factory workers in Moscow during a 
discussion about the role of trade unions in the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan that 
the 'brand of what you call 'Socialism' operated here is something which I cannot 
recognise as Socialism. It certainly is not Social Democracy. It is more like State 
Capitalism. ' 188 He did not, however, offer an analysis of what state capitalism was, 
but he was sure that Russia under Stalin was not a socialist country. 
184 lbid, p. 256 
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Clement Attlee made his trip in August 1936, and returned with a positive view of the 
USSR, but his opinion of what he saw were tempered by a realisation that 'in the 
main, we saw only that which it was intended we should see', 189 and this reservation 
must be remembered when reading Attlee's comments. He noted that Leningrad was 
an impressive city but it 'had a curiously dead appearance. "90 Moscow however, was 
&more alive' with a 'very fine' Metro system. 191 
Whilst there, he reflected upon two aspects of the Soviet Union. The first was the fact 
that Muscovites seemed very happy with their lives. He spent a day in the Park of 
Rest and Culture during a public holiday. 'I had every chance of seeing people as they 
were - its sum total in itself justifies the revolution. ' 192 He said that people were 
happy and well mannered, while the children 'were simply delightful', that '[flamily 
parties were frequent' and that the 'Russian father is very devoted. ' 193 He deeply 
appreciated the fact that Russians appeared to be constructing a socialist society for 
themselves, rather than working for the profit of capitalists. 'From my observations' 
he noted, 'I should judge that the ordinary citizen supports the existing rulers because 
he believes they are carrying out a programme which is for his good and which he 
himself desires... ' 194 But he realised that some of things he saw 'were really 
showplaces and not in the least bit typical. ' 195 
However, he also commented on the methods used by the CPSU to maintain control. 
'There is a great deal of skilful propaganda which is directed to connecting every 
success with the personality of Stalin and other Commissars'. 196 The biggest 
impression made upon him was the cult of Stalin whose picture was shown 
everywhere. 
"9 C. Attlee, As It Happened, London, 1954, p. 91 190 lbid 
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This was amusingly exemplified in the War Museum, where great 
pains had been taken to eliminate Trotsky. Our guides were 
anxious to explain that every success had been due to Stalin - every 
failure to Trotsky. 197 
Just as Citrine's visit did not alter his understanding of socialism, Attlee's visit failed 
to convert him to Soviet socialism, which was to some extent the reason that the 
USSR encouraged foreign travellers to make the journey - to "sell" Russian 
communism to the rest of the world. In 1937, Attlee wrote that 'I do not think that 
Britain must follow the Moscow ... road. 
"98 It is worth noting however, how 
enthusiastic the two returnees were about the Soviet system without fully endorsing it, 
and this was all the more surprising given that Labour at home was fending off a 
renewed call from the CPGB for unity against fascism. 
This final point acts as a reminder that the context of when the visits took place was 
important. The first visitors saw a new hope in revolutionary Russia after the carnage 
and destruction of World War One. Those such as the NFRB were in the USSR at a 
time of great economic problems in the West, which is why the ones who shaped 
party thought and policy along Soviet lines the most upon their return were the 
economists like Hugh Dalton. Interest could be retained in the Soviet Union even in 
the mid-1930s, as this was a time of heightened international tension that allowed the 
USSR to be given yet another chance to prove its worth to the Western democracies. 
So already Labour had begun to define the USSR as something more than simply a 
single unit or 'communist entity'. It could be a beacon of hope or despair; it could 
offer ideas or act as a model for economic thought; and it was a possible ally in the 
possible coming war with the Fascist States. But it was also the citadel that 
propagated international revolution that funded the problematic CPGB. So just as 
visitors went to see aspects of their politics that interested them, whether that was 
197 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 92 
198 Attlee, Labour Party, Perspective, p. 274 
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trade unionism or economic planning, the Labour Party as a whole began to see the 
USSR as either a help or a hindrance, depending on what it needed at the time. But 
the shared ideology of "socialism7' that allowed even the most rightist social democrat 
in the labour movement to find positive elements in the USSR was also important. 
The visits and the subsequent information that people learned and returned with 
helped Labour to construct an informed policy towards the USSR, but more 
importantly for the development of Labour's political thought, the visits highlight the 
fact that the Labour Party continued to be interested in other types of socialism and 
social democracy. Whilst Labour looked at many different forms of left of centre 
governments, none of the other forms of progressive governments provoked as much 
debate in the Labour press as the Soviet Union did. Only the USA under Franklin 
Roosevelt's New Deal came close, and that was only really seen in terms of 
economics. But the USSR offered a visible form of socialism that continued to attract 
a large number of Labourites for many years. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Labour's International policy, the USSR and Fascism 
For the fulfilment of its aims, both at home and abroad, the Labour Party needs Peace 
throughout the world. ' 
Labour's actions whilst in goverm-nent highlight the fact that the inclusion of the 
USSR in world affairs was an important element of the party's foreign policy. As the 
party left office in 1931, Anglo-Soviet relations were fairly healthy. The party had 
clearly pursued a foreign policy that emphasised stability and peace, reflecting the 
generally moderate approach to socialism favoured by the party leadership. This was 
despite the distrust that there was towards the Kremlin amongst some of the opinion 
formers such as Bevin and Morrison. This pro-Soviet foreign policy had much 
support throughout the Labour Party, for both pragmatic and ideological reasons. 
These are explored in this chapter, which focuses on the debates within the party 
concerning international policy, the USSR and the rise of the fascism in the 1930s, 
and it is split into three main sections. 
The first section examines how both the left and right of the party thought the USSR 
should be utilised in foreign affairs. The left favoured an ideological role, while the 
right saw the inclusion of the USSR in the League of Nations as imperative to 
creating a stable world system where peace was ensured. Only then could progressive 
politics challenge reactionary forces. This section looks specifically at G. D. H. Cole's 
1933 article in the New Clarion 'Socialism and Internationalism', Labour's Foreign 
Policy, written by Arthur Henderson in 1933, and the NFRB's Why the USSR Joined 
the League, written by Hugh Dalton in 1935. It will also assess the growth of the 
Unity Campaign on the far left of the labour movement. The most distinguishing 
characteristic about the attempted unity of the Socialist League, CPGB and ILP was 
the emphasis placed by figures such as Cripps on the defence of the Soviet Union, 
1 Labour Party, Labour's Foreign Policy, London, 1933, p. 2 
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which later turned into a defence of liberal democracy. In other words, this was a 
defence of the capitalist system as it stood then, the reason being that capitalist 
democracy was better than Nazism. 
This led to a temporary abandonment of socialist goals in some quarters of the party, 
as a type of "revolutionary defencism" took hold of party thought. In this the Socialist 
League and the CPGB shared a common goal with the Labour Party, while the ILP 
took a more revolutionary stance, as it favoured turning any world conflict into a class 
war. The ILP at this time was more influenced by the ideas of Trotsky than by Soviet 
Communists, which is visible in its 'revolutionary defeatist' approach. 2 
The official Labour Party, together with the other left-wing groups apart from the ILP, 
used the Soviet Union as a bulwark against fascism. Its presence was to be used in a 
real, rather than theoretical sense, even if that meant relegating socialist arguments or 
progressive policies for an uncertain period of time. The only real difference between 
the positions of the left and right-wings of the party was that the Socialist League 
argued for the defence of the USSR. 
The second section focuses on the question of rearmament that arose after the party 
leadership changed in 1935. The moderate right, led by Hugh Dalton and Ernest 
Bevin, asserted that the aggressive nature of Hitler's regime in Germany meant that 
the party should reconsider its foreign policy, and set about winning over the anti- 
Popular Front left of the party. 
The far-left was preparing the way for its Popular Front stage, focusing on uniting all 
anti-fascists in the struggle against Nazism. It continued to emphasise the need to 
2 Revolutionary defeatism was the opposite of revolutionary defencism (a position taken in Russia to defend the democratic gains made by the February revolution). It was a Leninist position arguing that 
workers should side with their class rather than with their country, which would ultimately lead to the 
establishment of a socialist rather than a bourgeois democracy 
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protect the USSF, but was increasingly sidelined as the leadership of the party 
became ever more dominant, especially after the pacifist leadership of George 
Lansbury was removed. This section will also look at how the Spanish Civil War 
helped Labourites to gradually accept rearmament. A final concluding section will 
bring the discussion to a close as it looks at how Labour's interpretation of 
internationalism stood at the end of the decade, after it had had close contact with the 
USSF, which then betrayed the trust of socialists everywhere by signing the Nazi- 
Soviet pact. 
4.1 Labour's Foreign Policy after MacDonald 
Despite MacDonald parting company with Labour and the movement's subsequent 
shift to the left after the financial crisis in 1931, the party maintained the essence of 
the foreign policy pursued by the MacDonald Government in international affairs. At 
home and abroad Labour sought to work within the existing international system and 
use the existing governmental machinery to implement gradual reforms that would 
bring about social change. Working within such an international framework continued 
the process of reinterpreting internationalism that began in the party after the end of 
World War One when party leaders began to favour talks about exchanging 
ambassadors and trade agreements. 
Inter-governmental relations and the protection of national sovereignty took 
precedence over urging general strikes and solidarity with workers in other countries. 
For international affairs, Labour's natural home was the Labour and Socialist 
International (LSI) rather than the Comintern. The Chairman's address at the party 
Conference in Hastings in 1933 reiterated this point, reminding delegates that the 
Labour Party was first and foremost a national party with affiliation to the LSI. 3 When 
3 Labour Party, Report of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party, London, 1933, 
p. 135 
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Labour was the party of Government it gave its full support to the development and 
strengthening of the League of Nations - the body that looked for governmental rather 
than "people's" solutions to international problems. This was not a policy bom out of 
any particular change in Labourist thinking, as the party's thought had always 
revolved around parliamentary and 'political' solutions rather than 'industrial' ones. 
The League of Nations and Narkomindel were the more natural allies for the Labour 
Party. 
Labour's gradualist approach to social change relied upon stability, and of course 
stability in the international arena could only be ensured by peace between nations. 
And despite various attempts from left-wingers throughout the decade to try and tie 
Labour to the Comintern, stability and peace continued to be the two guiding 
principles of Labour's foreign policy in the post-MacDonald era. This explains why 
the party continued its commitment to the League of Nations and later collective 
security between states to fight fascism. 
If peace and stability were constant elements within Labour's thought on foreign 
policy, so too was the presence of the Soviet Union. Labourites sought to include the 
USSR in its international policy for different reasons, and the Soviet Union continued 
to occupy an important place in the party's overall framework for international affairs. 
The question of how best to utilise the USSR had been at the forefront of the party's 
thought since the birth of the Soviet State, and the various answers that this question 
offered explained much about the various interpretations of socialism visible within 
the political thought of the party. 
For the leadership and thinkers on the right, the USSR had a valuable role to play on 
the world stage as a member of the League of Nations, especially after the installation 
of Hitler's regime in Germany in 1933. Maintaining world stability in the face of 
fascist aggression and the safeguarding of liberties provided by capitalism became 
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more important than pursuing a socialist agenda. Labour was concerned with ending 
confrontation in Europe, and this was the star that guided Labour's overall 
international policy in the inter-war years. The memories of World War One were 
sharp in the minds of Labourites. Egon Wertheimer claimed that all of Labour's 
policy choices - economic, social, and foreign - seemed to stem from '... an ethical 
postulate, the repudiation of war'. 4 
But even before that, as has been seen from the earlier assessment of Labour and the 
Nation, Labour emphasised the need to include the USSR in its foreign policy, so it 
was only logical that the party should continue its policy of emphasising contact with 
the Kremlin. The difference now was that the protagonists had changed, as power 
moved away from the PLP and towards what Andrew Williams called 'the Labour 
Party's administration sector grouped in Transport House under the same roof as the 
TUC and the Transport and General Worker's Union. '5 He notes that 'Bevin, as the 
leader of this union and Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC, thus assumed new 
and enormous power over the party's decision-making process. 6 
Despite the hostile rivalry that existed between Bevin and Herbert Morrison, these 
three, alongside Hugh Dalton, shaped the general thought of the movement more than 
most in this decade. They were helped by the election of the like-minded Clement 
Attlee to position of party leader after 1935, as this meant the important leading 
positions within the labour movement were occupied by moderate socialists who 
offered practical solutions to the new problems of the decade. The pragmatic answers 
offered were responsible for the quite momentous shift within the party that led it to 
an acceptance that rearmament, and not pacifism, was necessary to defeat Hitler. 
4 E. Wertheimer, Portrait ofthe Labour Party, London, 1930, p. 15 8 5 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 212 
6 lbid, p. 213 
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Yet this rightist-bloc was in no position directly after the events of 1931 to exert any 
real influence, as the trade unions were 'too busy trying to shore up their crumbling 
membership and to resist wage cuts in large areas of industry to take a lead in party 
matters 0 while a decimated parliamentary party came under the control of the left. 
Dalton and Henderson lost their parliamentary seats and the latter spent much of his 
time in Geneva as President of the Disarmament Conference, resigning as Labour 
Party leader in 1932. Lansbury became chairman of the PLP, and the leadership now 
consisted of Lansbury and two former junior ministers, Stafford Cripps and Clement 
Attlee. A centre-left party leadership, as opposed to the centrist, even centre-right 
leadership of MacDonald, was established, and Peter Shore notes that Lansbury and 
the parliamentary leadership 'were well to the left of the NEC and much more in tune 
with the mood of the party activists. '8 
The Labour left controlled not only the PLP, but also reacted against MacDonaldism. 
at Conference. The 1932 Labour Party Conference in Leicester is generally accepted 
as the one that pushed the Labour Party leftwards. There was clearly a need for 
Labour to set out what it now believed in, so that its supporters knew where their 
party stood, and where their party was heading. Labourites such as Emanuel Shinwell 
said that he had recently 'found great interest and very few signs of apathy, 
and ... considered that people would welcome a clear and advanced statement of 
Labour's policy of Socialism. '9 
Kenneth Harris claims that this conference was one of the 
most important in the party's history. It showed how strong was the 
movement to the left, and it saw the beginnings of the blueprints 
for a socialist state, which, elaborated throughout the thirties, 
became the basis of the postwar Labour government's policies. ' 0 
7 Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s, p. 28 
8 P. Shore, Leading the Left, London, 1993, p. 21 
9 Ernest Bevin papers, MSS 126/EB/SS/l/4 
10 Harris, Attlee, p. 105 
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Harris is certainly correct in his analysis that it was important for the future Labour 
Government in 1945, and Attlee worked with comrades who he would choose after 
the war. 'We are hard at work' he said, 'on defining policy; my idea is a plan of action 
to be agreed on, so that when we win next time we shall know exactly what to do and 
how to do it... "' The discussants included Lansbury and Cripps, Cole, Laski and 
Dalton - the last four featured in the radical Attlee Government - and Cole wrote that 
the 'Policy Reports which were put forward at every Conference from 1932 onwards 
did serve as the foundation of the third Labour Government's legislative and 
administrative programme in 1945. ' 12 This highlights just how important the 1930s 
were to the post-war Attlee Government. 
Domestic affairs raised in Leicester are discussed elsewhere. However, there was the 
inevitable overlapping between foreign and domestic concerns where the USSR was 
concerned. A motion was passed against the proposed abolition of the Anglo-Russian 
Trade Agreement. The resolution argued that it would lead to widespread 
unemployment in Britain, and claimed that Soviet trading organisations had 
(meticulously honoured every commercial bill bearing their endorsement, 13. john 
Mills, who moved the motion, said that trade with Russia would continue to help the 
poorest areas of Britain, and noted that in eleven years, Russia was 'the only country 
that has not defaulted by a single penny. ' 14 The Soviet Union was as important to the 
post-MacDonald Labour Party as it was when MacDonald was still in charge, with 
Labourites continuing to see it holding the key to stable management of the economy. 
Such an interpretation of the uses of the USSR led even the most anti-Soviet 
Labourites to encourage close ties with Stalin. 
11 Cited in ibid 
12 Cole, History, 1914, p. 279 
13 LPCR, 1932 p. 181 14 lbid 
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Just prior to the conference, William Gillies at Labour's International Department 
wrote to Walter Citrine to suggest that the promotion of co-operation between the 
USSR and the League of Nations be developed. Gillies wrote that 
[t]he economic life of a State must be coordinated with a view to its 
immediate and future development. But if world economic life is 
not also coordinated, unhealthy economic antagonisms may 
develop into political antagonisms and lead to war... The League 
of Nations, in all its branches, economic, financial, political, 
labour, is the gem of that machinery, which can prevent not only 
political and economic friction, but maý also be the coordinating 5 machinery of the world's economic life. 
Gillies favoured securing strength through the League of Nations, which, he accepted, 
had to involve the USSR, and this reflected the general feeling in the party hierarchy 
that stability in Europe could not be secured without involving the Kremlin. 
Gillies' vision of the USSR joining world governments in the League of Nations 
raised an interesting question for Labour's foreign policy to consider and this was 
'what was Labour's foreign policy trying to achieveT Should the emphasis be placed 
upon the extension of socialist thought and social democracy, as the left argued, 
which would bring the Soviet Union into world affairs on an ideological level, or 
should the USSR be included as part of an international body trying to create a 
peaceful world along traditional political lines? An answer to this question can be 
found in an article written by G. D. H. Cole, who made a case for the former 
argument in the New Clarion in 1932. Arthur Henderson offered a more general 
explanation in Labour's Foreign Policy in 1933. 
In Cole's article 'Socialism and Internationalism', he argues that it is not possible for 
a country to be socialist in its domestic policies and capitalist in international 
relations. Writing about international co-operation, he said that 'we want the Socialist 
13 MRC 292 947n 
164 
cause to triumph all the world over. It is therefore clearly our mission to co-operate 
closely with any country in which Socialism is in power, and to do all we can to 
hasten the coming of Socialism in as many countries as possible., 
16 This, argued Cole, 
immediately pointed 
to the need for a close working alliance with Russia, and to a joint 
use of British and Russian influence to strengthen the forces of 
Socialism in Europe. For, though we may not be Communists in 
the Russian sense, we recognise Communism as a form of 
Socialism, and recognise a fellowship with Russia such as we 
cannot feel for any capitalist country. 17 
Cole clearly envisaged an ideological role for the Soviet Union, as it was to be used to 
further the socialist cause. He held the same vision for the League of Nations, which, 
he argued, should be used 'as an instrument for promoting disarmament, closer 
economic relations, peaceful settlement of international disputes and the building up 
of real international public opinion'. 18 However, Cole raised a point that was to 
become one of the left's main fears throughout the decade - that the League could be 
used to attack socialist countries, most noticeably the Soviet Union. He said that 
we have also to prevent the League from being used as an 
international capitalist instrument for the preservation of the status 
quo in capitalist countries, and above all as a means of uniting the 
capitalist world against Russia or Socialism. We should remain 
members of the League; but our allegiance to world Socialism must 
always come first. 19 
However, not all members of the moderate Labour left agreed that the League should 
have such a prominent role. H. N. Brailsford took Cole's argument one step further, 
suggesting that Labour should focus on the inclusion of the USSR. He said that the 
party had to 





work for the acceptance and triumph of the principles on which 
alone a genuine League can be based. In that cffort our only natural 
and convinced ally is outside the League. For my own part, I 
should argue that Anglo-Russian collaboration, rather than faith in 
the Lea ue, must be the foundation of the Labour Party's foreign 
policy., 
9 
While Cole's eloquent arguments did not go so far as to suggest working outside of 
the League of Nations, his position was the opposite of those offered by Arthur 
Henderson in the party pamphlet Labour's Foreign Policy in 1933. For Henderson, 
articulating the general view of the moderates in the movement's leadership, one of 
the most important elements of the party's international policy was to ensure stability 
and peace in the world, as opposed to Cole's calls for the promotion of socialism 
throughout the world. The Soviet Union and socialism were not an integral part of 
Henderson's plans. He wrote that 
at no stage has the Party made its adhesion to this policy [of 
promoting a stable peace through permanent political institutions] 
dependent upon a universal or a general change in the existing 
social order. It has never held that the attempt to secure 
international co-operation must await the triumph of Socialism 
throughout the world. On the contrary, it has held that whatever 
kind of governments might exist in different countries, it was none 
the less the duty of the Labour Movement to work with all its 
,, 21 power "to develop the beginnings of peace. 
This sent a message to the left socialists in the movement who favoured either Cole's 
pro-socialist foreign policy, or the more aggressive interpretation offered by the 
Comintern. This message was that the aims of Labour's international policy were to 
work through the League to create a stable and peaceful world, as is shown by the 
quote opening this chapter. It also showed that the party's gradualist internationalist 
philosophy had not changed, despite the 'grave international situation' that included a 
20 New Clarion, September 23 1933 
21 Labour Party, Labour's Foreign Policy, p. 4 
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Gmenacing situation in Germany and the whole of Central Europe ... the increasing talk 
of war in Europe and the unwillingness of the heavily armed states to come to serious 
grips with the disarmament problem. 22 
Labour's Foreign Policy explains that the League had been successful in achieving its 
wider aims of putting in place the foundations of a more stable world, and therefore it 
is right that Labour's foreign policy continues to be largely that of the League of 
Nations. The party had, after all, followed such a policy since 1919, never wavering 
'in its loyalty to the League of Nations, of compulsory arbitration of international 
disputes, of disarmament, of international co-operation, and of "pooled security" by 
mutual guarantees against aggression'. 23 It follows then, that it was the duty of the 
labour movement to work with all its power 'to develop the beginnings of peace', 24 
and that this could only happen when the party was returned to Government. The 
policy of supporting the League worked well while the party was in power, but the 
League's progress had stopped since 1931, and this was 'a failure of the more 
important Governments to use the machinery which the League has provided. -)25 
To support this argument, Henderson refers to the League of Nations Disarmament 
Conference that opened in Geneva in February 1932. Andrew Williams notes that the 
'remainder of the Labour Party old guard in the form of Arthur Henderson had made a 
complete commitment to seeing the success of these talks. 26 However, there were no 
significant steps towards world peace taken in Geneva, and Henderson claimed that 
the increasing talk of war in Europe was not helped by 'the long-drawn out 
deliberations' at the conference 'where the heavily armed Governments have shown a 
hitherto invincible reluctance to agree that their armaments shall be reduced. )27 
22 lbid, p. 1 23 lbid p. 3 24 lbid, p. 4 25 lbid, p. 1 1 26 Williams, Lahour and Russia, p. 218 27 Labour Party, Lahour's Foreign Policy, p. 9 
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Persuading other governments to accept that collective interests were more important 
than individual ones proved a harder task than perhaps Henderson realised. Yet 
despite his obvious disappointment at the failure to achieve anything tangible from 
Geneva, he still rejected the suggestion that Labour should radically alter its policy. 
The alternative to making the League a success was a return to 'splendid isolation', 28 
and this was something an internationalist party could not consider. 
Henderson was still convinced that Labour's principles 'hold good' and that, for the 
Labour Party 'it is still true that the only hope of maintaining peace in the world is 
through a system of pooled security and co-operation such as the League was 
intended to create. 29 He suggested that even if the League was to be destroyed, the 
party 'would still be bound to follow the same policy. Finding itself back where it was 
in 1918, it would not try to find something different or new'. 30 
As for the situation with the Soviet Union, Henderson acknowledged that organised 
labour had recognised the 'value of friendly relations with Russia', noting that the last 
Labour Government 'built up such relations. The next Government will do the 
same. 31 He advocated furthering those friendly relations, both commercial and 
political, with Russia, and proposed a 'further treaty of non-aggression and 
conciliation between the two countries' and said that a Labour Government would 'do 
its utmost to encourage the active participation of Russia in the task of organising 
, 32 world peace. 
Henderson found support for all of these ideas within the ranks of the party. The issue 
of trade with the Soviet Union was raised in the Chairman's address at the party 
28 Ibid, p. 1 1 
29 Ibid, p. 16 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid, p. 26 
32 Ibid 
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Conference in October 1933. Joseph Compton said that the Labour Party wanted fair 
treatment for Russia in dealings with Britain over trade. It was nothing short of 
criminal, he said, that the British Government was neglecting 
this immense market because of political prejudice. We have never 
urged preferential treatment for British-Russian trade, but we have 
protested against, and shall continue to oppose, any proposal or 
attempt to discriminate against our import and export trade with the 
Soviet Union. 33 
Henderson's hopes that the USSR could play an important role in the promotion of 
peace were in some ways fulfilled a year after writing Labour's Foreign Policy, as the 
Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, much to the delight of Hugh Dalton, and 
Litvinov urged closer ties with the west to further the cause of collective security. 
Henderson's abiding faith in the promise of the League of Nations seemed not to be 
shaken by the advent of Hitler winning power in Germany, and the dangers that that 
brought with it. This was despite stories in the Labour press, most noticeably the 
Daily Herald, about the fate of German religious and political groups. The party was 
well aware of what this meant for socialists and the left in general. A common theme 
in the Daily Herald throughout March was the rising threat of Nazism and the violent 
anti-Semitic nature of the new government in Germany. 
The paper foresaw problems for Marxists, socialists, Jews and foreigners. It called the 
methods of Nazism barbaric, the regime 'completely reactionary', and said that its 
first objective 'will be a ruthless persecution of the Labour and democratic 
organisations. ' 34 The newspaper continued with its warnings against Hitler's regime, 
and there is no way that British socialists could have not known what was happening 
in Germany. Stories such as Hitler's 'silent pogrom against the Jews' on 27 March 
33 LPCR, 1933, p. 13 5 
34 Daily Herald, 7 March 1933 
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was followed up the next day with 'Free Hand Against Jews - Hitler Sanctions 
Persecution'. On 31 March the headline was 'Hitlerites bum Jewish Captive's Feet'. 
Such evidence of the dangers from Hitler's regime means that it was all the more 
surprising for Labour's Foreign Policy to simply advocate a continuation of the 
policies that allowed the situation to arise in the first place. After all, the League was 
not able to prevent the economic crisis in 1929 that led to the circumstances which 
allowed Hitler to become a serious political force in Germany. There were of course 
other factors to take into consideration when discussing Hitler's rise to power (not 
least Stalin's refusal to allow a popular front of socialists and communists). But to 
argue in favour of a continuation of this action now seems as na7fve as Henderson's 
suggestion that when the party next forms a government, it should 'pass a Peace Act 
through Parliament. 35 
The difference in the attitudes of Cole and Henderson highlight the general split over 
the aims of the Labour Party in its foreign affairs, and thus also the political thought 
of the party. The debates within the party were clearly based upon traditional 
differences between ideology and pragmatism, particularly when discussing how the 
Soviet Union should be utilised. For Cole, Stalin's Russia was to be an integral part of 
a progressive-leftist bloc that would extend socialism across borders. Ideology was 
still at the forefront of the left's approach to politics. The obvious difference in 
Henderson's assessment was the assertion that the Labour Party had never argued that 
'international co-operation must await the triumph of Socialism throughout the 
world. 936 Socialism for the more pragmatic right of the party was a long-term goal, 
not a means to an end, and this, of course, mirrored the general differences in thought 
about the ways in which change within society should be brought about. Labour's 
35 Labour Party, Labour's Foreign Policy, p. 20 
36 Ibid, p. 4 
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foreign policy still had room for an ideological dimension before taking steps towards 
accepting rearmwnent began in 1935 at the party conference. 
However, prior to this conference, there was one event that brought hope to the 
moderates on both the Labour right and left. The Soviet Union's decision to become a 
member of the League of Nations in 1934 gave a huge boost to those who saw the 
inclusion of the USSR in the League as an important move towards strengthening, as 
Cole put it, the 'forces of Socialism in Europe. ' The leadership in Transport House 
also welcomed the move from the Kremlin, as this not only represented a victory of 
the "moderates" (supporters of Socialism in One Country) over the "extremists" 
(international revolutionaries) in the Kremlin, but it was also a vindication of the 
long-standing party policy of bringing the Soviet Union into international affairs. This 
should not have come as a total surprise to the party, as a year earlier Gillies wrote 
that the Soviet Government had used League of Nations conferences 'to great 
advantage in developing its admirable policy of securing recognition and non- 
aggression pacts from the possible number of nations. 37 
Hugh Dalton welcomed this development. He wrote in Why the USSR Joined the 
League -a New Fabian Research Bureau pamphlet (1935) - that the Soviet Union's 
decision was 'a historic event. No friend of peace, least of all if he be a socialist, can 
have heard this news without a thrill of joy and hope. 38 He believed that this was a 
'timely reinforcement to the Collective Peace system 39 and that the next Labour 
Government 'will seek a still closer Anglo-Soviet co-operation. The British and 
Soviet peoples can, if they choose, be two of the leading partners in a great 
international association. 40 
37 The Labour Party, The Communist Solar System: The Communist International, London, 1933, p. 13 38 New Fabian Research Bureau, Why the USSR Joined the League, London, 1935, p. 3 39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
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Dalton's pamphlet on the USSR and the League was more than just extending a 
welcome to Litvinov and his comrades in Narkomindel. Dalton also assessed the 
history of Soviet foreign policy in such a way that he greeted the official Soviet 
department concerned with foreign affairs on the one hand, while criticising the more 
extreme Comintern and its 'social fascist' policy. He noted that the 'blind 
intransigence of the Communist Party was reflected in the short-sighted opportunism 
of Soviet foreign PoliCy. A 1 This, he said, was because the communists made 'no 
distinction between Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and Fascists' as 'the 
Soviet Government made none between democracies and dictatorships, militarist 
governments and those loyal to the League. 42 
The NFRI3 now felt, however, that the USSR had realised that the League was the 
only way to maintain peace. By 1934, 'the Soviet Government had moved a long way 
toward the League, and had done so because it was coming to the conclusion that it 
must use the League to the utmost in order to avert the pressing danger of war. A3 
Indeed, according to Teddy Uldricks the USSR 'presented itself publicly as the 
champion of collective security against aggression. A4 This commitment to 
maintaining peace in Europe was apparently reinforced by Soviet membership of the 
League of Nations. 
Litvinov made 'eloquent pleas at Geneva for joint resistance to aggression, security 
pacts with France and Czechoslovakia and the anti-fascist Popular Front line of the 
Comintern. 945 It was, of course, these final two points that were the sticking point for 
the moderates in the Labour Party. The Popular Front and the Comintern caused much 
discomfort for the right of the party, viewing the latter, together with the CPGB, as 
41 lbid 
42 lbid 
43 lbid, p. 19 
44 T. Uldricks, 'Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s' in G. Gorodetsky (ed. ) Soviet Foreign Policy 
1917-1991 A Retrospective, London, 1994 p. 65 45 lbid 
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ean exotic plant with no real roots in the soil ... dependent on artificial fertilizers (sic) 
and liable to wilt rapidly if left to its own resources. 46 Such feelings demonstrate why 
party leaders such as Bevin and Dalton were happier to have the Soviet Union on side 
within the League of Nations, which favoured much more orthodox methods of 
changing the world compared with the Comintern. 
However, the Foreign Office 'was unenthusiastic about Soviet entry into the League 
of Nations, although the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, lobbied for it, to 
reinforce the Franco-Soviet- rapprochement. 47 John F. Naylor notes that Barthou 
'attempted to strengthen French ties with Eastern countries; he was an advocate of an 
'Eastern Locamo', including Russia, to restrict German ambitions there as well as in 
the west. A8 The Labour Party was more in touch with the French government than it 
was with its own. 
The USSR joining the League offered more than simply a glimmer of hope for 
socialists of all shades of red as it legitimised the pragmatic position Labour had taken 
since the revolutionary upheaval of 1917-1921. The Chairman at the party Conference 
in October 1933 pleaded for fair treatment for Russia in dealings with Britain over 
trade (as opposed to fair treatment for Russia because of a shared ideology) and the 
argument that British workers would remain unemployed should Britain be denied 
access to such an immense market was popular amongst some Labourites. 
But more importantly for Dalton and his comrades, the Soviet Union's entry into the 
League meant that the collective approach to international security was strengthened. 
Narkomindel became the primary force for the USSR's foreign policy, replacing the 
Comintern which had been a constant thorn in the side of Labour socialists who saw 
internationalism as meaning co-operation between governments rather than a mass 
46 NFRB, Why the USSR Joined the League, p. 33 47 M. Jabara Carley, 'Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement', p. 35 48 Naylor, Labour's International Policy, p. 85 
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mobilisation of workers cutting across international borders. The accession of the 
USSR into the League began a process that saw advocates of stability triumph over 
advocates of socialism, and not simply in the field of foreign policy. Once the right 
regrouped in the early part of the decade, it pursued an overall policy that sought to 
protect the existing capitalist system from the Nazi threat, as this was the lesser of two 
evils. 
By the time the party held its Conference in Southport in 1934, the moderates were 
strong enough to reassert the policy of the 1929 Government that favoured active 
support for the League of Nations in its pursuit of disarmament. Conference approved 
this move, outlined in a National Joint Council document War and Peace, which 
agreed to oppose aggression through the League of Nations with diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. But more importantly, the decision was taken to also offer 
support for the League if it chose to use armed force as well. 
This was a major challenge to the historic pacifism that was so strong in the Labour 
Party. George Lansbury, the figurehead of Labour's pacifists, argued against the use 
of arms, and favoured opening up the markets of what he called the 'have nations' - 
Britain, France and the USA - to the 'have nots' - Germany, Italy and Japan - to help 
make economic concessions. This was a particularly surprising move from Lansbury. 
Not because he was suggesting an economic rather than an armed solution to the 
increasing problems in the world, but because it would seem that he completely 
ignored the stories of persecution of the Nazis' enemies that littered the pages of his 
old newspaper, the Daily Herald. Such an approach set Lansbury on course for a 
showdown with Bevin at the next Conference. 
The far left of the party also disagreed with Transport House's renewed support for 
the League of Nations, but for different reasons. The fellow travellers in the party, 
such as Stafford Cripps of the Socialist League, saw a threat of war from the capitalist 
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nations against the USSR. He reasoned that capitalist states would inevitably use 
anything in their power to continue the struggle for supremacy of the world's markets. 
Hugh Dalton berated Cripps for reducing everything down to a simple struggle 
between the workers and the exploiters. He accused Cripps of being 'unaware of 
nationalist passions as a factor of politics'. 49 But Cripps was supported by members of 
the Socialist League, and intellectuals such as Laski and Hamilton Fyfe, the former 
editor of the Daily Herald. 
This problem with the League of Nations ran deeper within the party than simply the 
usual suspects on Labour's far left-wing. In 1933, Henderson replied to a letter in the 
New Clarion, conceming Labour and the League. The letter stated that 
to make the cornerstone of our foreign policy a League of 
Capitalist Nations, whose antagonisms are inherent in the system 
and are constantly being exposed, and then hastily covered with 
bouquets of meaningless oratory at Geneva, is surely. to invite in 
the long run disillusionrnent and disaster. 50 
Arthur Henderson acknowledged that this view was held by many in the party, but 
took heart that the socialist governments in the world were members of the League, 
and that the Soviet Union, whilst not a member had been 
almost continually represented at Geneva in the last two years, and 
is showing to an increasing degree that it values the opportunity 
afforded by the meetings and machinery of the League to transact 
business with the Governments of the world and to take part in 
common endeavours to promote peace. 51 
Labour's position remained unchanged. The victory of socialism and peace would 
come through the ballot box rather than through anti-capitalist protest and workers' 
action. Henderson viewed the League of Nations as similar to the British Parliament, 
as an 'indispensable political instrument, to be used and developed by the next Labour 
49 Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 41 
50 NeW Clarion, 9 December 1933 
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Government in making peace secure. ' 52 He urged the next Labour Government to 
conclude a commercial treaty with Russia, and also a non-aggression and conciliation 
treaty. Labour should also 'do all in our power to bring Russia into close and friendly 
co-operation with us in the councils of the nations. ' 53 
Stafford Cripps on the other hand sought to ensure against any threat to 'the workers' 
and entered into a united front with the CPGB and ILP, whose foreign interest 
revolved around fighting fascism and protecting the Soviet Union from the capitalist 
states. This was a logical extension of the arguments put forward by the moderate left 
of the party, from individuals like Cole who favoured including the Soviet Union 
because of its ideology. For the fellow travellers on the far left of the Labour Party, it 
was only rational to want to ensure that the citadel of socialist revolution was safe 
from reactionary attacks. 
Cripps agreed with a letter published in the Daily Worker from the CPGB to the 
Executive Committee of the Labour Party, the TUC and the ILP that claimed that 
millions of workers were 
eager and anxious to build up a great united front of working-class 
struggle in defence of the workers' conditions in Britain, in support 
of the German and Austrian workers' fight against Fascism, and 
against imperialist war and armed intervention directed against the 
Soviet Union. 54 
Within a year, the National Council of the ILP, including James Maxton, Fenner 
Brockway, Jennie Lee and C. A. Smith, had agreed that the broadest possible united 
front of militant workers should be built and that the USSR had to be defended 'by all 
means available. '55 As the 1930s continued, the internationalism of the Labour left 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 Daily Worker, 11 March 1933 
55 New Leader, 12 January 1934 
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(with the exception of the ILP who later took a more revolutionary line) was defined 
by a position that demanded the defence of the USSR at all costs. 
But the ILP initially joined the call for a defence of the Soviet Union and this was part 
of a wider question of where the loyalties of British socialists should be. In 1933 the 
New Leader stated that 'United action to resist Fascism, War, the Capitalist offensive 
- and the Break with Russia - must be our slogan. 156 While the general message in 
favour of a united front and anti-capitalism is there, the call to defend the USSR 
attempts to invoke the feelings from the previous decade when the Tories attacked the 
beleaguered Soviet system and Labourites, often unquestioningly, rallied to its 
defence. 
Within this process of defending the USSR was a redefining of patriotism, and this 
took place at the same time as the Metro-Vickers trial in Moscow in 1933, the details 
of which are given elsewhere. But it is important to note here that Labour socialists 
could choose between a patriotism towards Britain, and join the party and the Daily 
Herald, and protest that the British engineers on trial in the Soviet Union were more 
than likely innocent, and simply caught up in a 'war of negotiations' between the two 
governments involved. Or they could choose to side with the ILP and CPGB who 
claimed that the men were clearly guilty of sabotage and 'wrecking' (the popular term 
in the Soviet Union in this period). Those who sided with this point of view were 
willing to exchange the patriotism for their country in favour of a patriotic stance for 
socialism. Indeed, this arguably became even stronger when the Spanish Civil War 
began, and Socialist Patriotism came to mean defending Spain and the USSR. 
Yet this was by no means a smooth transition for the ILP. While it agreed that 
safeguarding the USSR 'is necessary in order to maintain the world revolutionary 
movement', Brockway criticised the IKKI for its 'misunderstanding ... of the problems 
56 The New Leader, 7 April 1933 (original emphasis) 
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of different countries, in the ... analysis to countries with different conditions, and in a 
deliberate policy of temporarily sacrificing the revolutionary movement in one 
country to safeguard the USSR. ' 57 The Comintem later accused Brockway of 'anti- 
Soviet slanders'" and in 1935, Pollitt told the IKKI in Moscow that 'Brockway used 
the "New Leader" as an anticommunist journal' declaring that '[i]t is difficult to talk 
with these people. ' 59 
Stafford Cripps' attempts at unity with the communists and the by now departed ILP 
caused problems within the wider party, as Cripps was still a member of the 
triumvirate that led the Parliamentary Labour Party, but it was his assertion that the 
League of Nations should not be trusted that caused most problems, as this was a 
direct challenge to official party policy. The united front argued that the League, 
being led by capitalist countries, could be willing to turn its weapons against the 
Soviet Union. Cripps and the Socialist League argued that the League of Nations 
could not be trusted with arms, and therefore 'went from this point on a diametrically 
opposed track to the majority of the Labour Party on the subject of the League of 
Nations. 9 60 
The idea began to be floated by the Socialist League of a parallel of Nations, one 
made up of 'progressive states. ' 61 Cripps and the defenders of the USSR in the party 
found themselves further sidelined after Labour moved towards abandoning its 
historic links to pacifism in 1935 in favour of rearmament. However, until then, with 
fascism on the rise in Britain, Cripps 'believed that strong right-wing elements in the 
National Government would suppress any serious challenge from the trade union and 
57 New Leader, 7 July 1933 
58 New Leader, 2 March 1934 
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labour movements to the status quo. War and internal repression ... could only be 
prevented by a general strike. ' 62 
In the period after the fall of the second Labour Government, Labour's old foreign 
policy, with its history in 'a set of ethical stances, directly inherited from Victorian 
radical liberalism', 63 was challenged by the aggressive politics on the Continent. The 
accession to power of Hitler in Germany provoked different responses from different 
sections of the party. In the immediate period after MacDonald left to form the 
National Government, the left had the upper hand concerning internal party politics. 
Moderate left-wingers such as Cole and Brailsford urged the party to adopt a more 
radical foreign policy that had the extension of the socialist ideology as its guiding 
light. The Labour Party, it was argued, should embrace the USSR in a partnership that 
would see socialist and social democratic values installed in the countries of the 
world. The League of Nations, the body Labour traditionally put its faith in, could 
play a part, but the emphasis was clearly ideological. Labour must pursue a socialist 
foreign policy with socialist goals. 
The rightist leadership in Transport House, too weak to counter these arguments in the 
initial post-MacDonald phase of the party's history, soon found its voice. Arthur 
Henderson emphasised the need for Labour to continue its policy of supporting the 
League of Nations in an attempt to ensure a stable world where progressive politics 
could further the cause of humanity. The party had to make its policy that of the 
League. Clement Attlee found himself in a peculiar position where he agreed with the 
moderates such as Henderson on the need for a strong League, but also gave support 
to his PLP comrade Stafford Cripps, who was under fire from Dalton and Bevin for 
flirting with the communists. Attlee stated in the House of Commons that '[y]ou have 
62 Shore, Leading the Left, p. 27 
63 S. Howe, 'Labour and international affairs' in Tanner, Thane and Tiratsoo Labour's First Century, 
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got to make the League a real League, and you have to put loyalty to the League 
above loyalty to your country. ' 64 In 1937 he wrote that "National Socialism" is a 
contradiction in terms. A true Socialist cannot allow his sympathies to be bounded by 
anything so narrow as a nation, for nationalism is only egotism writ large. ' 65 
Attlee appeared to be successfully straddling the two moderate wings of the party. 
Placing loyalty to the League reaffirmed the position of Henderson and traditional 
party policy, but by stating that such loyalty must also come before patriotism he 
rekindled the fire of Labour's internationalism. It was perhaps an attempt at a 
pragmatic idealism, bringing the ideas of both wings together. In this, Attlee was 
showing the qualities he displayed in the early years of his post-war Administration. 
Perhaps the side that ought to have been the most ideological in its advocation of a 
socialist foreign policy was the far-left coalition of the Socialist League, CPGB and 
ILP. Yet the proposed united front was born out of the realisation that fascism was a 
much more serious problem than was first thought, and not out of a decision to fight 
for socialism together. This was not a joint venture where the common goal was to 
build a society based upon an agreed interpretation of socialism. The cracks in this 
union began to show during the Spanish Civil War, because there was no agreement 
about what the members were fighting for (whereas they initially knew what they 
were against). As is shown below, Cripps and the CPGB began to accept that the 
existing system of social democracy needed to be protected while the ILP continued 
to argue from more of a 'revolutionary defeatist' position that favoured turning the 
coming world war into an international class war. It was no coincidence that, prior to 
coming to this conclusion, the ILP had been growing closer to Trotsky. 
64 Cited in Harris, Attlee, p. 117 
65 Attlee, Perspective, p. 157 
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In October 1933, the New Leader carried an interview with Trotsky entitled 'Can 
Comintern be Reformed? ' Fenner Brockway noted that Trotsky's message was for the 
ILP to form the Fourth International 'to include all revolutionaries who accept the 
principles of Marx and Lenin, and know that the Second and Third Internationals are 
both bankrupt - the one through reactionary reformism and the other through 
bureaucratic centrism. 66 Trotsky advised that the ILP 'remain independent at all 
costs'. 67 This was a basis for the ILP's support for the anti-Stalinist POUM in the 
Spanish Civil War. 
The article came after a long discussion in the ILP about the correct line to take on the 
Comintern's new international policy. At the party conference in April, a narrow 
majority voted in favour of approaching the Comintern, and there was support for 
withdrawing from the Labour and Socialist International. The Secretariat of the 
Comintern sent a telegram to the General Secretary of the ILP, John Paton, 
& 68 expressing its readiness to commence negotiations' with the ILP. In spite of the 
decision at conference, Brockway attacked the CPGB for its policy of aggression 
towards the ILP and implied that the CPGB was too close to Moscow. 69 However, the 
basis for a united front had been constructed. 
Yet the Comintern was not interested in an equal united front with the ILP, as its 
policy was definitely based on winning over as many ILP members as possible whilst 
denouncing the party's leaders. The Political Commission of the Comintern was 
concerned that this policy should be rigorously implemented, and was worried that the 
CPGB made it 'easier for the ILP leaders to attack us because of our incorrect 
methods which turn the workers away from US. 00 The Revolutionary Policy 
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Committee of the ILP on the other hand, was seen as an improvement 'compared with 
the Maxtons', but the RPC was still to be 'subjected to far-reaching criticism. ' 71 
However, in the early stages of the unity campaign, a primary concern was the 
defence of the Soviet Union, and it was this that the foreign policy of the united front 
was based upon. -The coming years of heightened class struggle in Spain and the 
confidence that the fascists gained across Europe saw Labour's foreign policy 
coalesce around a new agenda, one which made a firm break with the* party's pacifist 
past, but one which still sought to invoke the party's traditional internationalism. 
4.2 The end of Labour's pacifism: rearmament and Spain 
1935 was a significant year for the British labour movement. The Labour Party fought 
a General Election in this year against a government that successfully played the 
6national unity' card. Emphasising the need for unity in a time of crisis the 
government returned with 429 seats, with the Conservative Party taking 387. Labour 
improved upon their 1931 result, but still only managed to win 154 seats. 
Significantly for the right, Dalton and Morrison were returned to parliament. 
The party's manifesto points concerning foreign policy called for a reversal of the 
Government's 'suicidal' policy that had led to 'a vast and expansive rearmament 
programme which will only stimulate similar programmes elsewhere. ' 72 It sought a 
'whole-hearted co-operation with the League of Nations and with all States outside 
the League which desire peace. It stands firmly for the Collective Peace System. ' 73 
However, perhaps more importantly for the party (given that there was no real chance 
of it winning the election) was the decision taken at the party Conference. The plight 
71 lbid 
72 1. Dale, Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, p. 46 73 lbid 
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of Jewish Germans and socialists had been well documented in The Daily Herald and 
The New Clarion for some years and the inevitable question of whether such an 
aggressive and hostile system as Nazism could be beaten by peaceful means needed 
an answer. Prior to the conference, the New Statesman encouraged the Labour Party 
to accept the need for sanctions - something the pacifist element was against. The 
Statesman encouraged the Labour Party to 'support economic sanctions with all their 
risks, emphasising at the same time that it would refuse to countenance a private war 
between Great Britain and Italy. ' 74 
Delegates at the 1935 party Conference took this one step further, accepting that the 
pacifist approach to defeating fascism had become largely untenable and delivered a 
vote of 2,168,000 to 102,000 in favour of the leadership's support of the League of 
Nations' proposed actions of sanctions against Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia. 
Dalton declared that '[w]e stand for the collective peace system, for strong collective 
action in defence of peace against any aggressor 75 and despite George Lansbury's 
impassioned plea against such a course of action, the party took the first steps to 
rejecting its pacifist past. This consequently led to Lansbury's resignation as party 
leader. Clement Attlee won the subsequent leadership election and thus began a new 
era for the Labour Party. With Lansbury gone, the Labour pacifists were leaderless 
and dwindling. While this was not the end of pacifism in the Labour Party, the loss of 
the leader of the "pacifist" bloc signalled a new direction for the party. Bevin had 
played a major part in forcing Lansbury out and he would not stop at simply removing 
one pacifist to allow another in. 
Clement Attlee had fought in World War One while the Labour Party had been 
divided over what to do. His support for some form of rearmament was practically 
assured, even if it was not immediate as, according to Harris, Attlee 'reacted more 
74 New Statesman and Society, 31 August 1931 
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slowly than some of his colleagues, above all Bevin, to the need to reconsider the 
party's foreign policy in the light of the rise of Hitler. 76 But after a trip to Germany 
'where he met 'some very tough looking Nazis'... he came to share his colleague's 
view of the threat to European democracy. ' 77 
The 1935 Labour Party Conference was clearly important for two reasons. The first 
was the endorsement of the League of Nations' proposed use of sanctions against 
Mussolini, which allowed Walter Citrine to ensure that support for the League of 
Nations continued. Neil Riddell notes that after the Abyssinian crisis, the labour 
movement 'finally began to acknowledge that force might be necessary' 78 , and cites 
the PLP's 'grudging acceptance of rearmament in 1937 979 as an example of this. The 
second reason for the importance of this conference was of course connected, and this 
was the removal of the pacifist Lansbury and the victory of Attlee. The Parliamentary 
party could work closer with the trade union leadership than it had at any other time 
since MacDonald left, largely because Cripps was preoccupied with building unity 
with the Socialist League and Dalton and Morrison were now back in the PLP. The 
return of Dalton was especially important as he had proved himself very 
knowledgeable in foreign affairs and had been working closely with the trade union 
leadership in Transport House. 
On the left, the Socialist League and the Communists were still calling for the USSR 
to be defended by all means necessary. Cripps was busy declaring that capitalist 
countries with guns were just as dangerous as fascist ones and that they must not be 
allowed to turn them against the citadel of the revolution. Delegates at the League's 
1935 conference agreed that as soon as a socialist government won in Britain, 'it 
76 Harris, Attlee, P. 115 
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would do everything possible to support the USSR. 80 Conference agreed that things 
had changed for the better now that there was a 'strong and determined Socialist 
state 181 present to offer more balance. Cripps said that the USSR 
came to Geneva fully conscious of the limitations of a League of 
Nations controlled by Capitalist states, but she has recognised that 
even in the world as it is to-day it is possible that fear, both 
physical and economic, may reinforce humanitarianism and drive 
some Capitalist states to accept measures which may help to 
postpone war. 82 
H. N. Brailsford argued in an article entitled 'Facing the Next War', that the Soviet 
Union was 'no longer a hated autocracy, but a Socialist Republic, the one state in the 
world to which we owe a spiritual allegiance. Can we hesitate then, to range 
ourselves, with our Russian comrades, against a barbarous Fascist state... ' 83 There 
was still, then, a hope from the moderate left in the Labour Party that the USSR would 
be utilised in an ideological way. 
The ILP criticised this new approach, as it meant treading a path of conciliation with 
capitalists as the communists advocated a unity with anyone opposing the methods 
and doctrine of the far-right, despite the fact that, just a year earlier, the Comintern 
was criticising Fenner Brockway for wanting to 'collaborate with all sorts of open 
enemies of the Comintern. ' 84 In an article in The Socialist entitled 'Comintern's New 
Crusade' Barbara Betts commented that the Communist Party was stretching 'the 
hand of reconciliation to the Labour Movements of different countries and seeks unity 
, 85 only on one condition - that it shall be unity against Fascism and War. She noted 
that the Communist Party sought an electoral agreement with the Labour Party that, in 
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constituencies where communists had mass support, the party's candidate would go 
unchallenged. 
Labour of course rejected this, and despite the rhetoric of reconciliation, Moscow was 
still adamant that it was 'faced with the responsibility that this bunch who control the 
reformist movement in this country are now the chief obstacles to any tremendous 
advance. ' 86 Betts criticised the Comintern's support for the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy of a union between the USSR and capitalist governments and questioned 
whether 'in moulding its tactics upon the necessities of the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy [it] postponed the day when the workers in other countries will win through to 
Socialism. '87 This shows that some Labourites who supported close ties with the 
USSR in the fight against fascism had come to see the Soviet Union's foreign policy 
in its proper light. It was no longer pursuing the successful promotion of international 
class struggle, but rather it was acting like other capitalist states, as it had done since 
Stalin adopted his policy of 'Socialism in One Country'. 
As has already been noted, the thoughts of Trotsky were influencing the ILP's 
interpretation of world affairs, and this certainly determined how the ILP responded to 
the Spanish Civil War. Rather than support the Communist-backed International 
Brigade in the conflict, the ILP offered support to the Marxists in the POUM 
(Workers' Party of Marxist Unity). Tom Buchanan notes that the ILP saw Spain as a 
way of promoting revolution in Britain at a time when the CPGB was distancing itself 
from it. 'Hence, where the Communist Party saw the Civil War as validation for the 
Popular Front, the ILP saw it as proof of the need for the revolutionary struggle 
against fascism. 88 Buchanan also claims that the ILP's support for the anti-Stalinist 
POUM 'marked the ILP out from the Labour Movement and the Communists. 89 This 
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helped the ILP to find a role for itself in the mid-thirties, after years of dwindling 
numbers and strife caused by flirtation with the CPGB. The form that this role took is 
explained later, but it shows that the ILP still had an important contribution to make to 
the socialist movement as a whole despite its many problems. 
Of course, the Socialist League and the CPGB followed the twists and turns of the 
party line from Moscow, while simultaneously trying to push for further unity in the 
Popular Front. The Labour Party found it more difficult to formulate a plan. This was 
because, as Ben Pimlott says, 
[n]othing in foreign or domestic politics between the wars aroused 
more passion and idealism on the British Left than the Spanish 
conflict. 'The issue are very simple', a young poet told Julian 
Symons, summing up the mood of a radical generation. 'This is a 
struggle between the forces of good in the world and the forces of 
evil. ' Almost all socialists, and many Liberals, agreed. 90 
The problem for Labour was clear. It was faced with the problem of trying to find a 
way of helping a coalition of socialists who had been democratically elected into 
government against a fascist opposition. 
The problems came from inside the party. Firstly, how could Labour offer support 
without entering into a pact with communists? Especially as the advent of the Popular 
Front government in France under the leadership of Ldon Blum, had given British 
left-wingers hope that the tide was turning in favour of anti-fascist action, especially 
after Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia and Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland. 
Secondly, many catholic workers had begun to join Labour in recent years, but these 
were also split over who to side with, as Franco claimed to be representing the 
Catholic church. 
90 Pimlott, Dalton, p. 233 
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Labour's parliamentary tactics remained against the extra-parliamentary activities that 
later took rank and file socialists to fight in Spain, that Konni Zilliacus wrote to Philip 
Noel-Baker that non-intervention - the favoured response of party leaders like Dalton 
- was 
merely Citrine and co's first steps to committing the Labour 
Movement to a United Front with the Tories in preparing for the 
next world war. I've known for some time that Citrine and Gillies 
were in the pockets of the FO [Foreign Office] and that Hugh 
[Dalton] was moving in the same direction. 91 
However, the policy of non-intervention did not fit neatly into Labour's defence of 
parliamentarianism -a fundamental part of Labour's political thought - as the party 
leaders effectively ruled out helping a democratically elected government, and a leftist 
one at that. This was a far cry from the days when the party rallied to the cause of the 
Bolsheviks, even though Lenin's party came to power through methods completely 
alien to the Labour Party. 
The Spanish Civil War helped to bring the USSR into world affairs in a way that it 
had not been since the revolutionary and Civil War period and forced Labour to view 
the Soviet Union slightly differently. As has been noted elsewhere, Labour did not 
simply see the USSR as a single bloc, but rather as a pool from which to pick, choose 
and reject ideas to help define its own understanding of socialism, and this was both a 
conscious and subconscious experiment. And its actions towards the two foreign 
agencies of the Soviet Union of course show this. Labour's foreign policy was defined 
by its need for stability, which inevitably meant that it preferred dealing with 
Narkomindel through ambassadors and trade agreements to enduring incursions into 
its sphere of influence from the Comintern (which, as is discussed later, helped shape 
Labour's own internal policies). 
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Until 1934 when the USSR joined the League of Nations, it was not an (actual 
presence' in world affairs, apart from the Comintern, which was largely ineffective in 
fulfilling its revolutionary aims. The Kremlin was too preoccupied with its own 
internal economic and political situation to really be involved as a world player. But it 
became actively involved in the Spanish conflict on two fronts. It sent arms to the 
Republicans - something the other anti-fascist states in Europe refused to do. And, 
through Communist Parties in various countries, it helped send willing fighters to join 
the cause. The Soviet Union, rather than simply the Comintern, was now active on the 
world stage. 
Despite this flexing of Soviet muscles, the Labour leadership did not seem unduly 
worried about this, and their attitude did not radically alter. A year after the Spanish 
Civil War had begun, Attlee continued the party line which supported the USSR as a 
member of the League of Nations, praising it for taking 'a very realistic line. Instead 
of the attitude of indiscriminate hostility to all Capitalist Governments, it draws a 
distinction between those which are definitely pacific and those which are potentially 
dangerous. 92 
As for the actual conflict itself, the 'responses of the trade-union movement to 
fascism, rearmament and Popular Frontism suggested that there was no possibility of 
re-directing the bulk of the party towards the socialist internationalism favoured by 
many on the left. 993 Herbert Morrison opposed non-intervention. He remembered that 
he was 'speaking for a minority within the Labour Party. As much as feeling that it 
was in the interests of peace to do so I felt that this was a question of principle. It was 
the elementary duty of all socialists to back up the legally elected Republic of 
Spain. 94 Morrison claimed to be speaking on behalf of a minority in the movement, 
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but there was much support against the leadership's perceived inactivity over Spain. 
John Callaghan notes that by 1937, 'when the ILP, the CPGB and the Socialist 
League launched the Unity Campaign, an estimated one-fifth of Labour's 90,000 
members in London were involved in the pro-unity lobby. '95 
The rank and file of the party was more supportive of the idea of direct involvement 
in the conflict in Spain, and this saw many members of the British labour movement 
leave their homes and risk their lives to fight on the side of the Republicans. This was 
'despite the fact that volunteering, recruiting volunteers or aiding them was illegal'. 96 
Over 2,000 British men volunteered to fight on the side of the Republicans, but, 
despite the common interest, not all of them fought on the same side whilst there. 
George Orwell famously fought on the side of the POUM, the non-Stalinist militia 
backed by the ILP. The CPGB supported the International Brigade. 97 
The battles fought in Spain between the POUM and the Brigaders were often hostile, 
reflecting Stalin's need to control the international movement. Yet in Britain the 
Popular Front was growing in spite of these differences. In 1936, the Socialist League 
supported the Communist Party's application for affiliation to the Labour Party and, 
despite the fact that delegates still rejected this proposal by a majority of three to one, 
it received the largest vote in favour yet. This suggests that the Soviet Union's 
influence in the debates about Spain was growing, and the rank and file of the Labour 
Party favoured aiding the Spanish cause in a way that far exceeded the official party 
line. 
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Even those traditionally less enthusiastic about the USSR began to see the value of 
allying themselves with the Soviet Union, while avoiding the CPGB at home. 
Donoughue and Jones note that in the early 1930s, Herbert Morrison 
expressed some warm feelings towards the Soviet Union, which 
were periodically publicised by the Beaverbrook Press to suggest 
that Morrison was not a patriot. He admired the original Russian 
revolution and had sympathy for the economic collectivism of the 
Soviet Union. When Russia had supported collective security 
through the League of Nations he had urged the National 
Government to collaborate, althouQ he opposed any collaboration 
with the Communist Party at home. 
There was a great amount of relief given to Spain, and arguably this common desire to 
help was more important than party lines. 
This could be explained by the tradition of "ethical" socialism within the labour 
movement, and it manifested itself in a great belief amongst Labour's followers that 
'the right thing' should be done to aid brothers and sisters in the 'socialist family'. In 
some cases, that 'right thing' was to collect money for the cause. Helen Cameron, a 
socialist from Glasgow, remembered that '[flhere were big rallies [for Spain] in the 
city hall. And it was astounding the amount of money that they could collect. I mean, 
people would even put in ... pound notes. '99 
In other cases, it was to bring refugees from the fighting to Britain. For example, 
when Bilbao fell, the ILP helped a number of refugee children and maintained an ILP 
Home until their repatriation in June 1939. 'Many children, whose parents had been 
killed, were adopted by friends or members of the Party. '100 Tom Buchanan notes that 
the labour movement played a role 'in the care of Basque refugee children' and that 
the movement had its 'own, very concrete, policies for supporting the Spanish 
98 Donoughue, B and Jones, G. W., Herbert Morrison Portrait of a Politician, London, 1973, pp. 226- 
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workers, even if these differed markedly from the Popular Front. "01 Other ways of 
helping was to send non-military aid, including ambulances or to physically go to 
Spain and fight alongside socialists and democrats from all over Europe. 
The problem for the leadership was that this unofficial activity could be perceived as 
siding with extremists, which, in the eyes of the leadership, was no good for Labour's 
electoral chances once all of this was over. Buchanan correctly argues that the 
leadership saw things differently, and once again, this highlights the difference 
between the rank and file and their leaders. For the moderates in Transport House, 
Spain was not 'an opportunity but a problem. It had the potential to undermine the 
structure of the labour movement and to force it off the course on which they had set 
it, by stimulating independent action by rank-and-file members. ' 102 
Buchanan also notes that the working class was never completely united over Spain, 
and therefore the party leaders had to take this into account. 103 However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that moderates like Dalton and Bevin would have reacted any 
differently had the labour movement been united in offering unconditional support for 
the Republicans in Spain. Bevin sympathised with the Republicans, but he refused to 
succumb to the 
emotion generated by Spain ... This approach mimics the language 
of contemporary leaders (especially Hugh Dalton) who used the 
term 'emotion' to belittle rank-and-file members who, for quite 
rational reasons, opposed the policy which the leaders wished to 
impose on them. 104 
Jim Fyrth notes that Bevin's 'lack of enthusiasm ... sprang not only from his lack of 
interest in the Spanish war, but also from his belief that the "Ieft's" real interest in 
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Spain was as a lever for moving the British Labour Movement towards a "People's 
Fronf' policy. " 05 
The leadership promoted non-intervention at the 1936 Conference when Greenwood's 
plea won the moderates a brief victory, with a resolution against sending weapons 
being carried by 1,836,000 to 519,000. However, the next day the Spanish fraternal 
delegates 
were able to make such sensational revelations of the breaches of 
the Pact by the Fascists that the Conference changed its mind, sent 
Attlee and Greenwood on a mission of protest to the Government, 
and, on their return, carried a new resolution much more helpful to 
the Republican side. 106 
This much more helpful resolution came as Attlee moved a new resolution 
'demanding that Britain and France should restore to the Spanish government its right 
to buy arms. It was passed unanimously. Labour could no longer support non- 
intervention. ' 107 
Tribune, Cripps' new journal that supported the Unity Campaign in 1937, agreed. In 
its first edition, William Mellor wrote 
[w]e must give the Republican Government of Spain its legal right 
to arms. We must tell the Fascist powers that the limit of their 
aggression has been reached. We must join with France and the 
Soviet Union to resist their piecemeal threat to the remaining 
democracies of the world. As they prepare to disarm, so shall we 
disarm. But as they threaten peace, so shall we defend it. 108 
1937 was a turning point for the party. The Socialist League disbanded after being 
disaffiliated. from the Labour Party, so that its members could stay in the official 
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organisation and campaign for unity, although the ILP opposed this, claiming the 
Communist Party had pressured the Socialist League to this as it was 'interested in 
preserving the lobby for CPGB affiliation and not averse to the liquidation of a 
potential rival. "09 
On the question of rearmament the parliamentary party reversed its long-held position 
against the government's service estimates (containing rearmament expenditures). 
The PLP now abstained on this point 
thereby demonstrating tacit approval of rearmament. This symbolic 
shift was consolidated later that year when both the TUC and the 
party conference accepted their executives' policy statement that a 
future Labour government would need rearmament if current 
international problems continued. ' 10 
The acceptance that arms would be needed to defeat Nazism was not inevitable. The 
long history of pacifism in the party would not be turned over easily. But the fact was 
that circumstances, and the leadership of the party, had changed. The belief that the 
League of Nations would succeed in bringing stability no longer seemed enough. 
Clem Attlee wrote that '[t]he League has suffered severely in prestige by the failure 
over the Abyssinian affair, and is, in fact, challenged by the Fascist States. The 
collective peace system is not a reality at the present time. "" Since the end of World 
War One Labour's foreign policy had revolved around the League of Nations, but this 
had been called into question since the Abyssinian crisis. 
The second factor in explaining the move to accepting the need for force against 
fascism was that independent working class action had not succeeded in defeating the 
Nazis. While the united front of leftists and anti-fascists had helped to beat Mosley in 
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Britain, the failure of Moscow to respond quickly enough to the German situation 
allowed Hitler to win and consolidate power. As Hitler's regime grew more confident 
and therefore more aggressive, the Labour Party really was left with no other choice 
but to accept that war was a real possibility. 
This epitomised the thought process of Labour Party. This process was one of gradual 
change that was driven by idealism but also by a need to be practical in its reaction to 
events. These twin factors can be seen in the way the party dealt with the Soviet 
Union and in its response to the Spanish Civil War. The party's Soviet policy was 
clearly led by the pragmatism of MacDonald, who believed that answers to the 
problems of economic depression and the rise of the far right in Europe could be 
found in trading and negotiating with the USSR. Arthur Henderson provided the 
practical, stable groundwork that could have brought success had the Labour 
government not fallen early in its first term. 
In a way, this was the right's interpretation of internationalism. The moderate party 
leadership did not want to withdraw from international affairs and live only within the 
borders of the British Empire. It wanted to play an active role in resolving any 
problems in Europe, as it was still driven by a vision of harmony born from its 
Liberal, Christian and Marxist socialism. Of course, there were many in the party who 
favoured closer ties with the Soviet Union because of, rather than in spite of its 
socialism. The USSR provided a vision of a working model of socialism that could 
offer hope to the desperation that plagued Britain. The need to defend the USSR at all 
costs advocated by some on the left of the party was Labour's original understanding 
of internationalism expressing itself. The country of the working class needed to be 
free to inspire all workers throughout the world. 
The question of the correct reaction to Spain proved quite the opposite in terms of the 
balance of power. Whereas the numerically smaller leadership led opinion on the 
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Soviet question, on Spain it was the much larger rank and file who guided the 
movement's response and ideas. The party-hierarchy could do little but advocate the 
practical party line of non-intervention as many rank and filers actively participated in 
aiding the Spanish conflict. This is not to say that the membership was on a 
completely different course to their leaders. Indeed, members generally agreed with 
the party line, and there were times during the Spanish Civil War when members and 
leaders were clearly in tune with one another, such as the action taken on refugees and 
financial collections for the cause. 
But there were occasions when the rank and file would not only let party bosses know 
that they disagreed with them, but they would act upon these disagreements. While 
this did not mean that the grassroots were suddenly advocating a Soviet Britain, it 
does show that, at times the party was definitely to the left of the leadership, and that 
idealism was more important to party workers 'at the bottom' than they were to 
pragmatists 'at the top'. What was important though, was that the rank and file never 
chose to try andformally create a united front. 
The 1936 Conference in October defeated a motion instructing the party to recognise 
the need for the unity of the working class movement, and to accept the affiliation of 
the Communist Party by 1,728,000 to 592,000.1 12 Conference the following year 
enforced this vote, and again demonstrates the nature of the Labour Party, as the 
members and the leaders could ultimately put their differences aside to work as a 
united party. The long-term aim of returning a Labour Government and the non- 
specific socialism of Labour were ultimately the glue that held the party together. 
112 The Labour Party, The Labour Party and the so-called "Unity Campaign", London, 193 7, p. 2 
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43 Conclusion: Towards War 
In a twist of history, this aim of seeing Britain's mainstream progressive party return 
to government became more of a reality the closer the country got to war. By 1939 
coalition politics was seen as a viable option amongst the parliamentary parties and 
Pimlott notes that '[b]y indicating their willingness to serve in such a government, but 
only if Chamberlain was not at the head of it, Labour leaders were able to exert a 
crucial pressure'. 113 Of course, Citrine had been working closely with the Government 
for some time, thus paving the way for Labour to play a part in an administration 
based on a coalition if war did become fact. 
Labour's foreign policy since the PLP accepted rearmament as a fact in 1937 was 
characterised by 'its opposition to appeasement and support for a Russian alliance as 
the cornerstone of an alternative foreign policy. ' 114 This of course was for purely 
practical reasons, as it was a matter of fact that the Soviet Union would be a useful 
ally in a military alliance against the fascist states. After the many debates of the 
decade, the official party line had returned to its traditional position that favoured the 
inclusion of the USSR in international affairs to create stability. Naylor notes the 
irony of the alliance that developed between the Labour Party and Churchill as the 
two 'pursued the same goal in British foreign policy: the man who had given his all to 
'strangle Bolshevism in its cradle' and the party which helped frustrate that aim, now 
agreed that Russia and Britain must ally to thwart Hitler's purposes. " 15 
In the final months before war began, the party had reaffirmed its position as a nation- 
based rather than class-based socialist party, as 'the Labour movement in both words 
and actions becarne concretely engaged in strengthening Britain's national 
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security. " 16 Of course, this 'commitment and involvement during the late 1930s 
paved the way for Labour's much greater role throughout the 1940s in Churchill's 
War Coalition and Attlee's postwar Labour Government' 117 and it would seem that 
this was the logical conclusion of the basic question of what Labour's foreign policy 
was trying to achieve, which has been discussed here. 
In the 1930s, the'active involvement of the Soviet Union in Labour's foreign policy 
was able to unite the party as both wings favoured an alliance of some sort with the 
USSR. The different strands of progressive political thought were able to unite around 
the idea that the USSR had an important role to play in international affairs. The 
right's policy of bringing the Soviet Union in from the cold was vindicated when it 
joined the League of Nations in 1934. This was a practical policy for the party to 
pursue in the face of the many problems in the international arena. The left sought an 
alliance based on a shared ideology, but misread the signs from Moscow showing that 
ideology was not, in fact, the Kremlin's paramount concern. Defence of the Soviet 
Union was an effective clarion call, and rallied British socialists to the cause of 
safeguarding the workers' state, but Stalin was more concerned with establishing a 
patriotic defence of Russia, which culminated in the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939. 
The Labour Party's foreign policy in the 1930s demonstrated the wider process of 
transition that saw Labour move away from being a party with a strong ideological 
base (as opposed to being an ideological party) to one that was closer to being a 
pragmatic, progressive political party that would be guided by a loose socialist or 
social democratic 'code of ethics' when resolving problems. In the future Labour 
could, as it did in this decade, dilute long-held doctrines with new concepts to form 
something in which observers can see remnants of the old faith. But it could also 
jettison 'out-dated' notions in favour of 'practical' policies that were children of the 
116 Brookshire, 'Speak for England', p. 251 117 Ibid 
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new circumstances, such as the rejection of pacifism in favour of rearmament. After 
the war, as the world found itself in yet another new situation termed the 'Cold War', 
this process began again. Labour's pacifists called for unilateral disarmament through 
CND, while some Labourites took a quasi-realpolitik approach, favouring 
membership of NATO in order to 'protect' the world from the Communist threat. 
The foreign policy of the moderate elements in the party in the 1930s tried to 
accommodate both the ideological and pragmatic strands of Labour's socialism. Cole 
argued that the extension of socialism across international ýorders should have 
formed the basis of the party's international policy, and that the inclusion of the 
Soviet Union was of the utmost importance if this ideological goal was to be fulfilled. 
Such an ideological approach was a reflection of the thought of the wider movement 
at the time, as the party needed reassurances about what its purpose was, and the left 
was able to offer such reassurances while the trade unions and Labourites on the right 
of the movement were otherwise engaged. 
This does not mean that the left was ideological and the right simply practical. There 
was some compromise or alliance in the ideals that formed Labour's wider 
understanding of internationalism. Both left and right agreed that isolation was not an 
option, and generally accepted that the USSR should be a partner in the Collective 
Security campaign. And, as is shown elsewhere, they both agreed that unity with the 
communists was not a sensible option for Labour, despite the threat of fascism. 
While Cole understood that socialist internationalism meant an extension of socialist 
thought and practice throughout the globe as soon as possible, it was not the same as 
the Trotskyism of the ILP in this period, which placed this aim above everything else. 
The ILP saw no difference between the victory of socialism and the defeat of fascism 
- the two had to go hand in hand. Cole and the left-wingers in the Labour Party did 
not reach the same conclusion, thus showing just how close they were in reality to the 
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right of the party, and that party unity and social democracy (as opposed to a more 
specifically socialist democracy) was worth holding on to. Those in the leadership did 
not consider the victory of socialism to be of paramount importance in the immediate 
future - that could come later when fascism was defeated. 
Overall, with the exception of the more extreme ILP, Labour's foreign policy in the 
1930s saw its internationalist traditions acclimatise to the new conditions of 
heightened tensions in Europe. It still sought change through gradualism, and, after 
time, the left of the party accepted this. But the need was also there for a clear long- 
term aim, which was the promise of socialism, and it was here that the USSR featured 
in Labour's plans. It offered hope of stability in Europe. By joining the League of 
Nations, the USSR confirmed that it had accepted the precedence of Narkomindel 
over Comintern, which meant that revolution was no longer the most important aspect 
of Soviet foreign policy. It also meant that the West had the largest country in the 
world on its side against the Nazi threat. 
But it also offered a clear signal to the left of the Labour Party that socialism was 
firmly on the agenda, and this interpretation came from the way the left utilised the 
USSR. Its experience of dealing with the Soviet Union had promoted more 
ideological ties than were invoked in the rightist Labourist elements. It was not so 
much that the left and right of Labour had different foreign policies, but they perhaps 
had different priorities set within the boundaries of "internationalism", which had to 
accept the new environment that included a more aggressive Germany and Italy, but a 
less hostile USSR. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Defining Labour: internal politics and the Soviet Union 
Given that the Soviet Union was credited with many admirable 
achievements, was the target of fascist threats and was the only 
nation to help Republican Spain, even the sceptical were reluctant 
to condemn. 
Labour's foreign policy was forged by conscious decisions taken by the party that 
envisaged a major role being played by the Soviet Union in international affairs. 
However, in matters closer to home the USSR gave the party no choice but to deal 
with it, forcing it to react to its ever-present and growing status in British politics in 
the 1930s. This was partly due to the 'credited achievements' that Mervyn Jones notes 
in the quote opening this chapter, as many Labour Party members saw unity with 
socialists as the best way to counter the threats of the 1930s. 
But it was also due to the justified paranoia of the party leadership that saw communist 
threats from all comers of the British labour movement at a time when they were 
concentrating on trying to rebuild the party after 193 1. The Soviet Union, through the 
CPGB and the Comintern, had stepped through the mirror that Labour held up to 
Stalin's country, and was firmly in Labour's back yard. This meant that figures such as 
Henderson and Dalton, who could theorise from a safe distance about the virtues of 
including the USSR in the party's foreign policy, were deprived of this safety as 
Labour defined the type of socialism it wanted to implement, and what type of party it 
would be. This process began after the events of 193 1, when Labour was in disarray. 
Its vote in the General Election crashed, and only 46 MPs were returned to parliament. 
Labour had three possible roads it could travel. Andrew Thorpe argues that Labour 
could accept that the 1931 election result could be 'written off as an aberration, a 
1 M. Jones, Michael Foot, London, 1994, p. 55 
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defeat due solely to special causes which would not prevail in a future contest. 2 
Henderson argued that Labour should continue with the gradualism that governed 
party thought under MacDonald, even though the response to the crisis that faced the 
Labour Government was 
uninspiring and represented the bankruptcy of gradualist socialism 
in an economic recession. Believing that socialism could only come 
from the success of capitalism, MacDonald and Snowden had no 
distinctive policy to deal with capitalism in crisis. The only 
solutions they had were orthodox ones - reducing taxation and 
public expenditure, and allowing industry to become more 
competitive by cutting its costs and, hence, wages. 3 
The second possibility was that Labour could retain its gradualist approach to social 
reform, whilst recognising that its policies needed more clarity. It needed to think 
about its relationship with capitalism - would it work to end it, reform it or simply 
attempt to manage it better than the capitalist parties? 
The final possibility was the left-wing argument that the 1931 result was the 
inevitable result of accommodating capitalism, and this should never be allowed to 
happen again. Capitalism was clearly close to collapse and therefore Labour should 
adopt a radical programme to take full advantage of the circumstances once it 
returned to power. 
The old MacDonaldite belief in Socialism emerging painlessly 
from the success of capitalism now seemed nonsensical; indeed, the 
march of Fascism on the Continent, and the formation of the British 
Union of Fascists in 1932, both seemed to suggest that an 
apocalyptic struggle was at hand. 4 
Initially, the party's almost instinctive reaction was to travel the third path, and 
embrace the left in order to return to what it knew. But the gradualist tendencies of the 
party won through and the initial rejection of MacDonaldism. ended. Capitalism did 
2 A. Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s, Oxford, 1992, p. 26 3 Ibid, p. 23 
4 Ibid, p. 27 
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not collapse and by the mid-1930s, Labourites such as Attlee, Dalton and Morrison, 
together with the leading trade unionist figures of Bevin and Citrine, led a steadier 
ship on slightly calmer waves. 
It was a quest for parliamentary power - one of the main reasons for the existence of 
the Labour Party - that helped to define the leaders' response to the "presence" of the 
USSR in British politics. And this "presence" also reinforced Labour's identity as a 
specifically parliamentary, rather than a revolutionary, party. It reacted against what it 
saw as an infiltration of the British labour movement by Communists by reasserting 
Labourist traditions of parliamentarianism, reformism and social democracy, as 
opposed to the doctrinaire interpretation of Marxism. 
As Labour began to travel on the 'second path', the need for tighter control over party 
activities was evident. By adopting the approach that Labour could still implement 
gradual change, the leaders were reaffirming the party's social democratic beliefs, 
which emphasised that the way to change society was through parliament. It 
thoroughly rejected any extra-parliamentary activities that were advocated by the far 
left of the party and the CPGB. Ironically, despite all the problems Labourites had 
with MacDonaldism, the party returned to the words of its former leader, who years 
earlier had written that '[a] workman was not fully organised unless to his weapon of 
trade unionism he added to it the weapon of the ballot box. 5 
It is this conflict between Transport House and the left of the movement that is 
discussed in this chapter. On the whole, the tensions in the movement revolved 
around the questions of whether Labour should be solely a party of the working class, 
or should it not only acknowledge its 'one-nation' traditions but actively pursue a 
more inclusive approach, and whether it should continue with its parliamentary and 
gradualist politics, or replace them with more aggressive and revolutionary tactics. 
5 Manchester Guardian, 26 March 1917 
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The parliamentary road meant that Labour had to be aware of the perceptions the 
electorate may have had of a party that denounced revolutionary tactics yet colluded 
with a revolutionary party. This desire for electoral purity was one of three reasons 
why Labour rejected the approaches of the CPGB to either affiliate to the Labour 
Party or to work with it in a united front. The second was the history of the 
Communist Party's entrist tactics and the openly hostile language used by 
communists to denounce Labour, especially as the Comintern maintained that it was 
continually 
necessary to show the role of the Labour Party as the chief social 
supporter of the bourgeoisie and how it weakens and divides the 
working class by showing illusions regarding Democracy and 
enchaining it to "constitutional methods. " Thus the Labour Party 
acts as. an accomplice of Fascism and the democratic institutions 
are utilised in order to prepare the way for it. 6 
The final reason was that, as has been shown elsewhere, Labour simply was not a 
"Bolshevik" party. The aggressive nature of Soviet socialism would not fit into 
gradualist socialism of Labour leaders like Dalton or the labourism of trade unionists 
like Bevin. Put simply, there was not the desire to create a Soviet Republic of Britain. 
Because no such desire existed, Labour used the USSR in a much more negative way 
than it did when confronting the foreign and economic issues (especially the latter). 
Exploring what Labour was by proving what it was not helped to define Labour's 
internal party politics. 
The chapter is split into two sections. The first section examines the leadership's 
response to the party's drift leftwards after 193 1, and how and why it sought to stave 
off the Soviet influences evident in the lefts arguments. It will compare the left's 
pursuit of the 'third path', which included a study of the Soviet political system by H. 
L. Beales in Twelve Studies of Soviet Russia, and the ILP's disaffiliation from the 
official Labour Party, to the leaders' response through various pamphlets, such as The 
RGA 495/100/88 1, document no. 783 5/6 
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Communist Solar System and Communist and Other Organisations, aimed at rank and 
file Labourites. The official Labour Party line not only maintained the old orders from 
the previous decade, which stipulated that the party should have no truck with the 
CPGB, but it went further than before, denouncing all extremist elements in British 
politics as no different from one another. This sentiment was not out of step with the 
majority view in the party, but it failed to recognise the growing support for some 
form of united action against fascism. 
The second section discusses some explanations as to why certain sections of the 
Labour Party continued to support the Soviet Union at a time when more and more 
disturbing stories were coming out of Stalin's Russia. It suggests that the fight against 
fascism and the need for a tangible "Heaven" - the USSR - were the main reasons. It 
assesses the reaction to the news that British workers were on trial in Moscow in 1933, 
how rank and file Labour Party members coalesced with communists to fight fascism 
in Britain and also looks at the response to the news of the Show Trials. 
5.1 A post-Election shift to the left 
The move leftwards by the majority of the party immediately after the end of the 
MacDonald era can be explained by the need to reassert what Labour believed in. 
There was general disappointment at the fact that it had failed to implement any 
socialist policies to alleviate the suffering caused by the Depression. The Labour 
Chancellor Philip Snowden had chosen orthodox capitalist economics that pleased the 
City more than it pleased his own comrades. With morale and confidence in Labour's 
political thought so low, it is not surprising that interest in the USSR intensified in the 
1930s, especially as the overall period of this leftist revival coincided with the 
NFRB's visit to the Soviet Union in 1932, which brought back reports of a working 
system of socialism as an alternative to some of Labour's ideas. 
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Prior to that visit however, as has already been shown, was the passing of control of 
the party to the PLP. The trade union representatives were either regrouping or fending 
off spending cuts. And moderate Labourites were either too shocked to analyse the 
events of 193 1, were out of parliament after the 1931 election, or both. On the whole, 
the left had the platform all to itself, and some on that platform used it to warn that 
socialism may not be possible by parliamentary methods. 
Cripps began to speak of the need for a temporary dictatorship when Labour next won 
power and he and Laski became more committed to a broad Marxism as they 
attempted to offer an explanation for the events of 1931. Gradualism, it was argued, 
could not defeat the vested interests of financiers, and Laski claimed that 
the road to power is far harder than Labour has so far been led to 
imagine. If it retains its faith in Socialism, it will meet a challenge 
that does not passively accept its right to govern in a Socialistic 
7 way... 
Cripps argued that Emergency powers would be needed to avoid a democratically 
elected Labour Government being forced from Office again by capitalists. Yet, as 
David Howell notes, 
these changes were essentially moves within the parliamentary 
arena. There was no suggestion that Labour's strength might be 
increased by a concurrent mobilisation of industrial power. The 
radical critics were thus encased for the most part within Labour's 
parliamentary tradition. Their proposals tended to concentrate on 
how far such institutions could be turned to Labour's benefit, 
instead of acting as obstacles. 8 
Even the more militant thinkers seemed to agree. For example, Cripps and Laski still 
favoured working within the Labour Party, albeit through the Socialist League. This 
shows that they still believed in parliamentary methods, retaining the traditional faith 
7 Cited in D. Howell, British Social Democracy: A Study in Development and Decay, London, 1976, 
r. 55 
lbid, p. 56 
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in the idea that a large majority of socialist MPs in the House of Commons could be 
enough to ensure that Labour had the power to introduce socialism through an Act of 
Parliament. Laski was still wary of shadowy financiers though, and reminded the 
followers of parliamentary democracy that the 'Constitution counts for nothing if 
property were at stake. '9 
These were the general interpretations of the situation after 1931 that formed the basis 
of the 'third path'. The problem for moderate politicians such as Dalton however, was 
the rhetoric of these two men. They both used terms clearly implying that MacDonald 
surrendered 'to international finance'. Cripps said that this provided 'the clearest 
demonstration of the power of capitalism to overthrow a properly elected Government 
by extra-parliamentary means. " 0 
Such talk of 'overthrowing', 'extra-parliamentary' and 'surrender' did nothing to 
bring the left and the right together, and despite the advocation of parliamentary 
tactics, Dalton could not accept that the party was being guided by Marxists. He 
fought against those advocating a course of action that was very un-Labour. Ben 
Pimlott highlights the first row between Dalton and Harold Laski. 
What concerned Dalton was a paper called A Labour Programme of Action, drafted 
by Laski and William Mellor, another Socialist Leaguer. Dalton saw anti-democratic 
leanings in A Labour Programme ofAction, and strongly objected to a suggestion by 
Laski and Mellor 'that socialists needed to arm themselves against the risk that 
6capitalist' parties would prevent an electorally victorious Labour Party from taking 
office. ' 11 He refused to sign the document, questioning whether 
any party which had just been defeated at a General Election dare 
to continue in office without summoning Parliament ... Would it be 
9 Cited in 1. Kramnick and B. Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life on the Left, London, 1993, p. 301 
'0 Cited in Callaghan, Socialism in Britain, p. 120 
11 B. Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, London, 1985, p. 207 
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able to collect any taxes, and would it not almost immediately bring 
itself into collision with the courts? 12 
However, Attlee, influenced as he was by G. D. H. Cole, disseminated the programme 
amongst Labour MPs. Dalton advocated that the N. E. C. should ignore it. 13 The 
interesting point about this episode is not that Cripps and Laski were advocating more 
extremist tactics, but that they were at least reassessing the whole situation. Whether 
their conclusions were right or wrong is not important. The fact is that they were 
willing to fundamentally question not only Labour's tactics, but also the methods of 
the capitalist system, which, they believed, would do anything to stop a socialist party 
taking office. 
Dalton, who was instrumental in restructuring the Labour Party's political thought in 
the thirties, was not. He, like his moderate party comrades, still believed that 
parliamentary methods and 'fair play' would win Labour power. Yet at the same time, 
his travelling companion on the trip to the USSR in 1932, H. L. Beales, was 
questioning this very aspect of British democracy. His essay in Twelve Studies of 
Soviet Russia, 'The Political System', explored the virtues of the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat. It opened with the statement that should have struck a chord with his 
comrades at the time, given that it was a period of rebuilding the Labour Party. In 
Britain, he wrote 
we are politically complacent. So enamoured are we of our political 
liberties, as embodied in our parliamentary and local government 
institutions, that we scarcely ever examine them in a qualitative, 
still less quantitative, manner. We take it for granted that we are a 
free people, that our Parliament is the mother of a numerous 
progeny of similar agencies of free democratic peoples ... 
14 
12 Cited, ibid 
13 lbid 
14 H. L. Beales, 'The Political System', Twelve Studies, p. 125 
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Beales discussed a number of issues in his essay, ranging from 'The Soviet 
Constitution' and 'The Communist Party' to 'The Isolation of Russia'. It is not 
necessary to discuss here whether or not Beales was correct in all of his findings, but 
rather what is important is the message he was trying to convey to the party back 
home. As with the essays by some of his comrades on the trip concerning the 
economics of the country, Beales was certainly trying to teach the leaders and rank 
and file members of the Labour Party not only about the Soviet Union, but also what 
his party could learn from it, and what his movement should avoid. In a comment 
structured to remind Labourites of the events of 1931, he claimed that the ballot-box 
was no longer the agency of freedom, as 'it is patent that the centre of gravity of our 
public life is shifting away from the House of Commons to the scarcely discernible 
figures, be they anonymous financiers or equally anonymous Treasury officials'. ' 5 
Once Beales has informed the reader that the Soviet system is now a permanent 
fixture on the world's political map, as the 'immediate revolutionary past has become 
the stable present' 'collapse is unthinkable', 16 he offers an assessment of what that 
system is now like. He notes that the USSR is 'a State under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat' and that the 'class struggle still continues and will continue for a long time 
to come. ' 17 He then referred to "liquidation" of opponents. After claiming that to be a 
kulak or bourgeois is to 'belong to a class that has no future', he claims that '[n]o one 
pretends that the process of liquidation is anything but devastating to the liquidated. " 8 
"Liquidation" was often overlooked in this way, mentioned either in passing or 
justified as a necessity that the "Russians" needed to pursue, the implication being 
that the British would not need to do this, as they were still more "civilised" than their 
Russian comrades. This must have been an unusual sight as members of a movement 
15 lbid 
16 lbid, p. 127 
17 lbid 
18 lbid, p. 128 
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with its foundation in the Methodist Church and large pacifist following were openly 
accepting the mass murder of political and economic opponents. George Bernard 
Shaw, quite matter-of-factly, wrote that '[i]n Russia the governing bodies are purged 
and the slackers "liquidated" (the word covers shooting in grave cases) pretty 
promptly' and then advocated such a policy for Britain stating that '[w]hat the 
Russians can do we can do. ' 19 
The Webbs also followed this line, claiming that it 
is hard for the Englishman of the present day to appreciate the 
abhorrence and hatred felt by the Russian for the kulak. To-day, in 
his "liquidation", he may seem only the exceptionally thrifty and 
energetic peasant, who had raised himself by his virtues out of the 
destitution of the thriftless and incapable mass. But all students of 
Russian rural life have, for the past half-century or more, 
stigmatised the kulak as a terrible oppressor of his poorer 
neighbours. 20 
They accepted without question the validity of a policy that led to the statement: '[fln 
those provinces in which the formation of kolkhosi [sic] had been specially pushed 
forward ... it could be reported, at the end of 1933, that the liquidation of the 
kulak had 
been substantially completed. il 1 The acceptance by Labourites that an answer to the 
problem of opposition was "liquidation" suggests either a lack of understanding of 
what that term meant, or a lack of understanding of what socialism meant. It is 
suggested that Beales falls into the former category, while the unemotional Fabians 
fall into the latter. But it does show that, where the Soviet Union was concerned, 
Labourites were at times willing to overlook, or at least explain away, the more 
unpleasant aspects of the system. 
Beales went on to discuss the proletarian dictatorship in further detail, stating that it 
was 'the organised power of the industrial workers in association with the humbler 
19 G. Bemard Shaw, Everybody's Political What's What, London, 1945, p. 36 
20 S. & B. Webb, Soviet Communism, p. 564 
21 Ibid, p. 566 
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peasantry. 22 In his defence of the use of a secret police force, he states that the role of 
the GPU was as a defender of the Revolution, necessary because of the ubiquitous 
sabotage of the industrialisation process, 'which at times deranges local services and 
retards the development of full Communism. 23 He continues to offer an analysis of 
the relationship between the CPSU and the Soviets, and notes that ultimately, 'the real 
heart and will of the Russian political system is the Communist Party. Formerly the 
Communist Party exercised a condominium with the Soviets, but those days are over. 
It is now supreme. 24 
Beales outlines how the CPSU exercised its will. 'It dominates the Soviets: it works 
through the GPU: it is supreme in the Red Army. It pulls all the strings, and the 
strings are gathered together in the Kremlin. 25 He recognises that this may sound 
undemocratic, but dismisses this as 
irrelevant to the Russia of to-day. The Communist Party is the 
unifying agent of Russian life. Be it education and the cultural 
revolution, or industrialisation and the economic revolution, or the 
defence against counter-revolution and attack from the outside, it is 
the Party that makes decisions and sees to their fulfilment. 26 
From this he makes the case in favour of dictatorship over parliamentary democracy. 
Applauding the direct and immediate contact between the government and the 
governed, he says that this system is the 'only conceivable method of government for 
a society that aims at classlessness. 27 Such words would suggest that Beales was in 
agreement with the assessment of British democracy offered by his good friends Laski 
and Cripps, and his conclusion that this was the only way to ensure a classless society 
was a clear message for the party back home. 
22 Beales, Twelve Studies, p. 128 
23 Ibid, p. 129 24 Ibid 
25 Ibid, p. 135 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid, p. 136 
211 
Beales continues this defence of the Soviet dictatorship claiming that (a wrong 
impression would be conveyed if it were suggested that the Communist Party played 
the tyrant in relation to the Soviets or to the public considered individually. 28 Yet he 
quickly accepts that this was the case, albeit temporarily. On the surface, he says, it 
may be true that 'in Russia the Communist Party, or the Politbureau at the head of it, 
plays the tyrant's part' but then claims that it 'would not be true to suggest that there 
is a divergence of interest between the proletarian masses and Stalin and his comrades 
of the Politbureau who exercise power on their behalf. '29 However, this simply sounds 
like the defence used by the Tsar's courtiers to fend off criticism that Nicholas 11 was 
removed from his people. One Tsarist follower once wrote that the Tsar could 'do no 
wrong; he stands above classes, party politics and personal rivalries. He desires the 
good of his people and has practically unlimited means for achieving it. He seeks 
nothing for himself. 00 
Yet in spite of Beales' praise of Stalin's system, and in spite of his criticism of British 
democracy, noticeable in this section of his essay for the disapproval he displays for 
'the doctrine of trusteeship' which is not based on equalitarian democracy (a subtle 
attack upon Labour's supporters of a corporate socialism? ), Beales does not endorse 
the importation of Soviet ways into Britain via the Labour Party. His conclusion was a 
mixture of defending the Soviet Union, claiming that it was 'more truly democratic 
than the parliamentary system of this and other professedly democratic countries', and 
rejecting Soviet methods. He conceded that the 'revolutionary process is indeed an 
unlovely process, one in the course of which people will suffer - commonly the 
wrong people. 31 
23 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 Cited in C. Read, The Making and Breaking ofthe Soviet System, p. 7 31 Beales, Twelve Studies, p. 143 
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He argued that 'an attitude towards the present rdgime in Russia of hatred, or pious 
horror or quasi-moral superiority is not very helpful. 932 The habit of 'mere 
condemnation of everything Russian' was already out of date, but so too was the 
(pious belief that a crude transference to this country of the Russian revolutionary 
method would bring us to the gates of the New Jerusalem. 03 He continued to say that 
[c]ontinuity counts in politics, and therefore England should not go 'a-whoring after 
strange Russian gods. 34 
The message that Beales was sending back to his comrades was that Labour did not 
need to go the way of the USSR to achieve socialism, but neither should it criticise 
the Soviets for doing things their way. Labour had long held the view that Russia 
should be allowed to experiment with its own version of socialism. But it also hoped 
that it would be given the same consideration from the USSR, hoping that it would be 
free from interference from the CPGB and the Comintem. Favouring sovereignty for 
individual parties whilst maintaining links within the international socialist movement 
had seen the Labour Party choose the Labour and Socialist International over the 
Moscow-based Comintern some years before. Even Labour's internationalism was 
guided by gradualism rather than revolutionary alternatives. 
The main area of debate in the immediate post-MacDonald period was between 
figures who were no longer willing to trust the idea that change was inevitable 
through gradual reforms, and those who would later advocate a similar approach, and 
this began the reassessment of Labour's identity in the 1930s. Cripps and Laski 
favoured a much more radical parliamentarianism, to the extent that Cripps spoke 
about Labour establishing a temporary dictatorship when it next gained power. 
Beales' report from the USSR lent loud applause to the notion of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, and his ideas here were in a similar vein to Lenin's comments about 
32 lbid 
33 lbid, p. 144 
34 lbid 
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parliament in State and Revolution. 35 But importantly, Beales did not advocate 
revolutionary action for Britain, and Cripps and Laski did not appeal for industrial and 
socialist action outside of the party. 
At the same time, the role of those on the right was to 'protect' Labour from such a 
shift. However, they were to some extent powerless, as they were either coming to 
terms with the events of 193 1, or they were not in the House of Commons. The 
debates between the protagonists helped to define Labour's boundaries as 
fundamentally parliamentary. The issue became one of how radical Labour's 
parliamentarianism would be. The USSR played an important role in answering this 
question, although its presence came more through the CPGB, as is discussed below. 
However, attention is now turned to the revolutionary element that was still in 
Labour's ranks, but which was soon to be shorn as Labour strengthened its reformist 
boundaries. 
5.2 Disaffiliation: Labour sheds its far left-wing 
There were two ideological reasons for the Independent Labour Party's decision to 
end its acquaintance with the party it helped to found. The first was the desire for a 
6genuinely' left-wing socialism to be adopted by Labour to replace the discredited 
gradualism of the previous era. This idea gained strength from the failure of the 
Labour Party to adopt a recognisably socialist programme prior to the 1929 election, 
and the subsequent failure by the Labour Government to implement socialist policies 
to defeat capitalism as it appeared to be fulfilling socialist prophecies of collapse. 
35 V. 1. Lenin, State and Revolution in Lenin: Selected Works, Moscow, 1977. In State and Revolution, 
Lenin advocates not the abolition of parliament, but rather making it work by converting 'the 
representative institutions from talking shops into "working" bodies. ' (p. 294) Beales' attitude suggests 
that he felt the same -not that parliament should go, but that it needed to be made to work "properly" 
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The second reason was the growing regard that some ILPers had for the USSR. The 
ILP had moved away from the gradualism of the official party, uniting around 'a 
general disgust with the second Labour Government and a commitment to a 
revolutionary Marxism. 36 According to Michael Foot, the ILP advocated a Marxism 
to 'suit modem conditionS, 37 . Andrew Williams states that the long-standing quarrel 
with the Labour Party had to it 'a strong Russian element' as the 'ILP was made up of 
firm supporters of the USSR. 08 
Members such as Brailsford, Brockway, Maxton and E. F. Wise 'had been most 
vociferous in their condemnation of MacDonald's 'non-respecting' of the 1929 
election promise to bind the two countries together. 39 Williams is correct in his 
assertion that '[s]upport of Russia had been for the ILP a true litmus test of the Labour 
Party's socialiSM, 40 but it is also true that this was the case for other members in the 
wider movement, as the Labour Party looked into the Russian mirror and some 
members saw their dreams becoming realities. 
The debate about whether or not the ILP should disaffiliate split it between those who 
favoured disaffiliating from Labour and those who favoured continuing contact. The 
situation was not made easier with the creation of the Revolutionary Policy 
Committee, a Marxist group within the ILP, which greatly interested Maxton and 
Brockway. However, Cohen claims that the 'agreement between Brockway and the 
RPC in July 1932 was partly an illusion. Differing meanings lay behind the same 
rhetoric. A1 The Marxism on offer from the RPC was specifically Soviet Marxism, 
evident in the supplement that accompanied the New Leader on a monthly basis, New 
Russia. Loyal Stalinists such as Anna Louise Strong extolled the virtues of the Five 
36 Cohen, The Independent Labour Party, p. 202 37 M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan - Volume 1: London, 1962, p. 87 38 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 15 8 
39 lbid 
40 lbid 
41 Cohen, The Independent Labour Party, p. 203 
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Year Plan and all things Soviet, offering an uncritical devotion to Comrade Stalin and 
the Soviet Union. 
It is arguable that there was no real need for the ILP to leave the party in this period. It 
could have stayed inside the organisation and argued its case from there, but the 
revolutionary excitement of the far-left rhetoric of the RPC may have pushed leaders 
into a more extreme comer than they would have been had it not existed. This is not to 
say that Maxton and Brockway would not have argued for a distinctly left-wing 
socialism from inside the party, but to suggest that leaving the official party may not 
have been the most important thing on their minds. 
Patricia Hollis explains that had the ILP leader John Wheatley lived, his less 
confrontational manner could have stopped disaffiliation. Wheatley was conciliatory 
and deeply respected and 'would have pulled the ILP back from the edge. But not 
Maxton. He may have thought ... that he could use the threat of disaffiliation to extract 
concessions from Henderson only to find his bluff was called. 942 It is possible that 
what the ILP leaders really wanted was to stay inside the Labour Party, but for their 
MPs and members to be allowed to argue for what they believed in, rather than what 
the party line was. This is somewhat reminiscent of what Lenin wanted for the British 
Communists. 
The decision of the Independent Labour Party to leave the Labour Party defies 
attempts to be explained in terms simply of members supporting revolutionary versus 
parliamentary socialism. At the Conference in July 1932, ILP Chairman Fenner 
Brockway argued that the working class had to line up behind 'the red banner of 
revolutionary SocialiSM'43 but he then went on to help defeat an RPC motion that 
defined the split with Labour in revolutionary terms. At the same time, those who 
42 P. Hollis, Jennie Lee, Oxford, 1997, p-61 
43 Cited in Cohen, The Independent Labour Party, p. 203 
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wanted to stay in the official party 'did not seek to oppose revolutionary socialism, 
rather they suggested that a real revolutionary policy should come from within the 
Labour Party. 944 This train of thought was born out of the failure of gradualism on 
such a grand scale, and was perhaps best represented by the Socialist League. 
The vote in favour of leaving the Labour Party was won by a clear majority - 241 
voted for disaffiliating, 142 against. George Lathan, the Labour Party Chairman, 
regretted the decision. He said that the ILP leadership was now weakening the party 
and divorcing it from the wider movement, and was 'playing into the hands of our 
political opponents. 45 He claimed that they were 'dooming the Independent Labour 
Party to factionalism and sterility, when it might have been, as it was during many 
years, an aid and inspiration to the whole Labour Movement. 
A6 
The fate of the ILP was less than favourable, and Lathan's comments proved to be 
quite prophetic. There is, however, an important lesson that was born with the ILP 
split, and it is one which parties inside the Labour Party have still failed to learn. This 
is that parties who begin inside the Labour Party and believe that they can not only 
exist outside of the official organisation, but also flourish and replace the official 
party, cannot. The CPGB failed to succeed, (although this was never strictly a 
member of the party). Oswald Mosley's New Party failed in the 1930s, to the point 
that he had to set up another party, which also failed. 
The ILP could not survive on its own, as it flirted with the CPGB and the Trotskyists, 
and its membership severely suffered, falling from 17,000 in 1932 to 4,500 by 1935, 
and this was 'a chilling reminder to the Labour Left of Keir Hardie's belief that 
socialists must subordinate their socialism to the labourism if they were to survive . 
'47 
44 Ibid, p. 203 45 LPCP,, 1932, p. 157 46 Ibid 
47 Foote, Political Thought, p. 147 
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Fifty years later the Social Democratic Party (SDP) failed, and only began to gain 
support from the British electorate in the 1990s, after transforming into something 
else. The Militant Tendency also failed to build on the relative successes it had when 
it was inside the party, when it was expelled. Ben Pimlott commented on the ILP split. 
Maxton and his associates, like Mosley in 1931, had misread the 
auguries. They believed, mistakenly, that there was a real 
possibility of crushing the Labour Party in open competition for 
working-class support in the country. In the wake of Labour's 
humiliating defeat and with unemployment at its highest level ever, 
the feeling was strong on the extreme left that the final crisis of 
capitalism was at hand and that an unfettered socialist leadership 
should make itself available to the masses. 48 
The ILP's split from Labour was not inevitable, given its historic links with the party. 
But it was made more likely by a number of factors. First was the failure of 
MacDonald to fulfil the promise that a Labour Government offered. The 
revolutionaries in the ILP could not see past the 'betrayal' of MacDonald when he 
was Prime Minister and when he formed the National Government. The second factor 
was the misguided belief that the ILP could live and succeed outside of the Labour 
Party without first securing a firm basis of support. Comrades inside the Labour Party 
were not necessarily comrades outside of it. The ILP misread the signs of this 
situation, just as it did when capitalism appeared to be in terminal decline. The final 
factor was the apparent success of the USSR's Five Year Plan, which offered hope to 
socialists in the chronically poor West. 
As was seen earlier, the ILP went on to support a hard line 'revolutionary defeatist' 
attitude. Ultimately it was swallowed up by the CPGB. It found that the Comintern 
was not interested in an equal united front with it, as the Comintern's policy was 
based on winning over as many ILP members as possible whilst denouncing the 
48 B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 4344 For a Marxist analysis of 
the situation of the ILP and the left in the 1930s, see J. Cox 'Skinning a live tiger paw by paw: reform, 
revolution and Labour' in International Socialism, volume 87, Summer 2000 
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party's leaders. The Political Commission of the Comintern was concerned that this 
policy should be rigorously implemented, and was worried that the CPGB made it 
fieasier for the ILP leaders to attack us because of our incorrect methods which turn 
the workers away from US. 09 The Revolutionary Policy Committee of the ILP on the 
other hand, was seen as an improvement 'compared with the Maxtons', but the RPC 
was still to be 'subjected to far-reaching criticism. '50 
The discussions surrounding the Comintern's new policy of collective action between 
the CPGB and the ILP reveal the level of importance that the Communist Party placed 
upon winning the ILP's support over to not only the CP's line, but also to the party 
itself. The united front in British left-wing politics was not built on trust - something 
that Labourites such as Citrine probably knew. From the CPGBs perspective, the 
pursuit of a common interest with the ILP in this period had, at best, the same amount 
of importance placed upon it as the CP placed upon building a mass movement. In the 
eyes of the Comintern, the struggle against fascism was, if not subordinate to this aim, 
not the only concern, in spite of the fact that all left-wingers knew just how dangerous 
Hitler was. 
Harry Pollitt called upon the 'Workers' Press' - the Daily Worker, the New Leader, 
Daily Herald and trade union journals to 'build enthusiasm, power and action'. 51 The 
three factors important to Pollitt were all of course subject to loyalty to the CP, and 
despite his call for support from the Labour press, the Comintern was by no means 
softening its position. In August 1933, it drafted a letter to the Central Committee of 
the CPGB accusing these organs and the Labour reformists of trying 'to strengthen 
their ideological hold over the youth' 52 . This highlights once again the fragile basis on 
which the united front of the left was built. 
49 RGA 495/100/881 
30 Ibid 
51 Daily Worker, 13 March 1933 
52 RGA 495/100/882, document no. 8205/10 
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This brief post-MacDonald history of the labour movement was the context for 
Labour's shift to the left in the immediate post-MacDonald era. Capitalism was 
seemingly on the verge of collapse and a Labour Government had been "removed" 
from power by usurping capitalists. This in turn led to respected members of the party 
such as Laski questioning how fair and just the British system of democracy was. 
Labourites were also fed more stories about the successful creation of a socialist 
infrastructure in the Soviet Union, either in newspapers or in books such as Twelve 
Studies in Soviet Russia. And some socialists in the party had simply decided that 
Labour was never going to be left-wing enough. This led to the disaffiliation of the 
ILP from the Labour Party. With this backdrop, it was not surprising that the party 
moved to the left. The surprise was that it moved so little, and did not adopt a 
revolutionary constitution or Soviet methods. 
5.3 The 1932 conference 
One of the most important aspects of the Leicester Conference in 1932 was that the 
party reasserted what it thought socialism should mean, and it was arguably the last 
time the left controllqd the direction of the party before the moderates regained 
control. Yet, despite the circumstances outlined above, there was no fundamental shift 
to unknown territory. Rather, it was the conscience of the party awakening from its 
slumber induced by the orthodox economics of Snowden and the pragmatism of 
MacDonald. The Leicester Conference in 1932 was certainly no Leeds of 1917. 
This is not to say that resolutions were not passed that specifically stated that the 
purpose of the party was not only socialist in principle, but that socialism was its main 
objective. George Lathan said that '[t]here is no political justification for the existence 
of the Labour Party except as a Socialist body working towards a Socialist objective 
and determined to achieve its objective as rapidly as possible. ' 53 Charles Trevelyan 
53 LPCR 1932, p. 161 
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said that '[t]he keynote of this Conference is that we must have Socialism in deed as 
well as in words. ' 54 Attlee supported Trevelyan, and there was a general consensus 
that agreed that this approach would give a definite socialist lead to the whole 
movement. 55 The motion was carried. 
This need for a clear declaration that Labour was a socialist party was fuelled by the 
events of the MacDonald Government. The party was attempting to not only 
rediscover, but also assert, its identity as a working class organisation that rejected the 
one-nation socialism of MacDonald. 'The atmosphere of the conference ... was one of 
resentment against betrayal, hostility to capitalism, and enthusiasm for a 'definite 
programme' seen not only as an electoral manifesto, but as shield and buckler when in 
power. ' 56 Labour once again wanted to be a crusade. 
The left defeated the leadership on various issues. It wanted to ensure that the break 
with MacDonald and MacDonaldism was final, that that period of Labour's history 
was buried. But leaders such as Arthur Henderson, an ally, if not a friend, of 
MacDonald, argued against such radicalism. It was noted earlier that some in the 
party 'argued that 1931 had been an aberration and that the 'pendulum' of electoral 
57 politics would 'swing back'. Henderson claimed that the party should therefore stick 
to the approach set out in Labour and the Nation and avoid 'false and ill-considered 
moves. '58 At Conference, Henderson supported the NEC line on minority 
governments, arguing against a 'certain, definite, clearly defined course' on taking 
office with or without a majority. 59 Yet he failed to read the mood of the party in this 
period. He was heckled by the delegates and resigned the party leadership soon 
afterwards. 
54 Ibid, p. 204 
55 Ibid, p. 205 
56 Harris, Attlee, p. 105 
57 Thorpe, History, p. 81 
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The left also won a victory, albeit a narrow one, on the question of finance and 
nationalisation. Price stabilisation was proposed in favour of the gold standard, which 
suggests that the party was seeking an assurance that the next Labour Government 
would be a more interventionist one than the last, where Snowden endorsed the free- 
market. It was also demanded that the Bank of England be brought into public control, 
and a National Investment Board be established which could advocate government 
guarantees for capital projects, and would be subject to public control. Planning, 
public works and accountability shaped Labour's socialism. 
Frank Wise, the ex-ILPer and organiser of the Socialist League, 'moved an 
amendment in favour of nationalising the other banks as well as the Bank of England, 
on the ground that control over short-term credit, as well as over long-term capital, 
would be essential for the carrying out of any real programme of Socialist planning. 960 
Conference narrowly supported this motion, with 1,141,000 voting in favour to 
984,000 against. This was in spite of opposition from leaders such as Bevin, and 
highlights the move to the left by the party. 
Because of this conference, a planned economy was now on Labour's agenda, being 
seen as an essential part of a socialist society. This established the boundaries of the 
party's economic thought. The free market economics Labour pursued when Snowden 
was Chancellor were now rejected. The new party programme, For Socialism and 
Peace, adopted by the Southport Conference in 1934, endorsed a policy of 
nationalisation and at the General Election in 1935, Labour's manifesto advocated the 
'public ownership for the efficient conduct, in the national interest ... [ofl banks, coal 
61 and its products, transport, electricity, iron and steel, and cotton. ' This assertion in 
favour of public ownership from 1932 was also inspired by the USSR's use of 
60 Cole, History, p. 280 
61 Dale, Labour Party General Election Manifestos, p. 46 
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planning, brought to Labour's close attention by the economists in the NFRB 
delegation, discussed elsewhere. 
In areas such as defining the type of political action the party should pursue, the 
Soviet experience helped Labour shape its ideas by focusing on what it would reject 
from other forms of socialism. While the party had moved to the left of the leadership, 
it stayed within the traditional boundaries of British socialism. This meant that there 
were no calls for a dictatorship of the proletariat or the establishment of soviets across 
the country. Just as this conference established Labour's economic thought for the rest 
of the decade, and also helped define its approach during the Attlee Government, the 
tacit rejection of Soviet political methods highlights the fact that the parliamentary 
method was an overwhelming tradition within the Labour Party. 
Anything else was seen as non-British. Attlee wrote that there was 'nothing more 
misleading than to try to apply to all countries a cast-iron theory of historical 
s62 necessity and to argue that Britain must go the Moscow road... A Soviet Britain 
was not desired by the majority of Labour members. A dogmatic use of one ideology 
(which defined Stalinism) could neither fit in with, nor suit, the traditions of the 
labour movement, which drew its inspiration from a number of different sources. 
Those who did flirt with revolutionary ideas, such as Cripps, were viewed with 
suspicion by the leadership, and this caused an uncomfortable feeling and a fierce 
response. 
5.4 Defining Labour's socialism: fighting and rejecting Communism in Britain 
To clarify the situation, the Labour hierarchy pursued a determined policy making it 
absolutely clear that the party did not accept fraternisation with the CPGB. From 1933 
until the end of the decade, in a clear and co-ordinated response to the cries from the 
62 Attlee, Perspective, p. 114 
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left that liberal democracy doesn't work or that a Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat 
should be established, Labour's leadership issued numerous pamphlets. These made 
clear its policies on communist agitation in Britain and also its case against unity with 
the far-left in the fight against fascism. 
The primary purpose of these documents was to uncover Communist activity in 
Labour's ranks, and to ensure that Labourites knew that such activity was neither 
acceptable nor compatible with Labour's ideas. For Labour to clearly know what it 
was, it needed to show what it wasn't, and this led to the attacks on CPGB 
"infiltration". One of the key architects of this response was William Gillies, who was 
not just involved in the development of Labour's international policies, but took part 
in the fight against Communist infiltration and Communist influence in the labour 
movement. 
The Labour Party document on Communist 'front' organisations (bodies which 
supported either left-wing action in Britain or support for the USSR, but which 
Labour believed to be housing Communists) The Communist Solar System, discussed 
below, was probably drafted by him, and he was known to 'dislike foreigners or at 
least to distrust them. His dislike of Russians is clear from everything he wrote. "' It is 
no surprise that someone so hostile to Russians should pursue a policy of hard anti- 
communism in his own party. 
It is no coincidence that the Labour leadership hardened its position against the CPG13 
in 1933. This was a direct result of four factors outside of Labour's control. The first 
was the moderate improvement in the British economy, which allowed the gradualists 
in the party to reclaim the initiative, as capitalism was not collapsing. Unemployment 
fell between 1932 and 1935 and this saw trade union membership begin to climb 
again. In 1933, when the economy slowly began to pick up, membership was at its 
63 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 153 
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lowest for twenty-one years, standing at 4,392,000. But in 1934 this number rose to 
4,590,000; in 1935 to 4,867,000 and in 1936 it topped the five million mark with 
5,295,000.64 
Trade union membership rose more or less steadily after this (except for a small 
decrease in 1945). Of course, there were still great problems, most notably in 
Scotland, northern England and South Wales where the economy failed to fully 
recover. This gave economists in the Labour Party who favoured a more 
interventionist approach from the Government a stronger voice in John Maynard 
Keynes, which, as shall be discussed elsewhere, helped develop a more corporatist 
socialism. But capitalism had not collapsed. It had come under great pressure, but it 
proved to be stronger than the left perceived it to be. 
The second factor came as the CPGB shifted to a less hard-line position. The 'Class 
against Class' tactic was the approach that defined Labour-Communist relations until 
1933, when the hard-line politics of the CPGB began to soften slightly. With a more 
conciliatory CPGB (it had stopped calling social democrats 'social fascists') looking 
for a 'United Front' of socialist parties to fight fascism, the Labour leadership grew 
concerned that this could lead to a growth in support for communist tactics in its own 
ranks. 
If this grew, then so could support for the CPGB to be allowed to affiliate to Labour, 
thus seriously undermining the party's parliamentary credentials. Labour therefore 
launched its series of pamphlets and published newspaper articles to make its position 
clear, thus ultimately reinforcing the anti-Communist stance the party had 
traditionally taken. The third factor was the coming to power of Adolf Hitler in 
Germany in March 1933, and the subsequent links that developed between Gennany 
and Mussolini in Italy. Far-right action was spreading across Europe and there was a 
64 Pelling, Trade Unionism, pp. 298-299 
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feeling that something needed to be done to challenge it, even if there were no clear 
ideas as yet about what that something was. 
The fourth factor was the Metro-Vickers Trial in Moscow. Several British engineers 
working in Russia for the Metropolitan-Vickers firm were arrested in March 1933. 
This came at a time when the British and Soviet Governments were negotiating the 
trade problems mentioned earlier. Andrew Williams comments that '[t]here is no clear 
proof that the arrests were to put pressure on London to come up with a new 
agreement favourable to Moscow, or that the action was revenge for past slights, but 
there is no escaping the linked timing. ' 65 The fierce debates that this issue aroused are 
discussed later, but, while it would be folly to suggest that the Labour Party would 
have welcomed any of the last three developments, it is difficult to deny that all three 
strengthened the party's anti-CPGB position. I 
Two of these factors gave the party an opportunity to attack the CPGB, either for 
increasing its activities through secrecy (through 'front' organisations) or for slavishly 
following Moscow and ignoring the plight of their fellow countrymen in supporting 
the trial of the engineers. But what is more telling is that the party could now lump all 
extremists together, warning party members and supporters of democracy that there 
was no difference between Communist and Nazi dictatorships. 
To clarify this notion, the National Joint Council (NJC), which represented the TUC, 
the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party, issued Democracy versus 
Dictatorship in March 1933. The document argued that all dictatorship was the same, 
and this rekindled the party's argument from the 1920s when Communists called for a 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Democracy versus Dictatorship concluded with the 
stirring words '[w]orkers everywhere should strengthen the Labour Party - the 
'5 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 201 
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spearhead of political power against Dictators, Fascist or Communist. ' 66 The main 
purposes of Democracy versus Dictatorship was to affirm the party's 'belief in 
constitutional principles and its opposition to Communism and Fascism alike. 67 
Various Labourites including Citrine and Bevin further disseminated the party line 
through the pages of the Daily Herald. An article entitled 'Dictators Not Wanted in 
Britain' reported Bevin's speech made at a Labour Party meeting in defence of 
democracy, where he stated that while the world was full of dictators, '[w]e in the 
Labour Party believe in democracy. I am not going to be tempted by all the 
blandishments of dictatorship to depart from my faith in the ultimate victory of social 
democracy. 68 The use of the term 'social democracy' was an interesting choice, and 
speculation can be made as to why he used this phrase instead of the word 'socialism'. 
It is possible that this was a conscious decision to move away from socialist rhetoric, 
so as to differentiate the Labour Party from the enemy he was attacking. A shift in 
language moved Labour's socialism away from Soviet socialism. 
Hector Hughes KC said that capitalist and communist extremists were risking the life 
of the nation by 'running it off the road of democracy. '
One of them risks running it into the ditch of dictatorship, while the 
other would slip it into the Slough of Sovietism. Labour in its 
political sanity keeps the middle of the road, which leads to the co- 
operative benefits of a Socialist State. 69 
Walter Citrine wrote Democracy or Dictatorship in response to a call for members for 
a 'Unity Campaign' of leftists, which included the CPGB, ILP and Socialist League. 
Against Dictatorship, terrorism, violence and the denial of freedom, 
the National Joint Council, representing the Trade Union Congress, 
the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party, has asserted 
66 National Joint Council, Democracy versus Dictatorship, London, 1933 
67 Pelling, Trade Unionism, p. 188 
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once more the principles of democracy which the organised 
working movement exists to promote and defend. 70 
He continued his attack on extremists who challenged the Labour Party's methods and 
reaffirmed the more gradualist, less radical approach favoured by the party leadership. 
He said that the rise of Hitler was not an 'isolated phenomenon' and signified a 
'widespread reaction against Parliamentarianism. ' 71 For this reason, the NJC could 
not 'assent to the proposal of the Communist Party and the Independent Labour Party 
for the formation of a "United Front" against Fascism. 72 The argument Citrine made, 
as with the general party line, recalled what Labour had said about the CPGB in the 
1920s, He remarked that the Communists insisted 'on the adoption of their full 
programme', that they made it clear through attacking the Labour and Socialist 
International, that this was to 
be a temporary alliance for the period of the present emergency. 
They hold themselves to be free ... to resume the destructive and disruptive attacks on the Trade union and Labour movement 
whenever they like. Unity on these terms is impossible. The 
Communists have continuously attacked the Trade Unions and 
Socialist Parties, and have endeavoured to destroy the workers' 
faith in constitutional methods. 73 
These are all relevant points made by Citrine. The CPGB and Comintern had always 
attacked the reformism of the Labour Party, had continually tried to undermine the 
leadership and also the tactics that that leadership espoused. So the leadership's attack 
on supporters of 'Unity' is not all that surprising. But the fact that the moderates in 
the movement would not even contemplate uniting even in the short term, at such a 
dangerous time with the far right threatening the Continental democracies and 
Mosley's British Union of Fascists growing in confidence on the streets of Britain, 





suggests that electoral credibility and not fascism was the leadership's main concern. 
As the party made clear in its pamphlet Unity - True or Sham? in 1939, 'nothing 
which has occurred has weakened the force of the argument of the National Executive 
against the Popular Front. A wrong remedy does not become a right remedy, even 
though the severity of an illness increases. 74 
Labour had to ensure that, once all the talk of war and fascism was over, the voting 
public could not be reminded by the Conservatives that Labour had worked with the 
Communists, and thereby risk losing the opportunity to gain support from the middle 
class. In 1939, one party pamphlet claimed that an alliance with the Communists 
'would bring some few thousand votes ... but it might well 
drive millions into the arms 
of Mr. Chamberlain's camp. 75 Labour's leaders also had to assess what the party 
could gain from allowing the comparatively small CPGB a leading role in the fight 
against the far-right. 
The attack on internal threats to the party's well-being were not just focused on the 
enemies Labourites could see, but targeted more hidden ones as well, as Labour's 
leaders widened its anti-Communist net in a sustained offensive against communism 
in the Labour ranks. The NJC published Communist and Other Organisations in June 
1933, which was a forerunner of The Communist Solar System. It listed the 
organisations that were nominally independent of the CPGB but which were 'actually 
of Communist origin or under Communist influence' attempting 'to disrupt the Trade 
Union Movement. 76 
These included the National Minority Movement, the National Unemployed Workers' 
Committee and the Friends of Soviet Russia. The message that the NJC was pushing 
was that '[n]othing that has happened since [19301 has modified the views of the 
74 Labour Party, Unity- True or Sham?, p. 5 
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General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Executive Committee of the 
Labour Party regarding these bodieS, 77 and it urged members to avoid contact with 
new bodies that it saw as a threat, including the European Workers' United Anti- 
Fascist Congress and the League of Militant Atheists. It warned its members that 
[i]t is well known to most Labour people that it is a recognised 
Communist practice to establish apparently innocent organisations 
for specific purposes in the hope of attracting loyal supporters of 
the Trade Union and Labour Movement who are unaware of the 
real origin and purpose of these bodies. As soon as one 
organisation of this kind is exposed another springs up under a 
different name, and it is difficult for the Movement to know 
whether any organisation seeking support should be helped. 78 
Some months later, Ernest Bevin ensured that the policy of anti-communism kept its 
momentum, arguing that Labour should have no unity with the Communist Party. 
Writing in the TUC-backed New Clarion, he claimed that their tactics were 
repugnant to decent people, and certainly repugnant to our tradition 
in this country. Whilst I feel, like many others, that the parties of 
the "Left" have a contribution to make, that contribution cannot be 
made whilst they resort to all these underground and stupid 
methods. ' 79 
At around the same time the Labour Party issued The Communist Solar System: The 
Communist International and this was a more direct assault on the international 
Communist Parties, but with particular reference to Harry Pollitt's CPGB. 
Some members of the Labour Party, it said, were impressed by the 'false conclusions' 
drawn from the 'fractitudal warfare between Communists and Social Democrats in 
Germany'. 80 The Labour Party was certainly correct to hold this view of communist 
activities, as the Comintern in Moscow issued a statement to the CPGB ordering it that 
77 Ibid 
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the 'German Social Democracy must be cited as an example of how Democracy leads 
to Fascism and only the policy of class struggle leads to Socialism. ' 81 
Even Harold Laski agreed with such sentiments, writing to a friend in 1935 that the 
Labour Party 
goes so directly the road of Gennan Social Democracy that it turns 
my hair grey. After a long fight, those blasted trade union leaders 
decided on non-intervention though they knew this meant a sure 
rebel victory in Spain. They turned down every suggestion of a 
united front ... I have never seen such blindness in a body of leaders 
since I began to be interested in politics. 82 
Laski touched upon the united front issue here, and this was a central theme of The 
Communist Solar System. It stated that the German CP performed its task of creating 
unity 'relentlessly, even unscrupulously' and noted that '[t]o accomplish this end, they 
made a de facto United Front with the Nationalists and the Nazis. 83 These three were 
'the modem Guy Fawkes Coalition which sought to blow up the German 
Parliament'. 84 
The Communist Solar System warned against any front action by reinforcing the 
traditional reformist ideas of the socialist and trade union movement, claiming that the 
communists, together with the Nazis, were 'fertile in the manufacture of grievances, 
notably when the workers were employees of a municipality with a Socialist majority', 
and that the united front 'was the battle cry of Communism at war with German Social 
Democracy and Trade Unionism. It was a slogan and nothing but a slogan. '85 The 
point here was to re-enforce the idea that communism and communist parties were not 
compatible with the Labour Party. 
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Apart from exposing the united front as nothing more than a cover for Communism, 
the other main aim of The Communist Solar System was to uncover all of the 
subsidiary groups and show them up for what they really were - communist 
instruments designed to wage war on the labour movement. 86 It lists organisations 
87 
such as the Workers' International Relief - 'the Communist strike fund" 
International Labour Defence and the National Minority Movement described as 'the 
counterpart in the Trade Union world of the Communist Party of Great Britain. 88 Its 
purpose, it was stated, was to overthrow capitalism and to agitate against a 'false 
social peace' and the 'delusion of a peaceful transition from Capitalism to 
Socialism'. 89 
As with the other pamphlets Labour produced at this time, the purpose of The 
Communist Solar System was to show rank and file members of the party the true 
character of the people they were dealing with. The message was clear, and they 
reinforced the case put forward by Citrine outlined above. Communists were not to be 
trusted, they believed in a different type of socialism and politics to the Labour Party 
and they were following foreign gods. After all, it had always been 'the object of the 
Labour Party to organise and maintain in Parliament and the country, a definite and 
independent political party. '90 
The National Council of Labour continued to denounce Communist activity along 
similar lines to The Communist Solar System. In 1936 it issued British Labour and 
Communism, a pamphlet billed as an 'exposure of Communist manoeuvres. '91 This 
listed more subsidiary organisations linked to the communists, and also questioned 
why the CPG13 and Comintern wanted to join with "reformiste', "capitalist lackeys", 
96 lbid, p. 6 
97 lbid 
:8 lbid, p. 15 
9 lbid 
90 Labour Party, The "Popular Front" Campaign: Declaration by the National Executive Committee, 
London, 1939, p. 1 
91 National Council of Labour, British Labour and Communism, London, 1936, p. 4 
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traitors" and "social fascists". Offering a reason for this, British Labour noted that, 
according to Comintern figures, the CPGB's membership was approximately 7,000 in 
1935. 'It is the abject failure to secure a substantial membership that has dictated the 
more subtle tactic of the "United Front. "'92 Where the Communists were concerned, 
Labour's aims and tactics remained largely unchanged throughout the 1930s. 
There could be no unity between Moscow's CPGB and the British Labour Party in a 
united front, especially as, according to Transport House, there was only one true 
united front of workers. This was made up of the Labour Party, the TUC, and the Co- 
operative Union, already consolidated in the National Council of Labour. This idea 
was given space in newspapers such as the New Clarion, which carried articles by 
Arthur Henderson and A. L. Rowse expounding Labour's response to the united front 
concept, and these articles reinforced party policy concerning Labour-CPGB 
relations. 93 Even some on Labour's left such as Cole argued that there was 'no 
question of a "Popular Front" of the French type'94 in Britain. He claimed that an 
alliance between the CPGB and the Labour Party 'would be, for us, like a partnership 
between an elephant and a flea. 95 
This line continued to be promoted by the party throughout the decade. Labour argued 
that a Popular Front Government would be disabled by 'inner conflicts ... It would be 
inherently weak and unstable, divided in its outlook on both home and foreign fronts. 
Its failure would discredit and endanger democracy in Great Britain. 96 It stated that 
the inclusion of the Communist Party in a Popular Front would be 'an electoral 
liability'97 and was 'undesirable, impractical and would meet with electoral disaster. 98 
92 Ibid, p. 6 
93 See Arthur Henderson, 'Your United Front', New Clarion, 6 May 1933 and A. L. Rowse 'The One 
Way to a United Front', New Clarion, 27 May 1933 
94 New Statesman and Society, June 13,193 6 
93 Ibid 
96 Labour Party, Socialism or Surrender? Labour Rejects the "Popular Front", London, 1939, p. 4 
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid, p. 3 
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The Comintern's line on Labour's position was predictable, stating that the Labour 
Party was deceiving the working class in its claims that a united front already existed 
in the Labour Party. 
We must explain to the workers that there are two kinds of united 
front - with the capitalists, or a united front of working class 
struggle. The Communists are fighting for the workers' united 
front, but the leaders of these organisations are sabotaging this 
struggle and making a united front with the capitalists. 99 
Such a reaction gave support to Labour's argument that the Comintern and CPGB 
were not to be trusted. Referring to speeches by Communist leaders, Labour said that 
'it was clearly shown that, in spite of their proposal for a "United Front, " the 
Communist International remained bitterly hostile to ... the democratic basis of 
Socialist Parties such as the British Labour Party. '100 
An 'Appeal to the Movement', was then made, reaffirming the party's position. And it 
reminded members that the 1934 Southport Conference had overwhelmingly accepted 
the decision that the CPGB was 'a political organisation ineligible for affiliation to the 
Party' adopting a recommendation from the party's ruling NEC by 1,820,000 to 
89,000 votes that stated that 'united action with the Communist Party ... is 
incompatible with membership of the Labour Party'. 101 It concluded by 'renew[ing] 
our claim that the Labour Party is the most democratic Party in British politics and the 
only effective force whereby Socialism can be realised in this country. ' 102 
The struggle within the Labour Party against Communist activity was fought because 
the leaders needed to ensure loyalty from party members. It was felt that any pact with 
the CPGB would be an electoral liability once the fascist threat diminished. While this 
underestimated the danger from the far-right, Labour's leading figures were probably 
99 RGA 495/100/881, document no. 7835/6 
100 Labour Party, "Unity Campaign", p. 1 
'01 Labour Party, Labour Party Loyalty. An Appeal to the Movement, London, 1937, p. 1 
102 Ibid 
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right not to trust the Communist Party given what the Comintern was privately saying 
in Moscow. However, to ignore the immediate threat and to rule out any type of 
united action against Mosley's British Union of Fascists suggests a paranoid short- 
sightedness. Labour was seemingly damned if it did and damned if it didn't. 
This struggle was also part of Labour's wider assertion of its Labourist identity, as it 
needed to emphasise the inclusive nature of social democracy, rather than the 
importance of class. Just as the post-1931 swing to the left was an instinctive reaction 
to the end of MacDonaldism, this was Labour defining what it was by showing what it 
was not, as the Communists flexed their muscles in Britain. The social democratic, 
trade unionist and ethical traditions of the British labour movement needed to be 
protected from what was perceived to be a foreign ideology, even though, as was 
shown elsewhere, even Ramsay MacDonald had accepted that Marx had a part to play 
in the development of organised labour in Britain. 
The reaction of Labour's leadership overlooked the fact that communism was not a 
German or Russian invention, but instead had roots in the international working class 
movement, and was therefore one of many traditions that helped Labour to grow. It 
wanted to assert Labour's gradualist and reformist traditions whilst relegating the 
more aggressive and confrontational tendencies that had been evident before 1917, and 
which had demanded close attention since the USSR appeared to be constructing 
socialism. It was this link to Marx that ensured a continued empathy with the USSR in 
spite of the hostility from the movement's hierarchy as many rank and file Labour 
Party members were still willing to work with the "internal enemy" to combat fascism 
at home and abroad. 
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5.5 Maintaining support for Stalin: respecting the socialist 'family' 
The willingness that existed amongst rank and filers of the Labour Party to work with 
communists was a child of its time, but also had its roots in a continuing respect for 
the USSR that was not easily swayed, despite the emergence of disturbing facts from 
Stalin's Russia. It shows that many Labour members were not willing to be dictated to 
by a ruling elite in Transport House, and that Labour was a mass party that had a 
respect for its leaders, rather than an elitist party that demanded loyalty from its 
members. 
This section explains why, despite all of the attacks, all of Labour's anti-CPGB 
rhetoric and arguments against calls for unity amongst all socialist organisations, 
some of the party's rank and file, some party intellectuals and some party newspapers 
continued to fraternise with Communists, with communist ideas and with the Soviet 
Union. This was all the more surprising given that news of the Metro-Vickers trial in 
Moscow and the purges of old Bolsheviks in the USSR was emerging in the press. 
Yet many Labourites were still willing to ally themselves with the British 
Communists and continued to tentatively put their faith in the Soviet Union as a guide 
out of the problems the Capitalist West found itself in, and this, perhaps, was the 
point. The USSR also appeared to some to be the best bulwark against Hitler, for both 
ideological and practical reasons. Ideological because Nazism was clearly the ultimate 
enemy of the labour movement, emerging as it did out of the apparent death throes of 
capitalism, and practical simply because of the size of the country and its armed force. 
There was, of course, a difference of opinion between rank and filers and the 
leadership over working with communists. The latter saw them as an electoral 
liability, and as parliamentary elections were the chosen medium for Labour to put 
across its message and influence British politics, it was obviously important that 
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electoral purity was maintained. The former however, was more likely to regard 
communists as possible comrades in arms against far right aggression. 
This was due in part to the climate of the time as there was a 'growing regard for the 
Soviet Union' described by Neal Wood as the 'most striking feature of the thirties, 
setting it off from the previous decade. ' 103 While it is in no way suggested that there 
was mass support for communism in Britain amongst Labour Party members, it was 
often the case that 'left-wing activists made little distinction between the Co- 
operative, Labour, Independent Labour and Communist Parties; 'seeing them as 
different branches of the socialist family. " 104 
It is also possible to agree with John Callaghan's assertion that, after 1933 
the influence of Marxism could be seen in the ILP, the Socialist 
League, the Fabian Society, the New Statesman, the Left Book 
Club, Tribune (from the moment Cripps established it in 1937) and 
in the a OT 1935.1 
itation for Left unity which the CPGB spearheaded from 
The common factor that united these groups is that they were, by and large, not 
organisations with a mass support base. The Socialist League and the Fabian Society 
did not have mass membership and were essentially more concerned with the 
promotion of ideas. The Left Book Club, started by Victor Gollancz, Harold Laski 
and John Strachey, had a very wide readership that included active members of all 
socialist bodies, but did not constitute a party. 
While the Club 'was a huge success, attracting 50,000 members and creating a spin- 
off of hundreds of local discussion groups' 106 it was '[o]stensibly non-partisan 
103 N. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, London, 1959 p. 42 
104 Weinbren, Generating Socialism, p. 128 
'05 Callaghan, Socialism in Britain, p. 122 
'06 M. Jones, Michael Foot, p. 56 
237 
[but] ... effectively under 
Communist control. ' 107 Victor Gollancz, the Club's founder 
said that they were creating 'the mass basis without which a true Popular Front is 
impossible. In a sense, the Left Book Club is already a sort of Popular Front. ' 108 As 
for the two parties that did concentrate their efforts on recruitment, the ILP had a 
dwindling membership after it disaffiliated from the Labour Party and the CPGB's 
membership grew steadily after 1935 (reaching 18,000 by December 1938) possibly 
because the Labour Party rejected its traditional pacifism at the 1935 Conference and 
probably because fascism threatened the democratic Republic of Spain in 1936. 
It is clear then, that there was a climate for left-wing ideas, and this, coupled with the 
threat from Oswald Mosley's fascists, formulated into action. This does not mean that 
Labour Party members were converts to communism, as they were still believers in 
parliamentary elections and supported their party in the liberal democratic process. 
But it demonstrates a twist in the party's traditions whereby the membership was 
more pragmatic than the leaders. By rejecting an alliance with the CPGB, Transport 
House was asserting its right to keep an ideological purity, that ideology being of 
course, social democracy. 
Yet the threat to British social democracy from fascism was more dangerous than 
some leaders realised. The workers on the streets were not quite so blind, and it was 
this ability to see the truth that led to the informal coalition of the united and popular 
fronts of the 1930s. As has already been shown, Labour members never formally 
voted for united front action, which suggests that there was no desire to break with the 
Labour Party. But there was the desire to defeat fascism in Britain, and in this they 
displayed more pragmatism than their leadership. 
107 Thorpe, Communist Party, Moscow, p. 227 
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However, before this, Labour had to deal with the trial of the British workers in 
Moscow in 1933. The Daily Herald, representing the official party line concerning 
Metro-Vickers, strongly suggested that the men were not guilty but covered itself by 
stating that 'for one Government to pre-judge the courts of another before even 
hearing the evidence would be most improper. "09 After reporting Litvinov's 
statement to Ovey that the men were to be 'charged with counter-revolution, the 
maximum penalty for which is death by shooting, "' 0 George Lansbury told readers to 
'keep calm and cool, and do not prejudice the case. "" Even Citrine said that no good 
would come from breaking off relations with Russia. 
The ILP pushed a more pro-Soviet line, as the New Leader reported that the British 
Government's response of rushing a bill through the House of Commons to place an 
embargo on Soviet trade. Raising the question of what an embargo on Soviet goods 
would mean, it suggested that the USSR would retaliate 'by refusing to give orders to 
Britain' 112 and therefore threaten jobs. 
The reaction from trade unionists towards the prospect of losing work due to a rupture 
with the USSR was one of anger and amazement that their leaders were not doing 
enough to prevent it. Of course, it is difficult to gauge whether the trade unionists who 
wrote to Walter Citrine concerning the Metro-Vickers Trial and its consequences 
were Communists, Soviet sympathisers or loyal Labourites who fell in to the second 
camp of patriotism outlined above. But there is no denying that Citrine received many 
letters from union branches who were worried about the possible repercussions after 
the Trial. 
'09 Cited in Williams, p. 201 
110 Daily Herald, 18 March 1933 
In lbid 
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Soon after the trial, the Leith branch of the TGVvrU wrote that breaking diplomatic 
relations with Russia was 'a step towards war, taken on the pretext of the Engineers' 
Trial which was a fair trial in the eyes of the workers throughout the world. We call 
for an immediate withdrawal of the Embargo and the resumption of peaceful trading 
relations with the USSR. " 13 In May 1933, the Nottingham and District Trades 
Council also wrote in support of the Russians' actions concerning the trial. It raised a 
'strong objection to the action of the National Joint Council in asking for the release 
of the British engineers found guilty of attempting to ruin the work of socialist 
construction in the Soviet Union. ' 114 
This letter was referring to a telegram the NJC sent to Moscow that 'British organised 
labour industrial and political appeal to Soviet Government for the immediate release 
of fellow countrymen in the interests of friendly relations between Great Britain and 
Russia. " 15 Citrine, Bevin and Lansbury all signed this. There was clearly support for 
the notion that the men were not only guilty, but that they 'received a fair trial and 
fully merited the sentences passed upon them. ' 116 There was then, clear opposition 
from some sections of the movement, but while they could make their voices heard, 
they were not necessarily listened to, as in the face of these criticisms Citrine simply 
restated that the official party line was in fact the correct line to take. 
As the movement split along pro- and anti- Soviet lines concerning the Metro-Vickers 
affair, it also had to cope with the rise of Mosley's BUF and this began to bring 
members together, realising the threat posed by the ex-Labour Minister. Geoffrey 
Foote has correctly argued that Mosley's Blackshirts were not sufficiently strong to 
launch a stable attack on the British State. He claims that the dominance of the 
National, mainly Conservative, Governments with large parliamentary majorities 
113 MRC, MSS 292/947/38 
114 lbid 
113 lbid 
116 lbid (National Union of Railwaymen, Birkenhead branch, 2 May 1933) 
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throughout the 1930s made 'the need for a Fascist movement superfluous for most of 
the patriotic men and women who, had they lived elsewhere in Europe, would have 
been drawn to the far Right. 9117 
This is a valid point and probably did mean that a large fascist party had no sufficient 
breeding ground. Keith Laybourn notes that there 'were few centres of fascist support 
in Britain, outside London, Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds. " 18 Yet, according to 
Daniel Weinbren, the BUF had around 20,000 members, 119 and by 1936 this number 
had risen to 'as many as 40,000 members, mostly from lower middle-class 
backgrounds. ' 120 
But the point that is often overlooked is that a large fascist party is not necessarily 
needed to cause damage and harm, and ruin ordinary peoples' lives. It only takes a 
small number of fascists to attack a refugee, a Jew or a political opponent. On this 
basis, the anti-fascists who defeated Mosley's Blackshirts in the 1930s were 
absolutely right to not underestimate the fascist movement in Britain. One Labourite 
recalled what happened in Stepney in October 1936. 
It was not just a case of Jews being there on 4 th October, the most 
amazing thing was to see a silk-coated Orthodox Jew standing next 
to an Irish docker with a grappling iron ... the people understood 
what fascism was and, in my case, it meant the continuation of the 
struggle in Spain. 121 
The left saw a threat from fascism in Britain, and was willing to counter that threat in 
physical struggles if necessary, for example the battle of Cable Street in 1936 and on 
the international stage, as has been shown elsewhere, as British socialists volunteered 
to fight in Spain. 
117 Foote, Political Thought, p. 144 
118 Layboum, A Century of Labour, p. 57 
119 Weinbren, Generating Socialism, p. 112 
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121 Cited in ibid. For some excellent examples of how different Labour activists reacted to British and 
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However the moderate leadership, unwilling to join this united front of socialists and 
communists, 'played down the importance of fascism at home, though not abroad. -) 1 22 
In this statement, Keith Laybourn is correct. Nevertheless, while he also rightly 
highlights the fact that 'Labour's attitude remained that it was pointless to fight 
fascism on the streets of Britain since it would draw attention to an insignificant 
organization' he is wrong to say that the Labour leaders were 'probably, quite right to 
play down the fascist challenge' 123 in Britain. Those who had their lives challenged by 
fascists on a day to day basis would disagree and it is fair to say that if the left - those 
socialists who joined the united front - did nothing else in this period, it helped to 
orchestrate the successful defeat of fascism in Britain. 
The rise in the number of meetings by the BUF in the London's East End between 
1936 and 1938 - 2,108 according to Daniel Weinbren 
124 
_ is one explanation for the 
continued support from some sections of the Labour Party for the USSR in a period 
when Labourites were made aware of the true nature of Stalin's regime. A steady flow 
of stories describing how one old Bolshevik after another was in fact a Nazi, a 
Wrecker, a Capitalist or Trotskyist, and therefore deserved their fate, began to appear 
in the newspapers, thus adding some credibility to the murderous rumours emerging 
from the USSR. 
In Citrine's I Searchfor Truth in Russia, he wrote that the Purges 
made a spy of every man on his neighbour ... it was the duty of 
every worker to keep an eye on the actions and words of his 
fellows, and to report anything which seemed to be hostile to the 
interests of the working class. That is why no Communist dare 
argue independently, or criticise his leaders, or their policy. He is 
so anxious not to be regarded as a "deviationisf', that when 
confronted with any question he asks himself, "What is the true 
Leninist line? What would Stalin say? " To argue with a Russian 
Communist is to argue with a gramophone record of Stalin. 125 
122 Layboum, A Century ofLabour, p. 57 
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However, despite Citrine's words, and despite the extraordinary charges aimed at men 
whose names were respected and who the Labour Party and its press associated with 
the Revolution, there was still a pro-Soviet feeling among the ranks. Letters in 
Labour's newspapers commented upon what they saw as negative reporting from 
Citrine. 
Sir Walter Citrine appears to forget that the USSR has not had 
twenty years yet, and in spite of fighting the capitalist world, has 
really travelled a considerable distance towards socialism, while 
the organisation of which he is such a sparkling ornament has had 
nearly a century, and lags behind Russia in actual security of the 
workers. 126 
Another letter supporting the USSR states that 
[t]hose of us who have been fortunate enough to see for ourselves 
some of the magnificent achievements of the one Socialist country 
and who appreciate the important part played by the USSR in the 
fight for peace know that the collection of half-truths and irrelevant 
details that fills Sir Walter's diary gives a thoroughly misleading 
picture of Russia as it is today. 127 
While CPGB members or fellow travellers could have written these letters, the 
general climate of fear in the Western world of war seemed slightly less real with the 
idealised Soviet Union on side, thus provoking a more sympathetic view from 
Labourites. This in turn promoted the belief that the USSR had to be kept on side at 
all costs. 
Bill Jones notes that the events in the Soviet Union after 1936 caused a problem for 
left-wingers. Before the trials, supporters of the USSR could deny that such things 
were happening as the Soviet legal system had abolished the death penalty. However, 
[t]hey now faced the choice of explaining, justifying or condemning events which 
"" Daily Herald, 7 July 1936 
127 lbid 
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they had previously believed impossible. ' 128 Respected figures such as Malcolm 
Muggeridge recalled that supporters of the Soviet system would excuse the use of 
terror by finding justifications for it. 
He described Stalin as 'his own counter-revolution' 129 and wrote that in the USSR 
[t]he total abandonment of Law, and its replacement by terrorism, 
was obscured by the ostensible application of humanitarian 
principles to the punishment of non-political offenders. The fact 
that many were shot without a public trial for unspecified reasons 
of state, did not deter earnest advocates of penal reform from 
holding the Soviet Government up to admiration for having 
abolished capital punishment; and even as late as 1937 the Rev. 
Hewlett Johnson could quote with approval a friend's estimate of a 
6colony for criminals adjacent to Moscow' as 'more marvellous 
than Canterbury Cathedral. ' 130 
Yet despite efforts from people like Muggeridge, even the party's official organ tried 
to find both sides to the story. Hamilton Fyfe's article 'Why There is Terror in Russia' 
in 1935 criticised both Moscow and outsiders. He did not deny that terror tactics were 
used, and he criticised the Soviets for this, but he chastised the onlookers for not 
understanding why such methods were used. 
His argument stated that nations could not escape their traditions immediately and 
recalled the adoption of Christianity in Europe. Europeans he said 'did not for a long 
time change their habits, their attitude towards the supernatural, nor even their modes 
of worship. They grafted the new faith on the old stem; it was a long time before the 
sap in the old stem died. ' 13 1 Fyfe also claimed that there was still a threat of counter- 
revolution, concluding that '[s]ome day conditions will be safe for political freedom. 
In the meantime, they cannot take any risks. ' 132 An editorial in the Daily Herald states 
123 B. Jones, The Russia complex, p. 26 
129 Cited in ibid 
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that this is not necessarily the view of the newspaper. Indeed, it claimed that the 
judicial methods used were 'worthy of Tsarism. ' 133 
H. N. Brailsford, who had retained his sympathy for the Soviet dream, condemned a 
'terror based on lies. ' 134 He said that the 'purge of the Communist Party ... recalls 
Hitler's slaughter of his rivals' and described the trial as 'a relic of the Middle Ages, 
worthy of the Inquisition rather than a Socialist tribunal. ' 135 Clem Attlee also wrote 
about the use of violence. 'In Soviet Russia to-day, fifteen years after the cessation of 
foreign intervention, the method of terrorism continues, as may be seen from the trials 
of the Trotskyists. ' 136 
Yet in 1937, a year after the Show Trials had begun, two readers of the Daily Herald 
voiced the popular opinion that the Soviet Union should be kept on side at all costs 
because of the threat of war. In their letter concerning the trials, they argued that 
Britain had to continue contact with Russia and insist on political co-operation with 
the ý Kremlin in the 'interests of peace and the defence of democracy. ' 137 They 
continued with a popular argument amongst left-wing supporters of the USSR in this 
period. 
If Britain could be allies with a Tsarist Government which was also 
capable of great severity in repression of anti-governmental 
movements, we ought not to boggle at co-operation with a Socialist 
Government which realised that it would have been destroyed by 
armed foreign intervention ... 
had it not been in a position to defend 
itSelf. 138 
The emerging news of the persecution and the Show Trials appears not to have 
completely convinced some Labour Party socialists, in spite of the fact that the 
Cited in B. Jones, The Russia complex, p. 27 
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evidence, as it was, seemed to go against some of the fundamental beliefs of the 
party's socialism - egalitarianism, freedom of expression and religious tolerance. This 
says something about the state of Labour's socialism. Because Labour's socialism 
was still not absolutely defined, and because it had failed to deliver any socialist 
improvements when the party had been in power while the USSR was seemingly 
building the new world that many hoped for, some Labourites were still willing to 
give the Soviet Union, albeit grudgingly, one last chance. This continued until the 
signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939 as Britain prepared for war. The USSR 
betrayed many people's hopes through this act. 
This feeling of 'one last chance' strongly suggests that there was a conscious decision 
by some to try and ignore what was happening inside the Soviet Union mainly 
because of what was happening outside of it. Writing about how it affected the CPGB, 
Thorpe notes that the '[t]error brought reflected shame on the party ... Spain offered it 
reflected glory. ' 139 This is the key to understanding why Labourites were willing to 
accept the terror, the trials and the religious persecution. The danger that Hitler and 
Franco represented was countered by the hope that the USSR could play a major role 
in defeating them. 
'Me fact that some in the Labour press still supported ties with the USSR, such as 
Kingsley Martin at the New Statesman and Nation, also helped to convince people 
that the USSR deserved their trust. Bill Jones notices that even after the second round 
of purges, Martin decided that general but critical support should still be given to the 
country that had adopted a planned socialist economy. 140 
This is not suggesting that the Statesman was endorsing the purges or the trials, rather 
that the journal was embracing the rationalist approach of its founders and the 
39 Thorpe, Communist Party, Moscow, p. 241 
40 B. Jones, The Russia complex, p. 27 
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pluralism of Martin, who presided over an instrument of socialist propaganda that 
was, by and large, inquisitive and informative, but in this instance could not reach a 
solid conclusion. In August 1936, it reported that most of the old Bolsheviks 
including Zinoviev, Kamenev and Tomsky were all gone and that those who were 
left, such as Bukharin and Radek, were under suspicion. 
The trial, if one may trust the available reports, was wholly 
unconvincing. The accused had no counsel, and the evidence 
consisted solely of confessions worthless in the circumstances ... it is hard to believe that all these orthodox Bolsheviks broke the first 
rule of the party by planning terrorism and assassination, and even 
more unlikely that they conspired with the Nazi Secret Police. 
Zinoviev and Kamenev, under a cloud since 1927 ... would have been reckless heroes if they had gone on plotting; and that was 
never the reputation of these particular revolutionaries. The worst 
interpretation is that the Soviet Political Police vamped up this 
conspiracy to perpetuate its power on the eve of the adoption of the 
quasi-democratic constitution. The truth is unknown. There may 
well have been a plot. But the disadvantages of these methods of 
justice, coupled with unconvincing confessions and broadcast 
propaganda, is that they reflect among those who retain any 
integrity of judgement, at least as much upon the State which 
employs them as upon the victim it condemns. 141 
Martin was unwilling to commit to any definite conclusions, and this line was 
reflected in the readership of the Statesman. While there were surprisingly few letters 
on the subject of the purges, either for or against (except ones from the expected 
quarters such as Pat Sloan of the CPGB), one letter stands out as it appears to 
encapsulate the problems that many had in deciding what action to take over the news 
coming from Moscow. 'I have no admiration' wrote a New Statesman and Nation 
reader 'for bourgeois democracy and earnestly hope that in Soviet Russia the seeds of 
a better civilisation are being sown, but there is no question that in me, and many like 
me, the recent events in Moscow have raised serious doubts and distress. ' 142 
141 New Statesman and Nation, 29 August 193 6 
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As the reader noted, there were 'many' like her. Perhaps a reason for not offering 
unconditional acceptance of the events in Moscow was due to the fact that there was 
little credible proof offered to those looking for answers. For years the Labour Party 
hierarchy had taken a very hostile line towards the USSR, which, as has been shown, 
did little to dent support for it. Why should the leaders be believed now? At the same 
time, leading figures like the Webbs, who by now had lost some of their influence but 
still commanded a level of respect, offered verdicts that carried some weight. 
John Strachey believed that '[n]o one who really reads the evidence can doubt that 
these things happened; no one who had not unalterably fixed his mind in the contrary 
opinion could read the verbatim reports of the trials without being wholly convinced 
of the authenticity of the confessions. ' 143 Add these voices to the opinions of 
6professionals' such as D. N. Pritt KC, who accepted the validity of the trials, and also 
to the general climate of concern over the consolidation of power of Hitler and the 
prospect of war, and an answer can be found. 
it is also possible to argue that the wider bond between "socialism" and 
"communism" bound sections of the Labour Party to the USSR, even at a time when 
the Soviet system was portrayed in a less than favourable light. In 1926, Harold Laski 
wrote that the compelling strength of communism is that 'it has a faith as vigorous, as 
fanatic, and compelling as any in the history of religions. It offers dogmas to those 
whom scepticism troubles; it brings to the believers the certitude which all great 
religions have conferred. Above all, perhaps, it implants in its adherents the belief in 
their redemption' 144 and this sentiment can be modified to help understand why some 
British socialists in the Labour Party maintained a connection with the USSR. 
"" Cited in N. Thompson, John Strachey An Intellectual Biography, Basingstoke, 1993, p. 112 
144 Laski, Communism, p. 246 
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If the "Soviet Union" replaces "Communism" and "hope" replaces "dogmas", then an 
explanation becomes clearer. Party members who were fearful of internal and external 
events were offered hope through the Soviet Union's attempts to build a socialist 
society in times of economic depression and belief that this country more than any 
other could play the leading role in defeating the far-right. Even after the Show Trials, 
the USSR was a fading, but still relevant, guiding light that offered a dimly lit road 
out of the darkness that was the 1930s. 
Laski went on to say that communism 'has made its way by its idealism and not its 
realism, by its spiritual promise, not its materialist prospect. ' 145 Again; if the "USSR" 
replaces "Communism", then it is possible to understand why the Soviet experiment 
offered so much hope, especially given the fact that, by this time, the USSR had in 
fact produced a Five Year Plan in which Labour economists could find answers to the 
questions about the economic situation in the West. 
This was clearly quite a trying time for pro-Soviet Labourites. News of the trials 
forced them to both reassess their allegiance to Moscow, and perhaps offer a more 
critical, or at least a less slavish support. Kingsley Martin at the New Statesman 
refused to simply accept what he was told by Moscow, by Communists or by fellow 
travellers, and this was reflected in his writings on the Show Trials. Those who still 
failed to criticise perhaps did so because they wanted to, rather than did believe that 
the USSR offered a way out of the problems Europe faced. 
This was made harder when Molotov signed the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939. It had 
generally been accepted by many left-wingers that a Popular Front between Britain, 
France and the USSR could defeat Nazi Germany. Now the Soviets had negotiated a 
separate "peace". While the CPGB followed the Moscow line 146 the Labour Party 
"5 lbid, p. 250 
146 For more on this see Thorpe, Communist Party, Moscow, and Paul Anderson and Kevin Davey's 
article 'Stalin's British bulldog' in New Statesman and Society, 4 February 1994 
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continued to support the National Government and its promise of support for Poland. 
However, a minority still found it hard to leave the socialist family altogether, and 
welcomed the fact that the USSR joined the war effort in 1941, although not, of 
course, the fact that this meant that the Nazis had invaded Soviet land. 
The pull of the socialist family was clearly strong. However, as circumstances 
changed and Britain began to prosper in the post-war 1950s, these ties lessened and 
allowed many to part company with the USSR after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 
1956, thus demonstrating that at least part of the support for the Soviet Union in the 
1930s came from the promise of what the USSR was supposed to be. When 
Labourites saw what it was, they lost their patience and, in many cases, their loyalty. 
Dire economic conditions, the threat of fascism and even desperate hope kept some 
from questioning Moscow during the Show Trials. With the first two factors 
seemingly removed, the third over and capitalism no longer on the verge of collapse, 
the Soviet Union lost much of its appeal, especially as the Labour Party had fulfilled 
part of its promise as a truly reforming party during the Attlee years and shown a 
glimpse of what it could do. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the tensions inside the Labour Party caused by the 
presence of the Communist Party of Great Britain within the labour movement in a 
time when the far-right became more confident in Britain and more dominant in 
Europe. And it has focused on how this influenced Labour's formation of the party's 
identity that developed in the 1930s. There can be little doubt that the fact that the 
CPGB was active on traditional Labour ground helped to shape the political thought 
of the Labour Party. Labour's socialism remained gradualist, even after MacDonald 
left. 
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This has something to do with the nature of British socialism that grew out of British 
traditions. But it was also a response to the aggressive politics of the CPGB and the 
USSR. Had Labour moved far to the left, then it would have been open to attacks 
from the right that it was just another Bolshevik party. But if it moved too far to the 
centre or right, it ran the risk of being outflanked on the left by the Communists. The 
presence of communism in Britain shaped Labour's politics, it defined its borders and 
its centre ground. It is shown later that the party borrowed economic ideas from the 
Soviet experiment, but it also looked at other models of progressive politics, such as 
Sweden's social democratic system and Roosevelt's New Deal. These were both 
around the edges of Labour's socialism, but neither could get into the centre of it in 
the way that the USSR did. 
Of course, some Labourites resented this fact. In 1935, Bevin said 
I wish Russia could have seen that if she had never supported the 
CP in England, but allowed the British trade union movement to 
help Russia she would have been in a much better position than 
today ... The philosophy of the Revolutionary International can not 
mix with our form of democracy. 147 
However, despite, or even because of, the challenge from the CPGB, Labour 
maintained its belief in progressive change through parliamentary elections, and thus 
reaffirmed what type of party it was through a rejection of everything that the CPGB 
stood for. 
It did this despite sections of the party calling for a more radically socialist 
programme at the 1932 Conference, in the immediate post-MacDonald period. But 
once the internal party politics and external economic situation had stabilised, the 
gradualist Labourist tradition won through. This was achieved by the leadership 
unleashing a sustained attack on extremism that reaffirmed its more social democratic 
147 Cited, A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin volume one Trade Union Leader 1881-1940, 
London, 1960 p. 559 
251 
credentials, such as the belief that the existing system could be reformed through 
parliamentary action. This had always relied on Labour appealing to a wider audience 
than simply the working class, and electoral credibility was uppermost in the minds of 
the leaders in this period. This position was stressed in pamphlets such as The 
Communist Solar System, which highlighted the type of organisations that Labour 
Party members should be wary of, and Democracy versus Dictatorship, which 
emphasised the type of organisation the Labour Party was and would continue to be. 
However, the reaction of the rank and file to demands from the leadership not to co- 
operate with Communists in the fight against fascism does show that Labour was not 
an elitist party. Grass roots support for the USSR or for united action against fascism 
showed that party members would not be bullied into accepting the party line if they 
fundamentally disagreed with it. While their loyalty to the Labour Party was not in 
question, if the rank and file believed that the wider issues of the day could be best 
confronted with the help of others, then they would stand with them as members of 
the 'socialist family'. There was a friction between the moderate leadership and the 
more radical membership, but the party was held together in a structure that allowed 
Labour to be a mass party but with a strong leadership and ultimately loyal following. 
Despite Communist encroachment onto traditional Labour ground, it retained its 
reformist traditions after a struggle for the heart of the party. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Labour's Economic thought and the USSR 
It is better to have a plan than not. ' 
The economic thought of the Labour Party in the 1930s was more or less governed by 
the realisation that the state should take a more interventionist position in the financial 
affairs of the country. It is possible to argue that a direct outcome of this was the 
structured programme of welfare reform and the creation of the National Health 
Service by Clement Attlee's government after World War Two. But this would not 
have been possible without the debates about planning and state intervention that took 
place in the party in this decade. 
One of the main platforms for these debates was the Soviet Union. The planned 
economy initiated by the Soviet Government provoked an explosion of excitement 
amongst some Labour Party thinkers, who wholeheartedly embraced the concept of 
planning and saw the USSR as something of an exemplar. In the development of the 
economic ideas in the early 1930s, the Soviet five-year plan provided a model of 
working socialism that offered a solution to Britain's economic problems. Labour 
used the USSR to learn about different economic possibilities, focusing on state 
intervention and planning, and the party's thought was defined by what it accepted 
and rejected from the Soviet Union's economic system. 
Until the mid-1930s, (Soviet) Marxism was more important to Labour than at any 
time before or after this era as the effects of the Wall Street Crash led many in the 
party to believe Marx's prophecy about the collapse of capitalism. This does not mean 
that there was a mass conversion to Marxism. Far from it. But even moderate party 
1 H. Dalton, 'A General View of the Soviet Economy with Special Reference toPlanning' in Twelve 
Studies ofSoviet Russia, p. 15 
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members like Dalton found something in the Soviet system that they could approve 
of Dalton was 
strengthened in my belief that, for a community as for an 
individual, bold and conscious planning of life is better than weak 
passivity and the tame acceptance of traditional disabilities, that 
trial and error is better than error without trial. 2 
He returned 'after five weeks of talk and travel, immensely stimulated. I had caught a 
quick but vivid glimpse of a quite new world. And this remained with me an abiding 
influence. 
While Soviet planning seemed to offer solutions to the problems brought on by 
capitalist slump at its absolute worst, once the British economy began to recover in 
the middle of the decade moderate party leaders turned their attention to less extreme 
forms of state intervention. The two most noticeable examples were the USA, 
apparently flourishing under Roosevelt's New Deal, and Sweden's successful mixed 
economy. It is not surprising that the party looked at these two countries, as both were 
led by progressive governments who appeared to have curtailed the harshness of 
capitalism without actually challenging its fundamental basis. 
This suited the agenda of the moderate Labourites better than the wholesale 
destruction of capitalism as outlined by Marx. Lenin's advocacy of smashing the state 
had never really suited the gradualist theory that socialism could be constructed 
slowly by a piecemeal replacement of capitalist managers with socialist ones. The 
moderate interventionism of America and Sweden appealed to those in the party that 
saw change from above - from government as opposed to direct workers' control - as 
the correct way to further the cause of socialism or social democracy. In some ways, 
Labour's economic thought was reacting to the new circumstances thrown up by 
2 lbid, pp. 334 
H. Dalton, The Fateful Years, p. 26 
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capitalism, as opposed to the party developing a specific concept of socialist 
This new situation helped to reconcile the two wings of the party - the 
Ij 
I dealists and the pragmatists - as both accepted that some form of planning and state 
intervention was necessary to create a more egalitarian society. 
Because this was a decade largely of research and analysis, particularly in the field of 
economic policy, the party had time to assess all forms of planning and state 
intervention. Various groups emerged with the purpose of establishing a coherent 
economic policy for the party. SSIP and the NFRB have already been discussed. But 
there was also the XYZ Club, a small group of City workers who sympathised with 
Labour's aims. While the XYZ Club was important to the overall development of 
Labour's economic thought, it had, unlike the other two groups, no particular interest 
in the Soviet Union, and therefore does not need to be discussed here. 4 
The fact that Labour had two possible paths to tread towards intervention and 
redistribution reflects the different traditions that had developed throughout Labour's 
history as a parliamentary party and these traditions found a voice in Labour's 
economic thought in the 1930s. Labour's ideas had often come from radical Liberals 
as well as from socialists, and in the realm of economic thought, the conflict over Free 
Trade and Protectionism saw the party caught between the Liberal idea of limited 
government and international trade and the Conservative preference for tariff barriers. 
Many Labourites favoured the system that saw cheap goods brought in through 
international trade. But at the same time, this favoured the interests of the consumer 
over the producer, and this was something Labourites could not support. Fabian 
socialists noted that the immediate benefits of the free market were only possible 
because of harsh working conditions and low pay for workers. Jim Tomlinson notes 
4 For details on the XYZ Club, see K. 0. Morgan, Labour People, Oxford, 1987, G. Foote, Political 







'by the time the Labour Representation Committee ... was 
formed 
... this liberal 
and unmanaged system was under challenge. '5 
According to Tomlinson, 
[mlany nineteenth-century British radicals and socialists defined 
their politics in opposition to liberal notions about the beneficence 
of the free market. They emphasised the instability of the free 
market (often accompanied by a belief in a forthcoming 'final 
collapse' of this type of economy). They stressed the interests of 
the worker in well-paid and secure employment, rather than the 
consumers' interests in low prices. Perhaps above all, they attacked 
the selfish, competitive environment which they saw as the 
inescapable accompaniment to free market, capitalist society. 6 
Here then was Labour attempting to fuse a number of different ideas that sought 
practical management of the economy and the promotion of a fair deal for producers. 
However, this did not mean that a complete economic programme emerged, rather a 
set of ideas driven by the various socialist elements in the movement. 
ILPers like Philip Snowden took an ethical stance. He complained that the 'instinct of 
competition applied to the production and distribution of wealth is wrongly applied, 
and that it is productive of untold misery, waste and ruin. 7 He argued that competition 
'develops not the human but the animal instincts of men. It makes men hard, cruel, 
selfish, acquisitive-'8 Capitalism for the ethical socialists was simply "evil". or "cruel". 
Marxists attacked the market and Free Trade, joining the Fabians in equating 
capitalism with low pay and poor conditions for the workers and highlighted the trends 
in capitalism that made collapse of the system inevitable. 
3 J. Tomlinson, 'Labour and the Economy' in Tanner, Thane and Tiratsoo, Labour's First Century, 
P. 47 
[bid, p. 48 
7 P. Snowden, Socialism andSyndicalism, London & Glasgow, no date, p. 84 
s Ibid 
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After World War One Labour adopted Labour and the New Social Order at its 1918 
Conference. The party began to formulate a coherent economic programme that 
distinguished it from the Liberals and the Tories. This document tied the State to a 
more public, or interventionist, role, urging the establishment of a national minimum 
wage, the democratic control of industry and distributing surplus wealth for the 
common good. Yet when Labour was in power in 1924 and 1929-3 1, the Chancellor 
Philip Snowden failed to break with the market-orientated economics he had once 
railed against. This led to the financial crisis in 1931 that saw MacDonaldite Labour 
accept the anti-working class measures demanded by the bankers, to the split in the 
party and ultimately the end of the Labour Government. 
In the post-Snowden era, Labour's economics turned its attention far away from the 
market and again embraced some of the more ethical and moral traditions that 
challenged capitalism. In the 1930s, the question of unemployment and how to 
alleviate the suffering this brought was of paramount importance, and it is worth 
noting that the imperatives here were short-termist in their outlook. The question was 
"how can the party help those who have suffered during the Depression? "
This short-termism then gave way to the need for an overarching idea on how to 
change the economic basis on which society was run, and this led to an interest in 
planning and therefore the Soviet system. But in the best traditions of the party, it 
could not simply allow only one approach. By the middle of the decade, due to 
shifting economic and political circumstances discussed elsewhere, state intervention 
no longer had to imply the immediate fundamental destruction of capitalism, but 
rather better management of it, with a vague acceptance that it would not exist 
forever. 
This chapter looks at the two directions Labour could take. The first section will look 
at the 'aggressive' approach to planning that the USSR took, and how this suited the 
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party's thought at the time. The second section will spend some time reviewing the 
economic models of the progressive governments outlined above. The conclusion will 
assess how these two quite different models of state intervention influenced the 
economic thought set out in two of the main party programmes of the Labour Party, 
For Socialism and Peace (1934) and Labour's Immediate Programme (1937). 
6.1 The Soviet model and the NFRB 
Labour's move to the left at the 1932 party Conference saw the party embrace a more 
interventionist style of government than had prevailed under its previous leader. A 
need for the party to come out definitely in favour of socialism saw demands for the 
Bank of England to be brought under public control when Labour was next returned 
to power and stabilising prices should take precedence over the gold standard. These 
ideas were products of their time, with belief in the free market generally lessening as 
protectionism was the new idea in the new House of Commons after the 1931 General 
Election. But state intervention, and more specifically contemplation of a Soviet-style 
planned economy, represented the most extreme way of rejecting the politics of 
MacDonald which had failed to deal with the problem of mass unemployment brought 
about by the crisis that beset the world-wide capitalist system. 
This shows that the party's advocation of the Soviet five-year plan as a model for the 
British economy was largely a product of its time. It was the best way of rejecting 
MacDonaldism, especially his one-nation politics and free market economics. 
Accepting an economic system that supposedly favoured workers over bosses and 
offered a planned society rather than leaving everything to the 'invisible hand' of the 
market sent a clear message to the policy makers that only a socialist programme 
would be acceptable to many in the party. And there was a genuine interest in the 
developments in the USSR. 
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But a main reason for this was largely due to MacDonald's actions and the high 
unemployment figures at the time. This interest was partly provoked by a genuine 
fascination with what was happening in the USSR, and partly by desperation. This fits 
in with how the Labour Party, in general, dealt with the Soviet Union in this decade. 
(It has been previously discussed how the threat posed by Hitler drove many 
Labourites into an alliance either with the government of the USSR or with its British 
satellite). 
1932 was an important year for Labour's political and economic thought. Some party 
thinkers and members of the rank and file were pushing for Labour to adopt clearly 
defined socialist policies. Some, like Laski, hoped that the party would not only adopt 
socialist policies, but also class itself as a socialist party, rather than simply tinkering 
with capitalism. He claimed that it would be 'a disaster to the socialist movement if 
Labour were returned in 1935 ... not in terms of the positive conviction that they 
wanted socialism and nothing but socialism, but liberalism as in 1929. '9 
This turn to the left coincided with the New Fabian Research Bureau's Twelve Studies 
in Soviet Russia, the collection of essays written by Labourites who visited the USSR 
in the first half of 1932. This exercise was the embodiment of the party's need to 
study other economic models that fitted with the new desire for government 
intervention. While the tourists were in the Soviet Union researching for their essays, 
one of the book's editors, G. D. H. Cole, wrote an article in the New Clarion, 'A 
Socialist Economic Plan' in which he states that the example of 
Russia and her plan has been a powerful influence on Capitalist as 
well as Socialist thought. Tories ... vie with Socialists in advocating a planned policy of production; and a good many 
people are ready to admire everything about the Russian Five 
Year Plan except the Socialist foundation on which it rests. ' 0 
9 Cited in Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski, p. 307 10 New Clarion, 2 June, 1932 
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The fact that the Soviet Five Year Plan was influencing capitalists as well as socialists 
II 
acted as a justification for Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia, as what was happening in 
I 
the USSR was clearly important and influential, and therefore warranted a closer look. 
The details of the findings of the other visitors on this trip have been assessed 
previously, but this section is concerned with the information imparted by Hugh 
ý1ý 
"Iton, F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, T. G. N. Haldane and G. R. Mitchison. These four Da 
members of the delegation were responsible for analysing the economic side of the 
Soviet system. Dalton's position in the party in this period has been discussed already. 
Pethick-Lawrence was one of Labour's financial experts and became a member of the 
executive of the PLP after 1935. Haldane and Mitchison were both on the SSIP 
Executive. 
Dalton's essay was entitled 'A General View of the Soviet Economy with Specific 
Reference to Planning'; Pethick-Lawrence wrote on 'Finance'; Haldane on 'Power 
and Industrial Development' and Mitchison on 'The Russian Worker'. While all of 
these were of obvious interest to the Labour Party, Dalton's piece on planning was in 
tune with the specific interest outlined above and Mitchison's essay on the Russian 
worker held the interest of the TUC. There was of course nothing new in this, as all of 
the visitors since the revolution found aspects of the Soviet system that they were 
specifically interested in. 
So what did each delegate find? Dalton visited different regions in the Soviet Union, 
including Sverdlovsk, Magnitogorsk, Kazan and Moscow. The first point he made 
was that there were clear difference between the Soviet system and the capitalist 
West, noting that there were features familiar to capitalism absent in the USSR, such 
as stock exchanges and unemployment. This second feature was something that 
lialion referred to on a number of occasions, clearly mindful of the fact that this was a 
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hiige problem in his homeland and therefore Britain could learn something from the 
S. oviet Union. 
-1 he demand for labour, he wrote, 'particularly in the industrial centres, is in excess of 
the supply, and no one need remain for more than a few days without a job. For the 
resent at least, unemployment has been planned away. "' He later gave quite specific 
figures on employment. Writing about some of the huge industries that were being 
ýonstructed within the Plan, he stated that the 'new machine shops, I am told, are the 
J II 
largest in the world ... They are designed to turn out 150,000 tons a year of heavy Iý 
12 
machinery for the steel industry ... and to employ 20,000 men. ' He also stated that an 1ý 
excavator plant would employ 20,000 workers; a plant manufacturing general 
_1ý 
electrical equipment would employ 95,000 workers and a clothing factory 10,000 
I! 
women. This can be seen as an endorsement of the notion that a public works 
programme (an idea that was popular amongst Labourites in this decade) could be 
good for Britain. 
highlighted some of the positive and negative aspects of the Plan. On the plus 
ide, he reported that 
output may fall short of the Plan, but this is a matter for 
condemnation, not thanksgiving. Fish is not thrown back into the 
sea, as in England, nor coffee burnt, as in Brazil, in order to raise 
its price, nor is corn used to fire railway engines, because it does 
not pay to feed the starving unemployed in the cities, as in the 
United States. 13 
He went on to say that 
the aim is always to increase supply, even, if possible, beyond the 
figures of the Plan. The capitalist phenomenon of the "limited 
markef' is absent. "Production, not for profit, but for use, " is the 
governing principle, though the competing claims of rival and 
11 Dalton, Twelve Studies, p. 16 
12 lbid, p. 26 
13 [bid, p. 16 
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urgent uses present a continuing problem. But this is solved, 
whether well or ill, by authoritative decision, and with reference to 
the plan. 14 
Dalton claimed that the question of whether the Plan has "succeeded" 'is apt to 
provoke misleading debate. In some lines of production, and in some districts, the 
original figures of the Plan have been surpassed; in others not. The original, 
moreover, have been revised, generally upwards, during the five year period. '15 
Noting that '[o]ne of the most sensational of the new ventures, the U. K. K, or Ural- 
Kuznetsk Combine ... was an afterthought, not included in the original Plan' he makes 
the point that the 'planning process ... is continuos, not spasmodic. ' 
16 This was a point 
that many visitors tried to convey in their works about the USSR - that they were 
there to study the process of the construction of socialism, rather than the finished 
product. 
While Dalton enthused about the 'formidable material apparatus' that 'has set going a 
unique type of industrial revolution ... in it speed, its geographical extension, and its 
planned Socialist basis' 17 , he tempered any excitement with a look at the particular 
problems of planning. He claimed that 'formidable material apparatus' mentioned 
above 
is not yet organised or handled with any degree of efficiency. It 
seems ... that the standard of living of the majority of workers, both in town and country, has fallen during the period of the Plan, partly 
owing to its inefficient execution, but partly because consumption 
has been deliberately sacrificed to construction, and light industry 
to heavy. 18 
14 lbid, p. 17 





1V 11 ýi:, r; 11 
One reason for this noted Dalton, was that the 'technique of planning has been 
developed empirically. There is, as yet, very little theory behind it', but he accepted 
this because the 'method of trial and error has been courageously applied. '19 
Other problems of planning dealt with in this study included the different points of 
view between the centre and the provinces. Dalton wrote that in Moscow 
when I said that I was going to the Urals, I was told, rather grimly, 
that there I should naturally hear a good deal from the Ural point of 
view, but that this had to be harmonised with other, and possibly 
conflicting, points of view. 20 
Dalton also wrote about price-fixing and rationing of producers' goods. He said '[wle 
made enquiries into this problem both at Moscow and in the various regions which we 
visited. ' But claimed that 'I am not satisfied that we got to the bottom of this 
complicated question' which also highlighted the fact that gathering information 
could be difficult. But the biggest problem that he returned to was the inefficiency of 
the system. Dalton concluded his essay by stating that he had seen 'a grim struggle for 
the mastery, a pull between the efficiency of Socialist principles and the inefficiency 
of their execution. 21 
During his time in the USSR, Pethick-Lawrence was 'fortunate in being able to have 
long personal interviews with many of the leading financial men, 22 in the USSR, 
including Grinko, the Finance Commissar, Arkus the Vice-President of Gosbank and 
Smilga, the acting head of Gosbank. He spoke highly of all of them, who he said 
'struck me as very able men, and they gave me answers to my questions which were, 
in the main, full and satisfactory. 23 
'9 Ibid, p. 19 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid, p. 34 
22 Pethick-Lawrence, Twelve Studies, p. 37 
23 Ibid 
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Interested in the financial system in the USSR, he wrote about the main differences 
between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries. One such difference was the 
importance of public or private money used for different ventures. He wrote how, in 
capitalist countries, 
industry is conducted with the assistance of two different kinds of 
financial backing. It requires long-term investment to provide its 
fixed capital. In a private firm the partners stake their own 
resources; in a company the public subscribe for shares and 
debentures. 24 
In the USSR though, 'there are no private resources available for investment in 
industry. Accordingly, when the plan necessitates the formation of a new factory, the 
25 
money has to be found from the public funds' and the industrial bank involved in 
I 
offering funds charged no interest and 'are to be regarded, therefore, not as loans, but 
as investments. 26 
Pethick-Lawrence goes on to compare the system that determines prices in each 
country. Under capitalism, the laws of supply and demand generally rule. 'In the 
USSR it is otherwise. Government control is of so extensive a character that the 
-)27 domain of supply and demand is restricted almost to vanishing point. After 
outlining where this government intervention appears (foreign trade, selling the 
"products of large-scale industry etc. ) and where it does not (such as the sale of 
agricultural products) he concludes that the 'Government in the USSR has, therefore, 
-)28 with these trifling exceptions, complete control of the price level. However, he does 
comment on 'the existence of the "black, " or illicit, exchange in which foreign 
currency fetches several times as many roubles as on the "white" exchange'. He 
24 lbid, p. 38 
25 lbid 
26 lbid, p. 39 
27 lbid, p. 40 
29 lbid, p. 41 
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suggests that this shows that the rouble did not have 'the purchasing-power value 
claimed for it in the official exchange. 29 
The other areas dealt with in this essay are the banking system of the Soviet Union 
and the budget, and this allows Pethick-Lawrence to offer quite a comprehensive 
overview of finance in the USSR as it seemed to outsiders in the 1930s. His general 
conclusions were that the financial structure had gone through many changes before it 
reached the condition that it was in when he examined it. Unlike Dalton he saw 'many 
features in common with those of capitalist countries. It has a monetary system which 
is everywhere in daily use. It employs cheques for transactions between different 
business organisations. It has a central bank of issue and special banks. 00 
However, he also notes that 'in many of these things the superficial similarity of 
technique hides a very difference in essence. It must never be forgotten when thinking 
of the USSR that the big hand of the State is behind nearly all transactions. The 
"trusts" which run its industry are organs of the State'. 31 He continues to note that in 
the realm of prices and exchange the similarity with capitalist 
finance is thinnest of all, and rugged differences brought about by 
the real basis of the communist system are everywhere coming to 
the surface. Gone is the law of supply and demand. Gone are the 
common market and the single price. Gone is the general price 
level 
... Instead, there is a system of price fixing and regulation of 
exchange which depends on the conscious, deliberate will of the 
Government. 32 
Pethick-Lawrence concludes his essay contradicting Dalton's findings concerning 
efficiency, stating that the financial structure of the Soviet Union 'certainly seems to 
make up a logical self-consistent whole which works successfully. and'provides 
checks and balances against inefficiency and waste. 33 He does, however, cast a 
29 lbid, p. 42 
30 lbid, p. 51 
31 lbid 
32 lbid pp-51-52 
33 lbid, p. 52 
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critical eye over the 'plastic nature of the whole Soviet r6gime' and says that a 'rigid, I 
un6anging system may provide stability; it may be a sign of strength. But the power 
to 
'Change 
is one of the fundamental indications of life. 934 
Peýhick-Lawrence had, perhaps, noted earlier than some observers, that the 
I 
revolutionary and dialectical nature of Marxism was stifled under the bureaucracy of I 
St4linism. In private, Dalton voiced similar criticisms, noting that there was an 
'unj intelligent uniformity of opinion. 935 However, again in private, he contradicts what I 
Pethick-Lawrence found, praising 'the fluidity of communism v. rigidity of 
capitalism. Readiness to learn from experience and change direction. 36 
Iýe British reader so far had quite a detailed view of economics in the USSR. The 
final two essays discussed in this section concerned industrial developments in the 
USSR and the life of the Russian worker. Haldane and Mitchison wrote on these 
issues. The object of Haldane's visit 'was to study the power and industrial 
developments of the USSR - not only those already completed but also those which 
are planned during the next five years. 937 He made a 'detailed inspection of .. mainly 
electrical factories, at Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, Rostov and Kiev employing 11 
38 between 70,000 and 80,000 workers. ' Mitchison covered a number of topics I 
concerning the Russian worker, including 'The Factory as a Social Unit'; 'Trade 
Unions and Collective Agreements' and 'Hours and Holidays' - all aspects of Soviet 
life that would have greatly interested not only rank and file Labourites but also the I 
ýde unionist element of the Labour Party. 
Haldane seemed to share Dalton's opinion on efficiency of the general running of 
some things, as early in his report he noted that 
3ý Ibid 
33 Cited in Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 174 3ý lbid, p. 172 
3 Haldane, Twelve Sludies, p. 55 3i lbid 
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it was found, particularly in Leningrad and Moscow, that 
permission to visit power stations and certain factories was difficult 
to obtain. This appears to have been due partly to recent regulations 
issued by the Government and partly to a breakdown of the 
organisation, particularly in Moscow. The above resulted in much 
time and energy being wasted in trying to arrange visits, which 
time and energy should have been devoted to actual inspection 
Work. 39 
He felt it necessary to comment on the difficulties affecting his visit because 'they are 
to some extent typical of the sort of inefficiency the overcoming of which is one of 
the main problems which Russia has to deal with in the future in order to obtain the 
full benefit of her remarkable industrial development'. 40 He said that this trouble was 
'typical of the general lack of efficiency and organisation in Russia when compared to 
Western standards. 41 
Once he got past this problem though, he was happy to write about the successes of 
the Soviet system. He was delighted to find that the USSR placed such a high priority 
on electrification (from Lenin's famous maxim), noting that it 'is so refreshing to find 
42 
a country where the importance of electrification is fully appreciated'. Such 
excitement suggests that Haldane was part of the 'technocratic' school of socialism 
that favoured a more scientific and technological approach to restructuring society. 
43 
This subject was also of interest to G. D. H. Cole, who included chapters on 'Coal' 
and 'Power' in his book Planfor a Democratic Britain, and both chapters referred to 
Labour's 'Plan' for industry. The chapter on coal informed the reader about Labour's 
belief in 'public ownership not only of coal itself, but also of the entire industry of 
coal-mining. 44 In the 'Power' chapter, Labour's blueprint of an electrification 
39 lbid, p. 56 40 lbid 
41 lbid 
42 lbid, p. 57 43 There had always been an element in the Labour Party that supported such an approach, acting as 
ýomething of an antithesis to the 'emotional' ethical socialists. Labour's technocrats found their home 
in Harold Wilson's Government in the 1960s 
44 G. D. H. Cole Planfor a Democratic Britain, London, 193 9, p. 126 
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programme featured heavily. This suggests that the 'technical socialists' were 
becoming more influential in the party, promoting the need to democratically control 
modem technology and thus ensure that it was used for the benefit of the whole 
population. 
Amongst the other areas of interest for Haldane was the greater role for women in 
industry. He welcomed the fact that 'a very large proportion of all the work is done by 
women' remarking that this was 'frequently done as well or better than by men. 45 He 
was at odds with Walter Citrine's opinion when he re-visited the USSR in 1935. 
Citrine complained on several occasions about this fact of Soviet life. He said 
... the women were doing arduous and severe tasks which in a Socialist state were quite unjustifiable. They were performing 
physically hard work, such as digging drains in the streets, ordinary 
navvy's work, pulling down houses, and in short, the very kind of 
work which in Great Britain we tried to protect them from. 46 
He later noted that protection of women was 
an absurd Trade Union notion, completely out of date, according to 
[the Russians]. Their hearts would be overjoyed to see the women 
here digging drains, working as builders' labourers, shovelling 
sand, driving tramcars and doing heavy work side by side with the 




Haldane however, felt that a situation that enables women to earn as much as or more 
than her husband 'goes a long way towards real equality of the sexes. 48 
Haldane found some very positiye aspects in his study. The inefficiency of the system 
though, as in Dalton's essay, is also highlighted. He notes the problems that came 
45 Haldane, Twelve Studies, p. 68 46 W. Citrine, I Searchfor Truth, p. 130 47 Ibid, p. 195 (original emphasis) 
48 Haldane, Twelve Studies, p. 68 
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with the shortage of skilled labour, such as the low quality of production. And his 
conclusion lists the other weaknesses he found as '[w]ant of efficient organisation. 
Defective transport and communications ... and Insufficient scope 
for individual 
initiative and responsibility. A9 The optimist in him believed however, that these 
defects 'are very likely to be cured in course of time (sic). '50 His concluding remarks 
were clearly aimed at the Labour Party back home. Noting that Russia would 
probably absorb the better elements of the outside world, he said that 'it is essential 
that those features of the Russian system which are proving their value be 
incorporated into systems of other countries. One of the most important of these is 
State Planning. '51 
Mitchison's essay dealt with a range of issues concerning the Russian worker and this 
final section will review what she said about those outlined above, beginning with 
'The Factory as a Social Unit'. Focusing on what the factory represented in the new 
Russia, Mitchison argued that, in larger towns at least, they were 'intended to be 
nothing less than the unit of social and economic life. ' 52 Here, she was making the 
point that, unlike in Britain, the factory was to be a main centre of all life for workers. 
'A factory in England may, or may not, have amenities: but in Russia the amenities 
are not an adjunct to the factory, not a means of contenting the workers; they are part 
of its function as a unit of social life. 953 
She notes that a factory may have a large room for lectures or meetings and could be 
used also to show cinema films. Doctors were also on hand and a cr6che was available 
for children under four (Mitchison noted that this was a necessity due to the extensive 
employment of women). With these observations, she was painting a picture of a 
country where workers were, seemingly, respected and seen as an integral part of 
49 Ibid, p. 74 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
52 M itchison, Twelve Studies, p. 80 
53 Ibid 
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society, as opposed to being disposable and worthless, as many workers felt in the 
Depression hit capitalist world. 
In her notes on 'Trade Unions and Collective Agreements', Mitchison is quick to 
point out that a worker's wages are a 'national matter - arranged as part of the Plan'. 54 
She refers to the fact that, since wages and prices were part of the Plan, 
and since the worker's interests as a wage earner are protected by 
trade-union representation on Planning bodies, the character of the 
trade union in Russia is different from that which it is bound to 
have in capitalist countries. In Russia a trade union is not struggling 
against an employer's federation- it is representing one factor in a 
Plan, which is the workers' Plan. 
Y5 
She enlightens her readers with the Russian meaning of the word 'collective'. In a 
factory, this word 'means the factory community and its common opinion. It is the 
basic unit of that mass opinion and mass intention upon which Russia, as a State, is 
grounded. ' 56 She was clearly trying to convey that something bigger than simply 
'workers' control' existed, or even a nationalised industrial basis where workers have 
a greater say in the running of society. "'Tbe collective... she wrote 'enforces rights 
and enforces responsibilities; "comradely courts, " before which a worker may be 
brought for reprimand or dismissal, are an expression of "the collective"'. 57 
Finally Mitchison's notes on 'Hours and Holidays'. She wrote that the shifts of 
workers in factories she visited were seven hours long, plus an extra hour for a meal. 
In heavy-industry factories though, the hours were shorter. 'I understand that the 
seven hour day becomes - in mines, for instance -a six hour day. However, she is at 
odds with Haldane over the length of the working week, which again shows that two 
people could visit the Soviet Union, see the same things and come away with 
54 lbid, p. 85 
5-5 lbid 
56 lbid, p. 86 
57 lbid 
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completely different facts. Haldane noted that a 'five-day week - four days' work and 
one day's holiday - was originally adopted throughout the USSR, but after a trial this 
was not found to be successful, and now a six-day week has been adopted almost 
universally. ' 58 
Mitchison was more generous to the Soviet worker. 'The "working week7 is five 
days, so that every sixth day is a holiday'. 59 As for actually getting away from work, 
Mitchison notes that 'there is provision, out of the Social Insurance Fund, for Homes 
of Rest in the towns and in such parts of the country as the Crimea. '60 These were 
designed to provide 'special holidays by way of reward for workers who are thought 
to have specially deserved them; but they seem to be also available to a good 
proportion of workers in the ordinary course of things ... 60 per. cent of miners go to 
Homes of Rest every year. ' 61 
Mitchison's conclusion leaves 'it to the reader to decide ... according to his own 
convictions, whether the Russian worker is or not contented and prosperous. My own 
view is that he. is more contented, but rather less than prosperous. 62 While she 
acknowledges that the Russian worker 'is very much better off in the way, of such 
matters as clubs, parks, medical and educational iI nstitutions, or holidays', 63 , she also 
believed that workers could 'no doubt, do with more food, more varied food, and 
more manufactured goods. It may well be that there will be little or no improvement 
in those respects this winter'. 64 Her conclusion, like Haldane's, is definitely meant to 
encourage the Labour Party in Britain. 'It is significant' she wrote,, 
of the spirit of a Socialist State that Russia has sought, in the first 
place, for a communal spirit, and for a basis of industrial 
58 Haldane, Twelve Studies, p. 69 59 Mitchison, lbid, p. 88 60 Ibid 
61 ]bid 
62 Ibid, p. 102 
63 Ibid, p. 103 
64 lbid 
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development, and is deliberately choosing by those means, at the 
cost of great economy and some hardship, to build on a sound 
foundation and on a colossal scale the first structure of a classless 
society. 65 
What conclusions can be drawn from this quite in-depth and specific study? Firstly, it 
must be noted that it is not the aim here to question whether or not these visitors had 
been duped into believing Soviet propaganda. That question has been confronted 
elsewhere. Secondly, the generally positive findings in Twelve Studies also helped. 
While there were the numerous remarks about the inefficiency of the Soviet economic 
system, these were outweighed with the important fact that was reiterated by different 
writers, which was that there was no unemployment in the USSR. 
Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia was a very important book. While the readership of it 
is difficult to gauge, it can be assumed that it was fairly wide. The contributors 
represented a wide range of political thought in the British labour movement. The 
NFRB, together with SSIP, enjoyed support from many influential figures in the 
Labour Party and the trade unions. At the same time, delegates such as Dalton and 
Pethick-Lawrence were important members of the Labour hierarchy. But attention 
was focused more on the content of the book, than the authors of the e ssays. In the 
current climate of the Depression, and the new belief in "un-MacDonaldite" 
socialism, anything with the word 'Soviet' in the title had a good chance of being 
read-The success of the Left Book Club in this decade shows that. Twelve Studies in 
Soviet Russia enlightened British socialists about economic models that, apparently, 
did not rely on exploitation of man by man. It also showed the attempts being made to 
create a totally different type of society, and Mitchison best described this in her 
chapter on the Russian worker. 
In the wider discussions that took place in this period, the book added weight to the 
I 




the same as the Soviet plan. Dalton made this point. He did not completely accept the 
view of Soviet economists that 'a Planned Economy is impossible except under 
Socialism. 66 He wrote that it could be argued instead, that 
, 
there are many possible types of Planned Economy and many 
possible variations and degrees of Socialism. It may be held that, ý 
even with a measure of social control far less extensive than that 
which prevails today in the Soviet Union, the adoption of the 
principle of economic planning can lead to large and beneficial 
results. 67 
This was laying the foundations of the party's interest in other forms of planning or 
state intervention. Dalton repeated this theme in his Practical Socialism for Britain in 
1935, discussed below. As for lessons for the Labour Party back home, the main one 
was that a planned economy, of some sort at least, could solve the problem of 
unemployment, the biggest threat facing the party's members in Britain at this time. 
Despite all of the complaints about inefficiencies, Haldane and Mitchison wrote 
receptively about the promise of planning and communalism -of the Socialist State, 
while in later years, Dalton remembered that '[t]hey were embarked -on a'vast 
economic experiment, which, if it succeeded, would revolutionise the thought and 
practice of the world. We could learn much from them, and so could they from us. 
And we must both learn to tolerate each other. ' 68 
Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia offered Labour a specific analysis of one of the most 
important economic alternatives open to the party at a time when the new economic 
reality realised that capitalism was a system in crisis. Even the Conservatives 
accepted this, although their interpretation was not one that assumed capitalism would 
collapse. The fact that writers such as Dalton, who were not necessarily known for 
their excitement about the Soviet Union, found positive aspects to the Five Year Plan, 
meant that this collection of essays could be accepted by the moderate elements in the 
66 Dalton, Twelve Studies, p. 16 
67 lbid 
68 Dalton, The Fateful Years, p. 30 
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party, more so than, for example, John Strachey, who was tarred with the 'Fellow 
Traveller' brush. 
In his The Coming Struggle for Power in 1932, Strachey noted that crisis was an 
inevitable feature of the capitalist system because 'capitalist production is carried on 
69 
without plan, that its only regulating mechanism is the mechanism of the market. , 
He argued in favour of a Marxist solution to the current crisis, which did nothing to 
endear him to the likes of Bevin. Capitalism, Strachey claimed, could not be reformed 
or made to work for the whole of society, and must therefore be replaced by a 
socialist system. 
This was an outright rejection of the general Fabian attitudes that had shaped party 
thought until 1931. The difference between Strachey's work and Twelve Studies in 
Soviet Russia, was that for the most part Strachey was preaching to the converted. 
Williams notes that Strachey's 'main influence within the Labour Party was on the 
ILP's successor, the Socialist League, which was the main self-consciously 'marxist' 
wing of the Labour Party up to its disaffiliation in 1937.00 Of course, with the 
economic climate as it was, some non-believers were also won over by Strachey's 
words. 
The target audience for Twelve Studies was the Labour Party as a whole, with the aim 
of explaining how a planned economy works, and also how a planned economy could 
work if implemented by the Labour Party. The other visits to the USSR have been 
discussed elsewhere, but this study was part of the wider debate on planning. This 
debate was carried out in the Labour press and in books by individuals such as Cole, 
Dalton and Attlee and by 'centre' groups such as Political and Economic Planning 
69 J. Strachey, The Coming Strugglefor Power, London, 1932, pp. 113 -14 70 Williams, Labour and Russia, pp. 205-6 
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(PEP). The perimeters of the debate were extended to include other examples of state 
intervention, to cover the wider issues concerning planning. 
6.2 From Soviet socialism to the social democratic models 
The debate about planning and state intervention was one of the most important 
factors defining Labour's political thought in this period, and the research conducted 
and the lessons learned in this decade influenced the party when it was elected into 
Government in 1945. While the USSR was clearly a great influence in the thirties, 
there were other possibilities that Labour's thinkers examined. But they continued to 
turn to the Soviet Plan as well. 
In 1932, Dalton wrote an article in the New Clarion, 'Plan or Perish', in which he 
noted that the USSR was at least trying to plan, and that 'at least they are trying, and 
not impotently giving up the ghost'. 71 In 1933, Cole wrote in the same newspaper that 
he hoped that the Soviet Union succeeded in its experiment as the situation 
everywhere else was 'black enough to threaten disaster. That is why all good 
Socialists must be passionately for the Russians, even if they are not Cormnunist in 
the sense of thinking the Russian strategy of revolution appropriate to their own 
conditions. 72 
In his 'Local Govemment and the Socialists Plan', Clement Attlee stated the need for 
a Five Year Plan. Writing about the transition period from capitalism to socialism, he 
stressed that during the reconstruction of society, 
[i]t is no use pretending that you are not changing the whole 
structure of society. It is no use thinking that you can carry on as in 
a time of no change or that you can do the work required solely by 
operating the existing institutions of the country from Whitehall. A 
period of Socialist reconstruction requires the active assistance of 
Xew, Clarion, 12 November, 1932 
ý'-, Naw-Clarion, 18 March, 1933 
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every Socialist ... There must be a Five Year Plan drive put into the 
work. 73 
He unashamedly called for Britain to import Soviet ideas, but at the same time 
reminded his readers that British socialists, unlike their Russian comrades, were not 
stupid. The local engineer and interpreter of the will of the Government, wrote Attlee, 
is not impartial. He is a Socialist, and therefore in touch with the 
Socialists in the region, who are his colleagues in his campaign. It 
may be said that this is rather like the Russia plan of commissioners 
and Communist Party members. I am not afraid of the comparison! 
We have to take the strong points of the Russian system and apply 
them to this country. In doing so we have got to remember that 
people in this country dislike being driven. They are not ignorant 
peasants. 74 
The PEP identified the various forms of planning as 'controlled', 'free' and 'mixed'. 
'The first was the Soviet or fascist model, the second the 'contemporary model of 
laissez-faire' (i. e. Liberal) and the third 'in line either with progressive Conservatism 
or Socialism'. 75 The PEP noted that 'the USSR remains the sole extant example of a 
State with a national plan and an aim dominating it., 76 
This final classification could have included Roosevelt's USA, with Roosevelt's New 
Deal neither advocating an outright socialist answer to the crisis, nor continuing with 
the economic orthodoxy of traditional laissez-faire capitalism. Two things can explain 
Labour's interest in the American New Deal. Firstly, there are the stories referred to 
elsewhere about the use of forced labour in the USSR. While the se were largely 
rejected, any possibility that there could be such a betrayal of the movement's 
labourist traditions would have raised at least minor concerns in Labour's ranks. 
73 C. Attlee, 'Local Government and the Socialist Plan' in F. Bealey, Social and Political Thought of 
the Labour Party, p. 13 8 74 Ibid 
15 Williams, Labour and Russia, p. 206 76 Cited in ibid 
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.4 f'. 
The second and more important explanation was the upturn in the British economy in 
1933, as unemployment gradually began to fall and capitalism began to recover. 
While the crisis within the capitalist system had not completely passed, with 
widespread unemployment and misery in some industrial areas of Britain, and unrest 
in Europe as Hitler used the problems to his own advantage, capitalism had stabilised. 
The predicted implosion of the system failed to occur and this meant that the party 
intellectuals interested in the economies of other countries had time to continue their 
research. 
One of the main reasons for the huge amount of interest in the Soviet exemplar was 
the urgent need for a solution to the great problems of the Depression. Now that 
capitalism had proved its resilience and the problems had lessened, the urgency for 
the extreme measures employed in the Soviet Union passed, and while the Five Year 
Plan continued to hold the interest of party thinkers, some Labourites saw the New 
Deal as a model of economic interventionism worth referring to. H. N. Brailsford 
remembered in 1936 how, when he saw New York in the grip of the banking crisis, 
[e]very second person to whom one then talked, from taximen to 
professors, looked to Mr. Roosevelt as a Messiah. Thereafter, for a 
year or more, even one's friends on the Left spoke of the New Deal 
in a langua e of excited optimism that was not a little 
bewildering. 
W 
In 1933 he assessed the New Deal and questioned whether Roosevelt would be strong 
enough to fight 'capitalist anarchy and turn industry into a public service - to achieve 
Socialism without SocialiStS? '78 In an interesting article, he states that the USA may 
be the first country to achieve socialism because they had no socialists trying to 
achieve it, and his argument was logical, if unorthodox. 
77 New Statesman and Nation, II January, 1936 79 New Clarion, 22 July, 1933 
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.A 
The rest of us have talked Socialism so loud and so long that the 
ears of our opponents have grown a protective armour-plate. In 
America the average man has not yet the faintest idea what 
Socialism means. It is, therefore, conceivable, that the lo 9c of 
facts 
may drive him into it, before he can shrink back in terror. 
Brailsford seemed to be suggesting that an actual implementation of socialism by 
capitalists without labelling it socialism, and without the internecine arguments that 
often accompanied the debates, could prove to be a more successful method'of 
building a socialist society than the approach adopted by the Labour Party. This was a 
partial return to the Webb's concept of replacing capitalist managers with socialist 
ones. However, there were no socialist managers in Roosevelt's plans, although 
Brailsford felt that the powerful reality of socialism would overtake events, 'noting 
that he failed to notice how Roosevelt 'can stop far short of socialism. 80 His 
concluding remarks correctly predicted that Roosevelt's policies would only create an 
orderly capitalism with the private owner and profit motive still in command, but 
while this may have been all that he intended to create, his administration 'is 
beginning to think of industry as a public service. ' 81 
The idea that industry should provide a public service was the driving force behind 
Labour's embracing of nationalisation and planning. It was far from uncommon to see 
articles in the Labour press asking why Britain could not have a 'public works 
scheme' like Roosevelt's New Deal. A. Susan Lawrence heavily criticised the 
Government for letting the situation worsen. 
Under the present Government ... by the reduction of unemployment benefit, by the raising of contributions and by the 
Means Test, we have reduced the spending power of the workers 
by some thirty millions ... But further, under the Chamberlain policy, we have cut down all public works, and have abandoned the policy', 




82 New Clarion, 22 July, 1933 
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She also turned to the American New Deal, quoting Roosevelt: 
The second part of the Industrial Recovery Act gives employment 
by a vast system of public works. Our studies show that we 
should be able to hire many men at once, and step up to a million 
new jobs by October 1, and a much greater number later ... Our first purpose is to create employment as fast as we can. 83 
The contrast, said Lawrence, 'could not be more complete', 84 and she concluded her 
article with the recommendation that Britain should follow the American plan. 
At the same time, Cole asked why the state shouldn't 'create the required additional 
money and use it to pay wages to the unemployed in return for useful work of a non- 
competitive and not directly remunerative kind? 85 Nolel Thompson notes that Cole 
'advocated an extensive programme of statc-financed public works along the lines 
that the Roosevelt administration was pursuing'. 86 Cole admired Roosevelt's 
fcourageous optimism 47 and his determination 'to embark on a radical economic 
strategy; he applauded too his willingness to take on the opposition to his policies that 
he confronted in the business and political communities. ' 88 
The American model offered a less aggressive, though according to Laski no less 
sweeping, alternative to that of the Soviet Union. Laski declared that Roosevelt was 
attempting to 'lay the foundations of a new social order' and to 'socialize the Profit- 
making motive by making its operation subordinate to a body of ethical principles'. 89 
The more democratic nature of the American system and Roosevelt's actions that 
Laski claimed was 'a revolution by consent' suited the Labour Party more than. the 
forceful tactics of the Communists in the USSR. 
13 Ibid 
84 Ibid 
'5 Cited in N. Thompson, Political Economy and the Labour Party, London, 1996, p. 103 " Ibid - 87 Cited in ibid 
's Ibid 
'19 Cited in Kramnick and Sheerman, Harold Laski, p. 309 
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-ne 'orderly capitalism' that Brailsford wrote about in his commentary on the New 
Deal ultimately appealed to Labour politicians, and by the mid-1930s, with a 
stabilisation of capitalism evident, Labour's economic aims were directed towards a 
gradualist 'socialist management' of capitalism. This allowed socialists to manage 
capitalism better than the capitalists, and also to argue that socialism could once again 
be created through capitalism without smashing it. This was the basis of Attlee's post- 
war administration that saw a mixed economy emphasise nationalisation and the 
creation of the welfare state and National Health Service. 
There was, however, no fundamental challenge to the market structure of capitalism 
with the view of abolishing this system. As John Callaghan notes, the planning 
proposals of the younger economists in the Labour Party, such as Hugh Gaitskell, 
Evan Durbin and Douglas Jay, together with Dalton, 'always fell short of a basic 
restructuring of the financial system in Britain even though the City of London was 
enfeebled by the world recession and at its most vulnerable. '90 This analysis could 
include World War Two, and the fact that Labour sought to rebuild capitalism, albeit 
with different priorities, after the war, rather than attack and destroy it, demonstrates 
that this was never really an intention of the party hierarchy. 
The idea that the economy and society could be planned clearly became a key element 
to the debates within the Labour Party in this period. The Soviet Five Year Plan and, 
to a lesser extent at this time Roosevelt's New Deal, influenced Labour Party thought, 
and this can be seen in the party programme For Socialism and Peace drafted in 1934., 
There was no specific reference to the Soviet plan as such, but the inference was 
clear, and this is not surprising given the fact that Hugh Dalton drafted it. 
-Despite 
his 
remarks about the inefficiencies within the Soviet system of planning, the influence 
his trip to the USSR had on him was more than what could have been expected before 
he went. 
1* J. Callaghan, Socialism in Britain, p. 127 
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The emphasis in For Socialism and Peace was on planning and the desire for a more 
socialised industrial basis for Britain is plainly evident. Public control over the major 
industries such as steel, coal and water, as well as banking and transport, was now 
firmly part of the Labour programme. The party committed itself to the idea that 
industry should be converted 'from a haphazard struggle for private gain to a planned 
national economy owned and carried on for the service of the community'. 91 The talk 
now was of industry being a 'public service, democratically owned and responsibly 
administered'. 92 This was similar to how Labourites saw the aims of the New Deal 
(while the USSR was clearly on a more wide-ranging project). The Labour Party had 
stated its intent about planning, and the 1934 Southport Conference adopted a 
programme that made state intervention a core part of Labour's thought, and helped to 
define the party's political thought. 
By 1935 unemployment had fallen from three to two million, and Labour had begun 
to clarify what a British plan under a Labour Government would look like. For 
Socialism and Peace offered 'the first thorough-going Labour programme since 
1928 03 and the party's manifesto for the 1935 General Election outlined a basic 
socialist programme of national isation, promising to 'bring into public ownership for 
the efficient conduct, in the national interest ... banks, coal and 
its products, transport, 
electricity, iron and steel, and cotton. ' 94 
That is not to say that interest in the USSR had disappeared. Cole referred to it in his 
Principles of Economic Planning (193 5) but the enthusiasm for "Copying" the Soviet' 
niodel was absent. Cole had begun to develop a 'machinery of socialist planning' 
(which was the title of another one of his books in 1938) and questioned whether 
91 Labour Party, For Socialism and Peace: the Labour Party's Programme of Action, London, 1934, 
P. 6 
2 lbid, p. 21 
93 A. Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s, p. 28 94 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, 1935, in 1. Dale, Labour Party General Election 




there should be a single planning authority for the economy in general or whether it 
could be organised on a regional level, and it was here that he turned away from the 
Soviet model. He noted that there were all-Russian authorities covering the whole 
USSR until 1934, but then this changed, with general planning of production 
remaining an all-Russian function, but supervision and execution of the plan would 
become regional functions. He wrote that this was not true in smaller countries. 'In a 
country the size of Great Britain national as opposed to regional planning need not 
involve delays'95 as in countries with a centralised system. 
Cole considered the question of applying other forms of planning to Western 
countries with parliamentary systems of government. He concluded that 
I have been unable to draw more than incidental morals from the 
actual working of a planned economy in Russia; for the conditions 
there are so different both economically and politically as to make 
comparisons save on a limited number of special points more 
dangerous than enlightening. 96 
He declared that many of the problems that occurred in the Soviet Union as it tried to 
implement a planned system would not influence the development of such a system in 
the West. Returning to the problem of inefficiencies that Dalton and Haldane 
commented on, Cole noted that in the USSR, there was 'a terrible deficiency of 
skilled personnel, technical, manual and administrative alike, which involved a high 
degree of inefficiency in the running of the new economic machine. 97 But there was 
no similar situation in the West. Western countries, claimed Cole, had 
[a]n immense asset in the abundance of highly competent 
technicians, skilled craftsmen and administrators whom they are 
able to command. Great Britain, or any highly developed Western 
country, can from the economic point of view successfully institute 
a planned economy with far less difficulty than Russia, and without 
the necessity for any of the severe sacrifices which the people of 
95 G. D. H. Cole, Principles ofPlanning, London, 1938, p. 299 96 Ibid, p. 398 97 Ibid, p. 407 
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Russia, in building for their future, have been compelled to 
undergo. 98 
Yet despite Cole's claims that Britain could and should not go 'the Russian way', his 
concluding remarks show his respect for the Soviet Union. He was not 'without hope' 
that, as decaying capitalism became worse, and the 'futility of the existing order' 
becomes more and more known to man, 'the Western countries will at length 
overcome the hesitations and timidities that hold them back and show under strong 
leadership, no less courage than the Russians have shown in facing an infinitely more 
difficult problem. '99 
Dalton also still regarded the USSR as a possible teacher, but, like Cole, had moved 
on since he returned from his trip. While he had been fascinated with the Soviet plan 
for some time, he had also often stated that there was a difference between socialism 
and planning. 
Socialism is primarily a question of ownership, planning a question 
of control or direction. Planning is not necessarily in the public 
interest, nor are those who direct it necessarily agents of the State. 
There is private planning towards Private ends and social planning 
towards social ends. ' 00 
Dalton makes it clear that he believes that there are differences between planned 
economies in the west to the type practiced in the Soviet Union. 'For Western 
Socialists, in peace time, the general object of planning is the maximum social 
advantage. Our particular objects are to wage peaceful war on poverty, insecurity, 
social inequality, and war itself. "01 Some of the main objects of planning in the USSR 
were summarised as avoiding 
the economic crises and trade fluctuations of capitalism ... to keep the whole working population in continuous employment and to 
98 lbid, p. 408 
99 lbid 
100 H. Dalton Practical Socialismfor Britain, London, 1935, p. 247 101 lbid, p. 249 
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raise their standard of living, without permitting the growth of large 
inequalities 
... to stimulate to the utmost the industrialisation of the 
country. 102 
In his assessment of the objectives for planners in the western capitalist states, Dalton 
appears to be suggesting that planning was possible under capitalism, and this view 
was clear in his distinction between socialism and planning. 
The direction that the discussion had taken by the mid- 193 Os shows that the party was 
continuing its interest in the USSR, but also widening its research to incorporate other 
ideas from systems that followed programmes closer to that of the Labour Party. It 
also came at a time when some party thinkers were coming under the influence of the 
economist John Maynard Keynes, who argued for an expansionist economic 
programme incorporating state intervention. Geoffrey Foote notes that 
[t]he practical policies of state intervention carried out by 
Roosevelt and Hitler were reflected in the development of 
Keynesian economic theory, which now argued that a market 
economy was incapable of sustaining itself without crisis, and 
needed the state to supplement its activities. Just as the state aided 
capital at its birth, so now it was required to step in as its nurse and 
saviour. 103 
This interest in Keynesian economics can be seen in the party's shift away from the 
left-wing years of the early thirties towards a corporate socialist stance committing 
itself to public corporations. The prominent Socialist Leaguer G. R. Mitchison 
claimed that these would be 'run by a bureaucracy or by the old capitalist directors 
and over which Parliament will have no effectual control. ' 104 For some in the labour 
movement, a corporate state would be modelled on the corporatism of fascist Italy, 
102 Ibid 
103 G. Foote, Labour's Political Thought, p. 145 104 The Socialist Leaguer, November-December 1934 
284 
A 
and therefore 'highly dangerous to the workers. ' 105 Such bodies, she said, 'cannot 
play any pad in a Socialist plan. ' 106 
She made her point that the Labour Party was a party pledged to the introduction of 
socialism, claiming that it must think in terms of a Socialist Plan for this country and 
ultimately for others. It is high time ... that Socialists should realise the dangers of a 
string of public corporations and the risks of a corporate state'. 107 She cited the 
London Passenger Transport Act as an example of some of the dangers. This was a 
relevant case to choose to prove the point, given that Labour had taken control of the 
London County Council for the first time in March 1934. Mitchison wrote that the 
London Act allowed 
the Board set up to control passenger transport [to be] the former 
chairman and the former managing director of the capitalist 
combine, which owned the underground railways and other means 
of transport. They receive respectively about E12,500 and E10,000 
a year, and they and other members of the Board are appointed for 
fixed terms of years: short of misbehaviour or something of the sort 
they are beyond the control of the Minister of Transport or of 
Parliament during their term of office. 108 
As far as the more traditional socialists in the party were concerned, the system of 
public corporations allowed capitalist managers to continue to be paid huge wages 
and continue being unaccountable to the democratically elected Parliament. But this 
corporate socialism was popular with the moderate Herbert Morrison, who had more 
control over the direction of the Labour Party than members of the Socialist League, 
and this explains why corporate socialism became an integral part of Labour's 
economic thought. According to Foote corporate socialism provided an economic 






the ethical ideas which had served the Party during its infancy. The 
needs of capitalist society, and of the organised working class 
within that society, were met as the Labour Party incorporated the 
syndicalist and Keynesian challenges into the general framework of 
its traditional ideas. In doing so, right and left were united on the 
fundamentals of a minimum programme of social and economic 
reform which would reshape British capitalism in the 1940s. 109 
Corporate socialism was a logical conclusion to the developments in the party's 
economic thought in the 1930s. The general assumption that Labour should embrace 
the notion that a government could intervene to change the direction of capitalism was 
perhaps the most realistic outcome of the planning debates in the 1930s, given 
Labour's tradition of gradual reformism. Keynesianism allowed the party to re- 
embrace the belief that stability in the economy should precede socialism. 
This thought process was not isolated in Labour's economic thinking. In its foreign 
policy, Labour saw stability in Europe, rather than laying the foundations of a 
socialist commonwealth, as the key factor that would determine the immediate future. 
And this meant accepting that some form of capitalism would continue for the 
foreseeable future. This also explains why the party's leadership was unwilling to ally 
itself with the CPGB, as shown elsewhere. 
Therefore, by the middle of the decade, Labour favoured a socialist management' of 
capitalism rather than replacing it, and this coincided with the party's interest in the 
Soviet Five Year Plan waning and its interest continuing in the New Deal and 
Sweden's 'middle road' between capitalism and socialism. Labour's economic 
theories tied in with the overall mood of the party in the mid-to late-1930s, as it 
concentrated on the fact that capitalism was not going to be, and indeed did not need 
to be, replaced. The main ideas in the areas of Labour's key interests finally had some 
kind of overarching theme. 
109 Foote, Labour's Political Thought, p. 146 
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The USSR was of course, still a popular model among some intellectuals such as the 
Webbs, (whose influence in the party had been weakening for some years), and 
elements within the labour movement such as the New Statesman. But the success of 
ficorpqrate socialism' / progressive capitalism, combined with the reduction in 
unemployment figures and the development by the Swedish Social Democrats of a 
'clear theoretical programme for the Social Democratisation of their country based on 
the twin pillars of welfare capitalism and the Keynesian steering of the economy" 10 
meant that the Scandinavian model earned the respect of some Labour theorists. 
The New Statesman and Nation published an article by George Soloveytchik entitled 
'Sweden's Successful Experiment' in which Soloveytchik compared Sweden's 
success with the turn around in the American economy, noting that Sweden's 
industrial production was ten per cent. above its 1929 peak while America's had 
fallen to approximately 26 per cent. below its 1929 level. Sweden was in a much 
better position 'than in the boom year 1929, and her factories are working at full 
capacity; there is practically no unemployment. "" 
Soloveytchik claimed that the Swedish model was a 'unique example of a controlled 
capitalism that works. This was not established abruptly, but grew gradually and 
developed on such lines as to find a middle way between collectivism and individual 
free enterprise. ' 112 There is a clear comparison to be made here between the 
development of the Swedish Social Democrat's 'controlled capitalism' and Labour's 
ideas on planning and the 'corporate socialism' that was integral to the party during 
the Attlee Government. 
Labour came to its conclusions gradually, moving from an excitement of the Soviet 
Five Year Plan in the early part of the decade back to an acceptance that capitalism 
110 S. Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Classes, p. 97 111 New Statesman and Nation, 23 May, 1936 112 Ibid 
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should be stabilised and then reformed into socialism. Towards the latter half of the 
1930s, the party was also trying to find a 'third way' between complete collectivism 
and the free market. The Swedish model held the interest of the Labour Party because 
it had succeeded in changing society without resorting to violence. According to 
Soloveytchik, the Swedish Social Democrats knew their job and were 'interested not 
in class warfare, but in general welfare. " 13 
Listing the achievements brought about by Swedish social democracy, such as cheap 
housing, a high standard of living for all and a free and first class education, he noted 
that Sweden had 'solved most of the main problems with which the rest of the world - 
including the red, black and brown-shirted revolutionaries - is still battling. And it has 
done it just by commonsense, without any conflicts or upheavals. ' 114 Sweden, 
apparently, had made capitalism work for everyone, without having to resort to 
Communist tactics. Even Kingsley Martin was impressed with what had occurred in 
Sweden, claiming that the Swedish Government 'gets much less attention than its 
achievements deserve', 115 as he described some of the factors of the Swedish 
economy. 
Unemployment in Sweden has been so far reduced as now to 
present no more than a problem of seasonal variation in the demand 
for labour. Estimated revenue is up by more than ten per cent., 
without any increase in taxation. The period of borrowing for 
public works is definitely over, and the Government has been for 
some time past repaying debts incurred during the crisis. 116 
He continued to comment on the Government's active pursuit of a programme of 
social legislation, which included legislation 'dealing with child welfare and mothers' 
pensions, as well as special grants for rural housing and an improved standard of 
113 lbid 
114 lbid 
115 New Statesman and Nation, 16 January, 1937 116 lbid 
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salaries for elementary school teachers and other low paid Government employees. ' 117 
Despite Martin's continued fascination with the Soviet Union in these years, and 
despite his admission that Sweden was not socialist, nor was it anywhere near being 
socialist, he claimed that it was a lesson for Western European countries in the way to 
manage capitalism in a period of crisis. The 'compatibility of sound financial policy 
with a progressive programme of social reform" 18 meant that the Swedes had been 
doing for years what Keynes was telling the British Government to do now. 
There were clear economic lessons for Labour to learn throughout the 1930s, and the 
policy document Labour's Immediate Programme, drafted in May 1937 and passed at 
the party Conference in October, showed how far Labour had travelled since 
MacDonald left, and what it had learnt on those travels. It was clear from Labour's 
Immediate Programme that the party had come a long way since the days when 
MacDonald and Snowden extolled the virtues of the Gold Standard and laissez-faire 
economics. 
The policy makers of the Labour Party stated clearly that the next time Labour was in 
power, the party would implement a programme of nationalisation. While this 
nationalisation no longer included a commitment to nationalise the joint stock banks, 
which had been present earlier, it did include the Bank of England, the coal industry, 
transport, gas and electricity. Labour's Immediate Programme also contained 
measures for easier land acquisition for public use (although this did not mean 
nationalising land); holidays with pay for all employed workers and a standard 40 
hour working week with higher wages. The Means Test was also to be abolished, and 
the party sought an improved Health Service. In terms of Labour's long-term aims 
Cole noted retrospectively that this 'was a substantial programme, not far short of 
what the Labour Government of 1945 was actually to put into effect. " 19 
117 Ibid 
118 Ibid 
119 G. D. H. Cole, Socialism andFascism, p. 85 
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This party programme was not really a direct assault on the capitalist system with the 
aim of implementing socialism. There was a strong socialist element to it, and also 
4concrete plans for the implementation of most of its policies, whereas earlier 
programmes had been expressions of wishes rather than plans of campaign. ' 120 But 
this was the socialism of the Labour Party as it was in the late 1930s, with a certain 
emphasis on planning and nationalisation, but without the promise that a socialist 
society would actually be created. 
The party had travelled a long way since the excited days of the early 1930s when 
Labourites advocated policies that made it clear that that there was a definite 
difference between the party under MacDonald's leadership and the party in the post- 
MacDonald era. The early part of the 1930s was when the left was at its most active, 
and when that activity had some influence. Between the 1932 and 1934 party 
Conferences, the left engaged in debates that led to unambiguously socialist ideas 
such as planning and nationalisation being advocated. 
The NFRB's delegation to the Soviet Union secured much information about the 
nature of planning in the USSR and the lessons leamt whilst there influenced 
Labour's thought on economic policy in this period. The party's programme For 
Socialism and Peace emphasised planning and the need for a socialised industrialised 
basis. Public control over the major industries was urged, and, while this document 
has been described as a means of containing the swing to the left, 12 1 the influence of 
the two leftist exemplars the party researched prior to its drafting can be seen. The 
main factors that shaped the socialist nature were the need to radically distance the 
party from MacDonald and to solve the great problem of unemployment as quickly as 
possible. While the policies of Roosevelt's New Deal may have been closer to the 
120 Thorpe, History, p. 96 
121 lbid, p. 83 
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gradualist heart of Labour, the promise of good times offered by the Soviet Union 
appealed to those who wanted an answer to the two problems above. 
By this time there was an overlap in Labour's interests. The USSR and America 
pulled the party back to the left of centre, to ground the rank and file of the party had 
generally occupied, but the party hierarchy, under MacDonald's leadership, had not. 
But as capitalism began to stabilise and unemployment fell, the progressive capitalism 
of the USA, and later the 'middle road' model of Scandinavia, and most noticeably 
Sweden, began to have a more important impact on Labour's thought. Labour 
reverted back to its belief that capitalism could be reformed and eventually replaced 
by socialism, and that socialist managers could make capitalism work for everyone. 
By the end of the decade the belief that the next Labour Government could or would 
introduce socialism had largely given way to the acceptance that the Keynesian 
approach was better than a full-scale assault on the capitalist system, and Cole stated 
that the aims of the next Labour Government would not be socialism, but rather 
putting in place plans for socialism. The next socialist Government would not be able 
to immediately establish socialism in any complete sense 'for a socialist system could 
not come at once, even as a result of revolution, as the experience of Russia has 
plainly shown. ' 122 
However, he continued to say that the next socialist administration would be 
called upon to make a real advance towards a socialist system, and 
not merely to carry through a series of uncoordinated social 
reforms. No real advance of this sort is possible without a plan, or 
without the establishment of some sort of organization for 
planning. It is possible, up to a point, to 'plan' without Socialism, 
but it is quite impossible to advance towards a socialist economic 
system without a plan. 123 
122 G. D. H. Cole, The Machinery ofSocialist Planning, London, 1938, p. 9 123 Ibid 
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This reiterated Dalton's point, and Labour's general thought, that planning of some 
form was necessary and better than the anarchy of the free market. But this allowed 
the long-term aims of the party to get caught between advancing to socialism and 
settling for a planned capitalism, and from here the mixed economy that Attlee 
successfully managed was born. 
6.3 Conclusion 
It is clear from what has been discussed here that the one element that had remained 
constant in Labour's economic thought throughout the 1930s was that there was a 
need for British socialists - both on the left and right of the Labour Party - to be able 
to control events when in Government more, than they could the last time Labour was 
in power. And there is no doubt that the Soviet Union played an influential role in the 
debates surrounding how this control should manifest itself. 
Within this period, the Labour Party became increasingly interested in the possibility 
of intervention, in taking direct control of situations, particularly in the field of 
economics. The presence of the USSR, and also the social democratic models of 
Sweden and the USA, helped Labourites from both sides to focus their ideas on the 
question of planning and control. The result was a party that agreed with the notion 
that the economic basis of the country was too important to be left to the 'invisible 
hand' of the market. Ultimately though, the more influential figures such as Herbert 
Morrison ensured that Labour accepted that the market did have a place in the party's 
economic thought, and this led to the corporatist approach adopted in the Attlee 
Government after World War Two when Britain desperately needed restructuring. 
Because of the economic debates in the 1930s, because of the models the party 
explored and because of the altering conditions in this decade, Labour at least 
emerged with a plan of what it wanted to do, replacing the loose collection of ideas 
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that guided the factions before the 1930s. In the party's economic thought, Corporate 
socialism offered the moderates on both sides a way of combining the traditions that 
had existed since Labour's birth. 
There can be little doubt that the USSR was a positive exemplar in Labour's 
economic thought in this period. It was the first model that the majority of party 
members turned to when the question of planning arose, and it instructed them in the 
art of planning not just an economy, but a whole society. This concept of changing the 
entire system appealed to more than just the economists in the party, as the idea 
offered hope that capitalism could be transformed in some way. 
In its guise as a teacher of how to plan, and as a leader out of the economic crisis of 
the 1930s, Labour used the Soviet Union in a positive way, as it defined the 
boundaries of Labour's notions about planning. It offered images of not only a non- 
capitalist system, but also one that proclaimed itself as definitely socialist. Where 
economics were concerned, Labour's identity in the Depression years was shaped by 
the need for an alternative to the market. Once the crisis had abated, some party 
thinkers focused their attention on the social-democratic models used in the USA and 
Sweden. Soviet-style planning still held the interest of party thinkers, but the ideas 
such as the New Deal promised a less aggressive approach to re-shaping the British 
economy. The Soviets had always advocated belligerent tactics of seizing and 
confiscating land or industry, while Labour's politics spoke of negotiation and 
compensation for those affected by Labour's policies. What Labour rejected from the 
USSR's approach to economics defined the party's socialism in more of a negative 
way than calls for implementing a planned system did, but it still influenced party 
thought nonetheless. On the whole though, it was certainly in the economic sphere 
that Labour used the USSR in its most positive way. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Labour Party and the Soviet Union 
The Labour Party at the end of the 1930s had no time to reflect upon the events of the 
decade, as its attention turned to Europe. But had there been time for introspection, it 
would have found a party whose identity was more certain than it was after it left 
government in 1931. It had not changed dramatically over the course of the decade 
but that should not imply an easy transition from the way it was in 1931 to where it 
was in 1939. Along the way Labour turned to the left and then back again to the 
centre-right, it fought for and secured its position as leader of the organised working 
class in Britain after its internal struggles with the CPGB, and it used other socialist 
and interventionist models of government, both positively and negatively, to help 
define its own political thought and practice. 
This thesis has explored these developments in Labour's history in the thirties, 
showing the extent to which the USSR played a role in shaping and influencing the 
type of party that Labour became. The Soviet Union helped Labour to distinguish 
itself from other political parties that traditionally vied for support from the same 
power base as Labour. The presence of the USSR, and the promises that were offered 
to the world proletariat by the Kremlin, meant that Labour had to be aware of the 
powerful working class rhetoric emanating from the citadel of revolution and its 
satellite, the CPGB. It could not move too far to the centre and allow itself to be 
outflanked on the left. 
But it did have to stay far enough on the left so that possible future supporters could 
differentiate between Labour and the Liberals. Labour's socialist traditions meant that 
it was more than just another progressive pro-capitalist party, even though when it 
was in power it did little to fundamentally challenge the basis of capitalism. The 
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party's established working class support gave it a Labourist base from which to 
explore different ways to improve the lives of working people. At the same time 
though, the 'one-nationism' of leaders such as MacDonald and Henderson saw 
Labour seek middle class support as well, though this perhaps attracted more middle 
class radicals than voters. 
Finally, it also had to conduct itself in such a way that would not give the 
Conservatives an opportunity to claim that it was a British Bolshevik party. This 
thesis has certainly laid this final claim to rest, even though the powerful right-wing 
press portrayed Labour as slaves of Moscow before, during and after the 1930s. 
Examples of this range from the Zinoviev letter to alleging that Michael Foot was a 
KGB agent. The Sun even claimed that it had consulted with Stalin from beyond the 
grave, and that he was backing Neil Kinnock in the forthcoming General Election. 
But by showing in each chapter that Labour's ideas were, on the whole, defined by 
what parts of the Soviet programme it rejected rather than copied or adopted, the 
party's non-revolutionary boundaries and British traditions have been highlighted. 
While there were many socialist traditions that influenced and inspired the Labour 
Party, it has been argued here that Marxism in its Soviet form was the most important 
of these specifically ideological influences in the 1930s. It was shown in Chapter One 
that the USSR posed more of a challenge to the Labour Party than any other country 
because of the shared belief in socialism. This meant that the Soviet Union was used 
as a gauge by which Labour could 'measure' its own socialist ideas, while the party 
simultaneously blended other interpretations of socialism which led to an eclectic 
socialism. 
Looking at the USSR could be like gazing into a broken miffor as Labour saw a 
reflection of itself that offered a vision of socialism, but one that was not its own 
vision. Soviet communists spoke of socialism, workers' rights, freedom, equality and 
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internationalism. These (together with a planned economy later) were all facets of 
Labour's inclusive socialism, yet they did not quite look the same in this mirror. 
Socialism meant more than just the 'workers' party' forming a Government. Workers' 
rights for communists meant workers' control, not just a greater say for the trade 
unions. A planned economy entailed more than just nationalising the country's key 
industries. Freedom and equality meant freedom and equality for proletarians only - 
there was no room for an extension of these ideals to other classes. Indeed, the other 
classes were to be eliminated. Labour therefore saw a refracted image in this cracked 
mirror. The image looked like socialism, but not necessarily the socialism that 
Labourites grew up knowing. 
The party's overarching faith though, could be found within the specific boundaries 
that were set through its own history and confirmed through its dealings with the 
USSR and the Comintern. After the revolutions of 1917 and the end of World War 
One, Labour moved gently to the left, whilst being careful not to alienate traditionally 
non-Labour voters. While the Leeds Conference in June 1917 saw moderate 
Labourites such as MacDonald and Snowden endorse revolutionary tactics, and the 
- party adopted the socialist Clause IV in 1918, Labour on the whole never seriously 
considered adopting a more Russian approach, despite opponents' claims that it was a 
"Bolshevik" Labour Party. 
It constantly reaffirmed its belief in parliamentary rather than revolutionary 
democracy, reform over revolution, compensation rather than expropriation and 
Gpolitical' rather than 'industrial' tactics, most noticeably through the battles it had 
with the communists discussed in Chapter Five. In the important sphere of internal 
party politics, Labour's ideas were defined by its reaction to the actions of the 
Comintern and CPGB. The USSR was clearly and most definitely used in a negative 
way, as a negative definer of Labour's ideas. 
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This also came through in the language used in party pamphlets such as Democracy 
versus Dictatorship and The Communist Solar System. The USSR was sometimes 
portrayed as a less aggressive or more progressive dictatorship than Nazi Gen-nany, 
but party members were still constantly reminded that it was a dictatorship 
nonetheless. By linking the two (in the same way that Cold War historians of the 
USSR did as they created the 'Totalitarian' model of Soviet history) Labourites who 
flirted with communism, or who openly advocated a United or Popular Front with the 
CPGB, were reminded that the leaders in the Kremlin and workers, soldiers and 
peasants in the country answered to only one man who ruled over the USSR like a 
Tsar. The very title Democracy versus Dictatorship leaves little to the imagination, 
and this case was helped by news of the Show Trials later in the decade. 
It has, however, also been shown that Labour used the Soviet Union in positive ways 
as well. After Lenin's death and Trotsky's removal from the CPSU, Labour's leaders 
seemed more comfortable dealing with what they saw as 'moderate' Bolsheviks who 
favoured Socialism In One Country and a mixed economy (NEP in the 1920s), and 
who in the 1930s became more conservative, thus posing even less of a threat to the 
West. Even some British businessmen supported trading with the USSR, and this gave 
leaders such as MacDonald the courage to continue pursuing a pro-Soviet foreign 
policy. 
In the early 1930s, the Soviet Five Year Plan heavily influenced the party's economic 
ideas, with Dalton extolling the virtues of planning for some years after his return 
from the USSR in 1932. It was here that the model of Soviet socialism was at its most 
relevant and most accepted in the Labour ranks. The economic climate dictated that 
new ideas were needed, and these ideas had to promise something that would 
challenge the existing order whilst offering hope to those who had been hit so hard 
and in such a devastating way by the Great Depression. Yet once again Labour's other 
socialisms exerted influence to ensure that the USSR was not the only example, and 
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as capitalism stabilised, America's New Deal and the economy of social democratic 
Sweden offered a less extreme solution to Britain's problems. Labour leaned towards 
a 'middle road' between capitalism and socialism, as it chose the "socialist 
management" of capitalism rather than pursuing policies that would help tol end it. 
In Labour's foreign policy, the Soviet Union was seen in a mostly positive light, 
though there was still concern from the right of the party that it would seek to exert its 
influence across Europe in a revolutionary, rather than military sense. Hugh Dalton 
hoped that the USSR would join the League of Nations and participate in the 
Collective Security campaign against fascism. The size and military might of the 
country meant that it would be a key ally if war became a reality. Some on the left 
such as Cole and H. N. Brailsford advocated such a practical use of the USSR as well, 
whilst also proposing the spreading of socialist ideas, and this shows that there was 
some common ground between the left and right of the party. 
But there was still mistrust from the party's hierarchy, as the Comintern's position 
was one of belligerence towards social democrats, until it moved away from its 'Class 
against class' policy in 1933. Labour leaders saw this as the Kremlin's view as well, 
despite the differences between Narkomindel and the Comintern. Therefore, calls 
from within the Labour Party to defend the USSR at all costs seemed at best 
misguided, at worst disloyal. Those on the left, such as Cole, still saw an influential 
role for the Soviets in terms of spreading socialism across Europe. This of course was 
not Henderson's main interest, as he and his comrades followed the traditional 
gradualist approach, prioritising stability and security over international socialism. 
Foreign policy was possibly the most complicated issue for Labour to deal with where 
the USSR was concerned. Utilising the Soviet Union had always been a cornerstone 
of the party's policy, but the many conflicting interests ranging from defending the 
Soviet Union to defending stability in Europe (and the minority ILP's calls for a class 
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war through its association with Trotskyists) meant that a coherent policy was not 
supported by the overwhelming majority of the party until well after the middle of the 
decade. This also saw the party accept that rearmament may be necessary to defend 
liberal democracy against Hitler's forces. 
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this study of the Labour 
Party and Soviet Union. Firstly, that the USSR played a key role in helping Labour to 
establish what type of party it was in the 1930s, which turned into a decade of self- 
discovery. Although the party ultimately re-established its traditional parliamentary 
boundaries and reaffirmed itself as a leftist social democratic party, it did so because 
of the Soviet Union's presence, partly because that was what it was and would always 
be, and partly to avoid being labelled a "Bolshevik" Labour Party. 
Secondly, it is important to note that while Labour defined itself by what it was not, it 
did borrow some ideas from the USSR, importing them with the intention of shaping 
them to fit British conditions and circumstances. This is most noticeable in the party's 
debates on planning, and without the numerous discussions about the type of planning 
suitable for Britain, the 1945 Government would not have adopted the policies it did. 
The USSR therefore became a means of resolving problems, especially whilst Labour 
was in Government. Examples of this can be seen in the trade negotiations between 
the two Governments, which Labour hoped would bring jobs to British workers, and 
in the belief that bringing the Soviet Union into the League of Nations would create a 
stable Europe. 
This leads onto the next conclusion, which highlights the fact that Labour was both a 
pragmatic and ideological party, and the USSR was utilised by both sides, in both 
ways. Those who were more pragmatic, favouring a more gradualist approach to 
reorganising society, looked to the USSR to fulfil a role of stabiliser in Europe, 
through the traditional means of trade agreements and ambassadors. Those on the left, 
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like Co1c, who were willing to work, with the right-wing leadership, saw a more 
ideological role for the USSR, as a teacher in terms of planning and a partner in 
spreading socialism across Europe. Both saw it as a bastion against the spread of 
fascism. 
The far-lcft in the party was also split. Cripps and his supporters who later worked on 
Tribune called for the defence of the Soviet Union, whilst the ILP called for 
revolutionary international socialism. All sides therefore broke the USSR down, and 
rather than viewing it as a large Communist entity, picked and chose which elements 
of Soviet socialism to copy and which to reject. The USSR offered something to 
everyone. But it also represented a threat. So some could use it as an economic model, 
as a partner for peace, or as an example of how socialism could be organised 'from 
the top down' or from the 'bottom up'. But within the internal politics of the Labour 
Party itself, it was something to be feared, distrusted and fought against - it could not, 
therefore, be allowed to encroach on Labour territory. 
There is little doubt that the USSR offered socialists in the Labour Party hope, as the 
perception was that the USSR was an existing model of working socialism, and as 
such a success in a sea of disaster. This hope remained strong in the hearts of many 
socialists, who refused to accept criticism of a member of the socialist family, even 
when facts showing the harsh reality of life in Stalin's Russia seemed irrefutable. This 
perhaps says more about events at the time than it does about individuals, as the 
economic devastation wreaking havoc in the West seemed unable to penetrate the 
mighty Five Year Plan, and the Communists, for whatever reasons, often led the 
protests on the streets against he British fascists. 
Context is therefore very important when attempting to understand why Stalin's 
dictatorship could retain the support of loyal Labourites who often came from a 
Methodist or pacirist background. However, party members' interest in Soviet affairs 
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did lessen as the economy stabilised in Britain, which strongly suggests that there was 
a relationship between crises and support for the USSR. 
The presence of the Soviet Union also ensured that socialism kept its traditional role 
as one of the forces that drove Labour. Socialism had always played a part in forming 
the party's ideas, and as the party measured itself against the USSR, the socialism of 
the Labour Party had to offer members more than just words. The strong Labourist 
tradition tied trade unionists to the party, but the promise of socialism also attracted 
those without hope. Even though it has never attempted to create a Socialist State 
when in government, Labour has historically chosen working class rhetoric as a 
means of keeping its traditional supporters. This ensured that these supporters did not 
look elsewhere - either to the USSR or to the other socialist traditions - for answers. 
The Soviet Union as part of Labour's history 
The final conclusion to be drawn is that the history of the Labour Party cannot be 
written without significant attention being paid to the role of the Soviet Union in the 
party's development. It was much more than simply a troublesome relation in the 
socialist family, or a country that could offer either ideas on how to plan an economy 
or protection against Hitler. It was an important definer of the Labour Party's ideas 
and actions when it was in and out of government. At the same time, studying the 
influence that the USSR had on the Labour Party cannot be confined simply to the 
1930s, partly because it is necessary to place it in the context of the other socialist and 
leftist traditions inside the Labour Party, and partly because this is a question of how 
ideas helped form the Labour Party of today. 
This means that a study such as this cuts across the historiography within Labour 
history. While this is a history of relations between Labour and the USSR, which adds 
to the work in this specific field, one of the undercurrent themes has been to assess the 
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ideas and actions of the party in the 1930s and to establish what part was played by 
the USSR in forging them. These ideas were central in resolving the clash that 
occurred between the different views of politics, power and opposition. The concept 
that gradual reforms could change society was challenged by promises from an 
aggressive and radical ideology that sought the overhaul of the capitalist system. This 
thesis therefore adds to the historiography concerning Labour's political thought as 
well as Labour's attitude to the USSR. 
In terms of adding to the overall historiography of Labour's history, this thesis has 
offered an in-depth study of the party in the 1930s, which was necessary due to the 
severe lack of such histories. The research into Labour and the USSR in this period 
either stops at 1934 with Williams' book (or 1935 with his article), or relies on Jones' 
detailed but limited chapters on the 1930s in his work. Works that deal with other 
areas of Labour's history here tend to relegate the USSR to a lowly position, apart 
from Pimlott's research on the Labour left. 
Where it has added specifically to the histories of Labour-Soviet relations is to 
suggest an importance of ideas that the other authors did not concentrate on. This is 
not to suggest a weakness in their works, simply a different emphasis in this research. 
But this thesis definitely disputes the claim by Graubard that '[t]he Labour Party's 
struggle with communist ideology ... had no important political consequences" In fact, 
the opposite is true. While Jones is correct to note that 'Labour's involvement with 
the idea of a workers' State in Russia had a subtle but profound effect upon British 
socialism at home', 2 the truth is that it was a major influence. Communist, or more 
specifically Soviet, ideology, forced Labour to determine its own ideology and clearly 
establish boundaries for its own socialism that could not be broken. 
1 Graubard, British Labour, p. 6 2 Jones, Russia complex, p. vii 
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Ideas could vie for supremacy within those boundaries, and Labour discussed 
socialist, social democratic, radical Liberal and progressive ideas, all of which have 
been discussed in the many histories of the party. But each idea had to accept that the 
party was parliamentary and reformist - anything after that, no matter how radical, 
would at least be acknowledged and discussed. These ideas were often what 
distinguished those on the left from those on the right of the party. It is important to 
note though, that this struggle for supremacy often allowed the leader of the party to 
be able to claim that he represented the real Labour Party, as Labour's political 
thought was so eclectic. Labour's federal structure also promoted an inclusiveness 
that ensured that Soviet Marxism remained an interest, as it did not split into two 
factions (socialist and communist) like the European Social Democrats did after 
World War One. 
There are still areas of this topic that need to be studied. Many of Labour's histories 
have focused on the internal debates. it would be very interesting to expand the 
research on different influences inside the party to explore the different models of 
progressive thought outside of the party. The USSR has been the focus here, but there 
is still Labour's interest in Roosevelt's New Deal and the social democracy of 
Sweden to be fully examined. The timeframe could be widened to incorporate the 
European socialist parties before and during the Cold War, and also New Labour's 
courting of the American Democrats during the 1990s. 
For Labour and the USSR, research could build upon Bill Jones' work and look at 
how Labour saw the USSR during ditente, and Gorbachev's perestroika and 
glasnost'. How did the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
effect socialism within the Labour Party? Did the New World Order in post- 
Communist times help the rise of New Labour? And in the 1930s relations between 
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the Labour Party and CPGB needs closer attention, 3 focusing not only on the battles 
inside the party, but also on the alliances forged whilst fighting fascism in Britain and 
in Spain. It is the hope that this thesis will act as a starting point for studies into these 
areas just as the works mentioned above were an excellent starting point for this 
study. 
The 1930s and Labour's future 
Finally, it is necessary to place the 1930s and the lessons learned in this decade within 
the context of Labour's wider history when it was out of power for a significant 
length of time. It has been suggested that realistic party members knew that it would 
be out of power for a long time, accepting that the party could not win the next 
General Election in 1935, as the task was simply too great. The same thoughts must 
have occurred to many in 1979, and subsequently both of the long periods in 
opposition saw Labour transform itself into a different party. 
At the end of the 1930s, and more importantly by the time Attlee formed his 
Government in 1945, the party was more confident in its ideals. This was due to the 
discussions that took place, and the battles that were won and lost in this decade. 
Attlee's administration was the most radical left-of-centre government in Britain's 
history, in that it established many institutions, such as the NHS, that were genuinely 
designed to help the poorer sections of society. While other Labour Governments may 
have had moderate successes, the 1945 Government at least relieved the suffering that 
was evident after World War Two, and it offered hope that Labour could deliver a 
better system than the one that gave the world the Great Depression, fascism and war. 
3 Andrew Thorpe's work on the CPGB and Moscow offers some details on this subject, but it is not the 
main focus of his book 
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After the defeat in 1979, Labour again instinctively shifted leftwards, just as it did 
after 1931, adopting the infamous General Election Manifesto in 1983. However, 
once that approach failed, the notion that the party was too left-wing developed, and 
the party began to reassess its ideals. The transition from Labour to New Labour had 
begun. The right of the party took control and, by the 1990s, with Tony Blair as 
leader, modelled itself upon the American Democrats. 
With Blair as leader, the party moved further to the centre-right than it ever has done 
in its history, not only re-embracing the 'one-nation' ideals that had driven Ramsay 
MacDonald but openly accepting that free market economics rule and that capitalism 
may be reformed, but not replaced. The difference with this leader of the party is that 
he has never tried to hide the fact that he is troubled by Labour's affiliation with the 
trade unions, and with its Labourist and socialist past. And this has, in the long-terin, 
caused problems within the labour movement. The ideological struggles between left 
and right could not be suppressed forever, and the left is now making claims to 
treclaim' the party. 
This is now a period of redefining Labour again - what it stands for and what its 
purpose is, and there is still a battle between left and right. Tony Blair has appealed to 
venture capitalists and big business, claiming that he has 'scars on his back' from 
fighting 'wreckers' in the public sector, while John Prescott, sometimes called the 
'voice of Old Labour' responded with more traditional words about the public sector 
correcting the private sector's mistakes. 4 
The class rhetoric of the past still lives on in the party, and traditional supporters are 
reasserting their beliefs as the left becomes more confident. A special "After New 
Labour" conference, billed as a conference of left-wing Labour MPs and trade 
4 For details, see A. Rawnsley, Servants of the People. The Inside Story offew Labour, London, 200 1, 
pp. 298-299 
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unionists, took place in July 2002, stating that it wanted to reassert the more 
traditional principles of the party, such as protection of workers' rights and the public 
sector and ensuring a living wage for the poor in society. Reports from the conference 
did not, however, include the word 'Socialism'. This is perhaps appropriate, as 
affiliated members did not necessarily advocate a socialism that favoured the end of 
capitalism, but rather a fair deal for the working class. 
This conference comes back to the idea suggested earlier that whoever led the party 
could claim to be representing the 'true' ideas of the Labour Party. Since Tony Blair 
has led Labour there has been an undeniable drift to the right, as Labour embraced big 
business whilst relegating the party's traditional base to a less than secondary 
position. It is therefore not surprising that rank and file members have begun to fight 
back, and that words such as 'reclaim' have been used. However, a similar 'fight 
back' would have taken place if the situation were reversed. Had left-wingers gained 
control of the party and formed a government, pursuing what it saw as 'traditional 
Labour values', of the sort that they are calling for now, those on the right of the 
movement would have argued that Labour was failing in its duty to rule for the whole 
nation, and thus betraying its 'inclusive' or 'broad church' tradition. Indeed, this 
happened in the early 1980s when right-wing social democrats broke away to form 
the Social Democratic Party. 
While this is more a comment on Labour's traditions than it is about Labour and the 
USSR, it is worth noting that even now, nearly eleven years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and eight years after New Labour was born, the Conservatives still use 
this as a means to attack Labour. During their search for a replacement for William 
Hague, David Davis launched his campaign to be the Tories' leader by likening 
Labour's ten year vision for the NHS to Stalin's Five Year Plan, claiming that Labour 
had still not escaped the influence of the Soviet Union. 
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By drawing attention to the idea of a 'plan', Davis implied that New Labour is not so 
new and is modelling itself on the Soviet Union. He used the rhetoric of the Old Right 
to conjure up images of the USSR from the dead, to suggest that Labour's redefinition 
of itself is nothing more than a mask, that when lifted reveals the Hammer and Sickle. 
By pushing Labour back by trying to make New Labour Old again, Davis was trying 
to regain territory lost to Tony Blair. And in July 2002 the Tories criticised Labour's 
housing policy as Stalinist central planning, suggesting that the party was in some 
5 ways commemorating the 50th anniversary of Stalin's death. Even though the party is 
ideologically and temporally removed from the 1930s, the Opposition are still 
conjuring up the spectre of Stalin's Russia, attempting to use it as a way of attacking 
and defining the Labour Party. 
Returning to Labour and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the party has always sought to 
accommodate various strands of socialism, and in this decade this was made more 
difficult by the fact that one strand of Labour's socialism had a life of its own in the 
USSR. What happened there undoubtedly influenced what happened inside Labour's 
ranks. During the thirties, the Labour Party looked for, and found, an identity of its 
own that owed much to the presence of the Soviet Union. 
5 The Guardian, 19 July 2002 
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